FLANDERS: THE 108TH BRIGADE IN THE MESSINES-KEMMEL BATTLE:[54] APRIL
TO JUNE 1918
The 36th Division had a glance only, infinitely tantalizing, at the
beautiful valley of the Bresle, with its pastures and woodlands,
and snug villages in which the troops were billeted, from Gamaches,
several miles inland, to the little pleasure-resort of Ault on the
coast. A short rest in these surroundings would have been delightful.
But there was no rest for anyone for a long time to come, nor could
be. The last trains did not arrive in the area till the morning of
April the 1st; the last trains left it, bearing the remnants of the
Division towards Ypres, on the 4th. For the old battlefield, still
known as the Salient, was its new destination.
The interval had been spent in reorganization and the absorption of
the Entrenching Battalions, originally formed in February from the
surplus personnel of the infantry, which had accompanied the Division
north. They did not go very far to fill the gaps caused by the
prodigious casualties. The word gaps, in fact, is inapplicable. The
infantry of the Division had disappeared. The 108th Brigade had been
reduced to a little over three hundred, mostly transport and employed
men. The total casualties in the Division in the ten days from March
21st were 7,252. Of these, 185 officers and 5,659 other ranks were
reported missing. Perhaps four-fifths of these were prisoners of war,
wounded or unwounded. It was a very weak Division which detrained at
Proven and other stations further west.
From the day of its arrival, however, it began to receive very
large drafts from the flood of recruits that now poured across the
Channel. Bitter criticisms have been heard of the policy which had
kept so many troops in England till then. Whatever their justice
in some cases, they have none where the drafts now received by the
36th Division are concerned; for of these eighty or ninety per cent.
consisted of boys of nineteen, with far from adequate training. In
some cases these youths, almost before they knew their officers by
sight, were to be put to the severest test, and were to emerge from
it with quite astonishing credit.
Divisional Headquarters, in which Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Thompson,
D.S.O., Indian Army, had succeeded Colonel Place as G.S.O.1, were
established at Ten Elms Camp, near Poperinghe, on April the 3rd. On
the night of the 6th the Division began relieving the southern part
of the front held by the 1st Division. By the morning of the 8th the
relief was complete, the 107th Brigade being in front line, the 109th
in support, and Divisional Headquarters on the Canal Bank a mile
north of Ypres.[55]
The new front line included the village of Poelcappelle, which
consisted now of a few "pill-boxes" and naught besides. The area
behind it had been the scene of the most savage fighting on the
British front, and was simply a waste of shell-holes, traversed by
"duck-board" tracks. In rear, however, camps had sprung up amidst the
desolation. Ypres, of all places under the sky, boasted an officers'
club. There was a railway station at St. Jean, which those who had
seen the campaign of 1917 remembered as one of the most unpleasant
spots upon the front, and a mass of sidings at Wieltje, which had
been infinitely worse. Not for long was the area to enjoy these
amenities, nor Ypres its unwonted isolation from the enemy. On the
9th the troops heard a tremendous bombardment to the south. The
enemy's offensive on the Lys had opened.
From Givenchy, where they were magnificently held, to the
neighbourhood of Gapaard, on a front of some twenty miles, the
Germans had broken through. On the front of the Portuguese Corps the
line was shattered, and the German wave flowed up the low valley of
the Lys. The battered city of Armentières fell. For two or three days
no real resistance could be organized across the gap, and the Germans
pushed west upon Hazebrouck, a most important railway junction.
Estaires, ten miles west of Armentières, was occupied by the evening
of the 10th. By that time troops of the 36th Division were upon the
scene of action.
The 108th Brigade was in II. Corps reserve. At noon on the 10th it
received orders to move at once to Kemmel, with "C" Company of the
Machine-Gun Battalion. 'Buses were provided for dismounted personnel.
The 'bus column, moving _via_ La Clytte, reached Kemmel village at
4-15 p.m., the Brigade coming under the orders of the G.O.C. 19th
Division. That Division, with the 9th, had been fighting hotly for
the defence of the Messines Ridge. The admirable steadiness of their
young recruits and the gallant fashion in which their counter-attacks
had been launched form a brilliant page in the history of the war,
and helped to turn the Lys offensive, huge as were its gains, into
one of the most expensive and fruitless of the great series of German
assaults. General Griffith was ordered to put his Brigade into the
Kemmel defences. His headquarters were established in Kemmel Château.
Shortly after midnight General Griffith received orders to move up
to the Messines Ridge, in support of the weak South African Brigade
of the 9th Division, which had been thrown into the battle under
the orders of the 19th. The 1st Irish Fusiliers took up a line on
the Messines-Wytschaete Road, from five hundred yards north of the
former village to the neighbourhood of the 36th Division's old
acquaintance, Pick House. The 12th Rifles was on the Spanbroek Ridge
in support; the 9th Fusiliers about the old British front line on
the Wulverghem-Messines Road. The morning passed fairly quietly, but
there was ominous news as to the German advance north of Ploegsteert.
General Griffith received a secret warning order that, in the
event of the enemy capturing Hill 63, the whole line would have to
pivot back across the Spanbroek Ridge and its prolongation east of
Wulverghem, south of which village touch would be obtained with the
25th Division.
At half-past three, after heavy bombardment, the enemy launched an
attack upon the crest-road. The South Africans on the left were
pushed off it, and the line of the 1st Irish Fusiliers broken. A very
gallant counter-attack by Fusiliers and South Africans, side by side,
restored the position, though subsequent pressure on the left of the
latter forced them to bend back somewhat from the road toward Hell
Farm. At 7 p.m. came another assault, in face of which the Fusiliers
lost not a yard of ground. None of the officers who took those raw
boys into action can have dared to expect of them such steadiness and
resolution as they now displayed.
At night, however, came orders to carry into effect the movement
anticipated in the warning order. The advance of the enemy to the
south had made it only too necessary. The ridge must go, though the
9th Division was still to cling to its northern crown, the village of
Wytschaete. The retirement was carried out before dawn, but it was
discovered on its completion that there was no touch with the left
flank of the 25th Division. After a great deal of trouble, this was
attained by withdrawing the right of the 108th Brigade some hundred
yards.
All day was heavy shelling, but no infantry attack developed till
after six o'clock. On this occasion, as always, the Germans placed
great reliance upon a local assault delivered as dusk was falling,
which just permitted attackers to consolidate a position won, and
gave no time for a counter-attack before the pall of darkness
descended. Such a night as this, which would be lit scarce at all by
the thin sickle of a new moon, was peculiarly favourable to these
tactics.
They were, however, unsuccessful. Once again the defence of the 108th
Brigade prevailed. The left of the 9th Fusiliers was driven back.
Quickly a counter-attack was launched. The reserve company of the
9th, led by the commanding officer of the battalion, Lieut.-Colonel
P. E. Kelly, and a company of the 12th Rifles, led by Major Holt
Waring, most gallantly restored the position. By eight o'clock
all was quiet. But casualties had been heavy. The 1st Fusiliers
in particular had had very serious losses the previous day on the
Messines Ridge. This battalion was reorganized as a company, and
attached to the 9th. During the night there was no touch with troops
of the 25th Division, the gap having formed owing to the advance
of the enemy on Neuve Eglise and the consequent lengthening of the
line. In the early hours of April the 13th a battalion of the 178th
Brigade, now attached to the 19th Division, was moved up to fill it.
The 13th was a day of continuous alarms. Parties of the enemy made
attempts at dawn to advance by short rushes on the front of the
12th Rifles, east of Wulverghem, but were beaten off with loss by
Lewis-gun and rifle fire. A couple of hours later fresh attacks
appeared to be brewing. Parties of Germans were dispersed by the
fire of machine and Lewis guns. The former were excellently placed
by an officer who knew every foot of the ground, Captain Walker, in
old positions which he had often held before the Battle of Messines
in 1917. Then, all through the afternoon, small parties of the enemy
strove to make ground under cover of the old camouflage screens upon
the Messines-Wulverghem Road. They were counter-attacked and driven
off, suffering considerable casualties from the fire of Lewis guns.
The position on the right flank was, however, more desperate than
ever. At nine o'clock had come from the 25th Division the evil news
that the Germans were in Neuve Eglise.
During the night the 9th Fusiliers was relieved by troops of the
178th Brigade, and withdrawn to the dug-outs on Kemmel Hill. The 12th
Rifles remained in line. The relieved battalion was not given long
to rest. Before noon it was ordered to man the Kemmel defences, and
to send up its company of the 1st Fusiliers to dug-outs behind the
old British front line opposite Kruisstraat Cabaret. The 14th may be
accounted a quiet day, since it passed without infantry attack. But
the volume of artillery fire was immense, and distributed to a great
depth in rear of the positions held. "Green Kemmel Hill," as one
officer wrote, "was turning brown before our eyes." And the enemy was
definitely in possession of Neuve Eglise.
At 10-30 p.m. orders were received from the 19th Division for an
immediate withdrawal west of Wulverghem. This was carried out
before dawn, the line pivoting back on the left of the 12th Rifles,
which joined up with the 178th Brigade west of the village. It was
completed only just in time. With morning light the Germans opened an
intense bombardment on the new position, which, for the greater part
of its length, followed no old British trench. An infantry attack
followed, and bodies of Germans broke through at the junction of the
12th Rifles and 178th Brigade. A counter-attack by the 1st Irish
Fusiliers and the scanty reserves of the 12th Rifles, led by Major
Holt Waring, failed to restore the position, but prevented the enemy
gaining further ground on the left. Major Waring, a most gallant
officer and a born leader of men, was killed. The left and centre of
the 12th Rifles were very wisely withdrawn a few hundred yards to a
famous communication trench of old days, known as "Kingsway." From
this there was a fairly good field of fire. The 9th Irish Fusiliers
had now been moved up from the Kemmel defences, and was ordered to
send up two platoons to connect the right flank in "Kingsway" with
the original line west of Wulverghem. These two platoons had an
unfortunate fate. At dusk they were almost surrounded by groups of
the enemy pressing forward, and were forced to fall back some hundred
yards with heavy casualties.
At 2-15 a.m. on the 16th the little remnant of the Brigade began to
withdraw on relief, covered by small outposts. It then marched back
to a camp near La Clytte, suffering numerous casualties on its route
from shell-fire. Four machine-guns remained near Kemmel village.
The enemy was now indulging in what were known to artillerymen as
area bombardments, concentrating upon half a square mile of country
for half an hour, then switching his batteries to another. Such
methods are ineffective unless based upon an enormous mass of heavy
artillery. With this available, as it was on this occasion, they
are extraordinarily noxious and demoralizing. Reserves, tired units
withdrawn for a short rest, are kept constantly on the strain, ever
wondering when their turn is coming, compelled hurriedly to shift
position when it does. Severe loss and disorganization are caused to
transport piqueted in the open or bringing up rations and munitions.
A spot undisturbed at one minute becomes the centre-point of a
hellish tornado at the next.
April the 16th, while the men of the 108th Brigade, wearied out
and dazed by shell-fire, snatched what rest they could, was the
occasion of furious fighting at Wytschaete. The village was lost in
the morning, and retaken by a magnificent counter-attack of those
veritable paladins of modern war, the Highland Brigade of the 9th
Division. It could not be held on the morrow owing to its isolation,
and the line had to be withdrawn to the neighbourhood of the old
British trenches of 1917. The 17th, to many observers, appeared the
blackest day they had seen. Almost everywhere the gains of years of
desperate fighting had been lost. Passchendaele and Poelcappelle--to
which there will be further reference when we return to the fortunes
of the 36th Division--were gone. Huge slices of territory on which
the Germans had never stood, or over which they had been hustled in
retreat, were now in their possession. Bailleul, which had been at
many periods a Corps Headquarters, had fallen. From villages such
as Westoutre, where they had lived in comparative peace since 1914,
the villagers were rushing out under shell-fire, pushing barrows,
staggering under the burden of huge bundles, across the fields.
Men asked whether we had any reserves remaining, whether the young
American formations would ever be ready, whether the Channel ports
could be saved.
And yet, though none who watched can have guessed it, hardly even
the great soldier now in supreme command of the Allied Armies, or
his British colleague, the day may have marked a turning-point.
The French were hurrying north. Their troops were already in line
on the right of the 9th Division; their field artillery, the
"seventy-fives," rushed up, each at the tail of a lorry which carried
the detachment, were lining the hills, the Scherpenberg, Mont Rouge,
and Mont Vidaigne. The German infantry was suffering heavy loss.
Black as was the night, there was, if as yet no faintest light of
dawn, the paler gray on the horizon which is its herald.
On the evening of that day orders were received for the formation of
the Brigade, which could now muster about four hundred rifles, into
a composite battalion. This battalion, under the command of Colonel
Kelly, was ordered to move down behind Kemmel Hill, in reserve, to
be in position by 4 a.m. next morning. It encountered a storm of
shelling on its way, having seventy casualties. Among the killed
here was Captain Despard, 9th Irish Fusiliers, who had shown great
tenacity and fine leadership during the retreat of the previous
month. All day the battalion remained here, under very heavy fire,
from which Kemmel now afforded but slight protection. At evening it
was withdrawn, French troops having taken over the defence of this
part of the line. The remnants of the Brigade marched all night, to
Siege Camp and Hospital Farm, between Poperinghe and Elverdinghe,
rejoining the 36th Division at 5-30 a.m. on the 19th of April.
The Brigade had, for the second time in a month, been cut to pieces.
The 12th Rifles alone had had upwards of fifteen hundred casualties
in that period. One often saw in our summaries of intelligence
reference to reports that such and such a German formation had had
particularly heavy losses, followed by a statement that it might
be considered negligible for some time to come. Few can have had
losses higher than those of the 108th Brigade, which had, as has been
recorded, practically disappeared by the end of March. Yet in ten
days' time this Brigade had entered another great battle, to prove
itself very far from negligible. The admiration one feels for its
achievements is mingled with surprise when one thinks of the youth
and lack of experience in its ranks. Well did it merit its share of
the commendation expressed in a telegram received from the G.O.C.
IX. Corps the day before it was finally relieved. The message ran as
follows:
"The C. in C. has just been at Corps H.Q. He would have liked to see
all ranks now fighting on the 9th Corps front, and to tell each one
of them of his personal appreciation of the magnificent fight they
have made and are making. He would like to shake hands with each
individual and thank him for what he has done. He has not time for
this, but has asked me to give everybody this message."
The 36th Division, when the 108th Brigade departed on its desperate
lone venture, was left with its front line east of Poelcappelle, and
its headquarters on the Canal Bank. On that very day, March the 10th,
the Army Commander decided to withdraw the II. Corps to its Battle
Zone, here practically the British front line of 1917. The right of
the 36th Division would now be just in front of Wieltje, so well
known of old. An outpost line was, however, to be maintained upon the
Steenebeek.
The retirement was absolutely essential, nor could it be delayed.
By April the 11th the Germans were approaching the Forest of
Nieppe. Passchendaele and Poelcappelle now protruded, an incredible
salient, that made the old Ypres Salient unremarkable by comparison.
Nevertheless, a few nights' respite was allowed, in order that the
enemy might be deprived of the booty, and of the shelter for future
operations, that had otherwise fallen to him. The heavy artillery
was to move back first, bringing back all the ammunition that
could possibly be carried, and tipping that which could not into
shell-holes. An extensive programme of demolitions was planned by the
C.R.E. Every dug-out or "pill-box" of importance was to be destroyed
by explosives at the last possible moment. Craters were to be blown
at important road-junctions. Light railways were to be, as far as
possible, torn up or otherwise demolished.
There was a feverish rush by the Engineers, assisted by Infantry
working-parties, to do the work in the scanty time available. Most of
the forward demolitions were carried out by the 122nd Field Company,
now commanded by Major W. Smyth, who had greatly distinguished
himself during the March retreat as an _attaché_ to the Divisional
Staff. They were very effective. The 121st Field Company dammed the
Steenebeek in an attempt to make it a more formidable obstacle, and
began the construction of a new line behind it. The 150th Field
Company prepared ten bridges over the Ypres Canal for demolition. The
world knows that none of these bridges was ever "sent up," but may
not know by how little their destruction was averted.
On the night of the 11th of April the withdrawal of the heavy
artillery to cover the Battle Zone began, being completed three
days later. The field artillery also moved back, leaving, however,
forward guns in action by night, to deceive the enemy as to the
British intentions. All was now prepared in rear. It remained only
to withdraw the two battalions manning the outpost positions, firing
the charges for the demolitions as they retired. This was carried
out on the night of the 15th. Necessary as was the task, it was one
which could not but inspire disappointment and regret. In a night the
British Army was abandoning ground which had been profusely watered
with its blood, and had taken long months in winning. The enemy
advanced very slowly and cautiously on the morrow, heavily shelling
Poelcappelle, now a mile and a half from the outposts, before he
ventured to occupy it.
The Belgian Army was extending its front, as a helping hand in time
of adversity. On the night of April the 18th the 4th Belgian Division
relieved the 30th Division, on the left of the 36th, taking over the
front of one battalion of the 107th Brigade. The next week passed
quietly, the infantry showing aggression against the enemy outposts,
capturing six prisoners in patrol affairs on successive nights.
Divisional Headquarters were withdrawn from the Canal Bank to Border
Camp, in the woodlands north of the Vlamertinghe-Poperinghe Road.
For a couple of days the Steenebeek became the line of resistance,
with outposts on the east bank. But Kemmel, so many miles in rear,
had fallen, and the Germans were attacking north of it. General
Plumer felt himself compelled to order a further withdrawal. The
Ypres Canal was now to be the line of resistance. That decision, it
is believed, has never been realized by people in England. Battered
Ypres, small as was its actual importance of late, had been all
through the war a sort of lodestar to the Germans. The best blood of
England had been spilt in its defence. And now, theoretically, it
was in the front line. Theoretically only, however, it may happily
be recorded. An outpost line over two thousand yards east of it was
maintained, and, as the German troops on the immediate front remained
unaggressive--they had had a heavy defeat from the Belgians further
north a few days previously--and the Lys Battle died down, lines in
rear were gradually improved and dispositions altered, so that they
might be held in greater strength in the event of an attack.
The second withdrawal of the 36th Division was evidently anticipated
by the Germans, who followed it closely. An officer and two men of
the 31st Landwehr Division, over impetuous, were captured. One party
of the enemy, pressing swiftly on, entered Juliet Farm, a point which
the 107th Brigade had been ordered to retain. Both the "pill-box"
and Canopus Trench, in its neighbourhood, were retaken next night,
together with an enemy machine-gun. The 109th Brigade on the right
took five prisoners.
On the following day a great attack was launched by the Germans from
south of Meteren to Voormezeele, upon the French D.A.N.[56] and
the Second British Army. Everywhere it was completely and bloodily
repulsed. To the enemy it was a terrible check. April the 29th, 1918,
deserves to rank as high as the following 8th of August[57] in the
history of the war. It marked the failure of the German northward
offensive. For failure that offensive was, as the Somme offensive was
not. The tenacity of troops on the flanks, such as the 55th Division
on the right and the 9th on the left, had confined and narrowed the
thrust. The curious formation of great hills, in almost straight line
across the Flanders plain; Kemmel, the Scherpenberg, Mont Rouge,
Mont Vidaigne, Mont Noir, Mont Kokereele, Mont des Cats, then, after
a gap, Cassel, proved an impassable barrier in later stages of the
battle. The first of the series alone fell. Upon the rest French
artillery was now massed, pouring death into the Germans below. A few
days earlier Ludendorff had, at a critical moment, struck again at
Amiens. That offensive, which might have changed the whole position,
had been pushed back before counter-attacks, and nipped in bud by the
brilliant recapture of Villers-Bretonneux by the Australian Corps.
The Germans were to make new offensives and gain much ground, notably
near Rheims, where they cut the main Eastern Railway, and came all
too close to Paris at Château-Thierry. But they were the blows of
desperation. Week by week drew nearer the great retribution.
The next six weeks passed quietly for the 36th Division. The chief
diversion was about a little dug-out near Juliet Farm, in the front
line, formerly a Signals testing-point for overhead wires. Here
there was constant bombing and raiding, largely to the disadvantage
of the German troops, who were not of first quality and were unable
to withstand our men in close fighting. During the month of May
fourteen prisoners were taken by the Division on seven separate
occasions. One night a German wagon with rations drove into our
outpost position in error and was captured, so indeterminate were the
opposing front lines. The 36th Divisional Artillery had returned and
taken over the defence of the front before the end of April. Early
in May it received, with all other British divisional artilleries in
France, a proportion of Indian personnel for its D.A.C., to replace
English drivers. These were thereupon sent back for training as
gunners.
During this period there occurred a great change in the command
of the Division. Within three weeks three general officers long
associated with it returned to England. On May the 6th Major-General
O. S. Nugent, C.B., D.S.O., was succeeded by Major-General Clifford
Coffin, V.C., D.S.O., in the command of the Division, General Nugent
proceeding next day to England, preparatory to taking up a command in
India. As long as the 36th Division is remembered, General Nugent's
name will be associated with it. His whole existence was centred
upon it; he was intensely proud of its achievements and jealous for
its good name. It owed much to him, particularly to his training in
the early days after its arrival in France. His successor, General
Coffin, was an officer of the Royal Engineers, with a reputation
for vigour, and a Victoria Cross gained for great bravery at Ypres.
Just before General Nugent, General Withycombe and, just after him,
General Griffith gave up command of the 107th and 108th Brigades
respectively. General Withycombe had commanded his Brigade from
within a few days of its arrival in France, except for a short
period in 1917 when he had commanded a Brigade in England, and had
inspired affection and trust in all its ranks. His headquarters was
always a happy family, and a hospitable one, as the present writer
would be ingrate were he to refrain from recording. The war leaves
few pleasanter memories than those of meals at friendly boards
after much perambulating of trenches. General Griffith had arrived
a little later, and his service with the Division was actually
longer. His imperturbability and resource in moments of emergency
had often served it and his own Brigade well. Their successors were
Brigadier-General E. J. de S. Thorpe, D.S.O., in the 107th Brigade,
and Brigadier-General E. Vaughan, D.S.O., in the 108th.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL C. C. COFFIN, V.C., C.B., D.S.O.]
The 36th Division had indeed enjoyed the continuity of tradition and
purpose which comes from a long tenour of command by senior officers.
General Nugent, General Withycombe, General Griffith, General Brock,
in the Divisional Artillery, had now commanded for two and a half
years. In the 109th Brigade had been more frequent changes, but two
of its Brigadiers, Generals Ricardo and Hessey, who between them
commanded it for two years, had previously commanded two of its
battalions.
In the early days of June came a most welcome relief, just when the
country was at its best. Handing over the defence of the line to the
12th Belgian Division, the 36th moved back to the agreeable wooded
area between Poperinghe and Proven. It was now in II. Corps reserve,
ready if necessary to support the right flank of the Belgian Army.
One Brigade, two Field Companies, and two companies of the Pioneer
battalion, were at the disposal of the II. Corps for work on rear
defences. There was now, men said, "wire from Ypres to Calais."
Between Ypres and Poperinghe, six miles apart, were no less than four
well-defended lines: the Brielen defences, and the Green, Yellow,
and Blue Lines. In rear of Poperinghe were plenty more. The troops
working upon these defences were relieved periodically, the other
formations and units carrying out training. The Artillery put one
section per battery into positions prepared for the defence of the
Blue Line, in the event of another great attack, which still appeared
not improbable.
The troops benefited very greatly from this welcome respite, the
first the Division had had for a year, if the few days in the snow
at Christmas be excepted. The young soldiers who now for the most
part filled the ranks grew strong under the influence of good food,
exercise, and life in the open under pleasant conditions. Their
fitness for battle increased swiftly under that of steady training.
There was plenty of sport, football, cricket, running, and boxing, in
all of which their neighbours, the Belgians, took a hand. The only
trouble was the extraordinary epidemic of influenza which swept over
the world that summer, and visited all the armies in the field. Some
German divisions, it was reported, were for a time not in a fit state
to move or fight owing to its ravages. In the prevalent fine weather,
fortunately, men recovered quickly from its effects.
The 36th Division had great tasks yet before it. It had to swing
its hammer in the mighty line of destroyers that was to crush in
the German defences and open the road to final victory. For those
tasks that sunny month of June out of line was, as a prelude, of
inestimable worth. After the dazing and deadening effect, the
_abrutissement_ of a battle, nothing told so much on the dash and
energy of troops as long, dreary months of trench warfare, even in
a line relatively quiet. They lost not only their physical agility,
their power to march and run, but their mental power as well. A spell
such as this gave them not only new strength, but new heart, new
spirit, new hope. Affairs might be gloomy, but gloom was dispersed by
the sun, like the Flanders mists. When the Division next entered the
line, it was once again a fine fighting force.
That event came in the first week of July. The French, who, after
losing Kemmel, had made a very fine stand at Locre, the vital gateway
to the valley between the Scherpenberg and Mont Rouge, were now being
relieved by the British along the line of the hills. After three
days about Cassel, in reserve to the French XVI. Corps, the 36th
Division relieved the 41st French Division on the northern skirts
of Bailleul. Divisional Headquarters were established at Terdeghem,
with a command post on the Mont des Cats prepared for emergencies.
The sudden move had almost, but not quite, succeeded in spoiling
a very fine Divisional Horse Show, held at Proven, in beautiful
weather and surroundings, on July the 3rd. Upon this the officers
of the neighbouring Belgian Cavalry Division, including an Olympic
competitor, descended like wolves on the fold, giving a remarkable
display of skill and horsemanship, and taking practically all the
prizes for jumping events.
The Division was to hold this line for upwards of two months, then to
go forward upon the enemy's heels. Nor was it ever again to be forced
to give ground. The gray blur on the horizon was brighter now; the
light was not far off.
FOOTNOTES:
[54] The official description of the fighting on April 10th and 11th
is the Battle of Messines, 1918. It is safe to prophesy that the
official nomenclature will never in this case, nor in many others,
become the popular one. The 108th Brigade also took part in the
action officially known as the Battle of Bailleul, dated from the
13th to the 15th of April, 1918.
[55] On this date there died, at Rouen, of wounds received in March,
one of the most gallant and popular C.O.'s the Division ever had,
Lieutenant-Colonel P. E. K. Blair Oliphant, C.M.G., D.S.O., who had
served with it from earliest days, first with the 11th Rifles, and
later in command of the 11th/13th Battalion of that Regiment.
[56] Détachement des Armées du Nord.
[57] The opening of the Amiens offensive.