Having confuted the errors of others in so far as they related to
riches themselves we have to confute those on the subject of time as a
cause of nobility, in that part where it is defined as ancient riches,
and this is done in the part that begins, "Nor will they admit that a
man lowly born a noble can become." And in the first place, this is
refuted by an argument taken from the very people who are so mistaken;
then to put them to greater confusion this, their argument, is
destroyed; and this is done where it says, "And thus it comes from
what I have said before." Finally it sums up--their error being
evident, and it being, therefore, time to learn the truth--and this it
does where it says, "Because to the healthy mind," etc.
[Footnote 26: From Book IV, Chapter XIV of "The Banquet." Translated
by Katharine Hillard. "The Banquet" is the least known of Dante's
prose writing. It is believed to have been written in his maturity,
but was not completed. Dante's purpose appears to have been to produce
a sort of hand-book, or commentary, on universal knowledge.]
I say then, "Nor will they admit that a man lowly born a noble can
become." Here we must observe that it is the opinion of these mistaken
ones that a man originally a peasant can never be called a nobleman,
and a man who is the son of a peasant can likewise never be called
noble. And here they contradict their own statement when they say that
time is required for nobility, by putting in this word ancient
(riches); because it is impossible by a process of time to arrive at
the generation of nobility, by the reason of theirs here given, which
denies that a man of low birth can become noble by anything he may do
or by any accident; and denies the possibility of a change from a
low-born father to a noble son. For if the son of a peasant be still a
peasant his son also will be a peasant, and thus we can never find a
point at which nobility can begin by process of time.
And if our opponent, wishing to defend himself, shall say that
nobility begins at the moment when the low estate of our ancestors is
forgotten, I answer that this tells against himself, because there
must necessarily be a change here from the low estate to the noble,
from one man to another, as from father to son, which is contrary to
what they assert.
And if our opponent defends himself pertinaciously, saying that he
maintains that the change may take place when the low estate of one's
ancestors has fallen into oblivion, then altho the text takes no
notice of this, it is fitting that the commentary should reply to it.
And therefore I answer thus: that from what they say four great
difficulties would follow, so that theirs can not be a good reason.
The first is that the better human nature might be the more difficult
and the more tardy would be the generation of nobility, which is a
great difficulty; since the better a thing is the more it is honored
and the more good it causes; and nobility would be commemorated among
the good things. And that this would be so is proved; for if rank or
rather nobility (which is understood to be the same thing) is
generated by oblivion, then the sooner men are forgotten the quicker
is their nobility generated, for so much the sooner would nobility
come for all. Therefore, the sooner men were forgotten, the sooner
they would be ennobled, and, on the contrary, the better the memory of
them the more tardy would be their nobility.
The second difficulty is that in no case except man's could such a
distinction be made, that is, between noble and vile, which is a great
difficulty. For in every kind of thing we see an appearance of
nobility or of vileness, whence we often call one horse noble and one
vile, or one falcon noble and one vile, or one pearl noble and one
vile. And that this distinction could not be made is proved thus: If
the forgetting of ignoble ancestors is a cause of nobility, where the
ancestors never were ignoble there could be no oblivion, since
oblivion is the destruction of memory. And in the said animals and
plants and minerals degrees of higher and lower are not noted, because
they spring from one nature and are of equal condition, and in their
generation there can be nothing of nobility or the reverse, seeing
that both extremes must be regarded as a possession or privation
possible to the same subject; and, therefore, in them no such
distinction can exist.
And if our opponent were to say that in other things nobility is
understood to be the goodness therefore, but in man is understood as
the forgetfulness of his low estate, one would like to answer not with
words but with the knife to such stupidity as would give goodness to
the cause of nobility in other things, but in man forgetfulness as its
origin.
The third difficulty is that those generated would often come before
the generation, which is quite impossible; and this may be
demonstrated thus:
Let us suppose that Gherardo de Cammino was a grandson of the lowest
peasant that ever drank of Sile or Cagnano, and that his grandfather
were not yet buried in oblivion; who would dare to say that Gherardo
de Cammino was not noble? And who would not agree with me in saying
that he was noble? Certainly none, however presumptuous they may wish
to be, because he was noble and such will his memory ever be. And if
his ignoble ancestors had not been utterly forgotten (as our opponent
asserts) and he had become noble and his nobility were as evident as
we see it to be, then it would have existed in him before its
generation had existed, and this is perfectly impossible.
The fourth difficulty is that such a man (as this supposed ancestor)
would be considered noble, being dead, who was not noble when living;
and a more impossible thing there could not be as may be demonstrated
thus:
Let us suppose that in the age of Dardanus there remained a memory of
his low-born ancestors, and let us suppose that in the age of Laomedon
this memory had died out and oblivion taken its place. According to
our opponent's opinion, Laomedon was noble, and Dardanus ignoble
during life. Should we, to whom the memory of their ancestors (I mean
beyond Dardanus) has not come down, should we say that Dardanus while
alive was a common peasant, and dead became noble? And this is not
contradicted by the story that he was the son of Jupiter (for this is
a fable, of which, in a philosophical discussion, we should take no
heed); and yet if our opponent should wish to fall back on the fable,
certainly that which is covered by the fable would upset all his
arguments.
And thus it is manifest that the argument of which who would make
oblivion the cause of nobility is false and erroneous.