MESSINES: JUNE 1917
The Battle of Messines has more than one claim to a prominent
position in the history of the war. It was, in the first place, the
first completely successful single operation on the British front. It
shares with the action of Malmaison, fought four months later, the
distinction of being the most perfect and successful example of the
limited offensive. Lastly, it was by far the most elaborately and
carefully "mounted" action ever fought by British arms. Fine as were
the fighting qualities of the formations and units that took part in
it, the most remarkable aspects which stand out when we look back
upon it are the perfection of its organization and of the liaison
between all arms. It represented a triumph of staff work. Every man
in the huge force under his command was made to feel the guiding hand
of the Commander of the Second Army, and of one of the most brilliant
staff officers the war discovered. The troops entered upon it with
high heart. The capture of the Vimy Ridge had seemed of good augury
for the year's campaign. The doubtful success of the French offensive
in Champagne, which might have acted as a check upon this optimism,
was not generally known.
Before no other battle was there such an infinity of detail to be
mastered as in the preparation of this. It would not be difficult to
write fifty pages about the plans. Since space permits of about six
only being allotted to them, it is impossible to do more than outline
them in the briefest manner.
Some idea of the thoroughness of the training for the assault may be
gained when it is recorded that not only were attacks practised over
ground marked out to represent the German trench system, but officers
from the flanking battalions of divisions attended each others' field
days to ensure that in the minutest details there was harmony along
the line. An elaborate model of the Messines Ridge, with all its
trenches, forts, roads, and woods, was constructed by the C.E. of the
IX. Corps on the slopes of the Scherpenberg Hill, between Locre and
La Clytte. It was surrounded by a wooden gallery and trench-board
walks, so that at least a company could examine it at one time. The
men took great interest in it, while all day long little knots of
officers were to be observed studying it. Another new feature of the
attack was the message-map served out on a large scale to officers
and N.C.O.'s. This had on one side a map of the German trenches,
on which the position could be marked; and on the other a skeleton
message-form, bringing forcibly to the mind of the sender those
details in a message that were of importance to the recipient, which,
in the heat of battle, a young and inexperienced officer might forget.
Nothing was studied more carefully than the provision of food,
water, ammunition, and stores for the advancing troops. In front of
the huge divisional dumps at Lindenhoek cross-roads and "Daylight
Corner," on the Lindenhoek-Neuve Eglise Road, there were an advance
dump, a dump for each of the attacking brigades, six battalion
dumps, and many smaller in the trenches. An elaborate system of pack
transport was devised, two hundred extra pack-saddles with special
crates attached being issued. Two hundred and fifty "Yukon packs"--a
Canadian device which enabled a man trained in its use to carry a
very heavy load--were also issued. Arrangements were made to serve in
the trenches a hot meal at midnight prior to the assault. A special
ration of oranges, Oxo cubes, chewing gum, and lime juice was issued
to every man, and a tin of solidified alcohol for cooking to every
fourth man.
Means of communication, by visual signalling, pigeons, wireless,
the fullerphone, runners, and the rocket for S.O.S. calls, were
worked out in detail. For the fullerphone there were two lines of
buried cables, with cable-heads in our front line trenches. Forward
stations were selected in the enemy's line at Spanbroekmolen and
Peckham, to which armoured lines were to be laid across "No Man's
Land," from the cable-heads, by the brigade forward parties. As soon
as the final objective was reached, these forward stations were
to move to the crest of the ridge. Working independently of this
machinery, which was in the hands of the Signal Service, were the
brigade and battalion intelligence sections, the former of which were
to establish observation posts at Spanbroekmolen and Peckham, while
the latter moved up behind their battalions, selected observation
posts to follow their movements and cover their final position, and
sent out scouts to obtain touch with flanking battalions and bring
information as to their progress. For visual signalling a divisional
signal station was established on Kemmel Hill, which had a clear
line to the brigade forward stations, so that messages could be sent
either forward or back by the Lucas lamp.
The Second Army was to attack the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, and the
ground east of it as far as the Oosttaverne line.[31] The IX. Corps
was allotted from the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road to the Diependaal
Beek, a distance of six thousand four hundred yards along the front
line of the enemy's salient. It was to attack with three divisions
in line: from right to left the 36th (Ulster) Division, the 16th
(Irish) Division, and the 19th (Western) Division. These troops
were to advance to the Black Line, east of the Messines-Wytschaete
Road, after which the 11th Division, in Corps Reserve, was to pass
through to the final objective. A glance at the map will show how
the frontage of attack narrowed with every thousand yards of the
advance. On the right of the 36th Division was the 25th, in the II.
Anzac Corps.
The attack of the 36th Division, of which the final objective was
from Lumm Farm to a cutting on the Wytschaete-Oosttaverne Road east
of Staenyzer Cabaret, was to be made by two Brigades, the 107th on
the right and the 109th on the left, each having one battalion from
the 108th Brigade attached. Each Brigade was to attack with two
battalions in front, which advanced as far as the Blue Line, the
ground in rear of that objective being "mopped up" by the attached
battalion of the 108th Brigade. The remaining two battalions of each
Brigade were to pass through on the Blue Line for the advance to the
Black, providing their own "mopping-up" parties. The 107th Brigade
was to use the 8th Rifles on the right and the 9th on the left for
the attack on the Blue Line, with the 15th and 10th Rifles to pass
through to the Black Line. The 12th Rifles, from the 108th Brigade,
carried out the work of "mopping up" and consolidation in rear. The
109th Brigade was to use the 14th Rifles on the right and the 11th
Inniskillings on the left to take the Blue Line, and the 10th and 9th
Inniskillings to take the Black Line. The 11th Rifles were attached
for consolidation and "mopping up." The boundary line between the
36th and 16th Divisions ran, it will be noticed, along the main
street of Wytschaete, half the village being in the objective of each
Division.
The date of the attack was designated "Z" day, the five days of
preliminary bombardment being designated "U," "V," "W," "X," and
"Y." There had been considerable bombardment of the ridge before
"U" day, but from this day onwards it became more intense. Its
object was not the total destruction of the hostile trench system,
but the disorganization of the defence by the smashing of concrete
emplacements and shelters. It took nothing short of an 8-inch
howitzer to destroy the German concrete, while 12-inch and 15-inch
howitzers fired on Wytschaete. The cutting of wire was performed by
the 18-pounders, assisted in the case of the front line by trench
mortars. Further to disorganize the enemy, a programme of barraging
night and day his communications, and shelling his billets, was
carried out, while bursts of fire with lethal and lachrymatory gas
shell of various sorts took place throughout the period. Special
half-hour hurricane bombardments of Messines and Wytschaete, during
which every gun available, from largest to smallest, was in action,
were carried out. The barrage for the advance consisted of, firstly,
a creeping barrage of 18-pounder shrapnel, moving in advance of the
infantry, with average lifts of a hundred yards, at the rate of a
hundred yards in three minutes; and, secondly, a standing barrage
of 18-pounders, 4.5 inch howitzers, and medium and heavy howitzers,
established in succession on trenches and strong points. For the
creeping barrage there was one gun to twenty yards, firing at maximum
rate. One gun a section fired smoke shell, to screen the infantry.
The barrage was highly complicated, as, owing to the configuration of
the German salient and the varying rate of the advance, it lifted off
none of the objectives at the same moment all along the line.
Meticulous care was taken by Army Headquarters to ensure that the
preparation was as complete as human forethought could make it. Each
morning air photographs, showing the effect of the previous day's
bombardment, were circulated to Divisions in the line. Each Division
was required to state, day by day, what further special bombardment
it desired. From its observation post on Kemmel Hill the Staff of the
36th Division could see practically all the slope of the Messines
Ridge, from just above the dip of the Steenebeek valley to the crest.
Day by day it studied the ground during the bombardment. A trench or
concrete work which did not appear to have been sufficiently shelled
was noted, and request made that it should receive further attention
next day. Such requests were invariably met. Trenches and dug-outs
were shelled again and again, till Divisional Headquarters declared
itself satisfied. Many of the concrete structures were revealed
only when the bombardment of the trenches had blown away the earth
about them. They were then subjected to the fire of heavy howitzers
till destroyed. Finally, each Division was asked to state if it were
satisfied with the preparation. In the case of the 36th Division at
least, the answer was an enthusiastic affirmative.
The sympathy and understanding which existed between the Staff of the
Second Army and the man in the fighting line created a moral tone of
incalculable value to the Army's efficiency as a striking force.
The work of the preliminary bombardment threw a great strain upon the
personnel of the artillery, though such rest as possible was given
by carefully organized reliefs. The infantry was greatly impressed
with the results it could witness. In particular the liaison between
infantry and heavy gunners, hardly thought of before this action, was
of the closest, the artillery officers bringing battalion commanders
aeroplane photographs to show the results of the bombardment on their
front.
Stokes mortars and machine-guns were assigned important _rôles_ in
the early part of the attack. The 3-inch mortars belonging to the
Division, less four a brigade, to be taken forward in the attack,
were to open a hurricane bombardment for three and a half minutes at
"Zero." A battery of 4-inch Stokes mortars, specially attached, was
to preface the assault with a bombardment of the Spanbroek salient,
with two lifts, using the highly demoralizing incendiary shell known
as "thermit." Six guns of the Machine-Gun Companies of the attacking
Brigades were to go forward with them; the rest of the guns of these
companies, with those of the 108th, the 32nd, two sections of the
33rd, and six guns of the 19th Motor Machine-Gun Battery,[32] a total
of sixty-six guns, were to be employed to provide a creeping barrage
beyond that of the artillery, a standing barrage on the main defences
of the ridge, and fire on strong points, woods, and ravines. One
section of Tanks[33] was allotted. They were not to catch up the
infantry till the Blue Line was reached, and in the advance to the
Black Line were to concentrate mainly upon Wytschaete.
All the successive lines, with the exception of the Green, were to
be consolidated, special strong points being established at such
positions as L'Enfer Farm, Skip Point, and Jump Point, in the Blue
Line; and Lumm Farm, Pick House, and Torreken Farm in the Black.
The infantry was to start the work of consolidation; then, when the
Black Line had been taken, the 121st and 150th Field Companies were
to move up to work upon the principal strong points. After dusk on
the evening of "Z" day, the 122nd Field Company was to move up and
construct a wire entanglement along the whole front of the Black
Line. Small opportunity, it will be seen, was left for successful
counter-attack if the assault reached its objectives.
Two contact aeroplanes were to be in the air at once throughout the
battle, calling at fixed hours, by the sounding of a Klaxon horn and
the firing of a Vérey light, for the signals by which the infantry
was to mark its progress. The latter consisted of green flares, lit
in bunches of three, and the turning of Watson fans, marked white on
one side and black on the other.
A whole series of mines, the greatest ever used in war, was to be
fired at "Zero." Of these there were three on the 36th Division's
front: one at Kruisstraat Cabaret, one at Spanbroekmolen, and one
at Peckham. The second had been doubtful up to the last minute. The
passage to the charge had been cut some time before by a German
defensive "camouflet," and it had seemed as though the toil of a
year and of thousands of men had been wasted. The tunnellers of the
171st Company had laboured unceasingly to cut a new gallery. On the
eve of the action a scribbled note from the commanding officer to
Colonel Place, G.S.O.1. of the Division, announced that the work
was accomplished and that it was "almost certain" the mine would go
up. In case there might be failure with this or any other charge,
the assaulting infantry was instructed not to wait more than fifteen
seconds after the opening of the barrage before leaving its trenches.
For the evacuation of the wounded there was an Advanced Dressing
Station at Lindenhoek, close to the main road, skilfully prepared by
the 109th Field Ambulance. Wounded could be carried into the main
shelter by the entrance on the north side, from the trench tramway,
given what attention was necessary, and conveyed out by the exit on
the west side, where the motor ambulances of the Division arrived
by a specially constructed semi-circular road. This relieved the
main road at that point, and enabled the cars to sweep round without
turning. The cars bore the wounded to the Main Dressing Station
just east of Dranoutre, manned by the 108th Field Ambulance, while
"walking wounded" were sent by a specially-marked track to the Main
Dressing Station prepared for them and manned by the 110th Field
Ambulance a mile east of the village. From these Dressing Stations
the Motor Ambulance Park had the task of carrying the wounded to the
two Casualty Clearing Stations in Bailleul. Distances were shorter
and roads better than on the Somme; and, had the casualties been as
many as on that occasion, they would have been removed in less than
half the time and with far less discomfort to the wounded. As it most
happily chanced, the casualties were less than a fourth of those at
Thiepval.
So much for the preparations. Any of importance which have not been
mentioned will appear in the account of the actual battle.
The 108th Brigade held the line during the period of preliminary
bombardment, employing for the purpose the two battalions which it
was to retain during the battle as divisional reserve. It having
been decided to carry out some practice barrages in broad daylight,
to note the effect of the smoke shell, and see whether any guns were
shooting short, these seemed to offer good opportunity for big raids.
The first of these raids took place at 3 p.m. on June the 3rd. A
party of three officers and seventy other ranks of the 13th Rifles
entered the enemy's trenches at Peckham behind the barrage, and after
a short bombing fight captured nineteen prisoners of the 2nd German
Division. On the following afternoon at 2 p.m., a larger party of the
9th Irish Fusiliers followed the barrage into the Spanbroek salient,
returning with one officer and thirty men as prisoners--a remarkable
haul for a raid. Their casualties were two killed and six wounded.
It was a fine, sunny day, and, despite the haze of dust caused by
the shelling, the whole operation could be seen in detail from the
observation posts on Kemmel Hill. The barrage, though the rate of
fire was but a third of what it was to be on the great day, was very
impressive. It appeared a wall of curling smoke creeping slowly up
the ridge. The figures of the infantrymen following it could be seen
distinctly; there was the flash of bombs, and there were Germans
coming from their dug-outs holding up their arms. As the party
returned one man was seen to break away from it, walk back fifty
yards in most leisurely fashion, summon forth two Germans whom he had
evidently observed hiding in a hole, and bring them in at the point
of the bayonet.
The day of battle was at hand. Nothing could have been more
favourable than the elements to the British cause. The weather
was clear for observation, dry, and not unduly cold at night.[34]
The infantry which was to make the attack was bivouacked in tents
and shelters, the 107th Brigade south of Locre, the 109th S.W.
of Dranoutre, thus avoiding the shelling, particularly with gas,
wherewith the Germans visited all our hutted camps. After dusk on
June the 6th, "Y" day, these Brigades moved up to their positions
of assembly, which consisted partly of our front and support line
trenches, and partly of slit trenches specially dug. As on the
occasion of the assembly for the Somme Battle, cross-country tracks
had been prepared to avoid the congested roads. East of the Neuve
Eglise-Lindenhoek Road there were no less than four tracks available
for each brigade. It was reported that the assembly was complete,
without a hitch, by 2-30 a.m. on June the 7th.
The reader must strive to imagine the emotions of the men who waited
in the dark for the fateful moment. Some, the luckier ones, those of
the battalions and attached troops that were to take the Blue Line,
had but another forty minutes, though those forty minutes must have
seemed long enough. The battalions which were to pass through them
on that objective had two hours after that. It was eleven months
since the Division had made its first great attack. Despite its heavy
losses on that day and since, there was here a large proportion
of officers and men who had taken part in it, including many who
had then been wounded. They must have recalled, as they waited for
the crash of opening artillery, with what high hopes they had gone
forward on the banks of the Ancre. The task must have appeared to
them almost equally formidable to-day. And yet there was a general
feeling of confidence, and confidence not unreasoned. The British
Army had learnt much since then, and the men in the line realized the
growth of that knowledge and had their part in it. They had watched
the stage prepared for the triumphant _dénouement_, prepared with
matchless industry and forethought, and they were ready to play their
part fitly when the curtain rose. There was among the men, it may
be, less of that spirit of gay, generous, headlong valour, ready to
spill itself without a thought of the cost, but there was a greater
store of the soldier's craft; the craft which seeks to save itself
that it may inflict the more loss upon the opponent. In fighting
efficiency the Division, war-tried, but not war-weary, was probably,
in the small hours of that June morning, at the highest pitch it ever
attained.
Zero was at 3-10 a.m. It had been fixed, after long consultation with
Divisions, by the Army as the hour at which men should be able to see
just one hundred yards ahead. In the conferences after the battle the
general opinion seemed to be that it had been put five or ten minutes
too early. It had been arranged that a normal programme of harassing
fire should be carried out, as a cessation of this would have
appeared suspicious to the enemy. It seemed, nevertheless, to those
who watched and waited, that the night was unusually quiet. A few of
our howitzers spoke now and again, and from the German lines came
regularly the hiccoughing double thud of their great gun, followed by
the whine of its missile overhead, on its course to some objective as
far back as Hazebrouck.
Then, with one monstrous roar, every British gun upon ten miles
of front opened fire. At the same time the great semi-circle of
mines exploded, spewing up, as it seemed, the solid earth, of
which fragments fell half a mile away, and sending to the skies
great towers of crimson flame, that hung a moment ere they were
choked by the clouds of dense black smoke which followed them from
their caverns. There came first one ghastly flash of light, then
a shuddering of earth thus outraged, then the thunder-clap. That
opening uproar was heard quite distinctly in England. General Nugent,
returning to his command post on Kemmel from the observation post a
hundred yards away, declared that the sight he had seen was "a vision
of hell."
Amid a gloom still thick and intensified by a smother of dust, the
first wave of the infantry sprang from its trenches and went forward.
The second followed at twenty-five yards' interval to avoid the
German barrage. One of the mines was fifteen seconds late. Curiously
enough, it was the doubtful one at Spanbroekmolen. The infantry had
obeyed instructions and had not waited for it. A few of the leading
men of the 14th Rifles, out in "No Man's Land," were thrown off their
feet by the force of the explosion. But there were no casualties,
and the men quickly closed in to the barrage. The size of the
craters to be skirted and the darkness made the keeping of direction
a matter of difficulty. It would have been impossible but for the
use of compasses by the platoon commanders. There was considerable
overlapping by the troops of the Division on our right, at least
two companies of which swung across our front. The body of one of
their officers was subsequently found in the bed of the Steenebeek,
at L'Enfer Wood, over two hundred yards within the 36th Division's
boundary.
There was no resistance by the enemy in his front or support
trenches. Dazed and disorganized by the mines and the tremendous
weight of artillery, the few survivors surrendered. Two machine-guns
only, firing through our barrage, are recorded to have come into
action at this stage, on the front of the 109th Brigade. They came
into the open when it had passed, on the extreme left flank, and
were put out of action, one by a section of rifle grenadiers, the
other by a Lewis gun of the 11th Inniskillings. The enemy's barrage
was unaccountably light and ragged, even when the violence of our
counter-battery fire is considered, and fell upon the British
front line. The assaulting troops went straight forward to the
Red Line, close upon the barrage, leaving to the "moppers up" the
task of taking prisoners. It was reached at Zero plus 35; that is,
at 3-45 a.m. Here there was a halt in the barrage of a quarter of
an hour, and here the third and fourth company of each battalion
"leap-frogged" the first and second for the assault of the Blue Line.
The serious business of the attack was but beginning.
As in almost every action of the war, the stoutest-hearted German
was the German behind the machine-gun. The artillerymen, with shell
hailing upon their positions, were more anxious to withdraw their
batteries than to support their infantry, but the machine-gunners
lived up to their reputation. As the new waves swept on, dipping now
on the right brigade front into the marshy bed of the Steenebeek,
guns came into action directly the barrage was past at L'Enfer Wood,
Earl Farm, Skip Point, and Scott Farm. At Skip Point, in particular,
two guns were handled with boldness, firing till the work was rushed
with the bayonet by the 9th Rifles, assisted by a platoon of the
14th, which swung in from the left. There was still resistance in
this veritable fortress, and some bombing of its dug-outs. Upwards
of a hundred and fifty prisoners were taken in it. At Scott Farm an
officer was seen standing on top of the work, encouraging his men. He
was shot at long range by a sniper, whereat the defence at this point
collapsed. There yet remained, however, Jump Point, the strongest
position short of the road. By this time the Intelligence Officer of
the 109th Brigade was on the high ground beyond Peckham, in touch
with his Brigadier on the telephone. He reported that he saw a yellow
flag at Jump Point. Now, the battalion flag of the 14th Rifles was
_orange_, a far more significant shade. "I said," writes General
Ricardo, "'Yellow be damned!' slammed down the 'phone, called the
Division on the other, and said I wished to report that Jump Point
was occupied. Corps was informed accordingly, within a few minutes of
schedule time. I was asked by B.G.G.S. Corps next day how we managed
our information and communications. I told him, 'by orange flags.'"
And so the first flag moved forward from the border of the map at IX.
Corps Headquarters, which was to mark the progress of the battle, and
was stuck into Jump Point.
All along the front the leading waves, well closed up to the barrage,
reached the Blue Line at the appointed hour, 4-50 a.m. The troops
of the 36th Division were in touch with those of the 25th and 16th
Divisions on right and left, both of which also reached their
objectives successfully. Here there was a halt of two hours, during
which consolidation was begun, during which also the battalions
attacking the Black Line, the 15th and 10th Rifles and the 10th and
9th Inniskillings, moved up in artillery formation. The two former
battalions had to pass through a light barrage which the enemy had
now put down upon the valley of the Steenebeek, but had not many
casualties. At 6-50 a.m. the barrage moved forward once more, the
fresh troops following it with great dash.
The severest resistance was not met here till the Green Line was past
and the troops were almost on the famous road, upon which they had
looked so long. Pick House was strongly held. With the rifle grenade
it was attacked, while a captured machine-gun was brought into
action against it from the flank.[35] The garrison, which included
a battalion commander, then surrendered. A little further north the
10th Inniskillings were held up by a machine-gun. A tank was just
in front, but the occupants apparently could not see the gun, nor
could the infantrymen attract their attention to it. A sergeant of
the Inniskillings ran up to the tank, beat upon its side with a Mills
bomb, and so gained the attention of the crew. The tank then bore
down upon the machine-gun and put it out of action. Still further
north, on their extreme left flank, the 10th had trouble from a
line of riflemen behind a ditch. A platoon of their neighbours,
the 9th Inniskillings, outflanked this party, killing three and
making prisoners of the rest. In their half of Wytschaete the 9th
Inniskillings had some "mopping up" to accomplish, and took about
fifty prisoners. Their neighbours, the Munsters of the 16th Division,
had a like task in the northern half of the village--a village that
was now a crumbled rubbish-heap of bricks, nowhere more than a few
feet high.
But the point at which resistance was most dogged was on the extreme
right, and it was the 15th Rifles which had the heaviest casualties
among the infantry. The following graphic account is taken from a
letter written by Captain P. K. Miller, who commanded the right flank
company of this battalion:
"About a hundred, or perhaps two hundred, yards short of the
Messines-Wytschaete Road we came into a lot of machine-gun fire, and
the men went to ground to find out where it came from, so I crossed
the road and lay down on the other side for about five minutes and
got my field-glasses going. Very warm spot, as our barrage was
dropping about there! Beat it back to the company, and ordered Lieut.
Falkiner to take his platoon, less Lewis-gun team, and put out of
action the strong point which I had spotted on my right. Got the
L.G. in action to spray the place meantime (had three out of five
riflemen killed doing this; however, they kept the gun going). Then
I went along to left of line and started Lieut. ---- of 'B' Company
(forget his name, but he got the M.C. for it) to attack another S.P.
which was plugging at our left. (O.C. 'B' Company had got a 'blighty'
coming up hill.) Then I went back to the right of the line and found
that Lieut. Falkiner had got Lumm Farm. The Huns put up a fight here.
However, one of the concrete places was bombed by Riflemen Aicken
and Cochrane. In the other the Hun officer and Lieut. Falkiner had
a rough-and-tumble fight. The Hun collared him somehow round the
waist, but he managed to get an arm free and shot him, and his men
came tumbling down after him and finished the rest of them. About
fifteen were left alive and surrendered.... I then pushed all the men
on a hundred yards and started them digging.... Some time later the
commander of the (25th Division) company on my right came along and
asked me if I would let him use Lumm Farm as a company headquarters,
as he had no dug-outs in his sector. So I gave him one of the
rooms--there were three or four in the dug-out."
The final part of this first-hand narrative is inserted because, in
a book recently published, the capture of Lumm Farm is attributed to
the 25th Division.[36]
Consolidation of the Black Line was started. At 8-40 a.m. patrols
pushed forward in touch with those of the 25th and 16th Divisions,
and established themselves without much difficulty a thousand yards
ahead, on what had been known on the preliminary plans as the Dotted
Black Line, afterwards called the Mauve Line, which was held as
an outpost line. Meanwhile, in the lull that followed, the field
artillery was moving forward. Most of the batteries moved to the
neighbourhood of the old British front line, but batteries of the
153rd and 173rd Brigades crossed "No Man's Land," and established
themselves as far forward as the Red Line. The gunners, in the
enthusiasm of victory, forgot their fatigue and the strain of those
sleepless nights of bombardment, and rushed their guns forward over
the difficult ground with the delight of schoolboys. At 10-5 a.m. it
was reported to General Nugent that batteries of the 173rd Brigade
were in position. A few minutes later came a similar report with
regard to the 153rd Brigade. Not for upwards of two hours was there
sign of a counter-attack in force. Then the IX. Corps announced that
long columns of troops and transport had been observed by balloon and
aeroplane moving west from the canal at Houthem. The German command
had, however, been too slow. By this time good progress had been made
with the work of consolidation of the Black Line, and of the strong
points in rear of it, the latter of which the engineers of the 121st
and 150th Field Companies had already taken in hand. In addition
to the wire brought forward on pack mules, far greater quantities
of German wire had been found, particularly at one big dump near
Guy Farm. All the twelve Vickers guns which had gone forward with
the infantry had arrived successfully. There were now three in
position north of Lumm Farm, three between Guy Farm and Staenyzer
Cabaret, three some hundred yards west of the main road, and two
in reserve. All the sixteen guns of the 108th Machine-Gun Company
were in position in their rear, a battery of eight east of L'Enfer
Wood, four at Jump Point, and four on Hill 94, at the south-west
corner of Wytschaete. A big counter-attack would have driven in the
outposts on the Mauve Line; it appeared improbable that it would
dislodge our troops from the Black. When it came, a little after one
o'clock, it was not on the front of the 36th Division, but on that of
its right-hand neighbours, the 25th and New Zealand Divisions. The
Germans came forward stoutly enough across the open ground, but the
attack got nowhere near the British lines. Before the terrific blast
of our barrage it withered away and dispersed.
The heat was now very great and the stench round Wytschaete from the
many horses that had been killed by our bombardments of the past week
was almost overwhelming. The troops were suffering from fatigue. It
was the hour at which reaction from the strain he has endured, and
the high pitch to which he has keyed himself, begins to creep upon
all but the very strongest of men. They solaced themselves during
the intervals of digging and wiring with the doubtful joys of German
ration cigars, found in great quantities in some of the dug-outs. The
Germans had begun to shell Messines and Wytschaete heavily.
The hour of the "New Zero"--that is, for the passing through of the
troops of the 11th Division--had been fixed meanwhile at 3-10 p.m. At
12-20 p.m. came an order from the IX. Corps that the Mauve Line was
to be held in force and consolidated, so that a good second line of
defence should be prepared by the time the 11th Division had captured
the Oosttaverne Line. Each Brigade was accordingly instructed to
garrison the Mauve Line with a battalion. Each Brigadier decided
to use the attached battalion of the 108th Brigade which had been
employed for "mopping up," and so was fresher than his other
battalions. Before three o'clock the 12th and 11th Rifles were upon
the Mauve Line, and at work putting it into a state of defence.
Punctually at 3-10 p.m. the 34th Brigade of the 11th Division moved
through the Mauve Line, behind a splendid barrage and with four
tanks. Though less artillery was firing, the barrage was even thicker
than had been that of the 36th Division, owing to the frontage having
been reduced to less than one half. It reached its objective, the
Oosttaverne Line, but was subjected to intense bombardment from the
German artillery, now all east of the Canal. The IX. Corps Cavalry
went through at 6 p.m.--too late, even if it had ever had a chance.
It suffered casualties from machine-gun fire, and could make little
or no progress.
The 16th Rifles (Pioneers) had attacked their heavy task of
road-making. Bridges for the trenches had been prepared and were
set in position. Shell-holes were hastily filled. With such a will
did the two companies on the road work, that before dusk wheeled
transport could move on the Lindenhoek-Messines Road beyond the great
crater in the Spanbroek salient. Another company cleared tracks for
pack transport up to the Black Line, marking them out with white
stakes and notice-boards. After the taking of the Oosttaverne Line
the battalion turned its attention to the top of the ridge, clearing
old communication trenches and cutting new ones. The 122nd Field
Company put up a fine obstacle along the whole length of the Black
Line, using, for the most part, German wire. This task was completed
by 3 a.m. on June the 8th.
It was an ideal opportunity for the employment of pack transport.
Once the enemy had been pushed off the ridge it was secure from
ground observation, while, as for German aeroplanes, they had no
chance to cross our lines, so complete was the British mastery of
the air. The pack was one of the successes of the battle. Officers
commanding battalions had in most cases picked their headquarters in
the enemy's lines days before, and told their transport officers they
would expect them at such an hour with the rations, just as if they
had been holding the most placid trenches on the front. They were
not disappointed. Indeed, mules were moving up with grenades, water,
and wire, before ever the Black Line was reached. The transport
officers of the battalions showed in this action that long months of
stagnation in the war had not robbed them of their initiative.
The forward slopes of the Messines Ridge, ere dusk put for a while
a decent veil upon it, presented a ghastly spectacle to bear
witness to the destructive power of modern artillery. The ground
had been literally ploughed up. L'Enfer Wood, which had remained a
considerable copse of stunted trees through years of shell-fire, was
now but an indeterminate collection of stumps. Some of the concrete
structures had disappeared. The Steenebeek stream was a stream no
more. Its path was marked by mud thicker than elsewhere, and where
its bed had been the shell-holes were full of water. There were a
number of dead Germans in the valley, with their faces turned toward
the hill. They had run back before the dreadful moving wall of the
British barrage, and had been caught by it in the marshy ground. Some
lay on their faces, arms outstretched. It was a sight that, at normal
times, would have filled the breast of everyone who witnessed it with
pity and horror. But in such moments the wells of these emotions are
almost dried up.
At night the 108th Brigade relieved the 107th and 109th in the
line; that is to say, its remaining battalions, which had been in
divisional reserve, relieved the troops holding the Black and Blue
Lines, while General Griffith took command of the front. The relieved
troops moved back to the comparative comfort of the old British
trenches. The night was very disturbed. On more than one occasion the
S.O.S. rocket went up on the right of the Division, and at 10 p.m.
a counter-attack on Messines was reported. If counter-attack there
was, it was of small account. No big attack could, in fact, have been
carried out in the darkness. Morning dawned, leaving the British in
secure occupation of the battlefield and all their objectives. The
ridge was, however, subjected to very heavy shelling all that day and
at night, when the 150th Field Company had a very wild task in wiring
the whole of the Mauve Line. On the afternoon of the following day,
at 4 p.m., command of the sector, the actual front line of which had
been held for upwards of forty-eight hours by his troops, passed to
the G.O.C. 11th Division. That night the 32nd Brigade of the 11th
Division relieved the 108th Brigade in the Mauve, Black, and Blue
Lines, the weary battalions moving back to bivouac on the slopes
of Kemmel Hill. On the 16th the Headquarters of the 36th Division
returned to their old village, St. Jans Cappel.
The total number of prisoners captured by the 36th Division in the
offensive was 31 officers and 1,208 other ranks. Against this its
casualties, to the night of June the 9th, when it was relieved, were
61 officers and 1,058 other ranks. In the actual assault, the losses
were probably not above seven hundred. Other divisions, notably some
of the Australians of the II. Anzac Corps, suffered more severely
than the 36th; but, on the whole, it seems safe to presume that the
German losses were more than thrice our own. One prisoner stated that
practically all his company was destroyed by one of the mines, while
the tenor of the letters found upon others was that it had been "far
worse than the Somme." No German field guns could be withdrawn by our
troops before the Division was relieved, but a number were captured
between the Black Line and the Mauve. Among the comparatively few
officers killed was Captain H. Gallagher, D.S.O., of the 11th
Inniskillings, whose gallantry and fine leadership upon the Somme
have been recorded. At the beginning of the action his right arm was
shattered by a fragment of shell. Urged to go back, he laughingly
refused, threw down the rifle he was carrying, and took his revolver
in his left hand, saying: "This will do me rightly." He led his
company to its objective, and was returning later to have his arm
dressed when he was killed instantly by a shell. He was buried in the
old "No Man's Land," just outside the "Bull Ring," which he had so
often held, from which he and his company had repulsed a big German
raiding party a short while before.
The 16th Division lost one distinguished man in Major William
Redmond, M.P., who was brought in by stretcher-bearers of the 36th
Division, and conveyed to its Main Dressing Station. He had been
attached to Divisional Headquarters, but had insisted on rejoining
his regiment for the battle. His wound was light, but he was no
longer a young man, nor in a state of physical fitness to withstand
such a strain. He died some hours later.
The 36th Division had by no means finished with the
Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, even for this year; but before dealing
with its last days in the area, it may be not unprofitable to
speculate upon the causes of this triumphant success. If this
account has achieved its object, the majority of them will stand
out clearly enough. In the conferences after the battle, and in
reply to _questionnaires_ issued by the commanders, there were very
few criticisms made. Zero, as has been stated, was considered to
have been too early, though by not more than a few minutes at most.
All the infantry was enthusiastic about the manner in which the
artillery had been handled, and about the effect of the barrage.
Some battalions considered that it had been set to move rather too
fast, but the general opinion was that the infantry had been able to
keep up with it comfortably enough, and that the pace was a factor
in the success. The mines, it was agreed, had been decisive in the
capture of the front-line system, and had exercised a great moral
effect much farther back. The tanks had been a success. They were
useful in incidents such as that which has been described, and they
probably saved the infantry some casualties on the top of the ridge.
Broadly speaking, however, they did not appear to have exercised any
great effect upon the course of the battle. Brigadiers and battalion
commanders were unanimous in praise of the smoothness with which the
machinery worked from behind. The services of supply--the Divisional
Train, Supply Column, and Divisional Ammunition Column--were at their
best, and their standard of excellence was high. The Ordnance had
responded to every demand made upon it for the multifarious material
used in the offensive.
With regard to the infantry itself, the most interesting feature of
the Battle of Messines was the triumph of the platoon. Each platoon
had now a Lewis-gun section and a section of rifle grenadiers. It
was converted thereby into a little self-sufficing force, an army in
miniature, with every weapon necessary for the carrying out of the
minor operations likely to confront it in such an assault. Some of
the platoon leaders displayed in this battle a high order of tactical
skill.
But let us glance also at the affair from the other side, where a
German Army Commander, the famous Sixt von Armin, was seated at his
map-table. What were the problems that confronted him, and how did he
face them?
The Germans meant to hold the ridge if they could. It was a valuable
position that had cost them dear in the winning. They knew an
attack was coming, but they put it one or two days later than it
was delivered. The Higher Command was well aware that the troops
in the trenches were in no fit state to meet it, after days of
terrific pounding, heavy losses, and shortage of food. It was in the
act of relieving them when the attack was launched. The relief of
one Division was incomplete when the mines went up and the British
bayonets came in the dark upon the columns in the communication
trenches. The confusion must have been indescribable. Again, the
German position, admirable for trench warfare, had weaknesses in
such a battle as this. It was a sharp salient, with a semi-circle of
artillery about it. The artillery had excellent observation. Had the
weather been misty, Kemmel would have been of little avail, and the
work of destruction comparatively ineffective. But the atmosphere was
wonderfully clear. The British fire upon the forts was overwhelming.
The counter-battery work was the best accomplished in the war. An
average of one gun to every German battery in action was destroyed
by our fire, according to the evidence of captured artillerymen.
The loss in horses alone constituted a severe blow. As to the
counter-attack, which was made in the afternoon with the 7th and
probably regiments of the 24th Divisions, it was launched late, and
met the full weight of our barrage. With its failure the High Command
appears to have decided, wisely no doubt, to abandon the struggle,
and made all haste to get every gun left to it east of the Canal
d'Ypres. It must have appeared to it that the position held by the
British offered doubtful results to a counter-attack in force. The
latter had now all the best of the ground, and a great counter-attack
upon the re-entrant held by them would have required more troops than
the enemy probably had available.
On the 13th of July the 36th Division, less its Artillery, which
remained in position, moved to the area between Mont Noir and
Bailleul. A certain amount of rest was obtained, but large parties
of infantry had to work under the Chief Engineer of the IX. Corps.
However, better things were in prospect, the Division being under
orders to move back to Merris. These orders were suddenly cancelled.
On the night of the 19th, the 107th Brigade on the right, and the
109th on the left, took over from the 11th Division the whole front
now held by the IX. Corps, from the Blauwepoortbeek at Deconinck
Farm, just north of the village of Gapaard, on the right, to Rose
Wood, north of the Roozebeek, on the left. The length of the front
was about three thousand yards. The Headquarters of the 107th Brigade
were established in a company headquarters of our old trenches, those
of the 109th Brigade in enemy dug-outs in the northern part of Grand
Bois. On the 20th, 36th Divisional Headquarters opened at Ulster Camp.
The holding of a new-won position after a great attack was always
an unpleasant task. In this case the conditions were, from some
points of view, more difficult than those of the capture of the
ridge. "Jerry was angry," said the men, with justice. The Germans
now had a mass of heavy artillery behind the Canal d'Ypres, and
day and night they shelled the British forward positions and the
western slope of the ridge. On their second day in the line the
Headquarters of the 109th Brigade in the Grand Bois were so heavily
bombarded that General Nugent decided they should be withdrawn to
a company headquarters in our old lines. The troops in the front
trenches were on a forward slope, very exposed to observation, and
suffered heavily. At night ration parties on the roads had many
evil experiences. Casualties rarely amounted to less than a hundred
for the period of twenty-four hours, and several battalions had
considerably greater losses in ten days of this experience than in
the period from the 7th to the 9th of June.
Nor was it alone upon areas over which he had observation from the
ground that the enemy was able to bring to bear accurate fire.
Parties on railway work, lorries on the Wytschaete Road, suffered
very heavily also. The reason was that the situation in the air had
altered. British supremacy there had been absolute. Not a German
aeroplane had been seen during the battle. Since then certain of our
squadrons had moved north to the Salient. The German air force, on
the contrary, had been heavily reinforced. In particular the famous
Richthofen, with a squadron of very fast single-seater scouts,
painted bright red, raged up and down the front, catching many of
our comparatively slow photographic and artillery aeroplanes, and
shooting them down. Another favourite device of his was to sweep
low over our trenches, firing belt after belt upon the infantry in
them, who retorted, without much effect, by the fire of machine-guns
on anti-aircraft mountings. But his most spectacular feat was
undoubtedly the burning of our balloons. Of these there was a great
number on the front. From Kemmel about fourteen could be counted,
stretching almost to the coast on one side, and perhaps to Estaires
on the other. For men in the neighbourhood of the hill it became one
of the interests of those sunny afternoons to watch the balloons. The
programme was always of a similar nature. There would be a sudden
uproar of anti-aircraft fire, a fast-moving dot would approach one of
the balloons, two silver dots below the latter would represent the
observers making their way earthwards in their parachutes. A tiny
flicker of fire would appear atop of the balloon, swiftly growing and
spreading. Within a few seconds the flaming mass would sink slowly.
Sometimes the aggressor would dart straight off to the next balloon
in the line, and repeat the process with that. On the afternoon of
June the 23rd, three balloons in succession were brought down by one
aeroplane. It must, however, have been displeasing to the Germans to
observe how swiftly every balloon burnt by them was replaced.
The German infantry, it must be added, was entirely unaggressive, nor
was it easy to locate its positions. It held the ground west of the
Canal d'Ypres with isolated posts, and made no effort to improve the
half-dug trenches already existing. All labour was concentrated upon
the positions east of the Canal.
On the 29th a welcome relief of the 36th by the 37th Division took
place. On the following day the G.O.C. 37th Division took over
command of the front, the whole of the 36th Division, less Artillery,
Engineers, and Pioneers, moving to the Merris area. The Headquarters
of the Division and that of the 108th Brigade were in that village;
the 107th Brigade at Outtersteene, and the 109th at Strazeele. The
batteries, which had withdrawn to their forward wagon-lines for
rest on the 19th, had returned to the line by the 27th in relief
of the 11th Divisional Artillery, and remained there till July the
5th, under heavy hostile shelling, in indifferent weather with poor
visibility. The Pioneers and Field Companies had but a day's rest
before being moved to the Salient to begin new work.
The first week of July was given to rest and training at Merris.
[Illustration: Map II.
The Battle of Messines, 1917.]
FOOTNOTES:
[31] The boundaries of the 36th Division, the successive objectives,
and all the names used in the following description are shown on Map
II.
[32] The 32nd, half of the 33rd Machine-Gun Companies, and the 19th
Motor Machine-Gun Battery, were at the disposal of the 36th Division
for the attack.
[33] _i.e._, four Tanks.
[34] One officer records that, two evenings before the attack, he
played bridge in the open air till midnight.
[35] Our own Vickers gun teams had dropped behind the infantry here.
Vickers guns, tripods, and belt boxes are very heavy loads on ground
cut to pieces by shell-fire.
[36] _The 25th Division in France and Flanders._ By Lieut.-Colonel M.
Kincaid-Smith.