SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.
My contention in this chapter will be that, given the protoplasm
of the sign-making faculty so far organized as to have reached the
denotative stage; and given also the protoplasm of judgment so far
organized as to have reached the stage of stating a truth, without the
mind being yet sufficiently developed to be conscious of itself as an
object of thought, and therefore not yet able to state to itself a
truth as true; by a confluence of these two protoplasmic elements an
act of fertilization is performed, such that the subsequent processes
of mental organization proceed apace, and soon reach the stage of
differentiation between subject and object.
And here, to avoid misapprehension, I may as well make it clear at the
outset that in all which is to follow I am in no way concerned with
the philosophy of this change, but only with its history. On the side
of its philosophy no one can have a deeper respect for the problem
of self-consciousness than I have; for no one can be more profoundly
convinced than I am that the problem on this side does not admit of
solution. In other words, so far as this aspect of the matter is
concerned, I am in complete agreement with the most advanced idealist;
and hold that in the datum of self-consciousness we each of us possess,
not merely our only ultimate knowledge, or that which only is “real
in its own right,” but likewise the mode of existence which alone the
human mind is capable of conceiving as existence, and therefore the
_conditio sine quâ non_ to the possibility of an external world.
With this aspect of the question, however, I am in no way concerned.
Just as the functions of an embryologist are confined to tracing the
mere history of developmental changes of living structure, and just
as he is thus as far as ever from throwing any light upon the deeper
questions of the how and the why of life; so in seeking to indicate
the steps whereby self-consciousness has arisen from the lower stages
of mental structure, I am as far as any one can be from throwing light
upon the intrinsic nature of that the probable genesis of which I am
endeavouring to trace. It is no less true to-day than it was in the
time of Soloman, that “as thou knowest not how the bones do grow in the
womb of her that is with child, thou knowest not what is the way of the
spirit.”
* * * * *
If we are agreed that it is only in man that self-consciousness is to
be found at all, it follows that only to man can we look for any facts
bearing upon the question of its development. And inasmuch as it is
only during the first years of infancy that a normal human being is
destitute of self-consciousness, the statement just made implies that
only in infant psychology need we seek for the facts of which we are
in search. Further, as I maintain that self-consciousness arises out
of an admixture of the protoplasm of judgment with the protoplasm of
sign-making (according to the signification of these terms as already
explained), I have now to make good this opinion upon the basis of
facts drawn from the study of infant psychology.
Nevertheless, before I proceed to the heart of the subject, I think it
will be convenient to consider those faculties of mind which, occurring
both in the infant and in the animal, in the former case precede the
advent of self-consciousness, and, according to my view, prepare the
way for it.
It will, I suppose, on all hands be admitted that self-consciousness
consists in paying the same kind of attention to internal or psychical
processes as is habitually paid to external or physical processes—a
bringing to bear upon subjective phenomena the same powers of
perception as are brought to bear upon the objective. The degrees in
which such attention may be yielded are, of course, as various in the
one case as in the other; but this does not affect my psychological
definition of self-consciousness.
Again, I suppose it will be further admitted that in the mind of
animals and in the mind of infants there is a world of images
standing as signs of outward objects; and that the only reason why
these images are not attended to unless called up by the sensuous
associations supplied by their corresponding objects, is because the
mind is not yet able to leave the ground of such association, so as
to move through the higher and more tenuous medium of introspective
thought.[112] Nevertheless, this image world assuredly displays
an internal activity which is not wholly dependent on sensuous
associations supplied from without. That is to say, one image suggests
another, this another, and so on—although, as I have just conceded,
this cannot be due to successive acts of inward attention, or of the
self-conscious contemplation of images known as such. Nevertheless,
that an internal—though unintentional—play of ideation takes place in
the minds of brutes, without the necessity of immediate associations
supplied from present objects of sense, admits of being amply proved
from the phenomena of dreaming, hallucination, home-sickness, pining
for absent friends, &c., which, as I have fully shown in my previous
work, can only be explained by recognizing such a play of inward
ideation.[113] Now, I hold it of importance to note that such an
internal play of ideation is thus possible even in the absence of
self-consciousness, because many writers have assumed, without any
justification, that unless ideas are intentionally contemplated
as such, they must be wholly dependent for their occurrence upon
associations supplied by present objects of sense. Of course I do not
doubt that an agent who is capable of intentionally making one idea
stand as the object of another, is likewise capable of going very
much further than a brute in the way of causing one idea to start from
another irrespective of immediate stimulation from without. My point
here is merely to remark that the ideation of brutes is not wholly
dependent on such stimulation; but is capable, in a certain humble
degree, of forming independent chains of its own.
The next thing which I desire to be remembered in connection with
the ideation of brutes is, that it is not restricted to the mere
reproduction in memory of particular objects of sensuous impressions;
but, as we have so fully seen in Chapter III., admits of undergoing
that amount of mental elaboration which belongs to what I have termed
recepts.
Furthermore, the foundations of self-consciousness are largely laid in
the fact that an organism is one connected whole; all the parts are
mutually related in the unity of individual sensibility. Every stimulus
supplied from without, every movement originating from within, carries
with it the character of belonging to that which feels and moves. Hence
a brute, like a young child, has learnt to distinguish its own members,
and likewise its whole body, from all other objects; it knows how to
avoid sources of pain, how to seek those of pleasure; and it also knows
that particular movements follow from particular volitions, while in
connection with such movements it constantly experiences the same
muscular sensations. Of course such knowledge and such experience all
belong to the receptual order; but this does not hinder that they play
a most important part in laying the foundations of a consciousness of
individuality.[114]
Lastly, and I believe of still more importance in the present
connection than any of the above-named antecedents, a large
proportional number of the recepts of a brute have reference, not to
objects of sense, or even to muscular sensations, but to the _mental
states of other animals_. That is to say, the logic of recepts, even
in brutes, is sufficient to enable the mind to establish true analogies
between its own states (although these are not yet the objects of
separate attention, or of what may be termed subjective knowledge),
and the corresponding states of other minds. I need not dwell upon
this point, because I take it to be a matter of general observation
that animals habitually and accurately interpret the mental states
of other animals, while they also well know that other animals are
able similarly to interpret _theirs_—as is best proved by their
practising the arts of cunning, concealment, hypocrisy, &c.[115] From
which considerations we reach the general conclusion, that intelligent
animals recognize a world of ejects as well as a world of objects:
mental existence is known to them ejectively, though, as may be
allowed, never _thought upon_ subjectively.[116]
It is of importance further to observe that at this stage of mental
evolution the individual—whether an animal or an infant—so far
realizes its own individuality as to be informed by the logic of
recepts that it is _one of a kind_. I do not mean that at this
stage the individual realizes its own or any other individuality
as such; but merely that it recognizes the fact of its being one
among a number of similar though distinct forms of life. Alike in
conflict, rivalry, sense of liability to punishment or vengeance,
&c., the truth is continually being borne in upon the mind of an
animal that it is a separate individuality; and this though it be
conceded that the animal is never able, even in the most shadowy
manner, to think about itself as such. In this way there arises a sort
of “outward self-consciousness,” which differs from true or inward
self-consciousness only in the absence of any attention being directed
upon the inward mental states as such. This outward self-consciousness
is known to us all, even in adult life—it being but comparatively
seldom that we pause in our daily activities to contemplate the mental
processes of which these activities are the expression.
Now, if these things are so, we encounter the necessity of drawing
the same distinction in our analysis of self-consciousness, as we
have had to draw in our previous analyses of all the other faculties
of mind: there is a self-consciousness that is receptual, and a
self-consciousness that is conceptual. No doubt it is to the latter
kind of self-consciousness alone that the term is strictly applicable,
just as it is to conceptual naming or to conceptual predicating
alone that the word “judgment” is strictly applicable. Nevertheless,
here, as before, we must not ignore an important territory of mind
only because it has hitherto remained uncharted.[117] Receptual or
outward self-consciousness, then, is the practical recognition of
self as an active and a feeling agent; while conceptual or inward
self-consciousness is the introspective recognition of self as an
object of knowledge, and, therefore, as a subject. Hence, the one
form of self-consciousness differs from the other in that it is only
objective and never subjective.[118]
I take it, then, as established that true or conceptual
self-consciousness consists in paying the same kind of attention to
inward psychical processes as is habitually paid to outward physical
processes; that in the mind of animals and infants there is a world of
images standing as signs of outward objects, although we may concede
that for the most part they only admit of being revived by sensuous
association; that at this stage of mental evolution the logic of
recepts comprises an ejective as well as an objective world; and that
here we also have the recognition of individuality, so far as this is
dependent on what has been termed an outward self-consciousness, or the
consciousness of self as a feeling and an active agent, without the
consciousness of self as an object of thought, and, therefore, as a
_subject_.
Such being the mental conditions precedent to the rise of true
self-consciousness, we may next turn to the growing child for evidence
of subsequent stages in the gradual evolution of this faculty. All
observers are agreed that for a considerable time after a child is
able to use words as expressive of ideas, there is no vestige of true
self-consciousness. But, to begin our survey before this period, at a
year old even its own organism is not known to the child as part of the
self, or, more correctly, as anything specially related to feelings.
Professor Preyer observed that his boy, when more than a year old, bit
his own arm just as though it had been a foreign object; and thus may
be said to have shown even less consciousness of a limb as belonging
to “self,” than did Buffon’s parrot, which would first ask itself for
its own claw, and then comply with the request by placing the claw in
its own beak—in the same way as it would give the claw to any one else
who asked for it in the same words.
Later on, when the outward self-consciousness already explained has
begun to be developed, we find that the child, like the animal, has
learnt to associate its own organism with its own mental states, in
such wise that it recognizes its body as belonging in a peculiar
manner to the self, so far as the self is recognizable by the logic of
recepts. This is the stage that we meet with in animals. Next the child
begins to talk, and, as we might expect, this first translation of the
logic of recepts reveals the fact that as yet there is no _inward_
self-consciousness, but only outward: as yet the child has paid no
_attention_ to his own mental states, further than to feel that he
feels them; and in the result we find that the child speaks to himself
as an object, _i.e._ by his proper name or in the third person. That
is to say, “the child does not as yet set himself in opposition to all
outer objects, including all other persons, but regards himself as one
among many objects.”[119] The change of a child’s phraseology from
speaking of self as an object to speaking of self as a subject does not
take place—or but rarely so—till the third year. When it has taken
place we have definite evidence of true self-consciousness, though
still in a rudimentary stage. And it is doubtful whether this change
would take place even at so early an age as the third year, were it
not promoted by the “social environment.” For, as Mr. Sully observes,
“the relation of self and not self, including that between the I and
the You, is continually being pressed on the child’s attention by the
language of others.”[120] But, taking this great change during the
time of life when it is actually observed to be in progress, let us
endeavour to trace the phases of its development.
It will no doubt be on all hands freely conceded, that at least up to
the time when a child begins to speak it has no beginning of any true
or introspective consciousness of self; and it will further be conceded
that when this consciousness begins to dawn, the use of language
by a child may be taken as a fair exponent of all its subsequent
progress. Now we have already seen that, long before any words are
used indicative of even a dawning consciousness of self as self, the
child has already advanced so far in its use of language as to frame
implicit propositions. But lest it should be thought that my judgment
in this matter is biased by the exigencies of my argument, I may again
quote Mr. Sully as at once an impartial witness and a highly competent
authority on matters of purely psychological doctrine.
“When a child of eighteen months on seeing a dog exclaims ‘Bow-wow,’
or on taking his food exclaims ‘Ot’ (Hot), or on letting fall his toy
says ‘Dow’ (Down), he may be said to be implicitly framing a judgment:
‘That is a dog,’ ‘This milk is hot,’ ‘My plaything is down.’ The first
explicit judgments are concerned with individual objects. The child
notes something unexpected or surprising in an object, and expresses
the result of his observation in a judgment. Thus, for example, the boy
more than once referred to, whom we will call C., was first observed to
form a distinct judgment when nineteen months old, by saying ‘Dit ki’
(Sister is crying). These first judgments have to do mainly with the
child’s food, or other things of prime importance to him. Thus, among
the earliest attempts at combining words in propositions made by C.
already referred to, were the following: ‘Ka in milk,’ (Something nasty
in milk); ‘Milk dare now’ (There is still some more milk in the cup).
Towards the end of the second year quite a number of judgments is
given out having to do with the peculiarities of objects which surprise
or impress the mind, their altered position in space, &c. Among these
may be instanced the following: ‘Dat a big bow-wow’ (That is a large
dog); ‘Dit naughty’ (Sister is naughty); ‘Dit dow ga’ (sister is down
on the grass). As the observing powers grow, and the child’s interest
in things widens, the number of his judgments increases. And as his
powers of detaching relations and of uttering and combining words
develop, he ventures on more elaborate statements, _e.g._ ‘Mama naughty
say dat.’”[121]
Were it necessary, I could confirm all these statements from my own
notes on the development of children’s intelligence; but I prefer,
for the reason already given, to quote such facts from an impartial
witness. For I conceive that they are facts of the highest importance
in relation to our present subject, as I shall immediately proceed to
show.
We have now before us unquestionable evidence that in the growing
child there is a power, not only of forming, but of expressing a
pre-conceptual judgment, long before there is any evidence of the
child presenting the faintest rudiment of internal, conceptual, or
true self-consciousness. In other words, it must be admitted that long
before a human mind is sufficiently developed to perceive relations as
related, or to state a truth as true, it is able to perceive relations
and to state a truth: the logic of recepts is here concerned with
those higher receptual judgments which I have called pre-conceptual,
and is able to express such judgments in verbal signs without the
intervention of true (_i.e._ introspective) self-consciousness. It
will be remembered that I have coined these various terms in order to
acknowledge the possible objection that there can be no true judgments
without true self-consciousness. But I do not care what terms are
employed whereby to designate the different and successive phases
of development which I am now endeavouring to display. All that I
desire to make clear is that here we unquestionably have to do with a
_growth_, or with a continuous advance in degree as distinguished from
a difference of kind.
First, then, let it be observed that in these rudimentary judgments
we already have a considerable advance upon those which we have
considered as occurring in animals. For in a child between the second
and third years we have these rudimentary judgments, not only formed
by the logic of recepts, but expressed by a logic of pre-concepts
in a manner which is indistinguishable from predication, except by
the absence of self-consciousness. “Dit dow ga” is a proposition in
every respect, save in the absence of the copula; which, as I have
previously shown, is a matter of no psychological moment. The child
here perceives a certain fact, and states the perception in words, _in
order to communicate information of the fact to other minds_—just as
an animal, under similar circumstances, will use a gesture or a vocal
sign; but the child is no more able than the animal designedly to make
to its own mind the statement which it makes to another. Nevertheless,
as the child has now at its disposal a much more efficient system
of sign-making than has the animal, and moreover enjoys the double
advantage of inheriting a strong propensity to communicate perceptions
by signs, and of being surrounded by the medium of speech; we can
scarcely wonder that its practical judgments (although still unattended
by self-consciousness) should be more habitually expressed by signs
than are the practical judgments of animals. Nor need we wonder, in
view of the same considerations, that the predicative phrases as used
by a child at this age show the great advance upon similar phrases as
used by a parrot, in that subjects and predicates are no longer bound
together in particular phrases—or, to revert to a previous simile,
are no longer stereotyped in such particular phrases, but admit of
being used as movable types, in order to construct, by different
combinations, a variety of different phrases. To a talking bird a
phrase, as we have seen, is no more in point of signification than a
single word; while to the child, at the stage which we are considering,
it is very much more than this: it is the separately constructed
vehicle for the conveyance of a particular meaning, which may never
have been conveyed by that or by any other phrase before. But while we
thus attach due importance to so great an advance towards the faculty
of true predication, we must notice, on the one hand, that as yet it is
_not_ true predication in the sense of being the expression of a true
or conceptual judgment; and, on the other hand, we must notice that
the power of thus using words as movable types does not deserve to be
regarded as any wonderful or unaccountable advance in the faculty of
sign-making, when we pay due regard to the several considerations above
stated. The really important point to notice is that, notwithstanding
this great _advance_ towards the faculty of predication, this faculty
_has not yet been reached_: the propositions which are made are
still unattended by self-consciousness: they are not conceptual, but
pre-conceptual.
Given, then, this stage of mental evolution, and what follows? Be it
remembered I am not endeavouring to solve the impossible problem as to
the intrinsic nature of self-consciousness, or how it is that such a
thing is possible. I am merely accepting its existence (and therefore
its possibility) as a fact; and upon the basis of this fact I shall now
endeavour to show how, in my opinion, self-consciousness may be seen to
follow upon the stage of mental evolution which we have here reached.
* * * * *
The child, like the animal, is supplied by its logic of recepts with a
world of images, standing as signs of outward objects; with an ejective
knowledge of other minds; and with that kind of recognition of self
as an active, suffering and accountable agent which, following Mr.
Chauncey Wright, I have called “outward self-consciousness.” But, over
and above the animal, the child has at its command, as we have just
seen, the more improved machinery of sign-making which enables it to
signify to other minds (ejectively known) the contents of its receptual
knowledge. Now, among these contents is the child’s perception of the
mental states of others as expressed in their gestures, tones, and
words. These severally receive their appropriate names, and so gain
clearness and precision as ejective images of the corresponding states
experienced by the child itself. “Mama pleased to Dodo” would have
no meaning as spoken by a child, unless the child knew from his own
feelings what is the state of mind which he thus ejectively attributes
to another. Therefore we cannot be surprised to find that at the same
stage of mental evolution the child will say, “Dodo pleased to mama.”
Yet it is evident that we here approach the very borders of true
self-consciousness. “Dodo” is no doubt still speaking of himself in
objective terminology; but he has advanced so far in the interpretation
of his own states of mind as to name them no less clearly than he names
any external objects of sense perception. Thus he is enabled to fix
these states before his mental vision as things which admit of being
_denoted_ by verbal signs, albeit he is not yet able to _denominate_.
The step from this to recognizing “Dodo” as not only the object, but
also the subject of mental changes, is not a large step. The mere act
of attaching verbal signs to inward mental states has the effect of
focussing attention upon those states; and, when attention is thus
focussed habitually, there is supplied the only further condition
required to enable the mind, through its memory of previous states, to
compare its past with its present, and so to reach that apprehension
of continuity among its own states wherein the full introspective
consciousness of self consists.
Again, as Mr. Chauncey Wright observes, “voluntary memory, or
reminiscence, is especially aided by command of language. This is a
tentative process, essentially similar to that of a search for a lost
or missing external object. Trials are made in it to revive a missing
mental image, or train of images, by means of words; and, on the other
hand, to revive a missing name by means of mental images, or even by
other words. It is not certain that this power is an exclusively human
one, as is generally believed, except in respect to the high degree of
proficiency attained by men in its use. It does not appear impossible
that an intelligent dog may be aided by its attention, purposely
directed to spontaneous necessaries, in recalling a missing fact, such
as the locality of a buried bone.”[122]
But whether or not animals possess any power of recollection as
distinguished from memory, there can be no doubt that the use of words
as signs necessarily leads to the cultivation of this faculty, and so
to the clear perception of a continuance of internal or mental states
in which consists the consciousness of an abiding self.
Further, the acquisition of language greatly advances the conception
of self, both as a suffering or feeling agent, and as an active cause;
seeing that both the feelings and the actions of the self are placed
clearly before the mind by means of denotative names, and even, as we
have just seen, by pre-conceptual propositions. Doubtless, also, the
recognition of self in each of these capacities is largely assisted by
the emotions. The expressions of affection, sympathy, praise, blame,
&c., on the part of others, and the feelings of emulation, pride,
triumph, disappointment, &c., on the part of the self, must all tend
forcibly to impress upon the growing child a sense of personality. “It
is when the child’s attention is driven inwards in an act of reflection
on his own actions, as springing from good or bad motives, that he
wakes up to a fuller consciousness of himself.”[123]
The conspiring together of all these factors leads to the gradual
attainment of self-consciousness. I say “gradual,” because the process
is throughout of the nature of a growth. Nevertheless, there is some
reason to think that when this growth has attained a certain point,
it makes, so to speak, a sudden leap of progress, which may be taken
to bear the same relation to the development of the mind as the act
of birth does to that of the body. In neither case is the development
anything like completed. Midway between the slowly evolving phases _in
utero_ and the slowly evolving phases of aftergrowth, there is in the
case of the human body a great and sudden change at the moment when it
first becomes separated from that of its parent. And so, there is some
reason to believe, it is in the case of the human mind. Midway between
the gradual evolution of receptual ideation and the no less gradual
evolution of conceptual, there appears to be a critical moment when
the soul first becomes detached from the nutrient body of its parent
perceptions, and wakes up in the new world of a consciously individual
existence. “Die Schlussprozesse, durch welche jene Trennung des Ich von
der Aussenwelt vor sich geht, geschehen allmälig. Es ist eine langsame
Arbeit, durch die sich die Scheidung bewerkstelligt. Doch diese
Scheidung selber ist stets eine plötzliche That: es ist ein bestimmter
Moment, in welchem das Ich mit einem Mal mit voller Klarheit in der
Seele aufblitzt, und es ist derselbe Moment, in welchem das bewusste
Gedächtniss beginnt, Sehr häufig ist es daher, dass gerade diesses
erste blitzähnliche Aufleuchten des Selbstbewusstseins bis in späte
Jahre noch als deutliche Erinnerung zurückbleibt.”[124]
Of course the evidence upon this point must always be more or less
unsatisfactory—first, because the powers of introspective analysis
at the particular time when they first become nascent must be most
incompetent to report upon the circumstances of their own birth;
and next, because we know how precarious it is to rely on adult
reminiscences of childhood’s experience. Therefore, I have only
mentioned this evidence for what it is worth, in order to remark
that it has no important bearing upon our present subject. Whether
or not there is in the life of every human being some particular
moment between the ages of two and three when the fact of its own
personality is revealed to the growing mind, the results of the present
analysis are in no way affected. For, even if such were supposed to
be invariably the case, it could not be supposed that the revelation
were other than low and feeble to a degree commensurate with the still
almost infantile condition of all the other mental powers. Nor could
it be doubted that this revelation needed to be led up to by that
gradual process of receptual evolution with which my analysis has been
concerned, and which in the terms of our previous analogy we may liken
to the pre-natal life of an embryo. While, on the other hand, as little
can it be doubted that such consciousness of self as is then revealed,
requires to be afterwards supplemented by another prolonged course
of mental evolution in the conceptual sphere, before those completed
faculties of introspective thought are attained, which serve to
difference the mind of a full-grown man from that of a babbling child
almost as widely as the same interval of time is found to difference
the body of an adult from that of a new-born babe.
* * * * *
In this brief analysis of the principles which are probably concerned
in the evolution of self-consciousness, I should like to lay particular
stress upon the point in it which I do not think has been sufficiently
noticed by previous writers—namely, the ejective origin of subjective
knowledge. The logic of recepts furnishes both the infant and the
animal with a marvellously efficient store of ejective information.
Indeed, we can scarcely doubt that to a very considerable extent this
information is hereditary: witness the smile of an infant in answer
to a caressing tone, and its cry in answer to a scolding one; not to
mention the still more remarkable cases which we meet with in animals,
such as newly-hatched chickens understanding the different sounds
made to them by the hen, being terror-stricken at the voice of a
hawk, newly-born mammals knowing the voice of their mother, &c.[125]
Moreover, we find that the child, even for a considerable time after
it has begun to use words, manifests a strong tendency to regard all
objects, whether animate or inanimate, as ejects. This fact is a matter
of such general observation that I need not wait to give special
instances. I will, therefore, merely observe that the tendency is not
wholly obliterated even when the faculty of speech has been fully
acquired, and with it a general knowledge of the distinction between
objects as animate and inanimate. Mr. Sully, for instance, gives a case
of this when he records the saying of a little girl of five—“Ma, I
do think this hoop must be alive; it is so sensible; it goes wherever
I want it to.”[126] Again, we meet with the same tendency in the
psychology of uncultured man. Pages might be filled with illustrations
showing that savages all over the world both mentally and expressly
personify, or endow with psychical attributes, the inanimate objects
and forces of nature; while language, even in its most highly developed
forms, still retains the impress of an originally ejective terminology.
And, if Professor Max Müller is right in his generalization that the
personal pronoun “I” is in all languages traceable to roots equivalent
to “This one” (indicative of an accompanying gesture-sign), we have
additional and more particular evidence of the originally ejective
character of the idea of self. Nor is it too much to say that even
civilized man is still under the sway of this innate propensity to
attribute to external things the faculties of feeling and willing of
which he is conscious in himself. On the one side we have proof of this
in the universal prevalence of the hypothesis of psychism in Nature,
while on the other side we meet with further proof in the fact of
psychological analysis revealing that our idea of cause is derived from
our idea of muscular effort.
Now it is evident that in all these cases the tendency which is
shown by the human mind, in every stage of its development, to
regard external phenomena ejectively, arises from man’s intuitive
knowledge—or the knowledge which is given in the logic of recepts—of
his own existence as twofold, bodily and mental. This in his early
days leads him to regard the Ego as an eject, resembling the others
of his kind by whom he is surrounded. But as soon as the power
of pre-conceptual predication has been attained, the child is in
possession of a psychological instrument wherewith to observe his
own mental states; and as soon as attention is thus directed upon
them, there arises that which is implied in every act of such
attention—namely, the consciousness of a self as at once the subject
and object of knowledge.
I may remark that this analysis is not opposed, as at first sight it
may appear to be, to the conclusion with regard to the same subject
which is thus given by Wundt:—“It is only after the child has
distinguished by definite characteristics its own being from that of
other people, that it makes the further advance of perceiving that
these other people are also beings in or for themselves.”[127] In
other words, the attribution of personality to self is prior to the
attribution of personality to others. Now this I do not question,
although I do not think there can be much before or after in these two
concepts. But the point which I have been endeavouring to bring out is
that, prior to either of these concepts, there are two corresponding
recepts—namely, first the receptual apprehension of self as an agent,
and, second, the eject of this receptual apprehension, whereby “other
people” are recognized as agents. Out of these two recepts there
subsequently develop the corresponding concepts of personality. The
order of development, therefore, is:—
(A) Receptual Subject. (a) Receptual Eject.
(B) Conceptual Subject. (b) Conceptual Eject.
Upon the whole, then, it appears to me perfectly evident that
language is quite as much the antecedent as it is the consequent of
self-consciousness. We have seen that in its first beginnings, or
before the child is able to state a truth as true, what I have called
rudimentary or pre-conceptual predication is concerned only with
existence as objective or ejective: all these propositions, which
are made by children during the first two years of their life, have
reference to objects of sense, states of feeling, &c.; but never to
self as self, and therefore never to truths as true. But as soon
as the protoplasm of predication, or sign-making at this stage of
elaboration, begins to mix freely with the protoplasm of judgment,
or the logic of recepts at that stage of elaboration, an intimate
movement of action and reaction ensues: the judgments are rendered
clearer and more comprehensive by being thrown into the formal shape of
even rudimentary propositions, while the latter are promoted in their
development by the growing powers of judgment. And when this advancing
organization of faculties has proceeded to the extent of enabling the
mind incipiently to predicate its own states, the mental organism may
be said for the first time to be quickening into the life of true
self-consciousness.[128]