California, climate and native languages of, 261, 262
Caldwell on language of savages, 349
Carlyle on fundamental metaphor, 344
Carpenter, Commander Alfred, on monkeys using stones to open oysters,
382
Casalis on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 351
Cat, intelligence of, 59, 98, 99;
use of signs by, 158
Caterpillars, sign-making by, 95, 96
Causation, ideas of, in brutes, 58-60;
origin of idea of, in man, 210
Cebus, intelligence of, 60, 61;
different tones uttered by, 96
Champollion on Egyptian hieroglyphics, 311
Charlevoix on language of savages, 349
Cheyenne language. _See_ Languages
Child, psychogenesis of, 4, 5;
emotions and instincts of, 7, 8;
intelligence of, as regards classification, 26, 27, 41, 66, 67;
instinctive and imitative articulation by, 121, 122;
understanding of words by infantile, 123;
spontaneous invention of words by, 138-143;
indicative stage of language in, 158, 218-222, 324;
denotation and connotation of, 179, 191, 218-231, 283-285;
recognizing portraits, &c., 188, 189;
rise of self-consciousness in, 200-212;
use of personal pronoun by, 201, 232, 408, 409;
hypothesis of languages having been originated by, 259-263;
undifferentiated language of, 296, 297, 317;
stages of language in, 157-193, 328;
differences between infantile and primitive man, as regards
development of speech, 329-334;
order of development of articulate sounds in, 372, 373
Cicero on the origin of speech, 240
Chimpanzee. _See_ Apes
Chinese language. _See_ Language
Classification, in relation to abstraction, 31, 32;
powers of, exhibited by a young child, 26, 66, 67;
by lower animals generally, 27-30 (_see_ also under Precepts);
of ideas, 34-39, 193;
conceptual, 78-80, 174;
of the animal kingdom by the early Jews and by Aristotle, 78, 79;
of language, 85-89;
of mental faculties artificial, 234;
of languages, 245-251
Clicks of Hottentots, 291
Clothes only worn by man, 19
Communication. _See_ Language
Complex ideas. _See_ Ideas
Compound ideas. _See_ Ideas
Comte, Auguste, on the logic of feelings and of signs, 42, 46, 47
Conception. _See_ Concepts
Concepts, defined, 34;
logic of, 47, and chap. iv.;
as named recepts, 74, 75;
as higher and lower, 76, 185;
in relation to particular and generic ideas, 76-78;
in relation to judgment and self-consciousness, 168-191;
Max Müller’s alleged, 221;
in relation to non-conceptual faculties, 234-237;
attainment of, by the individual, 230-232;
original, 269-281;
philological proof of derivation of, from recepts, 343-349
Concrete ideas. _See_ Ideas
Connotation, 88, 89, 136, 137, 157, 159-162, 169, 170, 179-184, 218,
219, 283, 284, 294 _et seq._, 368, 383, 384
Conscience. _See_ Morality
Coptic language. _See_ Language
Copula, the, 172, 173, 230, 309, 314, 387
Counting, by rooks, 56, 57, 214, 215;
by an ape, 58, 215;
by sensuous computation and by separate notation, 57, 215;
by savages, 215
Crawford on Malay language, 351
Cronise on the climate of California, 261
Crows, intelligence of, 56, 57
Cuvier on speech as the most distinctive characteristic of man, 371
D
Dammaras, counting by, 215
Darwin, Charles, on intelligence of savage man in relation to his
cerebral development, 16, 17;
on intelligence of animals, 51, 52, 54;
on pointing of sporting dogs, 97;
on expression of emotions, 103;
on psychogenesis of child, 123, 158;
on self-consciousness, 199;
on descent of man, 369, 370, 374-376, 380
Dayak language. _See_ Language
Deaf-mutes, sign-making by, 105-120;
ideation of, 149, 150, 339-341;
invention of articulate signs by, 122, 263, 367
De Fravière on sign-making by bees, 90
Demonstrative elements. _See_ Pronouns
Denomination, 88, 89, 161, 162, 168-170, 294, _et seq._
Denotation, 88, 89, 157, 158, 159, 162, 168, 179-184, 218, 219, 294
_et seq._, 368-369, 383, 384, 386
De Quatrefages, on distinctions between animal and human intelligence,
17-19;
on intelligence of a dog, 198;
on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 351
Dog, seeking water in hollows, 51;
making allowance for driftway, 52;
generic ideas shown by, 54, 352;
chasing imaginary pigs, 56;
idea of causation shown by, 59, 60;
pointing and backing of, 97, 98;
other gesture signs made by, 99, 100, 221;
understanding of written signs by, 101, 102;
understanding of words by, 124, 125;
alleged articulation by, 128;
Indian sign for barking, 146;
recognizing pictorial representations, 188;
practising concealment and hypocrisy, 198;
ejective ideation of, 198;
receptual self-consciousness of, 199;
counting by, 215;
begging before a bitch, 221;
deaf-mute’s articulate name of, 367
Donaldson on demonstrative elements, 244
_Dublin Review_ on psychology of judgment, 166, 167
Dumas, Alex., on sign-making, 111
Du Ponceau on language of savages, 349, 351
E
Ecitons. _See_ Ants
Egyptian language. _See_ Language
Elephant, intelligence of, 98
Ellis on early English pronunciation, 373
Emerson on fundamental metaphor, 344
Emotions of man and brutes compared, 7
Empty words, 246
_Encyclopædia Britannica_ (1857), on the origin of speech, 240
English language. _See_ Language
Etruscan language. _See_ Language
F
Farrar, Archdeacon, on demonstrative elements, 244;
on invention of languages by children, 263;
on roots of language, 268, 358;
on origin of the verb, 275;
on paucity of words in vocabulary of English labourers, 280;
on onomatopœia, 284-288, 290;
on objective phraseology of young children and early man, 301;
on the substantive verb, 309;
on fundamental metaphor, 344;
on language of savages in respect of abstraction, 350;
on absence of subjective personal pronouns in early forms of speech,
421
Feejee language. _See_ Language
Fire only made by man, 19
Fitzgerald, P. F., on self-consciousness, 212
Flight, capability of, in insects, reptiles, birds, and mammals, 156,
157
Forbes, James, on intelligence of monkeys, 100
Fox, intelligence of, 55, 56
Frogs, understanding by, of tones of human voice, 124
G
Galton, Francis, on ideas as generic images, 23;
on relation of thought to speech, 83;
on intelligence of Dammaras, 215
Garnett, on nature and analysis of the verb, 275, 307, 309-312;
on sentence-words, 300;
on primitive forms of predication, 318;
on fundamental metaphor, 344, 358;
on absence of subjective cases of pronouns in early forms of speech,
421
Geiger, on ideas, 45;
on dependence of thought upon language, 83;
on understanding of words by brutes, 127;
on roots of language, 268, 273, 336;
on distinction between ideas as general and generic, 279;
on increasing conceptuality of terms with increase of culture, 280;
on the impossibility of language having ever consisted exclusively
of general terms, 282;
on Heyse’s theory of the origin of speech, 289;
on onomatopœia, 292;
on the vanishing point of language, 314, 354;
on fundamental metaphor as illustrated by names of tools, 345, 346,
and words of moral significance, 346, 347;
on the sense of sight in relation to the origin of speech, 366, 367;
on _Homo alalus_, 380
General ideas. _See_ Ideas
Generalization. _See_ Ideas
Generic ideas. _See_ Recepts
Genitive case, philology of, 305, 385
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Isid., on a monkey recognizing pictorial
representations, 188
Geology, imperfect record of, 19
Gesture. _See_ Language
Gibbon. _See_ Apes
Goethe on obliteration of original meanings of words, 284
Goodbehere, S., on sign-making by a pony, 97
Gorilla. _See_ Apes
Greek. _See_ Language
Green, Professor, on self-consciousness, 212
Grimace. _See_ Language
Grimm, on the origin of speech, 240;
on names for thunder, 286;
on fundamental metaphor, 344
H
Haeckel, Professor, on _Homo alalus_, 370, 380;
on sounds made by apes, 374
Hague on sign-making by ants, 93, 94
Hale, Dr. H., on spontaneous invention of words by children, 138-144;
on the origin of languages, 259-263
Hamilton, Sir William, on ideas as abstract and general, 24, 25, 79,
80
Harper, F., on Greek tenses, 301
Haughton, Sir Graves, on roots of languages, 275
Hebrew. _See_ Language
Hegel, on absence in brutes of the idea of causality, 58;
on self-consciousness, 212
Heinieke on words spontaneously invented by deaf-mutes, 367
Hen, different tones used by, as signs to chickens, &c., 96
Herder, on the origin of speech, 240;
on the original concretism of language, 359
Herzen on self-consciousness, 212
Heyse, on onomatopœia, 285, 287;
on the origin of speech, 289;
on fundamental metaphor, 344;
on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 351
Hobbes on the copula, 172, 173
Hogg on a dog understanding words, 125
Holden on the vocabularies of children, 372, 373
_Homo._ _See_ Man
Horace on the origin of speech, 240
Horse, sign-making by, 97
Hoste, Sir W., on intelligence of monkeys, 101
Hottentots, language of, 291, 373, 374
Houzeau, on dogs seeking water in hollows, 51;
on tones used by the common hen as signs, 96;
on talking birds, 129, 130;
on danger signals of birds, 369
Hovelacque, on demonstrative elements, 244;
on auxiliary words, 247;
on formulæ of language-structure, 248;
on affinities of languages, 250, 255;
on limitations of consonantal sounds in various languages, 373
Huber on sign-making by insects, 88-90
Human. _See_ Man
Humboldt on the origin of speech, 240
Hun, Dr. E. R., on spontaneous invention of words by young children,
140-143
Hungarian language. _See_ Language
Huxley, Professor, on importance of the evolution theory in relation
to anthropology, 2, 3;
on animal automatism, 11;
on the brain-weight of man as compared with that of anthropoid apes,
16;
on ideas, 23, 43;
on importance of language to development of human thought, 134;
on smallness of anatomical difference which determines or prevents
power of articulation, 153, 370, 371;
on psychology of judgment, 164;
on erect attitude assumed by gibbon and gorilla, 381, 382
I
Icelandic language. _See_ Language
Ideas, definition and classification of, 20-39;
as recepts, chap. iii.;
as concepts, chap. iv.;
as general and generic, 38, 39, 68, 69, 276-281, 336, 337;
as abstract, 20-39, 70-80;
of causation in brutes, 58-60,
and in man, 210;
of uneducated deaf-mutes, 149-151;
psychological classification of artificial, 234-237;
of savages, 337, 338, 349-353
Idiots, psychology of, 104, 105;
meaningless and imitative articulation by, 121;
ideation of, 152
Incorporating. _See_ Languages
Indians, sign-making by, 105-113;
languages of, 249, 255, 259, 260
Indicative phase of language. _See_ Language
Indicative signs, or stage of language. _See_ Language
Indo-European languages. _See_ Languages
Infant. _See_ Child
Inflectional. _See_ Languages
Instinct, defined, 7;
of man and brutes compared, 7, 8
Intellect of man and brutes compared, 9
Introspection. _See_ Self-consciousness
Isolating. _See_ Languages
J
Jackdaw, sign-making by, 97
James on language of savages, 349
Javanese language. _See_ Language
Johnson, Capt., on intelligence of monkeys, 100, 101
Jones, Sir W., on the origin of speech, 240
Judgment, unconscious or intuitive, 48, 49, 189;
J. S. Mill upon, 48;
psychology of, 163-237;
G. H. Lewes upon, 164;
Professor Huxley upon, 164;
St. G. Mivart upon, 165, 166;
Professor Max Müller upon, 165;
in relation to recepts, concepts, and thought, 163-193;
Professor Sayce upon, 170;
pre-conceptual, 227-230, 278, 384, 386;
blank form of, 166, 167, 319, 320
K
Khetshua language. _See_ Language
Kleinpaul on gesture language, 120
L
Landois on sign-making by bees, 90
Langley, S. P., on intelligence of a spider, 62, 63
Language, in relation to brain-weight, 16;
abstraction dependent on, 25, 30-39;
not always necessary to thought, 81-83;
etymology and different signification of the word, 85;
categories of, 85-89;
as sign-making exhibited by brutes, 88-102;
of tone and gesture, 104-120;
articulate, spontaneously imitated by children, 138-143;
of tone and gesture in relation to words, 145-162;
stages of, as indicative, denotative, connotative, denominative, and
predicative, 157-193;
in relation to self-consciousness, 212;
growth of, in child, 218-237;
theories concerning origin of, in race, 238-242, 361-384;
evolution of, 240-245, 264, 265;
roots of, 241-245, 248, 249;
differentiation of, into parts of speech, 294-320, 339-342;
demonstrative elements of, 243-245;
of savages deficient in abstract terms, 349-353;
nursery, 365, 366;
Chinese, 246, 253, 256, 257, 265, 266, 298, 300, 317, 338, 373;
Magyar, 253;
Turkish, 253;
Basque, 258, 260, 311;
Etruscan, 258;
Hungarian, 259;
Malay, 259, 301, 305, 311, 351;
Latin, 267;
Egyptian, 297, 298, 310, 311;
English, 247, 259, 266, 338, 348, 373;
Khetshua, 263;
Hebrew, 266, 309;
Greek, 301, 310, 320;
Taic, 305;
Sanskrit, 266-277, 301, 309, 354;
Zend, 309;
Lithuanic, 309;
Icelandic, 309;
Coptic, 310;
Javanese, 311;
Malagassy, 311;
Philippine, 311;
Syriac, 311;
Dayak, 317;
Feejee, 318;
Cheyenne, 348;
Australian, 351;
Eskimo, 351;
Zulu, 351;
Tasmanian, 352;
Kurd, 352;
Japanese, 373;
Hottentot, 373, 374
Languages, number of, 245;
classification of, 245-251;
isolating, radical, or monosyllabic, 245, 246, 267, 268;
agglutinative or agglomerative, 247;
inflective or transpositive, 247, 248;
polysynthetic or incapsulating, 249;
incorporating, 245-250;
analytic, 250;
affinities of, 250-259;
native American, 249, 255, 259-263, 265, 311, 342, 348, 349, 351;
African, 260, 263, 291, 337, 338, 351, 373, 374;
Aryan and Indo-European, 266-278, 298, 304, 309, 314, 423;
Semitic, 266, 311;
Romance, 308;
Polynesian, 318
Latham, Dr., on the growth of language, 241;
on language of savages in respect of abstraction, 351, 352
Latin, roots of, 267.
_See_ also Language
Laura Bridgman, her syntax, 116;
her instinctive articulate sounds, 122
Lazarus, on ideas, 44, 45;
on origin of speech, 361
Lee, Mrs., on talking birds, 130
Lefroy, Sir John, on intelligence of a dog, 99
Leibnitz on teaching a dog to articulate, 128
Leroy on intelligence of wolf, 53;
of stag, 54, 55;
of fox, 55, 56;
of rooks, 56, 57
Lewes, G. H., on the logic of feelings and of signs, 47;
on judgment, 164;
on pre-perception, 185
Links between ape and man missing, 19
Lithuanic language. _See_ Language
Locke on ideas, 20-23, 28-30, 65, 342
Logic, of recepts, chap. iii.;
of concepts, 47, and chap. iv.
Long on gesture-language, 120
Lubbock, Sir John, on communication by ants, 94, 95;
on teaching a dog written signs, 101, 102
Lucretius on the origin of speech, 240
Ludwig on demonstrative elements, 244
M
Magyar language. _See_ Language
Malagassy language. _See_ Language
Malay language. _See_ Language
Malle, Dureau de la, on intelligence of brutes, 12
Mallery, Lieut.-Col., on sign-making by Indians and deaf-mutes, &c.,
105-112, 117-120;
on teaching a dog to articulate, 128;
on sign for a barking dog, 146;
on genetic relation between gestures and words, 342, 348, 349
Man, antecedent remarks on psychology of, 4-6;
points of resemblance between his psychology and that of brutes,
6-10;
points of difference, 10-39;
intelligence of savage, 13, 16, 17, 215, 337, 338, 349-353,
and of palæolithic and neolithic, 14, 213, 214;
corporeal structure of, 19;
animism of savage and primitive, 275;
speechless, 277;
differences between infantile, and infantile child as regards
development of speech, 329-334;
use of personal pronoun by early, 300, 301, 387-389;
hypotheses as to mode of origin of, from brute, 361-389;
superior use by, of the sense of sight, 366, 367;
possibly speechless condition of early, 370-379
Mansel, Dean, on ideas as general and abstract, 42
Maudsley, Dr., on self-consciousness, 212
Maury on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 351
M’Cook, Rev. Dr., on sign-making by ants, 95
Metaphor, importance of, in evolution of speech, 343-349
Meunier, on the understanding of words by brutes, 125;
on talking birds, 130
Midas, a, recognizing pictorial representations, 188
Mill, James, on the copula, 173
Mill, John Stuart, on ideas as abstract and concrete, 25;
on the logic of feelings and of signs, 41, 42;
on judgment, 48;
on connotation and denomination, 169;
on conception, 172;
on the copula, 173;
on predication, 236
Milligan on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 352
Mind, undergoes evolution, 4-6;
of man and brute compared, 7-39;
classification of faculties of artificial, 234
Missing links, 19
Mivart, St. George, on psychology of brutes, 10, 177;
on animal automatism, 11;
on superiority of savage mind to simian, 16;
on absence in brutes of the idea of causality, 58;
on relation of thought to speech, 83;
on categories of language, 85, 86;
on rationality of brutes, 87;
on psychology of judgment, 165-167;
on thought and reflection, 177, 178
Mixed ideas. _See_ Ideas
Moffat, R., on invention of languages by children, 263
Monboddo on the origin of speech, 240
Monkeys, general intelligence of, 60, 61, 100, 101;
discovering mechanical principles, 60, 61, 213, 214;
more intelligent and imitative than parrots, 153;
recognizing pictorial representations, 188;
understanding words, 369;
using stones to open oysters, 382
Monosyllabic. _See_ Languages
Morality, alleged to distinguish man from brute, 17-19, 346;
terms relating to, derived from ideas morally indifferent, 346, 347
Morshead, E. J., on comparative psychology, 37
Moschkan, Dr. A., on talking birds, 130
Müller, F., on sign-making by bees, 90
Müller, J., on absence in brutes of the idea of causality, 58
Müller, Professor Friedrich, on ideas, 45;
on language, as not identical with thought, 83;
on classification of languages, 245;
on sentence-words, 296;
on undifferentiated language of child, 297;
on origin of pronouns, 302;
on the genitive case, 305;
on the origin of speech, 362
Müller, Professor F. Max, on ideas, 42, 43;
on language as necessary to thought, 81, 83;
on psychology of judgment, 165;
on the copula, 173;
on origin of the personal pronoun, 210;
on evolution of language, 241;
on demonstrative elements, 244, 423;
on roots of Sanskrit, 267-289;
on undifferentiated language of young children, 296, 317;
on sentence-words, 298-300, 317;
on gesture origin of pronouns, 302,
and of language in general, 354;
on origin of adjectives, 306;
on the origin of verbs, 307;
on Chinese sentence-words, 317;
on Aristotle’s logic as based on Greek grammar, 320, 321;
on philology proving that human thought has proceeded from the
abstract to the concrete, 334-336;
on names necessarily implying concepts, 336, 337;
on fundamental metaphor, 344, 345;
on imperfection of early names, 356;
on the evolution of parts of speech, 423;
on the general theory of evolution, 432, 433
N
Names, in relation to abstract and generic ideas, 31, 32, 57, 58,
70-78, 174, 273-281, 336-339;
not always necessary for thoughts, 81-83;
or thoughts for them, 226, 336-339
Natterer, J., on the languages of Brazil, 263
Negro, intelligence of, 13;
Mr. Mivart’s use of the term to illustrate the psychology of
predication, 166, 235
Neuter insects, instincts of, 297-299
Nodier, on onomatopœia, 288;
on metaphor, 344
Noiré, on ideas, 43;
on the origin of speech, 288, 289, 379-381;
on the origin of pronouns, 302;
on fundamental metaphor, 344, 345
Nominalism, 145
Noun-substantives, appropriately used by parrots, 129, 152;
early use of, by children, 218;
of earlier linguistic growth than verbs or pronouns, 275;
not differentiated in early forms of speech, 295 _et seq._;
oblique cases of, as attribute-words, 306, 385
O
Onomatopœia, in nursery-language, 136, 244;
in relation to the origin of speech, 282-293, 339
Orang-outang. _See_ Apes
Oregon, climate and native languages of, 262
P
Palæontology. _See_ Geology
Parrots, talking of, 128-138;
use of indicative signs by, 158;
denotative and connotative powers of, 179-191, 222-226;
statements made by, 189, 190
Particular ideas. _See_ Ideas
Parts of speech, differentiation of language into, 294-320, 339-342,
423
Peckham, Mr. and Mrs., on memory in a spider, 207
Perception, analogies between reason and, 32;
constituted by fusions of sensations, 37;
in relation to other mental faculties, 48;
illusions of, 49
Perez on psychogenesis of the child, 26, 41, 158, 210
Philippine language. _See_ Language
Philology. _See_ Language
Pickering on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 352
Pictures recognized as portraits, &c., by infants, dogs, and monkeys,
188, 189
Pig taught to point game, 97
Poescher on the Aryan race, 273
Pointing, game by a pig, 97;
of setter-dogs, 97, 98;
as the first stage of language, 157, 158
Polynesian languages. _See_ Languages
Polysynthetic. _See_ Languages
Pony, sign-making by, 97
Pott, on the origin of speech, 240;
on language-roots, 267;
on names for thunder, 286;
on fundamental metaphor, 344
Powers on the climate of California, 261
Pre-concepts, 185-193, 218, 219, 227-230, 278, 384, 386
Predicate, the, 305, 306, 423
Predication, 88, 89, 157, 162-164, 169, 171, 175, 227, 235-237, 294
_et seq._, 384, 386, 387, 422
Prepositions not differentiated in early forms of speech, 295
_et seq._
Preyer, on psychogenesis of the child, 26, 219, 221, 222;
on sensuous computation of number, 57, 58
Primates. _See_ Apes _and_ Monkeys
Pritchard on Celtic languages, 275
Progress in successive generations, 12-15
Pronoun, first personal, 201, 232, 301, 387-389, 408, 409
Pronouns and pronominal elements, 210, 275;
not differentiated in early forms of speech, 295 _et seq._;
origin of, in gestures, 301-304, 387, 421, 422
Proposition. _See_ Predication
Psychogenesis. _See_ Child
Psychology. _See_ Mind
Q
Quadrumana. _See_ Apes _and_ Monkeys
R
Radical. _See_ Languages
Ray on different tones used by the common hen, 96
Reason in relation to perception, 32;
to sensation, 37;
and to other mental faculties in general, 48
Recepts, defined, 36-39;
logic of, 40-69;
recognized by previous writers, 40-45;
in relation to the intellectual faculties, 48-50, 234;
examples of, in the animal kingdom, 51-63;
as primitive as percepts, 64-69;
of water-fowl, 74;
in relation to judgment and self-consciousness, 176-193;
as higher and lower, 184-193;
counting by, 214, 215;
naming by, 218, 219;
of the framers of Sanskrit, 277-279;
philologically prior to concepts, 343-349
Reflection in relation to reflex action, 48.
_See also_ Thought
Reflex action, 48
Religion alleged to distinguish man from brute, 17, 19, 346
Renan on roots of Hebrew, 266
Rengger on different tones uttered by the cebus, 96
Reptiles, understanding by, of tones of human voice, 124
Ribot, Professor, on self-consciousness, 212
Richter on obliteration of the original meanings of words, 284
Romance languages. _See_ Languages
Romanes, on teaching an ape to count, 58;
on intelligence of cebus, 60, 61;
on sign-making by caterpillars, 95, 96;
on pointing of setter-dogs, 97, 98;
on sign-making by other dogs, 100, 221;
on infant intelligence, 122, 159, 160, 188, 189, 218-220, 232, 283,
324;
on dogs and apes understanding words, 124-126;
on talking birds, 129, 130;
on ideation of deaf-mutes, 149, 150
Rooks, intelligence of, 56, 57
Roots of language. _See_ Language
S
Sandwith on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 352
Sanskrit. _See_ Language
Sayce, Professor, on differences of degree and kind, 3;
on terms as abbreviated judgments, 170;
on the number of languages, 245;
on the affinities between languages, 250-259;
on monosyllabic origin of language, 268;
on civilization of the Aryan race, 272;
on antiquity of the Aryan race, 273;
on rarity of general terms in savage languages, 280;
on onomatopœia, 286;
on the clicks in the language of Hottentots, etc., 291, 373, 374;
on sentence-words, 299, 300, 303;
on the origin of pronouns, 302;
on the genitive case, the predicate, and the attribute, 305, 306,
313, 423;
on the evolution of nouns, adjectives, and verbs, 308;
on Aristotle’s logic as based on Greek grammar, 321;
on deficiency of savage languages in abstract terms, 352;
on Noiré’s theory of the origin of speech, 380
Schelling on parts of speech, 295, 296
Schlegel on the origin of speech, 240
Schleicher, on evolution of language, 241;
on formulæ of language-structure, 248
Scott, Dr., on psychology of idiots and deaf-mutes, 104, 105, 115,
116, 121
Scott, Sir Walter, on a dog understanding words, 125
Self-consciousness, condition to introspective reflection or thought,
175;
absent in brutes, 175, 176;
genesis of, 194-212;
philosophy and psychology of, 194, 195;
character of, in man and in brutes, 195-212;
as inward and outward, or receptual and conceptual, 199, 200;
growth of, in child, 200-212, 228, 229-234
Semitic. _See_ Languages
Sensation in relation to perception and reason, 37;
and to other mental faculties in general, 48
Sentence and sentence-words, 296 _et seq._
Sicard, Abbé, on syntax of gesture-language, 116
Sight, superior use of sense of, by man, 366, 367
Signs and sign-making. _See_ Language
Simple ideas. _See_ Ideas
Skeat, Professor, on Aryan roots of English, 266
Skinner, Major, on intelligence of elephants, 98
Smith, Rev. S., on ideation of deaf-mutes, 150
Snakes, understanding by, of tones of human voice, 124
Solomon, quoted, 195
Somnambulism in animals, 149
Speech. _See_ Language
Spider, intelligence of, 62, 63, 153, 207
Steinthal, on ideas, 45;
first issue of his _Zeitschrift_, 240;
on roots of language, 277;
on onomatopœia, 286;
on primitive forms of predication, 318
Stephen, Leslie, on intelligence of the dog, 54
Stephen, Sir James, on dependence of thought upon language, 85
Street, A. E., on vocabulary of a young child, 143, 144
Substantive. _See_ Noun _and_ Verb
Sullivan, Sir J., on talking birds, 130
Sully, J., on ideas, 40, 41;
on illusions of perception, 49;
on rise of self-consciousness in the growing child, 201-203, 207,
210, 212
Sweet, on animistic thought of primitive man, 275;
on the evolution of grammatical forms, 306, 315, 316
Syntax, of gesture-language, 107-120;
of different spoken languages, 246, 247;
of gesture-language in relation to that of early speech, 339-342,
385
Syriac language. _See_ Language
T
Taine, on psychogenesis of the child, 26, 66, 67, 180, 181;
on abstract ideas, 31, 32;
on self-consciousness, 212
Thought, distinguished from reason, 12;
absent in brutes, 29, 30;
dependent on language, 30, 31;
simplest element of, 165, 174, 215, 216;
animistic, of primitive and savage man, 275;
not necessary to naming, 226, 336-339
Toads, understanding by, of tones of human voice, 124
Tone. _See_ Language
Tools, said to be only used by man, 19;
names of, derived from activities requiring only natural organs,
345-347;
used by monkeys, 382
Threlkeld on language of savages, 349
Transposition. _See_ Languages
Tschudi, Baron von, on the Khetshua language, 262, 263
Turkish language. _See_ Language
Tylor, on sign-making by Indians and deaf-mutes, 105-108, 113-117;
on articulate sounds instinctively made by deaf-mutes, 122;
on ideation of deaf-mutes, 150
V
Varro on roots of Latin, 267
Verbs, appropriately used by parrots, 130, 152;
substantive, 167, 308-312;
early use of, by children, 219;
early origin of, 274;
not differentiated in early forms of speech, 295 _et seq._;
development of, 275, 307, 308, 385, 386
Voice. _See_ Language
Volition of man and brutes compared, 8
W
Waitz, Professor, on self-consciousness, 212;
on the sentence as the unit of language, 296
Wallace, A. R., on intelligence of savage man in relation to his
cerebral development, 15, 16
Ward on the descent of man, 365
Wasps, sign-making by, 88-90
Watson on understanding of words by brutes, 125
Wedgwood, on roots of language, 268;
on onomatopœia, 288
Westropp, H. M., on intelligence of a bear, 51
Whitney, Professor, on dependence of thought upon words, 83;
on superiority of voice to gesture in sign-making, 147, 148;
on our ignorance of polysynthetic languages, 255, 256;
on monosyllabic origin of language, 267;
on civilization of the Aryan race, 272;
on the growth of language, 290;
on priority of words to sentences, 333, 334;
on fundamental metaphor, 343;
on the possibly speechless condition of primitive man, 369
Wildman on bees understanding tones of human voice, 124
Wilkes, Dr. S., on talking birds, 131, 132, 136
Will. _See_ Volition
Wolf, intelligence of, 53
Wright, Chauncey, on language in relation to brain-weight, 16;
on self-consciousness, 199, 206, 207, 212
Wundt, Professor, on latent period in seeing and hearing, 146;
on self-consciousness, 197, 200, 201, 208, 211, 212;
on evolution of language, 265;
on the distinction between ideas as general and generic, 279, 280;
on onomatopœia, 287, 291;
on objective phraseology of primitive speech, 301;
on sentence-words, 304
Y
Youatt on a pig being taught to point game, 97
Z
Zend language. _See_ Language
Zoological affinity between man and brute, 19
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _Man’s Place in Nature_, p. 59.
[2] It is perhaps desirable to explain from the first that by the words
“difference of kind,” as used in the above paragraph and elsewhere
throughout this treatise, I mean difference of _origin_. This is the
only real distinction that can be drawn between the terms “difference
of kind” and “difference of degree;” and I should scarcely have deemed
it worth while to give the definition, had it not been for the confused
manner in which the terms are used by some writers—_e.g._ Professor
Sayce, who says, while speaking of the development of languages from
a common source, “differences of degree become in time differences of
kind” (_Introduction to the Science of Language_, ii. 309).
[3] See _Mental Evolution in Animals_, chapter on the Emotions.
[4] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, p. 159. “The term is a generic
one, comprising all the faculties of mind which are concerned in
conscious and adaptive action, antecedent to individual experience,
without necessary knowledge of the relation between means employed and
ends attained, but similarly performed under similar and frequently
recurring circumstances by all individuals of the same species.”
[5] Of course my opponents will not allow that this word can be
properly applied to the psychology of any brute. But I am not now
using it in a question-begging sense: I am using it only to avoid the
otherwise necessary expedient of coining a new term. Whatever view we
may take as to the relations between human and animal psychology, we
must in some way distinguish between the different ingredients of each,
and so between the instinct, the emotion, and the intelligence of an
animal. See _Mental Evolution in Animals_, p. 335, et seq.
[6] If any one should be disposed to do so, I can only reply to him
in the words of Professor Huxley, who puts the case tersely and
well:—“What is the value of the evidence which leads one to believe
that one’s fellow-man feels? The only evidence in this argument from
analogy is the similarity of his structure and of his actions to
one’s own, and if that is good enough to prove that one’s fellow-man
feels, surely it is good enough to prove that an ape feels,” etc.
(_Critiques and Addresses_, p. 282). To this statement of the case
Mr. Mivart offers, indeed, a criticism, but it is one of a singularly
feeble character. He says, “Surely it is not by similarity of structure
or actions, but by _language_ that men are placed in communication
with one another.” To this it seems sufficient to ask, in the first
place, whether language is not action; and, in the next, whether, as
expressive of _suffering_, articulate speech is regarded by us as more
“eloquent” than inarticulate cries and gestures?
[7] Of course where the term Reason is intended to signify
Introspective Thought, the above remarks do not apply, further than to
indicate the misuse of the term.
[8] I here neglect to consider the view of Bishop Butler, and others
who have followed him, that animals may have an immortal principle as
well as man; for, if this view is maintained, it serves to identify,
not to separate, human and brute psychology. The dictum of Aristotle
and Buffon, that animals differ from man in having no power of
mental apprehension, may also be disregarded; for it appears to be
sufficiently disposed of by the following remark of Dureau de la Malle,
which I here quote as presenting some historical interest in relation
to the theory of natural selection. He says: “Si les animaux n’étaient
pas suscéptibles d’apprendre les moyens de se conserver, les espèces se
seraient anéanties.”
[9] John Fiske, _Excursions of an Evolutionist_, pp. 42, 43 (1884).
[10] _Natural Selection_, p. 343. It will subsequently appear, as a
general consequence of our investigation of savage psychology, that of
these two opposite opinions the one advocated by Mr. Mivart is best
supported by facts. But I may here adduce one or two considerations of
a more special nature bearing upon this point. First, as to cerebral
_structure_, the case is thus summed up by Professor Huxley:—“The
difference in weight of brain between the highest and the lowest man
is far greater, both relatively and absolutely, than that between
the lowest man and the highest ape. The latter, as has been seen, is
represented by, say 12 ounces of cerebral substance absolutely, or by
32:20 relatively; but, as the largest recorded human brain weighed
between 65 and 66 ounces, the former difference is represented by
more than 33 ounces absolutely, or by 65:32 relatively. Regarded
systematically, the cerebral differences of man and apes are not of
more than generic value—his family distinction resting chiefly on his
dentition, his pelves, and his lower limbs” (_Man’s Place in Nature_,
p. 103). Next, concerning cerebral _function_, Mr. Chauncey Wright well
remarks:—“A psychological analysis of the faculty of language shows
that even the smallest proficiency in it might require more brain power
than the greatest proficiency in any other direction” (_North American
Review_, Oct. 1870, p. 295). After quoting this, Mr. Darwin observes of
savage man, “He has invented and is able to use various weapons, tools,
traps, &c., with which he defends himself, kills or catches prey,
and otherwise obtains food. He has made rafts or canoes for fishing,
or crossing over to neighbouring fertile islands. He has discovered
the art of making fire.... These several inventions, by which man in
the rudest state has become so preeminent, are the direct results
of the development of his powers of observation, memory, curiosity,
imagination, and reason. I cannot, therefore, understand how it is that
Mr. Wallace maintains that ‘natural selection could only have endowed
the savage with a brain a little superior to that of an ape’” (_Descent
of Man_, pp. 48, 49).
[11] _The Human Species_, English trans., p. 22.
[12] Sundry other and still more special distinctions of a
psychological kind have been alleged by various writers as obtaining
between man and the lower animals—such as making fire, employing
barter, wearing clothes, using tools, and so forth. But as all
these distinctions are merely particular instances, or detailed
illustrations, of the more intelligent order of ideation which belongs
to mankind, it is needless to occupy space with their discussion.
Here, also, I may remark that in this work I am not concerned with
the popular objection to Darwinism on account of “missing-links,” or
the absence of fossil remains structurally intermediate between those
of man and the anthropoid apes. This is a subject that belongs to
palæontology, and, therefore, its treatment would be out of place in
these pages. Nevertheless, I may here briefly remark that the supposed
difficulty is not one of any magnitude. Although to the popular
mind it seems almost self-evident that if there ever existed a long
series of generations connecting the bodily structure of man with
that of the higher apes, at least some few of their bones ought now
to be forthcoming; the geologist too well knows how little reliance
can be placed on such merely negative testimony where the record of
geology is in question. Countless other instances may now be quoted of
connecting links having been but recently found between animal groups
which are zoologically much more widely separated than are apes and
men. Indeed, so destitute of force is this popular objection held to
be by geologists, that it is not regarded by them as amounting to any
objection at all. On the other hand, the close anatomical resemblance
that subsists between man and the higher apes—every bone, muscle,
nerve, vessel, etc., in the enormously complex structure of the one
coinciding, each to each, with the no less enormously complex structure
of the other—speaks so voluminously in favour of an uninterrupted
continuity of descent, that, as before remarked, no one who is at
all entitled to speak upon the subject has ventured to dispute this
continuity so far as the corporeal structure is concerned. All the
few naturalists who still withhold their assent from the theory of
evolution in its reference to man, expressly base their opinion on
those grounds of psychology which it is the object of the present
treatise to investigate.
[13] In my previous work I devoted a chapter to “Imagination,” in
which I treated of the psychology of ideation so far as animals are
concerned. It is now needful to consider ideation with reference to
man; and, in order to do this, it is further needful to revert in
some measure to the ideation of animals. I will, however, try as far
as possible to avoid repeating myself, and therefore in the three
following chapters I will assume that the reader is already acquainted
with my previous work. Indeed, the argument running through the three
following chapters cannot be fully appreciated unless their perusal
is preceded by that of chapters ix. and x. of _Mental Evolution in
Animals_.
[14] _Human Understanding_, bk. ii., chap. ii., 10, 11. To this passage
Berkeley objected that it is impossible to form an abstract idea of
quality as apart from any concrete idea of object; _e.g._ an idea of
motion distinct from that of any body moving. (See _Principles of
Human Knowledge_, Introd. vii.-xix.). This is a point which I cannot
fully treat without going into the philosophy of the great discussion
on Nominalism, Realism, and Conceptualism—a matter which would take
me beyond the strictly psychological limits within which I desire
to confine my work. It will, therefore, be enough to point out that
Berkeley’s criticism here merely amounts to showing that Locke did not
pursue sufficiently far his philosophy of Nominalism. What Locke did
was to see, and to state, that a general or abstract idea embodies a
perception of likeness between individuals of a kind while disregarding
the differences; what he failed to do was to take the further step of
showing that such an idea is not an idea in the sense of being a mental
image; it is merely an intellectual symbol of an actually impossible
existence, namely, of quality apart from object. Intellectual symbolism
of this kind is performed mainly through the agency of verbal or other
conventional signs (as we shall see later on), and it is owing to
a clearer understanding of this process that Realism was gradually
vanquished by Nominalism. The only difference, then, between Locke
and Berkeley here is, that the nominalism of the former was not so
complete or thorough as that of the latter. I may remark that if in the
following discussion I appear to fail in distinctly setting forth the
doctrine of nominalism, I do so only in order that my investigation
may avoid needless collision with conceptualism. For myself I am a
nominalist, and agree with Mill that to say we think in concepts is
only another way of saying that we think in class names.
[15] This simile has been previously used by Mr. Galton himself, and
also by Mr. Huxley in his work on Hume.
[16] Hence, the only valid distinction that can be drawn between
abstraction and generalization is that which has been drawn by
Hamilton, as follows: “Abstraction consists in concentration of
attention upon a particular object, or particular quality of an object,
and diversion of it from everything else. The notion of the _figure_
of the desk before me is an abstract idea—an idea that makes part of
the total notion of that body, and on which I have concentrated my
attention, in order to consider it exclusively. This idea is abstract,
but it is at the same time individual: it represents the figure of this
particular desk, and not the figure of any other body.” Generalization,
on the other hand, consists in an ideal compounding of abstractions,
“when, comparing a number of objects, we seize on their resemblances;
when we concentrate our attention on these points of similarity.... The
general notion is thus one which makes us know a quality, property,
power, notion, relation, in short, any point of view under which we
recognize a plurality of objects as a unity.” Thus, there may be
abstraction without generalization; but inasmuch as abstraction has
then to do only with particulars, this phase of it is disregarded
by most writers on psychology, who therefore employ abstraction
and generalization as convertible terms. Mill says, “By _abstract_
I shall always, in Logic proper, mean the opposite of _concrete_;
by an abstract name the name of an attribute; by a concrete name,
the name of an object” (_Logic_, i. § 4). Such limitation, however,
is arbitrary—it being the same kind of mental act to “concentrate
attention upon a particular _object_,” as it is to do so upon any
“particular _quality_ of an object.” Of course in this usage Mill is
following the schoolmen, and he expressly objects to the change first
introduced (apparently) by Locke, and since generally adopted. But it
is of little consequence in which of the two senses now explained a
writer chooses to employ the word “abstract,” provided he is consistent
in his own usage.
[17] The age here mentioned closely corresponds with that which is
given by M. Perez, who says:—“At seven months he compares better
than at three; and he appears at this age to have visual perceptions
associated with ideas of _kind_: for instance, he connects the
different flavours of a piece of bread, of a cake, of fruit, with their
different forms and colours” (_First Three Years of Childhood_, English
trans., p. 31).
[18] _Die Seele des Kindes_, s. 87.
[19] Taine, _Intelligence_, p. 18.
[20] _Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. ii., §§ 5-7.
[21] If required, proof of this fact is to be found in abundance in the
chapter on “Imagination,” _Mental Evolution in Animals_, pp. 142-158.
It is there shown that imagination in animals is not dependent only on
associations aroused by sensuous impressions from without, but reaches
the level of carrying on a train of mental imagery _per se_.
[22] _Loc. cit._, pp. 397-399. Allusion may also be here conveniently
made to an interesting and suggestive work by another French writer,
M. Binet (_La Psychologie du Raisonnement_, 1886). His object is to
show that all processes of reasoning are fundamentally identical with
those of perception. In order to do this he gives a detailed exposition
of the general fact that processes of both kinds depend on “fusions”
of states of consciousness. In the case of perception the elements
thus fused are sensations, while in the case of reasoning they are
perceptions—in both cases the principle of association being alike
concerned.
[23] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, p. 118.
[24] In this connection I may quote the following very lucid statements
from a paper by the Secretary of the Victoria Institute, which is
directed against the general doctrine that I am endeavouring to
advance, _i.e._ that there is no distinction of kind between brute and
human psychology.
“Abstraction and generalization only become intellectual when they are
utilized by the intellect. A bull is irritated by a red colour, and not
by the object of which redness is a property; but it would be absurd to
say that the bull voluntarily abstracts the phenomenon of redness from
these objects. The process is essentially one of abstraction, and yet
at the same time it is essentially automatic.” And with reference to
the ideation of brutes in general, he continues:—“Certain qualities
of an object engage his attention to the exclusion of other qualities,
which are disregarded; and thus he abstracts automatically. The image
of an object having been imprinted on his memory, the feelings which
it excited are also imprinted on his memory, and on the reproduction
of the image these feelings and the actions resulting therefrom are
reproduced, likewise automatically: thus he acts from experience,
automatically still. The image may be the image of the same object, or
the image of another object of the same species, but the effect is the
same, and thus he generalizes, automatically also.” Lastly, speaking of
inference, he says:—“This method is common to man and brute, and, like
the faculties of abstraction, &c., it only becomes intellectual when
we choose to make it so.” (E. J. Morshead, in an essay on _Comparative
Psychology_, _Journ. Vic. Inst._, vol. v., pp. 303, 304, 1870.) In
the work of M. Binet already alluded to, the distinction in question
is also recognized. For he says that the “fusion” of sensations which
takes place in an act of perception is performed automatically (_i.e._
is receptual); while the “fusion” of perceptions which are concerned in
an act of reason is performed intentionally (_i.e._ is conceptual).
[25] The more elaborate analysis of German psychologists has yielded
five orders instead of three; namely, _Wahrnehmung_, _Anschauung_,
_Vorstellungen_, _Erfahrungsbegriff_, and _Verstandesbegriff_. But for
the purposes of this treatise it is needless to go into these finer
distinctions.
[26] _Outlines of Psychology_, p. 342. The italics are mine. It will
be observed that Mr. Sully here uses the term “generic” in exactly the
sense which I propose.
[27] _First Three Years of Childhood_, English trans., pp. 180-182.
[28] _Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy_, p. 403.
[29] To this, Max Müller objects on account of its veiled
conceptualism—seeing that it represents the “notion” as
chronologically prior to the “name” (_Science of Thought_, p. 268).
With this criticism, however, I am not concerned. Whether “the many
pictures” which the mind thus forms, and blends together into what
Locke terms a “compound idea,” deserve, when so blended, to be called
“a general notion” or a “concept”—this is a question of terminology
of which I steer clear, by assigning to such compound ideas the term
recepts, and reserving the term notions, or concepts, for compound
ideas _after they have been named_.
[30] _Logos_, p. 175, quoted by Max Müller, who adds:—“The followers
of Hume might possibly look upon the faded images of our memory as
abstract ideas. Our memory, or, what is often equally important, our
oblivescence, seems to them able to do what abstraction, as Berkeley
shows, never can do; and under its silent sway many an idea, or cluster
of ideas, might seem to melt away till nothing is left but a mere
shadow. These shadows, however, though they may become very vague,
remain percepts; they are not concepts” (_Science of Thought_, p.
453). Now, I say it is equally evident that these shadows are _not_
percepts: they are the result of the _fusion_ of percepts, no one of
which corresponds to their generic sum. Seeing, then, that they are
neither percepts nor concepts, and yet such highly important elements
in ideation, I coin for them the distinctive name of recepts.
[31] _Life of Hume_, p. 96.
[32] Steinthal and Lazarus, however, in dealing with the problem
touching the origin of speech, present in an adumbrated fashion this
doctrine of receptual ideation with special reference to animals. For
instance, Lazarus says, “Es gibt in der gewöhnlichen Erfahrung kein
so einfaches Ding von einfacher Beschaffenheit, dass wir es durch
_eine_ Sinnesempfindung wahrnehmen könnten; erst aus der Sammlung
seiner Eigenschaften, d. h. erst aus der _Verbindung_ der mehreren
Empfindungen ergibt sich _die Wahrnehmung eines Dinges_: erst indem
wir die weisse Farbe sehen, die Härte fühlen und den süssen Geschmack
empfinden, erkennen wir ein Stück Zucker” (_Das Leben der Seele_
(1857), 8, ii. 66). This and other passages in the same work follow
the teaching of Steinthal; _e.g._ “Die Anschauung von einem Dinge
ist der Complex der sämmtlichen Empfindungserkenntnisse, die wir
von einem Dinge haben ... die Anschauung ist eine Synthesis, aber
eine unmittelbare, die durch die Einheit der Seele gegeben ist.”
And, following both these writers, Friedrich Müller says, “Diese
Sammlung und Einigung der verschiedenen Empfindungen gemäss der in
den Dingen verbundenen Eigenschaften heisst Anschauung” (_Grundriss
der Sprachwissenschaft_, i. 26). On the other hand, their brother
philologist, Geiger, strongly objects to this use of the term
_Anschauung_, under which, he says, “wird theils etwas von der
Sinneswahrnehmung gar nicht Unterschiedenes verstanden, theils auch
ein dunkles Etwas, welches, ohne dass die Bedingungen und Ursachen zu
erkennen sind, die Einheit der Wahrnehmungen zu kleineren und grössern
Complexen bewirken soll.... So dass ich eine solche ‘Synthesis’ nicht
auch bei dem Thiere ganz ebenso wie bei dem Menschen voraussetze: ich
glaube im Gegentheile, dass es sich mit der Sprache erst entwickelt”
(_Ursprung der Sprache_, 177, 178). Now, I have quoted these various
passages because they serve to render, in a brief and instructive
form, the different views which may be taken on a comparatively simple
matter owing to the want of well-defined terms. No doubt the use of
the term _Anschauung_ by the above writers is unfortunate; but by it
they appear to me clearly to indicate a nascent idea of what I mean by
a recept. They all three fail to bring out this idea in its fulness,
inasmuch as they restrict the powers of non-conceptual “synthesis” to
a grouping of simple perceptions furnished by different sense-organs,
instead of extending it to a synthesis of syntheses of perceptions,
whether furnished by the same or also by different senses. But these
three philologists are all on the right psychological track, and their
critic Geiger is quite wrong in saying that there can be no synthesis
of (non-conceptual) ideas without the aid of speech. As a matter of
fact the _dunkles Etwas_ which he complains of his predecessors as
importing into the ideation of animals, is an _Etwas_ which, when
brought out into clearer light, is fraught with the highest importance.
For, as we shall subsequently see, it is nothing less than the
needful psychological condition to the subsequent development both of
speech and thought. The term _Apperception_ as used by some German
psychologists is also inclusive of what I mean by receptual ideation.
But as it is also inclusive of conceptual, nothing would here be gained
by its adoption. Indeed F. Müller expressly restricts its meaning
to conceptual ideation, for he says, “Alle psychischen Processe bis
einschliesslich zur Perception lassen sich ohne Sprache ausführen und
vollkommen begreifen, die Apperception dagegen lässt sich nur an der
Hand der Sprache denken” (_loc. cit._ i., 29).
[33] As stated in a previous foot-note, this truth is well exhibited by
M. Binet, _loc. cit._
[34] The word Logic is derived from λόγος, which in turn is derived
from λέδω, to arrange, to lay in order, to pick up, to bind together.
[35] The terms Logic of Feelings and Logic of Signs were first
introduced and extensively employed by Comte. Afterwards they were
adopted, and still more extensively employed by Lewes, who, however,
seems to have thought that he so employed them in some different sense.
To me it appears that in this Lewes was mistaken. Save that Comte is
here, as elsewhere, intoxicated with theology, I think that the ideas
he intended to set forth under these terms are the same as those which
are advocated by Lewes—although his incoherency justifies the remark
of his follower:—“Being unable to understand this, I do not criticize
it” (_Probs. of Life and Mind_, iii., p. 239). The terms in question
are also sanctioned by Mill, as shown by the above quotation (p. 42).
[36] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, p. 62.
[37] Special attention, however, may be drawn to the fact that the
term “unconscious judgment” is not metaphorical, but serves to convey
in a technical sense what appears to be the precise psychology of
the process. For the distinguishing element of a judgment, in its
technical sense, is that it involves an element of _belief_. Now,
as Mill remarks, “when a stone lies before me, I am conscious of
certain sensations which I receive from it; but if I say that these
sensations come to me from an external object which I perceive, the
meaning of these words is, that receiving the sensations, I intuitively
believe that an external cause of those sensations exists” (_Logic_,
i., p. 58). In cases, such as that mentioned in the text, where the
“unconscious judgment” is wrong—_i.e._ the perception illusory—it
may, of course, be over-ridden by judgment of a higher order, and thus
we do not end by believing that the bowl is a sphere. Nevertheless,
so far as it is dependent on the testimony of our senses, the mind
judges erroneously in perceiving the bowl as a sphere. In his work on
_Illusions_, Mr. Sully has shown that illusions of perception arise
through the mental “application of a rule, valid for the majority of
cases, to an exceptional case.” In other words, an erroneous judgment
is made by the non-conceptual faculties of perception—this judgment
being formed upon the analogies supplied by past experience. Of course,
such an act of merely perceptual inference is not a judgment, strictly
so called; but it is clearly _allied_ to judgment, and convenience
is consulted by following established custom in designating it
“unconscious,” “intuitive,” or “perceptual judgment.”
[38] _Descent of Man_, p. 76.
[39] See _Animal Intelligence_, pp. 465, 466.
[40] Of course the words “general idea” and “concept” here are open to
that psychological objection for the avoidance of which I have coined
the terms generic idea and recept.
[41] In my previous works I have already quoted facts of animal
intelligence narrated by this author, but not any of those which I am
now about to use.
[42] _Intelligence of Animals_, English trans., p. 20.
[43] _Ibid._, p. 107. This identical illustration appears to have
occurred independently both to Mr. Darwin and Mr. Leslie Stephen. All
these writers use the terms “abstract” and “general” as above; but,
of course, as shown in my last chapter, this is merely a matter of
terminology—in my opinion, however, objectionable, because appearing
to assume, without analysis, that the ideation of brutes and of men is
identical in kind.
[44] _Ibid._, pp. 43, 44.
[45] _Ibid._, p. 39.
[46] _Ibid._, p. 30. In the present connection, also, I may refer
to the chapter on Imagination in my previous work, where sundry
illustrations are given of this faculty as it occurs in animals; for
wherever imagination leads to appropriate action, there is evidence
of a Logic of Recepts, which in the higher levels of imagination,
characteristic of man, passes into a Logic of Concepts.
Since publishing the chapter just alluded to, I have received an
additional and curious illustration of the imaginative faculty in
animals, which I think deserves to be published for its own sake. Of
course we may see in a general way that dogs and cats resemble children
in their play of “pretending” that inanimate objects are alive, and
this betokens a comparatively high level of the imaginative faculty.
The case which I am about to quote, however, appears to show that this
kind of imaginative play may extend in animals, as in children, to the
still higher level of not only pretending that inanimate objects are
alive, but of “peopling space with fancy’s airy forms.” I shall quote
the facts in the words of my correspondent, who is Miss Bramston, the
authoress.
“_Watch_ is a collie dog belonging to the Archbishop of Canterbury; but
lives with me a good deal, as Lambeth does not suit him. He is a very
remarkable dog in many ways, which I will not inflict on you. He is
very intelligent, understands many words, and can perform tricks. What
I mention him for, however, is that he is the only dog I ever met with
a dramatic faculty. His favourite drama is chasing imaginary pigs. He
used now and then to be sent to chase real pigs out of the field, and
after a time it became a custom for Miss Benson to open the door for
him after dinner in the evening, and say, ‘Pigs!’ when he always ran
about, wildly chasing imaginary pigs. If no one opened the door, he
went to it himself wagging his tail, asking for his customary drama. He
now reaches a further stage, for as soon as we get up after our last
meal he begins to bark violently, and if the door is open he rushes
out to chase imaginary pigs with no one saying the word ‘pigs’ at all.
He usually used to be sent out to chase pigs after prayers in the
evening, and when he came to my small house it was amusing to see that
he recognized the function of prayers, performed with totally different
accompaniments, to be the same as prayers performed in an episcopal
chapel, so far as he expected ‘Pigs’ to be the end of both. The word
‘Pigs,’ uttered in any tone, will always set him off playing the same
drama.”
[47] _Ibid._, pp. 125, 126.
[48] Professor Preyer has ascertained experimentally the number of
objects (such as shot-corns, pins, or dots on a piece of paper), which
admit of being simultaneously estimated with accuracy. (_Sitzungs
berichten der Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenshaft_, 29 Juli,
1881.) The number admits of being largely increased by practice, until,
with an exposure to view of one second’s duration, the estimate admits
of being correctly made up to between twenty and thirty objects. (See
also _Mental Evolution in Animals_, p. 138.)
[49] _Lessons from Nature_, pp. 219, 220.
[50] See _Animal Intelligence_, pp. 422-424.
[51] I may here observe that the earliest age in the infant at which
I have observed such appreciation of causality to occur is during the
sixth month. With my own children at that age I noticed that if I
made a knocking sound with my concealed foot, they would look round
and round the room with an obvious desire to ascertain the cause
that was producing the sound. Compare, also, _Mental Evolution in
Animals_, pp. 156-158, on emotions aroused in brutes by sense of the
_mysterious_—_i.e._ the _unexplained_.
[52] The reader is referred to the whole biography of this monkey
(_Animal Intelligence_, pp. 484-498) for a number of other facts
serving to show to how high a level of intelligent grouping—or of
“logic”—recepts may attain without the aid of concepts. In the same
connection I may refer to the chapter on “Imagination” in _Mental
Evolution in Animals_, and also to the following pages in _Animal
Intelligence_:—128-40; 181-97, 219-222, 233, 311-335, 337, 338, 340,
348-352, 377-385, 397-410, 413-425, 426-436, 445-470, 478-498.
[53] Taine, _On Intelligence_, pp. 16, 17.
[54] _Lectures_, vol. ii., p. 290.
[55] _Science of Thought_, p. 35. For his whole argument, see pp. 30-64.
[56] _Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 91.
[57] _Grundriss der Sprachwissenshaft_, i., s. 16. It will be observed
that there is an obvious analogy between the process above described,
whereby conceptual ideation becomes degraded into receptual, and that
whereby, on a lower plane of mental evolution, intelligence becomes
degraded into instinct. In my former work I devoted many pages to
a consideration of this subject, and showed that the condition to
intelligent adjustments thus becoming instinctive is invariably to be
found in frequency of repetition. Instincts of this kind (“secondary
instincts”) may be termed degraded recepts, just as the recepts spoken
of in the text are degraded concepts; neither could be what it now is,
but for its higher parentage. Any one who is specially interested in
the question whether there can be thought without words, may consult
the correspondence between Prof. Max Müller, Mr. Francis Galton,
myself, and others, in _Nature_, May and June, 1887 (since published
in a separate form); between the former and Mr. Mivart, in _Nature_,
March, 1888. Also an article by Mr. Justice Stephen in the _Nineteenth
Century_, April, 1888. Prof. Whitney has some excellent remarks on this
subject in his _Language and the Study of Language_, pp. 405-411.
[58] From this it will be seen that by using such terms as “inference,”
“reason,” “rational,” &c., in alluding to mental processes of the lower
animals, I am in no way prejudicing the question as to the distinction
between man and brute. In the higher region of recepts both the man
and the brute attain in no small degree to a perception of analogies
or relations: this is inference or ratiocination in its most direct
form, and differs from the process as it takes place in the sphere
of conceptual thought only in that it is not itself an object of
knowledge. But, considered as a process of inference or ratiocination,
I do not see that it should make any difference in our terminology
whether or not it happens to be itself an object of knowledge.
Therefore I do not follow those numerous writers who restrict such
terms to the higher exhibitions of the process, or to the ratiocination
which is concerned only with introspective thought. It may be a matter
of straw-splitting, but I think it is best to draw our distinctions
where the distinctions occur; and I cannot see that it modifies the
process of inference, as inference, whether or not the mind, in virtue
of a superadded faculty, is able to think about the process as a
process—not any more, for instance, than the process of association
is altered by its becoming itself an object of knowledge. Therefore, I
hope I have made it clear that in maintaining the rationality of brutes
I am not arguing for anything more than that they have the power, as
Mr. Mivart himself allows, of drawing “practical inferences.” Hitherto,
then, my difference with Mr. Mivart—and, so far as I know, with all
other modern writers who maintain the irrationality of brutes—is only
one of terminology.
[59] See _Animal Intelligence_, p. 158.
[60] _Animal Intelligence_, pp. 114-116.
[61] Kreplin, quoted by Büchner.
[62] The best instances of sign-making among Invertebrata other than
the Hymenoptera which I have met with is one that I have myself
observed and already recorded in _Mental Evolution in Animals_ (p. 343,
note). The animal is the processional caterpillar. These larvæ migrate
in the form of a long line, crawling Indian file, with the head of the
one touching the tail of the next in the series. If one member of the
series be removed, the next member in advance immediately stops and
begins to wag its head in a peculiar manner from side to side. This
serves as a signal for the next member also to stop and wag his head,
and so on till all the members in front of the interruption are at a
standstill, all wagging their heads. But as soon as the interval is
closed up by the advance of the rear of the column, the front again
begins to move forward, when the head-wagging ceases.
[63] _Fac. Ment. des Animaux_, tom. ii., p. 348.
[64] Darwin, _Descent of Man_, pp. 84, 85.
[65] _Nature_, April 10, 1884, pp. 547, 548.
[66] For information on all these points, see Darwin, _Expression of
the Emotions_.
[67] Quoted by Tylor, _Early History of Mankind_, p. 80.
[68] Burton, _City of the Saints_, p. 151.
[69] _Loc. cit._, p. 78.
[70] _Sign-language among the North American Indians, &c._, by
Lieut.-Col. Garrick Mallery (_First Annual Report of the Bureau of
Ethnology, Washington_, 1881).
[71] Mallery, _loc. cit._, p. 320. The author gives several very
interesting records of such conversations, and adds that the mutes show
more aptitude in understanding the Indians than _vice versâ_, because
to them “the ‘action, action, action,’ of Demosthenes is their only
oratory, and not a heightening of it, however valuable.”
[72] _Loc. cit._, p. 39.
[73] See especially Tylor, _loc. cit._, pp. 28-30, where an interesting
account is given of the elaborate and yet self-speaking signs whereby
an adult deaf-mute gave directions for the drawing up of his will.
[74] _Early History of Mankind_, pp. 24-32.
[75] _Loc. cit._, p. 54.
[76] Further information of a kind corroborating what has been given
in the foregoing chapter concerning gesture-language may be found in
Long’s _Expedition to the Rocky Mountains_, and Kleinpaul’s paper in
_Völkerpsychologie_, _&c._, vi. 352-375. The subject was first dealt
with in a philosophical manner by Leibnitz, in 1717, _Collectanea
Etymologia_, ch. ix.