After this, Plato adds, “He likewise commanded them to govern as much
as possible in the best and most beautiful manner the mortal animal,
that it might not become the cause of evil to itself.” On these words
Proclus observes: Of all that the one demiurgus delivers to the
junior Gods, it must be admitted that there are three most beautiful
boundaries, the boniform will of him that delivers, the perfect power
of the recipients, and the symmetry of both these with each other. Of
the demiurgic production, however, of the junior Gods themselves, three
elements and these the greatest must be again surveyed, a reduction to
the good, a conversion to intelligible beauty, and a liberated power
sufficient to rule over all the subjects of its government. For as
Phanes,[93] himself the demiurgus of wholes, rendered the whole world
as much as possible the most beautiful and the best, thus also he was
willing that the second fabricators should govern the mortal animal
in a way the most beautiful and the best; pouring on them indeed from
intelligibles, beauty, but filling them with that boniform power and
will, which he himself possessing fabricated the whole world. For thus
generation also will participate of beauty and goodness, as far as it
is naturally adapted to such participation, if the Gods by whom it is
connected and contained, adorn it, who are themselves transcendently
decorated with beauty and good.
If, however, the second demiurgi have such a nature as this, nothing
evil or preternatural is generated from the celestial Gods; nor is
it proper to divide the Gods in the heavens after this manner, as
many do, viz. into the beneficent and malignant; for being Gods this
is impossible. But the mortal animal is the cause of evil to itself.
For neither disease, nor poverty,[94] nor any thing else of this kind
is evil; but the depravity of the soul, intemperance, timidity, and
every vice. Of these things, however, we are the causes to ourselves.
For though being impelled by others to these vices we are badly
affected, yet again it is through ourselves; since we have the power
of associating with the good, and separating ourselves from the bad.
According to Plato, therefore, we must not think that of the Gods some
are malignant and others beneficent, but we must admit that all of
them are the sources to mortals of all the good which they are able to
receive; and that things which are truly evils are not produced, but
are only signified by them, as we have before observed. For they extend
terrific appearances and signs to those who are able to see and read
the letters in the universe, which the framers of mortal natures during
their revolutions write by their configurations. And though some one
should derive a certain evil from the motions of the celestial Gods,
so as to become timid or intemperate, yet they operate in one way, and
their influences are participated by souls in another. For the efflux
of intellect, says Plotinus, becomes craft in him who receives the
efflux badly; the gift of an elegant life becomes intemperance through
a similar cause; and in short, while they produce beneficently, their
gifts are participated by terrestrial natures, after a contrary manner.
Hence the givers who bestow beneficently are not to be accused as the
authors of evil, but the recipients who pervert their gifts by their
own inaptitudes. Thus also Jupiter in Homer blames souls as in vain
accusing the Gods, while they themselves are the causes of evils. For
the Gods are the sources of good, and the suppliers of intellect and
life, but are not the causes of any evil; since even a partial nature
is not the cause of evil to its offspring. What, therefore, ought we
to think concerning the Gods themselves? Is it not, that they are much
more the causes of good to their productions; since with them there
is power, with them there is a self-perfect nature, with them there
is universal goodness, to all which evil is contrary. For in its own
nature it is powerless, imperfect, and without measure.
In the next place Plato says, “At the same time he who orderly disposed
all these particulars, remained in his own accustomed manner.” And
Proclus observes, that Plato every where after having employed many
words, summarily comprehends the multitude of them in the conclusion.
For he knew that in the Demiurgus, one intellectual perception
comprehends the multitude of intellectual conceptions; that one power
connects many powers; and that a uniform cause collects into one union
divided causes. Hence the words [prior to these], “Having, therefore,
instructed souls in all these particulars,” and the words before us,
“He who orderly disposed all these particulars,” lead the distinct
energy of the Demiurgus to an united cause. Farther still, the word
_all_ manifests that which is consummated from all its appropriate
boundaries. But the words _orderly disposed_, indicate the order
pervading through all beings, which the Demiurgus introduced to the
mundane Gods, and to partial souls; demonstrating the former to be
demiurgi, but inscribing in the latter the laws of Fate. Moreover,
the word _remained_, does not manifest station, and inflexible
intellection, but an _establishment[95] in the one_. For according to
this, he is exempt from wholes, and is separated from the beings that
intellectually perceive him. But this establishment itself is eternal,
and always invariably permanent. These things, therefore, are also
indicated by the words _accustomed_ and _manner_; the one exhibiting
sameness of permanency; but the other the peculiarity of the demiurgic
stability. For _manner_ is indicative of peculiarity; since connective
is different from immutable, and both these from demiurgic permanency.