who is all-knowing and all-powerful, is necessarily entirely free.
Division 3.--The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and of
duration, who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and entirely free, is
necessarily completely happy.
Sub-proposition.--The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and
of duration, who is all-knowing, all-powerful, entirely free, and
completely happy, is necessarily perfectly good.
The first objection against the foregoing arguments is that it seeks to
prove too much. It affirms one existence (God) infinite in extent and
duration, and another entirely different and distinct existence (the
material universe) finite in extent and duration. It therefore seeks
to substantiate everything and something more. The first proposition
is curiously worded, and the argument to demonstrate it is undoubtedly
open to more than one objection.
Mr. Gillespie has not defined infinity, and it is possible therefore his
argument may be misapprehended in this paper. Infinite signifies nothing
more than indefinite. When a person speaks of infinite extension he can
only mean to refer to the extension of something to which he has been
unable to set limits. The mind can not conceive extension _per se_,
either absolute or finite. It can only conceive something extended. It
might be impossible mentally to define the extension of some substance.
In such a case its extension would be indefinite; or, as Mr. Gillespie
uses the word, infinite. No one can therefore possibly have any idea of
infinity of extension. Yet it is upon the existence of such an idea, and
on the impossibility of getting rid of it, that Mr. Gillespie grounds
his first proposition. If the idea does not exist, the argument is
destroyed at the first step.
Mr. Gillespie argues that it is utterly beyond the power of the human
mind to conceive infinity of extension non-existent. He would have been
more correct in asserting that it is utterly beyond the power of the
human mind to conceive infinity of extension at all, either existent or
non-existent. Extension can only be conceived as quality of substance.
It is possible to conceive substance extended. It is impossible in
thought to limit the possible extension of substance. Mr. Gillespie
having asserted that we can not but believe that infinity of extension
exists, proceeds to declare that it exists necessarily. For, he says,
everything the existence of which we can not but believe, exists
necessarily. It is not necessary at present to examine what Mr.
Gillespie means by existing necessarily; it is sufficient to have
shown that we do not believe in the existence of infinity of extension,
although we may and do believe in the existence of substance, to
the extension of which we may be unable to set limits. But, says Mr.
Gillespie, "everything the existence of which we can not but believe is
necessarily existing." Then as we can not but believe in the existence
of the universe (or, to adopt Mr. Gillespie's phrase, the material
universe), the material universe exists necessarily. If by "anything
necessarily existing," he means anything the essence of which involves
existence, or the nature of which can only be considered as existent,
then Mr. Gillespie, by demonstrating the necessary existence of the
universe, refutes his own later argument, that God is its creator. Mr.
Gillespie's argument, as before remarked, is open to misconception,
because he has left us without any definition of some of the most
important words he uses. To avoid the same objection, it is necessary to
state that by substance or existence I mean that which is in itself and
is conceived per se--that is, the conception of which does not involve
the conception of anything else as antecedent to it. By quality, that by
which I cognize any mode of existence. By mode, each cognized condition
of existence. Regarding extension as quality of mode of substance, and
not as substance itself, it appears absurd to argue that the quality
exists otherwise than as quality of mode.
The whole of the propositions following the first are so built upon
it, that if it fails they are baseless. The second proposition is, that
infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible. In dealing with
this proposition, Mr. Gillespie talks of the _parts_ of infinity of
extension, and winds up by saying that he means parts in the sense of
partial consideration only. Now not only is it denied that you can have
any idea of infinity of extension, but it is also denied that infinity
can be the subject of partial consideration. Mr. Gillespie's whole proof
of this proposition is intended to affirm that the parts of infinity of
extension are necessarily indivisible from each other.
I have already denied the possibility of conceiving infinity in parts;
and, indeed, if it were possible to conceive infinity in parts, then
that infinity could not be indivisible, for Mr. Gillespie says that, by
indivisible, he means indivisible, either really or mentally. Now
each part of anything conceived is, in the act of conceiving, mentally
separated from, either other parts of, or from the remainder of, the
whole of which it is part. It is clearly impossible to have a partial
consideration of infinity, because the part considered must be mentally
distinguished from the unconsidered remainder, and, in that case, you
have, in thought, the part considered finite, and the residue certainly
limited, at least, by the extent of the part under consideration.
If any of the foregoing objections are well-founded, they are fatal to
Mr. Gillespie's argument.
The argument in favor of the corollary to the second proposition is
that the parts of infinity of extension are necessarily immovable among
themselves; but if there be no such thing as infinity of extension--that
is, if extension be only a quality and not necessarily infinite; if
infinite mean only indefiniteness or illimitability, and if infinity can
not have parts--this argument goes for very little. The acceptance of
the argument that the parts of infinity of extension are immovable
is rendered difficult when the reader considers Mr. Gillespie's
sub-proposition (4) that the parts of the material universe are movable
and divisible from each other. He urges that a part of the infinity of
extension or of its substratum must penetrate the material universe and
every atom of it. But if infinity can have no parts, no part of it
can penetrate the material universe. If infinity have parts (which is
absurd), and if some part penetrate every atom of the material universe,
and if the part so penetrating be immovable, how can the material
universe be considered as movable, and yet as penetrated in every atom
by immovability? If penetrated be a proper phrase, then, at the moment
when the part of infinity was penetrating the material universe,
the part of infinity so penetrating must have been in motion. Mr.
Gillespie's logic is faulty. Use his own language, and there is either
no penetration, or there is no immovability.
In his argument for the fourth proposition, Mr. Gillespie--having by his
previous proposition demonstrated (?) what he calls a substratum for the
before demonstrated (?) infinity of extension--says, "it is intuitively
evident that the substratum of infinity of extension can be no more
divisible than infinity of extension." Is this so? Might not a complex
and divisible substratum be conceived by us as possible to underlie a
(to us) simple and indivisible indefinite extension, if the conception
of the latter were possible to us? There can not be any intuition. It
is mere assumption, as, indeed, is the assumption of extension at
all, other than as the extension of substance. In his argument for
proposition 5, Gillespie says that "any one who asserts that he can
suppose two or more necessarily existing beings, each of infinity of
expansion, is no more to be argued with than one who denies, Whatever
is, is." Why is it more difficult to suppose this than to suppose
one being of infinity, and, in addition to this infinity, a material
universe? Is it impossible to suppose a necessary being of heat, one
of light, and one of electricity, all occupying the same indefinite
expansion? If it be replied that you can not conceive two distinct and
different beings occupying the same point at the same moment, then it
must be equally impossible to conceive the material universe and God
existing together.
The second division of Mr. Gillespie's argument is also open to grave
objection. Having demonstrated to his own satisfaction an infinite
substance, and also having assumed in addition a finite substance,
and having called the first an infinite "being"--perhaps from a devout
objection to speak of God as substance--Mr. Gillespie seeks to prove
that the infinite being is intelligent. He says: "Intelligence either
began to be, or it never began to be. That is never began to be is
evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have had a cause; for
whatever begins to be must have a cause. And the cause of intelligence
must be of intelligence; for what is not of intelligence can not make
intelligence begin to be. Now intelligence being before intelligence
began to be is a contradiction. And this absurdity following from
the supposition that intelligence began to be, it is proved that
intelligence never began to be: to wit, is of infinity of duration."
Mr. Gillespie does not condescend to tell us why "what is not of
intelligence cannot make intelligence begin to be;" but it is not unfair
to suppose that he means that of things which have nothing in common one
can not be the cause of the other. Let us apply Mr. Gillespie's argument
to the material universe, the existence of which is to him so certain
that he has treated it as a self-evident proposition.
The material universe--that is, matter--either began to be, or it never
began to be. That it never began to be is evident in this, that if it
began to be, it must have had a cause; for whatever begins to be must
have a cause. And the cause of matter must be of matter; for what is
not of matter can not make matter begin to be. Now matter being before
matter began to be is contradiction. And this absurdity following from
the supposition that matter--i. e., the material universe--began to be,
it is proved that the material universe never began to be--to wit, is of
indefinite duration.
The argument as to the eternity of matter is at least as logical as the
argument for the eternity of intelligence. Mr. Gillespie may reply that
he affirms the material universe to be finite in duration, and that
by the argument for his proposition, part 2, he proves that the one
infinite being (God) is the creator of matter. His words are:
"As the material universe is finite in duration, or began to be, it must
have had a cause; for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And this
cause must be [Mr. Gillespie does not explain why], in one respect or
other, the simple sole being of infinity of expansion and duration, who
is all-knowing [the all-knowing or intelligence rests on the argument
which has just been shown to be equally applicable to matter], inasmuch
as what being, or cause independent of that being, could there be? And,
therefore, that being made matter begin to be." Taking Mr. Gillespie's
own argument, that which made matter begin to be must be of matter, for
what is not matter can not make matter begin to be, then Mr. Gillespie's
infinite being (God) must be matter. But there is yet another
exception to the preposition, which is that the infinite being (God) is
all-powerful. Having, as above, argued that the being made matter, he
proceeds, "and this being shown, it must be granted that the being is,
necessarily, all-powerful." Nothing of the kind need be granted. If it
were true that it was demonstrated that the infinite being (God) made
matter, it would not prove him able to make anything else; it might show
the being cause enough for that effect, but does not demonstrate him
cause for all effects. So that if no better argument can be found to
prove God all-powerful, his omnipotence remains unproved.
Mr. Gillespie's last proposition is that the being (God) whose existence
he has so satisfactorily (?) made out is necessarily completely happy.
In dealing with this proposition, Mr. Gillespie talks of unhappiness as
existing in various kinds and degrees. But, to adopt his own style of
argument, unhappiness either began to be, or it never began to be. That
it never began to be is evident in this, that whatever began to be must
have had a cause, for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And
the cause of unhappiness must be of unhappiness, for what is not of
unhappiness can not make unhappiness begin to be. But unhappiness being
before unhappiness began to be is a contradiction; therefore unhappiness
is of infinity of duration. But proposition 5, part 2, says there is but
one being of infinity of duration. The one being of infinity of duration
is therefore necessarily unhappy. Mr. Gillespie's arguments recoil on
himself, and are destructive of his own affirmations.
In his argument for the sub-proposition, Mr. Gillespie says that God's
motive, or one of his motives, to create, must be believed to have been
a desire to make happiness, besides his own consummate happiness, begin
to be. That is, God, who is consummate happiness everywhere forever,
_desired_ something. That is, he wanted more than then existed. That is,
his happiness was not complete. That is, Mr. Gillespie refutes himself.
But what did infinite and eternal complete happiness desire? It desired
(says Mr. Gillespie) to make more happiness--that is, to make more than
an infinity of complete happiness. Mr. Gillespie's proof, on the whole,
is at most that there exists necessarily substance, the extension and
duration which we can not limit. Part of his argument involves of the
use of the very _a posteriori_ reasoning just considered, regarded by
himself as utterly worthless for the demonstration of the existence of a
being with such attributes as orthodox Theism tries to assert.
If Sir William Hamilton meant no flattery in writing that Mr.
Gillespie's works was one of the "very ablest" on the Theistic side, how
wretched indeed must, in his opinion, have been the logic of the less
able advocates for Theism. Every Theist must admit that if a God exists,
he could have so convinced all men of the fact of his existence that
doubt, disagreement, or disbelief would be impossible. If he could not
do this, he would not be omnipotent, or he would not be omniscient--that
is, he would not be God. Every Theist must also agree that if a God
exists, he would wish all men to have such a clear consciousness of his
existence and attributes that doubt, disagreement, or belief on this
subject would be impossible. And this, if for no other reason, because
that out of doubts and disagreements on religion have too often resulted
centuries of persecution, strife, and misery, which a good God would
desire to prevent. If God would not desire this, then he is not
all-good--that is he is not God. But as many men have doubts, a large
majority of mankind have disagreements, and some men have disbeliefs as
to God's existence and attributes, it follows either that God does not
exist, or that he is not all-wise, or that he is not all-powerful, or
that he is not all-good.
Every child is born into the world an Atheist; and if he grows into a
Theist, his Deity differs with the country in which the believer
may happen to be born, or the people among whom he may happen to
be educated. The belief is the result of education or organization.
Religious belief is powerful in proportion to the want of scientific
knowledge on the part of the believer. The more ignorant, the more
credulous. In the mind of the Theist "God" is equivalent to the sphere
of the unknown; by the use of the Word he answers without thought
problems which might otherwise obtain scientific solution. The more
ignorant the Theist, the greater his God. Belief in God is not a faith
founded on reason, but a prostration of the reasoning faculties on the
threshold of the unknown. Theism is worse than illogical; its teachings
are not only without utility; but of itself it has nothing to teach.
Separated from Christianity with its almost innumerable sects, from
Maliometanism with its numerous divisions, and separated also from every
other preached system, Theism is a Will-o'-the-wisp, without reality.
Apart from orthodoxy, Theism is a boneless skeleton; the various
mythologies give it alike flesh and bone, otherwise coherence it hath
none. What does Christian Theism teach? That the first man made perfect
by the all-powerful, all-wise, all-good God, was nevertheless imperfect,
and by his imperfection brought misery into the world, when the all-good
God must have intended misery should never come. That this God made men
to share this misery--men whose fault was their being what he made them.
That this God begets a son, who is nevertheless his unbegotten self, and
that by belief in the birth of God's eternal son, and in the death of
the undying who died to satisfy God's vengeance, man may escape the
consequences of the first man's error. Christian Theism declares that
belief alone can save man, and yet recognizes the fact that man's belief
results from teaching, by establishing missionary societies to spread
the faith. Christian Theism teaches that God, though no respecter of
persons, selected as his favorites one nation in preference to all
others: that man can do no good of himself or without God's aid, but yet
that each man has a free will; that God is all-powerful, but that few
go to heaven and the majority to hell; that all are to love God, who has
predestined from eternity that by far the largest number of human beings
are to be burning in hell for ever. Yet the advocates for Theism venture
to upbraid those who argue against such a faith.
Either Theism is true or false. If true, discussion must help to spread
its influence; if false, the sooner it ceases to influence human
conduct the better for human kind. It will be useless for the clergy to
urge that such a pamphlet deserves no reply. It is true the writer is
unimportant, and the language in which his thoughts find expression
lacks the polish of a Macaulay, and the fervor of a Burke; but they are
nevertheless his thoughts, uttered because it is not only his right, but
his duty, to give them utterance. And this Plea for Atheism is put forth
challenging the Theists to battle for their cause, and in the hope that
the strugglers being sincere, truth may give laurels to the victor and
the vanquished; laurels to the victor in that he has upheld the truth;
laurels still welcome to the vanquished, whose defeat crowns him with a
truth he knew not of before.
IS THERE A GOD?
Some of those who have heard me venture to examine the question of the
existence of Deity _viva voce_, have desired to have my reasons for
holding the Atheistic position briefly stated, and while I do not
pretend to exhaust the subject in these few pages, I trust to say enough
to provoke thought and inquiry. I do not say, "There is no God," and
the scarcely polite rejoinder of those who quote the Psalmist can not,
therefore, be applied with justice toward myself. I have never yet heard
living man give me a clear, coherent definition of the word "God," and I
have never read any definition from either dead or living man expressing
a definite and comprehensible idea of Deity. In fact, it has always
appeared to me that men use that word rather to hide their ignorance
than to express their knowledge.*
* In Sir William Hamilton's Essay on Cousin, I find a note
quoting Mr. Piesse on Kant, in which the word God stands
as the equivalent for a phase of the unknowable.
Climatic conditions often, and diversity of human race always, govern
and modify the meaning conveyed by the word. By "God" one nation or
sect expresses love; another, vengeance; another, good; another, wisdom;
another, fire; another, water; another, air; another, earth; and
some even confound their notion of Deity with that of devil. Elihu Palmer
well observes: "The Christian world worships three infinite gods, and
one omniscient devil." I do not deny "God," because that word conveys
to me no idea, and I can not deny that which presents to me no distinct
affirmation, and of which the would-be affirmer has no conception. I can
not war with a nonentity. If, however, God is affirmed to represent an
existence which is distinct from the existence of which I am a mode,
and which it is alleged is not the _noumenon_, of which the word "I"
represents only a specialty of _phenomena_, then I deny "God," and
affirm that it is impossible "God" can be. That is, I affirm that there
is one existence, and deny that there can be more than one. Atheists
are sometimes content to say to their opponents, your "proofs" are no
proofs, your "evidences" are failures, you do not and can not prove
the existence of Deity. This ground may be safe, but the conduct of its
occupier is not daring. The swordsman who always guarded and parried,
but never ventured cut or thrust, might himself escape unwounded, but he
would thus make but little progress toward victory over his opponent.
It is well to show that the position of your antagonist is weak, but it
is better to prove that you are strong.
In a paper as limited as the present, it is necessary to be brief both
in answer to opponents and in the statements of my own opinions. This is
rather intended as the challenging speech of a debate, not as a complete
essay on the existence of Deity.
There are two modes in which Theists endeavor to prove the existence
of God, and each of these modes is in its turn denounced by Theistic
writers--1st, the _a priori_; 2d, the _a posteriori_. Of the former,
Pearson, in his "Prize Essay on Infidelity," says: "The _a priori_ mode
of reasoning is the exclusive idol of many of the German logicians....
But in their hands this kind of reasoning has completely failed. It
conducts the mind to no firm resting place; it bewilders instead of
elucidating our notions of God, of man, and the universe. It gives us
no divine personal existence, and leaves us floating in a region of mere
vague abstractions. Such reasonings are either altogether vain or are
not really what they profess to be. In our country the name of Dr.
Clarke is chiefly associated with the _a priori_ argument.... Clarke
himself found it necessary to stoop to the argument _a posteriori_, and
thereby acknowledged the fallacy of attempting to reason exclusively _a
priori_.... The fate of Dr. Clarke's pretended demonstration, and
the result, in so far as theology is concerned, of the transcendental
reasoning of the continental philosophers, show the futility of
attempting to rise up to the height of the great argument of the
existence of God by the _a priori_ method alone."
Of the latter, William Gillespie, in his "Treatise on the Necessary
Existence of Deity," writes that it "can never make it appear that
infinity belongs in any way to God." It "can only entitle us to infer
the existence of a being of finite extension, for, by what rule in
philosophy can we deduce from the existence of an object finite in
extent (and nothing is plainer than that the marks of design which we
can discover must be finite in their extent) the existence of a cause of
infinity of extension? What, then, becomes of the omnipresence of the
Deity, according to those who are content to rest satisfied from the
reasoning of experience?... It will be vain to talk of the Deity being
present by his energy? although he may not be present by his substance,
to the whole universe. For, 'tis natural to ask not so much how it is
proved that God is virtually present, though not substantially present,
in every part of nature, as what can be meant by being everywhere
present by mere energy?" This reasoning can no more make out that the
Deity is omnipresent by his virtue, than that he is omnipresent as
to his substance.... And, from the inaptitude of the reasoning under
consideration to show that immensity, or omnipresence, belongs to God,
it will be found to follow, directly and immediately, that his wisdom
and power can not be shown to be more than finite, and that he can never
be proved to be a free agent.... Omnipresence (let it be only by energy)
is absolutely necessary in a being of infinity of wisdom. And therefore,
'the design argument' is unable to evince that the Deity is in
possession of this attribute. It likewise plainly follows, from the
inaptitude of this argument to show that God is omnipresent, that
thereby we can not prove infinity of power to belong to him. For, if
the argument can not make out that the being it discovers is everywhere
present, how can it ever make out that he is everywhere powerful? By
careful reflection, too, we may perceive that omnipotence of another
kind than power, winch can exert itself in all places, requires the
existence of immensity. "The design argument" can never evince that God
is a free agent....
If we can not prove the immensity or omnipresence of the Deity, we can
for that reason never show that he is omniscient, that he is omnipotent,
that he is entirely free.... If the Deity can not be proved to be of
infinity in any given respect, it would be nothing less than absurd to
suppose that he could be proved to be of infinity in any other respect.
It "can do no more than prove that at the commencement of the phenomena
which pass under its review, there existed a cause exactly sufficient to
make the effects begin to be. That this cause existed from eternity, the
reasonings from experience by no means show. Nay, for aught they make
known, the designer himself may not have existed long before those marks
of design which betoken his workmanship." This reasoning "can not prove
that the God whom it reveals has existed from all eternity, therefore,
for anything it intimates, God may at some time cease to be, and the
workmanship may have an existence when the workman hath fallen into
annihilation.... Such reasonings can never assure us of the unity of the
Deity." Whether there be one God or not, the argument from experience
doth by no means make clear. It discovers marks of design in the
phenomena of nature, and infers the existence of at least one
intelligent substance sufficient to produce them. Further, however, it
advances not our knowledge. Whether the cause of the phenomena be one
God or many Gods, it pretends not to determine past all doubt.... But
did this designer create the matter in which the design appeared? Of
this the argument can not convince us, for it does no more than infer a
designing cause from certain appearances, in the same way we would infer
from finding some well-contrived machine in a desert that a human being
had left it there.... Now, because this reasoning can not convince us
of such a creation, it can not convince us there is not a plurality of
deities, or of the causes of things.... If we can not prove the eternity
of God, it is not possible we can prove the unity of God. To say that,
for anything we know to the contrary, he may have existed from all
eternity, being much the same as saying that, for anything we know to
the contrary, there may be another God or many Gods beside." Sir W.
Hamilton considered that the only valid arguments for the existence of
a God, and for the immortality of the human soul, rest on the ground of
man's moral nature.
Dr. Lyman Beecher issued, some few years since, a series of lectures on
Atheism, without merit or fairness, and which are here only alluded
to as fairly illustrating a certain class of orthodox opposition. His
statements of Atheistic opinions are monstrous perversions, and his
answers are directed against the straw man built together by himself.
The doctrine of "almighty chance" which Dr. Beecher attacks, is one
which I never heard an educated Atheist teach, and the misrepresentation
of Freethought objects is so obvious that it can only be effectual with
those who have never freed themselves from the trammels which habit
and fashion-faith bound upon them in their infancy, and which have
strengthened with their growth. The Rev. J. Orr, in his "Treatise on
Theism," says, "All inquiry about chance is, however, impertinent in
the present day. The idea is an infantine one, possible of entertainment
only in the initial state of human knowledge. Chance is _not_ the
position relied upon by modern Atheism. And when, therefore, the Theist
expends the artillery of his argument upon this broken down and obsolete
notion, he is intermeddling with the dead, and after accomplishing the
destruction of the venerable fallacy, the modern Atheist will likely ask
him to come down to the nineteenths century and meet him there."
The only attempt at argument in Dr. Beecher's book is founded on the
assumption:
1st. That there is an existence called matter.
2d. That there are certain effects perceivable which can not result from
matter.
3d. That therefore there is a God the cause for these effects. Where are
there any Materialists who accept Dr. Beecher's limitation of matter?
It is a word I do not use myself.
On the question of evil, Coleridge, in his "Aids to Reflection," says:
"1st. That evil must have had a beginning, since otherwise it must
either be God or a co-eternal and co-equal rival with God. 2d. That it
could not originate in God; for if so, it would at once be evil and not
evil, or God would be at once God--that is, infinite goodness--and
not God." If God be infinite goodness, can evil exist at all? It is
necessary above all that we should understand the meaning of each word
we use. Some men talk as if their words were intended rather to conceal
than to express their ideas. So far as this essay is concerned I will
endeavor to avoid this difficulty by explicitly defining each special
word I use. Dugald Stewart, indeed, says, "That there are many
words used in philosophical discourse which do not admit of logical
definition, is abundantly manifest. This is the case with all those
words that signify things un-compounded, and consequently unsusceptible
of analysis--a proposition, one should think, almost self-evident;
and yet it is surprising how very generally it has been overlooked by
philosophers."
The advantages, however, accruing from frequent definitions are very
great; at the least they serve to explain what was meant by the persons
using the word, whereas sometimes two men confuse each word by using
words to which each attaches an opposite or a dissimilar value.
Men will talk of "First Cause," and "Intelligent First Cause." Do they
know what they mean? I confess I do not, and from the manner in which
they use the words, the most charitable conclusion is that they use them
because others have done so, and for no worse or better reason. They
talk of the "Beauties of Creation," and "Works of the Great Creator." If
by creation is meant the origin of existence, then each utterance of the
phrase is an absurdity. The human mind is utterly incapable of
construing it in thought as possible that the complement of existence
has either been increased or diminished. Man can neither conceive
nothing becoming something nor something becoming nothing.
Definitions.--1. By existence, or substance, I mean that which is in
itself and is conceived _per se_--that is, the conception of which
does not require the conception of anything else as antecedent to it.
Whenever I use the words universe or matter, I use them in the same
sense as representing the totality of existence. Existence can only be
known in its modes, and these by their attributes. 2. By attribute,
I understand that by which I cognize any mode of existence. Hardness,
brightness, color, life, form, etc., are attributes of conditional
existence. 3. By mode, I understand each cognized condition or accident
of existence. 4. By eternity I mean indefinite duration; that is
duration which is to me illimitable. 5. By infinity, I mean indefinite
extension. The axioms, so far as I shall give them, are in the precise
language of Spinoza. "1. Everything which is, is in itself, or in some
other thing.. 2. That which cannot be conceived through another _per
aliud_, must be conceived _per se_. 3. From a given determinate cause,
the effect necessarily follows; and, _vice versa_, if no determinate
cause be given, no effect can follow. 4. The knowledge of an effect
depends on a knowledge of the cause, and includes it. 5. Things that
have nothing in common with each other, can not be understood by means
of each other--that is, the conception of one does not involve the
conception of the other."
Propositions.--Existence is prior to its modes. This follows from
definitions 1 and 3, because modes of existence are conceived relatively
and in dependence on existence, which is absolutely precedent in such
conception. Existences having different attributes have nothing in
common with each other. This is founded on definition 1. Existences have
nothing in common with each other, can not be the cause of, or affect
one another. If they have nothing in common, they can not be conceived
by means of each other (per axiom 5), and they can not be conceived as
relating to each other, but must be conceived _per se_ (per definition
1); and as (per axiom 4) the knowledge of an effect depends on the
knowledge of the cause and includes it, it is impossible to conceive any
existence as an effect, so long as you can not conceive it in relation
to any other existence. By "cause" in the absolute, I mean "existence."
In its popular or relative sense, I use "cause" as an effect of some
precedent causative influence, itself the cause of some consequent
effect, as the means toward an end, in the accomplishment of which end
it completes itself.
What fact is there so certain that I may base all my reasonings upon it?
My existence is this primary fact; this, to me, indubitable certainty. I
am. This logic can neither prove nor disprove. The very nature of proof
is to make a proposition more clear to the mind than it was before, and
no amount of evidence can in-crease my conviction of the certainty of my
own existence. I do not affirm that I am in existence, but I affirm that
there is existence. This existence is either eternal, that is, unlimited
in duration, that is, indefinite in duration; or else it had a
beginning, that is, it has been created. If created, then such creation
must be by some existence the same as itself, or by some existence
differing from itself. But it can not have been created by any existence
the same as itself, because to imagine such, would be to conceive
no more than a continuance of the same existence--there would be
no discontinuity. "But," says S. T. Coleridge, "where there is no
discontinuity, there can be no origination." And it can not have been
created by any existence differing from itself, because things which
have nothing in common with one another can not be the cause of, or
affect, one another. Therefore, this existence has not been created,
that is, its duration is indefinite--that is, you can not conceive a
beginning--that is, it is eternal. This eternal existence is either
infinite in extent, that is, is unlimited in extent, or it is finite,
that is, limited. If limited, it must be limited by an existence the
same as itself, or by an existence differing from itself. But the same
arguments which applied to a limitation of duration, also apply to
a limitation of extension. Therefore, this existence is unlimited in
extent; that is, is infinite and eternal--that is, there is only one
existence. It is at this point that Atheism separates from Pantheism.
Pantheism demonstrates one existence, but affirms for it infinite
attributes. Atheism denies that attributes can be infinite. Attributes
are but the distinguishing characteristics of modes, and how can that
be infinite which is only the quality of finity? Men do not talk of
infinite hardness or of infinite softness; yet they talk of infinite
intelligence. Intelligence is not an existence, and the word is without
value unless it strictly comprehend, and is included in, that which
is intelligent. The hardness of the diamond, the brilliancy of the
burnished steel, have no existence apart from the diamond or the steel.
I, in fact, affirm that there is only one existence, and that all we
take cognizance of is mode, or attribute of mode, of that existence.
I have carefully abstained from using the words "matter" and "spirit."
Dr. Priestly says: "It has generally been supposed that there are
_two distinct kinds of substance_ in human nature, and they have been
distinguished by the terms _matter_, and _spirit_, or _mind_. The former
of these has been said to be possessed of the property of _extension_,
viz., of length, breadth and thickness, and also of _solidity_ or
impenetrability, and consequently of a _vis inertiæ_; but it is said to
be naturally destitute of all other powers whatever. The latter has of
late been defined to be a substance entirely destitute of all extension,
or relation to space, so as to have no property in common with matter;
and therefore to be properly _immaterial_, but to be possessed of the
powers of perception, intelligence, and self-motion. Matter is alleged
to be that kind of substance of which our bodies are composed, whereas
the principle of perception and thought belonging to us is said to
reside in a spirit, or immaterial principle, intimately united to the
body; while higher orders of intelligent beings, and especially the
Divine Being, are said to be purely immaterial. It is maintained that
neither matter nor spirit (meaning by the latter the subject of sense
and thought) correspond to the definitions above mentioned. For that
matter is not that _inert_ substance that it has been supposed to be;
that powers of _attraction or repulsion_ are necessary to its very
being, and that no part of it appears to be _impenetrable_ to other
parts; I therefore define it to be a substance possessed of the property
of extension, and powers of attraction or repulsion; and since it has
never yet been asserted that the powers of _sensation_ and _thought_
are incompatible with these (_solidity or impenetrability_, and,
consequently, a _vis inertiæ_, only having been thought to be repugnent
to them), I therefore maintain that we have no reason to suppose that
there are in man two substances so distinct from each other as have been
represented. It is likewise maintained that the notion of two substances
that have no common property, and yet are capable of intimate connection
and mutual action, is absurd."
I do not conceive _spirit or mind_ as an existence. By the word _mind_,
I simply express the totality of perception, observation, collection,
and recollection of perceptions, reflection and various other mental
processes. Dugald Stewart, in his "Essay on Locke," says: "We are
conscious of sensation, thought, desire, volition, but we are not
conscious of the existence of the mind itself."
It is urged that the idea of God is universal. This is not only not
true, but I, in fact, deny that any coherent idea exists in connection
with the word "God." The chief object to which the emotions of any
people were directed in ancient times became their God. When these
emotions were combined with vague traditions, and a priesthood became
interested in handing down the traditions, and increasing the emotions,
then the object becoming sacred was hallowed and adored, and uncertain
opinions formed the basis of a creed. Any prominent phenomenon in the
universe, which was not understood, was personified, as were also the
various passions and phases of humanity. These, in time, were preached
as religious truths, and thus diverted the people from inquiry into the
natural causes of phenomena, which they accounted for as ordained by
God, and when famine or pestilence occurred, instead of endeavoring to
remove its cause or using preventive measures against a recurrence
of the evil, they sought to discover why the supernatural power was
offended, and how it might be appeased, and ascribing to it their own
passions and emotions, they offered prayers and sacrifices. These errors
becoming institutions of the country, the people, prompted by their
priests, regarded all those who endeavored to overturn them by free and
scientific thought and speech as blasphemers, and the Religion of
each State has, therefore, always been opposed to the education of the
people.
Archbishop Whately, in his "Elements of Rhetoric," part 1, chap, ii,
sec. 5, urges that "those who represent God or Gods as malevolent,
capricious, or subject to human passions and vices, are invariably to
be found among those who are brutal and uncivilized." We admit this, but
ask is it not the fact that both the Old and New Testament teachings do
represent God as malevolent, capricious, and subject to human passions
and vices--that is, are not these bible views of God relics of a brutal
and uncivilized people?
There is, of course, not room in a short essay like the present to say
much upon the morality of Atheism, and it should therefore suffice to
say, that truth and morality go hand in hand. That that is moral which
tends to the permanent happiness of all. The continuance of falsehood
never can result in permanent happiness; and therefore if Atheism be
truthful, it must be moral, if it be against falsehood, it must tend to
human happiness.
Yet if quoting great names will have effect, Lord Bacon, who is often
quoted against Atheism, also says: "Atheism leaves a man to sense, to
philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation, all of which may
be guides to an outward moral virtue, _though religion were not_; but
superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy
in the mind of men; therefore Atheism never did perturb states, for it
makes men wary of themselves as looking no further; and we see the times
inclined to Atheism, as the times of Augustus Caesar were civil times;
but superstition has been the confusion of many states." George
Combe says: "I have known men in whom the reasoning organs were amply
developed and well cultivated, who assured me that they could not reach
the conviction of the being of a God. I have known such men equal
in point of integrity and practical benevolence to the most orthodox
believers." In the West Riding of Yorkshire, among the men themselves,
a wealthy employer bore favorable testimony to the conduct and
intelligence of Atheistic working men. Nay, even the fanatical Dr. Lyman
Beecher is obliged to concede that Atheism made converts among "females
of education and refinement--females of respectable standing in
society."
HAS MAN A SOUL?
[This lecture was originally delivered to the Sheffield
Secular Society, and was printed from the reporter's notes
without efficient correction from myself, I, at that time,
suffering under a severe attack of acute rheumatism. The
lecture has since been often re-delivered; and three
editions having been exhausted, I have again corrected and
revised the present edition. It is not intended as an answer
to the question which forms the title, but it is intended to
provoke thought upon this important subject.]
What do you mean by soul? What is the soul? Is it I? Is it the body?
Is it apart from the body? Is it an attribute of the body? Has it a
separate and distinct existence from the body? What is the soul? If I
ask one of those who claim to be considered orthodox men, they will
tell me that the soul is a spirit--that the soul lives after the body is
dead. They will tell me that the soul is immortal, and that the body is
mortal; that the soul has nothing whatever in common with the body; that
it has an existence entirely independent of the body. They will tell me
that after the body has decayed--after the body has become re-absorbed
in the universe, of which it is but a part, that the soul still exists.
Is there any proof of the existence of the same individual soul apart
from all material conditions? I have endeavored to examine this
subject, and, up to the present time, I have not found one iota of proof
in support of the positions thus put forward. I have no idea of any
existence except that of which I am part. I am. Of my own existence I am
certain I think. I am. But what is it that thinks? Is it my soul? Is
it "me," and yet distinct from me? I am but a mode of existence. I am
only part of the great universe. The elements of which I am composed are
indissolubly connected with that great existence which is around me and
within me, and which I help to make up. If men tell me I am a compound,
and not a compound--a mixture, and not a mixture--a joining together,
and not a joining together--of two entirely different existences, which
they call "matter" and "spirit," I am compelled to doubt those men.
The ability to think is but an attribute of a certain modification of
existence. Intelligence is a word by which we express the sum of
certain abilities, always attending a certain mode of existence. I find
intelligence manifested so far as organization is developed. I never
find intelligence without animal organization. I find intelligence
manifested in degree, only so far as I find a higher or lower type of
organization--that is, I find man's intellectual faculties limited
by his organization. But the orthodox tell me that my soul has an
immaterial existence, independent of all organization--independent of
all climatic conditions--independent of all education. Is that so? When
does the soul come into man? When does it go out of man? If the soul
is immortal, why is it that standing here, in the prime of health and
strength, if part of that roof should fall fracturing my skull, and
pressing upon my brain--how is it, if my soul is not subject to material
conditions, that it then ceases to act? Is the plaster roof more
powerful than my immortal soul? Or is it that intelligence is the
necessary result of a certain condition of existence, and that
the moment you destroy that condition--the moment you destroy the
organization--the result ceases to be realizable? By the course of
reasoning you adopt (says the orthodox objector) you reduce man to the
same level as the beasts. And why not? I stand on the river's bank, I
see there a man full grown, possessed of the physical figure of man, but
an idiot--an idiot from his birth upward--one who could not, even if he
would, think and act as other men. A little child is there playing on
the bank, and the idiot, having large destructive propensities, has
thrust the child into the water, and he stands there jabbering and
gesticulating while the little child is drowning in the river. And see
how half-vacantly, half-triumphantly, he points to the helpless child. A
Newfoundland dog has come to the bank; it jumps in and brings the child
out and saves its life. Yet theologians tell me that the idiot has a
soul, and that the Newfoundland dog has not one. I can not understand
these nice distinctions, which make the man so superior to the beast
in matters in which he is positively inferior. Man has doubtless an
organization on the whole far superior intellectually to that of
any other animal, but he is only superior by virtue of his superior
organization and its consequent susceptibility for development or
education. Many brutes can see more clearly than man; but they possess
not the capability for the manufacture of telescopes to aid their
vision. Many brutes can run more swiftly, but they manifest no capacity
for the subjugation of a steam power which far outstrips their
speed. But man himself, a well-organized, thoughtful, intelligent,
well-educated man, by a fall from a horse, by a tile from a roof, may
receive an injury to his nervous encephalic apparatus, and may be,
even while a man in shape, as low as the brute in the imbecility of his
reason, and inferior to the brute in physical strength. There is as
much difference between different races of men, there is, in fact, more
difference between a pure Caucasian and a Sahara negro, than between the
Sahara negro and the infant chimpanzee.
When did the soul come into the body? Has it been waiting from all
eternity to occupy each body the moment of birth? Is this the theory
that is put forward to man--that there are many millions of souls still
waiting, perhaps, in mid air, 'twixt heaven and earth, to occupy the
still unborn babes? Is that the theory? Or do you allege that God
specially creates souls for each little child at the moment it is born
or conceived? Which is the theory put forward? Is it that the soul
being immortal--being destined to exist for ever, has existed from all
eternity? If not, how do you know that the soul is to exist for ever;
when it only comes into existence with the child? May not that which
has recently begun to be, soon cease to be? In what manner does the
soul come into the child? Is it a baby's soul, and does it grow with
the child? or, does it possess its full power the moment the child is
born? When does it come into the child? Does it come in the moment
the child begins to form, or is it the moment the child is born into the
world? Whence is it this soul comes? Dr. Cooper, quoting Lawrence
on the "Functions of the Brain," says: "Sir Everard Home, with the
assistance of Mr. Bauer and his microscope, has shown us a man eight
days old from the time of conception, about as broad and a little
longer than a pin's head. He satisfied himself that the brain of
this homunculus was discernible. Could the immaterial mind have been
connected with it at this time? Or was the tenement too small even for
so etherial a lodger? Even at the full period of uterogestation, it is
still difficult to trace any vestiges of mind: and the believers in its
separate existence have left us quite in the dark on the precise time
when they suppose this union of soul and body to take place." Many of
those who tell me that man has a soul, and that it is immortal--that man
has a soul, and that the beast has not one--forget or ignore the fact
that at a very early stage in the formation of the brain the state of
the brain corresponds to that of the avertebrated animal, or animal
that is without vertebra. If the brain had stopped in its first month's
course of formation, would the child have had a soul? If it would have
had a soul, then have avertebrated animals souls also? If you tell me
it would not have had a soul, then I ask, How do you know it? and I
ask you what ground you have for assuming that the soul did not begin
to form with the formation of the brain? I ask you whether it was
pre-existing, or at what stage it came? In the second month this
brain corresponds then to the brain of an osseous fish. Supposing the
development of the child had been then stopped, had it a soul at that
time? If so, have fishes souls? Again, if you tell me that the child
had not a soul, then, I ask, why not? How do you know it had not? What
ground have you for alleging that the soul did not exist in the child?
We go on still further, and in the third month we find that brain
corresponds then to that of a turtle, and in the fourth to that of a
bird; and in the fifth month, to an order termed _rodentia_; sixth,
to that of the _ruminantia_; seventh, to that of the _dugitigrada_;
eighth, to that of the _quadrumana_; and not till the ninth month does
the brain of the child attain a full human character. I, of course, here
mean to allege no more than Dr. Fletcher, who says, in his "Rudiments of
Physiology," quoted by the author of the "Vestiges of Creation": "This
is only an approximation to the truth; since neither is the brain of all
osseous fishes, of all turtles, of all birds, nor of all the species of
any of the above order of mammals, by any means precisely the same;
nor does the brain of the human fetus at any time precisely resemble,
perhaps, that of any individual whatever among the lower animals.
Nevertheless it may be said to represent, at each of the above-named
periods, the aggregate, as it were, of the brains of each of the tribes
stated."
Now, should a birth have taken place at any of the eight stages, would
the child thus prematurely born have had a soul? That is the question
I propose to you. You who affirm that man has a soul, it lies upon
you, here, without charging me with blasphemy--without charging me with
ignorance--without charging me with presumption--it lies upon you who
affirm, to state the grounds for your belief. At which stage, if at any,
did the soul come into the child? At the moment of the birth? Why when
a child is born into the world it can scarcely see--it can not speak--it
can not think--but after a short time I jingle my keys, and it begins
to give faint smiles; and after a few weeks, it is pleased with the
jingling of my keys. Is it the soul which is learning to appreciate the
sound of the jingling keys, and pleased with them? Is it the immaterial
and immortal soul amused and pleased with my bundle of keys? Where is
the soul? How is it that the soul can not speak the moment the child is
born--can not even think? How is it, that if I keep that child without
telling it any thing of its soul until it become fourteen or fifteen
years of age, it would then speak and think as I had taught it to speak
and think; and if I kept it without the knowledge of a soul, it would
have no knowledge of a soul at that age? How is that? Rajah Brooke,
at a missionary meeting in Liverpool, told his hearers there that the
Dyaks, a people with whom he was connected, had no knowledge of God, of
a soul, or of any future state. How is it that the Dyaks have got this
soul and yet live knowing nothing whatever about it? And the Dyaks
are by no means the only people who live and die knowing nothing of
any immortal and immaterial soul. Again you tell me that this soul is
immortal. Do you mean that it has eternally existed--has never been
created? If so, you deny a God who is the creator of all things. If the
soul began at some time to exist, where is the evidence that it will not
also at some time cease to exist? It it came into existence with the
body's birth, why not cease with the body's death? You say the soul is
immaterial; do you mean that it is susceptible to material conditions
or do you not? If susceptible to material conditions, what do you mean
by its being immortal and immaterial? If not susceptible to material
conditions, then explain to me how it is that under good conditions
it prospers and advances, and under bad conditions deteriorates and
recedes. If a child is born in some of the back streets of our city,
and lives on bad food in a wretched cellar, it grows up a weak and puny
pale-faced child. If allowed to crawl into existence on the edge of a
gutter, imperfectly educated, in fact mis-educated, it steals--steals,
perhaps, to live--and it becomes an outcast from society. Is this
immortal soul affected by the bodily conditions? or is the soul
originally naturally depraved? And if the soul is primarily naturally
depraved, why is God so unjust as to give a naturally depraved soul to
any body? If not, how is it that this immortal soul, when the body
is kept without food, permits the man who has no money to buy food, to
steel to satisfy his hunger? You allege that the soul moves my body.
You assert that matter is inert, unintelligent; that it is my active,
intelligent soul that moves and impels my inert and non-intelligent
body. Is my immortal soul hindered and controlled by the state of my
body's general health? Does my soul feel hungry and compel my body to
steal? Some theologians declare that my soul is immaterial--that there
is no means by which I can take any cognizance whatever of it. What
does that mean, except that they know nothing whatever about it? Sir
W. Hamilton admits that we are entirely ignorant as to the connection
between soul and body. Yet many who in so many words admit that they
have no knowledge, but only faith in the soul's existence, are most
presumptuous in affirming it, and in denouncing those who dispute their
affirmation. It is an easy method to hide ignorance, by denouncing your
opponent as an ignorant blasphemer.
Joseph Priestley, in his book upon matter and spirit, quotes from
Hallet's discourses, as follows; "I see a man move and hear him speak
for some years. From his speech I certainly infer that he thinks, as I
do. I then see that man is a being who thinks and acts. After some time
the man falls down in my sight, grows cold and stiff, and speaks and
acts no more. Is it not then natural to conclude that he thinks no more;
as the only reason I had to believe that he did think was his motion and
his speech. And now that his motion and speech have ceased, I have lost
the only way of proving that he had the power of thought. Upon this
sudden death, one visible thing, the one man, has greatly changed.
Whence could I infer that the same being consisted of two parts, and
that the inward part continues to live and think, and flies away from
the body? When the outward part ceases to live and move, it looks as
if the whole _man_ was gone, and that he, with all his powers, ceases at
the same time. His motion and thought both die together, as far as I
can discern. The powers of thought, of speech and motion, equally depend
upon the body, and run the same fate in case of declining age. When a
man dies through old age, I perceive his powers of speech, motion, and
thought decay and die together, and by the same degrees. That moment he
ceases to move and breathe he appears to cease to think, too. When I
am left to my reason it seems to me that my power of thought depends
as much upon the body as my sight and hearing. I could not think in
infancy; my power of thought, of sight, and of feeling are equally
liable to be obstructed by the body. A blow on the head has deprived a
man of thought, who could yet see, and feel and move; so naturally the
power of thinking seems as much to belong to the body as any power of
man whatsoever. Naturally there appears no more reason to suppose that a
man can think out of the body than he can hear sounds and feel cold out
of the body."
What do those mean who say that man is made up of two parts--matter and
mind? I know of only one existence. I find that existence manifested
variously, each mode having certain variations of attributes by which
it is cognized. One of these attributes, or a collection of certain
attributes, I find in, or with, certain modifications of that existence,
that is, in or with animal life--this attribute, or these attributes, we
call intelligence. In the same way that I find upon the blade of a knife
brightness, consequent upon a certain state of the metal, so do I find
in man, in the beast, different degrees, not of brightness, but of
intelligence, according to their different states of organization. I am
told that the mind and the body are separate from one another. Are
the brightness and steel of the knife separate? Is not brightness the
quality attaching to a certain modification of existence--steel? Is
not intelligence a quality attaching to a certain modification of
existence--man? The word brightness has no meaning, except as relating
to some bright thing. The word intelligence, no meaning, except as
relating to some intelligent thing. I take some water and drop it upon
the steel, in due course the process of oxidation takes place and the
brightness is gone. I drop into man's brain a bullet; the process
of destruction of life takes place, and his intelligence is gone.
By changing the state of the steel we destroy its brightness, and by
disorganizing the man destroy his intelligence. Is mind an entity or
result? an existence or a condition? Surely it is but the result of
organic activity, a phenomenon of animal life. Dr. Engledue says: "In
the same way as organism generally has the power of manifesting, when
the necessary stimuli are applied, the phenomena which are designated
life; so one individual portion--brain, having peculiar and distinct
properties, manifests on the application of its appropriate stimuli
a peculiar and distinct species of action. If the sum of all bodily
function--life, be not an entity, how can the product of the action of
one portion of the body--brain, be an entity? Feeling and intelligence
are but fractional portions of life." I ask those who are here to prove
that man has a soul, to do so apart from revelation. If the soul is a
part of ourselves, we require no supernatural revelation to demonstrate
its existence to us. D'Holbach says: "The doctrine of spirituality,
such as it now exists, affords nothing but vague ideas; it is rather a
poisoner of all ideas. Let me draw your attention to this: The advocates
of spirituality do not tell you anything, but in fact prevent you
from knowing anything. They say that spirit and matter have nothing in
common, and that mortal man can not take cognizance of immortality. An
ignorant man may set himself up as an orator upon such a matter. He says
you have a soul--an immortal soul. Take care you don't lose your soul.
When you ask him what is my soul, he says he does not know--nobody
knows--nobody can tell you. This is really that which they do. What is
this doctrine of spirituality? What does it present to the mind?
A substance unsubstantial that possesses nothing of which our senses
enable us to take cognizance." Theologians urge that each of us has a
soul superior to all material conditions, and yet a man who speaks can
not communicate by his speaking soul so freely with that man who is deaf
and dumb; the conditions cramp that which is said to be uncontrolled
by any conditions. If you cut out a man's tongue, the soul no longer
speaks. If you put a gag in his mouth, and tie it with a handkerchief,
so that he can not get it out, his soul ceases to speak. The immaterial
soul is conquered by a gag, it can not utter itself, the gag is in the
way. The orthodox say that the soul is made by God; and what do you know
about God? Why just as much as we know about the soul. And what do you
know about the soul? Nothing whatever. How is it that if the soul
is immaterial, having nothing in common with matter, that it is only
manifest by material means? and how is it that it is incased
and inclosed in my material frame? They affirm that my soul is a
spirit--that I receive the same spirit from God. How is it that
my spirit is now by myself, and by my mortal body, denying its own
existence? Is my mortal soul acting the hypocrite, or is it ignorant of
its own existence, and can not help itself to better knowledge? And if
it can not help itself, why not, if it is superior to the body? and if
you think it a hypocrite, tell me why.
What is meant by the declaration that man is a compound of matter and
spirit?--things which the orthodox assert have nothing in common with
one another. Of the existence of what you call matter you are certain,
because you and I, material beings, are here. Are you equally certain
of the existence of mind, as an existence independent and separate from
matter? and if you are, tell me why. Have you ever found it apart from
matter? If so, when and where? Have you found that the mind has a
separate and distinct existence? if so, under what circumstances? and
tell me--you who define matter as unintelligent, passive, inert, and
motionless--who talk of the _vis inertiæ_ of matter--tell me what you
mean when you give these definitions to it? You find the universe, and
this small portion of it on which we are, ceaselessly active. Why do you
call it passive, except it be that you want courage to search for true
knowledge as to the vast capabilities of existence, and, therefore,
invent such names as God and Soul to account for all difficulties, and
to hide your ignorance? What do you mean by passive and inert matter?
You tell me of this world--part of a system--that system part of
another--that of another--and point out to me the innumerable planets,
the countless millions of worlds, in the universe. You, who tell me of
the vast forces of the universe, what do you mean by telling me
that that is motionless? What do you mean by yet pointing to the
immeasurable universe and its incalculably mighty forces and affirming
that they are incapable of every perceptible effect? You, without one
fact on which to base your theory, strive to call into existence another
existence which must be more vast, and which you allege produces this
existence and gives its powers to it. Sir Isaac Newton says: "We are
to admit no more causes of things than are sufficient to explain
appearances." What effect is there which the forces of existence are
incapable of producing?
Why do you come to the conclusion that the forces of the universe are
incapable of producing every effect of which I take cognizance? Why do
you come to the conclusion that intelligence is not an attribute--why?
What is there which enables you to convert it into a separate and
distinct existence? Is there anything? Is it spirit? What is spirit?
That of which the mortal man can know nothing, you tell me--that it
is nothing which his senses can grasp--that is, no man, but one who
disregards his senses, can believe in it, and that it is that which no
man's senses can take cognizance of. If a man who uses his senses can
never by their aid take cognizance of spirit, then as it is through the
senses alone man knows that which is around him, you can know nothing
about spirit until you go out of your senses. When I speak of the
senses, I do not limit myself to what are ordinarily termed man's five
senses--I include all man's sensitive faculties, and admit that I do not
know the extent of, and am not prepared to set a limit to, the sensitive
capabilities of man. I have had personal experience in connection with
psycho-magnetic phenomena of faculties in man and woman not ordinarily
recognized, and am inclined to the opinion that many men have been
made converts to the theories of spiritualism because their previous
education had induced them to set certain arbitrary limits to the
domains of the natural. When they have been startled by phenomena
outside these conventional limitations they at once ascribed them to
supernatural influences rather than reverse their previous rules of
thinking.