THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: JULY 1ST, 1916
On the first day of June, 1916, the front of the 36th Division
was held by the 107th Brigade, the 108th being in support in the
neighbourhood of Martinsart, and the 109th training. To permit the
two latter Brigades to train together, the 147th Brigade of the 49th
Division was ordered to relieve the 108th and take over its working
parties. The 108th Brigade then moved back to Varennes, and the
neighbouring villages of Harponville and Léalvillers. Training was
carried out over an elaborate system of dummy trenches marked out
with plough and spade, near Clairfaye Farm, to represent those of the
German system to be attacked. It was largely due to this preparation
that the men knew their task so well, and were able to push on to
their objectives when their leaders had fallen. On the 5th a raid was
carried out by a party of the 12th Rifles, sent up from the training
area, on the German sap that ran parallel with the main railway line
north of the Ancre.[19] The wire was cut by an ammonal torpedo. This
was a zinc tube, three inches in diameter, filled with ammonal. Each
tube was about six feet in length, but tubes could be connected up
with bayonet joints, and any length of torpedo thus made. It was
generally fired by a sapper accompanying the raiding party. The
Germans had run back or taken to their dug-outs under the fire of
our artillery, and few were seen. The dug-outs were bombed, and an
officer shot. Two tunnels leading toward the British lines were
discovered, one containing fourteen high-tension copper wires, which
seemed to point to mining with a mechanical digger. The heads of
these saps were blown in by the engineers who accompanied the raiding
party. Five nights later the Germans retaliated upon the little
salient in the British line opposite, known as the William Redan,
then held by the 15th Rifles. After our trenches had been pounded by
a bombardment of half an hour, the raiders advanced. They suffered
loss from our barrage, and not more than half a dozen ever actually
entered our trench. Half a minute's bitter hand-to-hand fighting,
and they were out of it again, bearing with them the leader of the
raid, who had been shot by a British officer. Our trenches were
considerably damaged, but casualties were not heavy.
The weather now took a turn for the worse, there being a sort of
cloud-burst on the 12th. Cross-country tracks were impassable for
infantry, and the carriage of ammunition to the new gun positions was
a very heavy task. The rain came at an unfortunate moment. Battalions
of the 109th Brigade were moving up to Aveluy Wood, south of Mesnil,
to complete the work of preparation. The 16th Rifles (Pioneers) were
there already. These troops had to endure the gravest discomfort
from the weather. Little canvas shelters were all their protection,
and for days together their clothes were not dry. Yet their work was
magnificent. When, almost at the last moment, a Regiment of French
Field Artillery joined the Division to assist in the attack, the
11th Inniskillings were ordered to help them in the construction of
gun-pits and shelters, with little enough time to do it. The men
threw themselves into the task with splendid enthusiasm. It seemed
that they worked the harder because their work was for strangers,
who would be left half-protected if they failed them. There was a
fine flavour of international courtesy in the manner of their toil,
for they gave of their free will energy that not the most skilful
of taskmasters could have wrung from them. General Nugent sent to
Colonel Brush, then in command of the Battalion, a letter of warm
congratulation upon their efforts.
In the battle that was about to begin, General Sir H. Rawlinson's
Fourth Army was taking the offensive along its whole front, with the
Sixth French Army of General Fayolle on its right. The Battle of the
Somme, the first in which our New Armies of volunteers were engaged
in great numbers, concerned the 36th Division but at its opening.
Its general aspects were, however, of the highest importance to
all the Allied troops. It differed broadly from such an action as
that of Loos. There an immediate strategic result was sought from a
small offensive. Here, while a break through was sought on the first
day, and would doubtless have been possible had the whole German
trench system been captured all along the front, thereafter the aims
became quite other. On the vast plateau of Picardy, an advance of
ten miles or thereabouts had small strategic importance. The nearest
first-class railway junction, Cambrai, was thirty miles away. The
new phase was the "limited offensive." The plan was to push forward
infantry behind artillery fire of overwhelming weight upon a broad
front, step by step, smashing down resistance. The plan was made
possible for us by the huge development of our munition factories.
It was the war of attrition. It was a mighty assault battle, wherein
England and France hurled man and gun and material upon German man
and gun and material. It had manifold and obvious blemishes. Its cost
was prodigious, particularly in its early stages, before certain
needful lessons had been learnt. It stereotyped attack and robbed
commanders of initiative, and was in this respect the text-book of
all the lessons Ludendorff impressed upon his troops in the first
three months of 1918. But--and of this there can be no shadow of
doubt to-day--it laid the foundations of final victory.[20] The
German troops were never quite the same after it, while our young
levies, dreadful as were their sacrifices, were to arrive at a far
higher standard of military value.
The 36th Division was the left Division of the X. Corps, having on
its right the 32nd Division and on its left the 29th Division, not
long arrived from the East, which was in the VIII. Corps. The 49th
Division was in X. Corps Reserve. The 36th Division was to attack
astride the Ancre. On the left, or southern bank, its objective was
the fifth line of German trenches, known as the "D" line.[21] The
right flank boundary ran from the north-east corner of Thiepval
Wood to D 8. On the right bank the objective was a triangle of
trenches enclosed between the left boundary line and the Ancre,
beyond Beaucourt Station. The left boundary ran from the point of the
salient in our lines, known as the Mary Redan, to two houses half-way
between Beaucourt and its railway station, thence along the river
to the railway bridge. The ground rose sharply on either side from
the deep-cut bed of the Ancre, but while on the northern bank it was
cut by a gorge running down from the village of Beaumont-Hamel, at
right angles to the river, and parallel with the German trenches, on
the south it swelled up in a great convex curve, rising two hundred
and fifty feet in a thousand yards. The crest was crowned by a
parallelogram of trenches, extending from the German "B" line to the
"C" line, that will live long in history as the Schwaben Redoubt.
The trenches were defended by masses of wire. An artillery officer,
who made a careful reconnaissance with a good glass from "Brock's
Benefit," on the Mesnil Ridge, counted sixteen rows guarding the
front line just south of the river, and an average of five rows along
the second line. The dug-outs, most of them at least thirty feet deep
in the chalk, were to all intents and purposes shell-proof, and were
numerous enough to house the whole trench garrison. The enormous
activity behind our lines had taught the Germans long before that an
attack was brewing. They trusted to their fortifications and awaited
it with confidence.
For the purposes of attack, the front was divided into four sections.
The right and right centre sections were allotted to the 109th and
108th Brigades respectively. The left centre section, bounded by a
line drawn from the north corner of Thiepval Wood just north of B
19, C 11, and D 11, and the Ancre, was, owing to the great frontage
of the 36th Division, not to be attacked directly. The left section,
on the right bank of the Ancre, was allotted to the 108th Brigade.
This Brigade had attached to it one battalion of the 107th. It was
to employ three battalions in the right centre section, and two in
the left section. The 107th Brigade (less one battalion) was in
Divisional Reserve.
The task of the 109th Brigade in the right section was to attack the
"A" and "B" lines within its section,[22] and to advance to a line
drawn from C 8 through B 16 to the Grandcourt-Thiepval Road at C 9;
there to halt and consolidate. For this purpose General Shuter was
attacking with two battalions, the 9th Inniskillings on the right,
the 10th on the left, in first line; and the two remaining, 11th
Inniskillings on right and 14th Rifles on left, in second. The two
first were to take and consolidate the final objective, the rear
battalions to hold the "A" and "B" lines and to send up liaison
patrols to get touch with the leading battalions. The most important
task of the 11th Inniskillings was the fortification of the Crucifix
on the Thiepval-Grandcourt Road.
The task of the 108th Brigade in the right centre section was to
clear the "A" and "B" lines within the section, and advance to the
"C" line, halting and consolidating on the salient C 9, C 10, C 11,
the north-east corner of the Schwaben Redoubt. A special detachment,
with one Stokes mortar, one Lewis and one Vickers gun, was to act as
left flank guard, to clear the communication trench from B 19 to C
12, holding the latter as a defensive post, and sending a detachment
down to C 13, to ensure observation and fire on the Grandcourt-St.
Pierre Divion Road. In addition, two officers' patrols, each a
platoon in strength, with a Lewis gun, were to reconnoitre and clear
the left of the "A" and "B" lines up to St. Pierre Divion. General
Griffith was attacking here with the 11th Rifles on the right, the
13th on the left, and the 15th Rifles of the 107th Brigade, attached,
in support.
North of the Ancre, in the left section, the task allotted to the
two remaining battalions of the 108th Brigade was to assault the
German salient on the left of its objective and clear the trenches
down to the railway, to establish strong points at B 26, B 24, and
B 21, and to occupy Beaucourt Station and the trenches immediately
behind it. It was afterwards to occupy the mill on the river bank
and the two houses beyond the station. Here the 9th Irish Fusiliers
were attacking on the right, and the 12th Rifles on the left. Of the
latter battalion one platoon was detailed to attack the railway sap,
of which mention has already been made, and one to patrol the marsh.
The assault on the "D" line, the final objective, was to be carried
out by the 107th Brigade with its three remaining battalions. The
Brigade was to advance through Thiepval Wood, following the 109th
Brigade, pass through the leading Brigades on the "C" line and attack
the "D" line from D 8 to D 9; then to extend its left to D 11.
General Withycombe disposed the 10th and 9th Rifles in first line,
the former with its right on D 8, the latter with its left on D 9.
After the capture of this objective, the 9th Rifles were to extend to
D 10 and the 10th to D 9. The 8th Rifles, moving up in rear, were to
occupy and hold from D 10 to D 11.
The assaulting battalions were to advance, each in eight successive
waves, at fifty yards' interval, but the 107th Brigade, passing
through to the attack on the final objective, was to advance in
artillery formation till compelled to extend.
The artillery consisted of the 36th Divisional Artillery, one
Brigade of the 49th Division, a Regiment of French Artillery, and,
under the orders of the X. Corps, a greater concentration of heavy
artillery than had been made in the course of the war till now,
except perhaps in the latter stages of Verdun. The preliminary
bombardment was to last five days, from the 24th to the 28th of June.
Owing to wet weather the attack was postponed two days, and there
were two extra days of bombardment. The results, as witnessed from
our observation posts, were magnificent. All wire that could be seen
was effectively cut. As one watched the big shells bursting, sending
up huge columns of earth, day after day, it appeared as though no
life could continue in that tortured and blasted area. The barrage
for the attack was not the true "creeping barrage" which was to
become universal later on, and was, indeed, employed that day by the
French. After a final intensive bombardment of sixty-five minutes, it
fired upon each German line in succession, lifting from the "A" to
the "A.I." at Zero, from the "A.I." at Zero plus three minutes, from
the "B" at Zero plus eighteen minutes, to a line 400 yards east of
this objective. Then at Zero plus twenty-eight minutes it moved on to
the "C" line, and at Zero plus one hour eighteen minutes off the "C"
line to the "D." There was then a long halt to permit of the passing
through of the 107th Brigade. At Zero plus two hours thirty-eight
minutes the barrage moved up to a line three hundred yards east of
the "D" line. At each lift, sections of 18-pounders and 4.5 howitzers
"walked up" the communication trenches to the next barrage line.
Stokes mortars were to take part in a final hurricane bombardment
prior to Zero, while medium[23] and heavy mortars were also employed,
the former on special points, the latter moving with the artillery
barrage to the extremity of their range. The French artillery joined
in the preliminary wire-cutting, using high explosive instead of
shrapnel according to its custom, but its main task was the drenching
of the Ancre valley with gas shell. Two machine-guns were to
accompany each battalion in the attack, the remaining eight of each
Machine-Gun Company being in Brigade Reserve. Guns were allotted
to all the principal strong points that were to be consolidated.
Eighteen Stokes mortars were to go forward, the personnel of the
remaining eighteen acting as carriers. Two sections of the 150th
Field Company were allotted to the 109th Brigade, and one section
of the 122nd Field Company to the 108th Brigade on each bank of
the Ancre. The remainder of the Field Companies were in Divisional
Reserve.
The medical arrangements were of peculiar difficulty, particularly
on the southern part of the front. The two Main Dressing Stations,
for stretcher cases and "walking wounded" respectively, were at
Forceville, manned by the 108th Field Ambulance, and Clairfaye Farm,
further west, manned by the 110th Field Ambulance. The Advanced
Dressing Station was situated close to the Albert-Arras Road in
Aveluy Wood. Evacuation of wounded from the Regimental Aid Posts
in Thiepval Wood and Authuille had to take place over Authuille
Bridge, or by the trench tramway which crossed the Ancre to the
north of it. The motors of the Field Ambulance were parked on the
Martinsart-Albert Road, south of the former village. For "walking
wounded" there was a collecting station west of Martinsart, whence
horsed wagons carried them by a cross-country track through
Hédauville to Clairfaye. From Hamel evacuation was simpler, though
even here it had to follow a specially dug trench from the village to
a point where the Hamel-Albert Road was screened from observation.
On the 22nd and 23rd the infantry took up the positions it was to
occupy during the bombardment; the 9th Inniskillings in the right
section of Thiepval Wood, the 11th Rifles in the left, and the 9th
Irish Fusiliers in the Hamel trenches. These troops had a purgatory
to endure. For the most part in the narrow slit assembly trenches,
with the rain pouring steadily down upon them, they were under
furious German bombardments that wreathed the wood in smoke and
flame, and made the crashing of great trees the accompaniment to the
roar of bursting shells. On the night of the 26th gas was liberated
by us from cylinders in the wood after a great bombardment. It was
the first time the Division had had to do with the abominable stuff,
which brought no good fortune. Many cylinders were burst by the
heavy German barrage, and serious casualties suffered by the men of
the Special Brigade responsible for opening the cocks, and by the
infantry assisting them.
Two hours later a raid was carried out in this sector by a party sent
up by the 13th Rifles. The men, now at a pitch of excitement and
enthusiasm that rendered them resistless opponents in hand-to-hand
fighting, swarmed into the battered German trenches, shooting right
and left, and bombing dug-outs. They returned with one German officer
and twelve other ranks as prisoners, the first captured by the 36th
Division. Their own casualties were six killed and nine wounded,
suffered for the most part in the Sunken Road, where, like the 9th
Inniskillings, they had to lie for some time ere it was possible to
return to their trenches. Captain Johnston, the leader of the raid,
brought in all his casualties, as well as his prisoners. He was to
fall five days later in the greater venture. The prisoners denied
knowledge of our gas, nor did their respirators smell of it. It was
occasionally the experience of the Division that the British gas
services rated too highly the effects of their devices.
On the 27th, "X" day, it rained in sheets, and "Y" day was little
better. It was accordingly decided by the Higher Command to postpone
the attack for two days. This necessitated a postponement of the
assembly also. Instead, inter-brigade reliefs were carried out in
the trenches to give some rest to the troops that had endured the
early hammering. Their rest, unfortunately, was in huts in Martinsart
Wood, huts that trembled and creaked to the terrific roar of siege
howitzers firing night and day beside them. Yet it was better than
that other wood across the river, which was the following day, now
"Y.1" day, visited by the heaviest bombardment yet seen. The trenches
were in a terrible state, and the men of the medium trench mortar
batteries, engaged in cutting the German wire, suffered more even
than the infantry, and earned the admiration of the latter by their
devotion to their task.
In all the circumstances it must be said that the total casualties
for the month of June, approximately seven hundred and fifty,
were not heavy. They included the results of a veritable calamity
that befell the 13th Rifles. On the evening of the 28th, "Y" day,
the battalion was relieving the 11th Rifles in Thiepval Wood,
and marching out of Martinsart by platoons at two hundred yards'
interval. As number 11 Platoon and battalion headquarters were about
to march out together a shell fell right in the midst of the party.
Fourteen were killed on the spot, and ten more died later. Almost all
the rest were wounded, including the second-in-command, Major R. P.
Maxwell, and the adjutant, Captain Wright. The confusion in the pitch
darkness, with scarce a man on his feet, was appalling. Fortunately a
platoon of the 11th Rifles, just relieved from the trenches, appeared
on the scene, and the street was speedily cleared. But the Germans
could have had far bigger hauls than this at "Lancashire Dump" on the
Albert-Hamel Road in Aveluy Wood any night they had chosen to shell
it.
This was the _rendezvous_ of a mass of transport immediately after
dusk, bringing up munitions and rations for the offensive. Large
stores of the latter were placed in specially constructed dug-outs
on the river bank. The work of the Divisional Train was here most
admirably organized by its commander, Colonel Bernard. So close
were the big convoys to the German trenches that extraordinary
precautions to avoid noise had to be taken. Wheels were bound with
straw and old motor tyres, steel chains replaced by leather straps,
boots, like those used in rolling a cricket ground, placed over the
horses' hoofs. And it was an amusing sight to see an A.S.C. driver
frantically clinging to the nose of some sociable horse that desired
to greet new acquaintances with a friendly neigh.
The reward of waiting came in a fine day on "Y.2" day, the 30th.
Divisional Headquarters moved up to their report centre on the
Englebelmer-Martinsart Road. At night the approach march took
place, and assaulting battalions returned to their positions in the
trenches. The assembly positions of the 107th Brigade (less 15th
Rifles) were in slit trenches in Aveluy Wood. The battalions marched
up by cross-country tracks, marked, one by red lanterns, the other by
green. The night was fine, and the artillery on either side rather
less active, though lachrymatory shell was falling in the wood.
In a curious complete lull that fell before dawn, men heard with
astonishment a nightingale burst into song, pouring out her bubbling
notes one upon the other, as though this had been still the pleasant
copse, deserted by man, but a kingdom of the birds, of two years gone.
The two days' postponement had had upon the men an effect contrary to
that which might have been attended. The extra strain of waiting was
more than counterbalanced by the coincidence of the date. For it was
upon July the 1st, the anniversary of the Boyne, that the sons of the
victors in that battle, after eight generations, fought this greater
fight. To them it had a very special significance. A stirring in
their blood bore witness to the silent call of their ancestors. There
seemed to them a predestination in the affair. They spoke of it as
they waited, during the final intensive bombardment, while the German
counter-barrage rained upon their trenches.
Day had dawned clear and sunny. Zero was at 7-30 a.m., when it
had been light for four hours. Far better had it been had the
conventional dawn attack been carried out. However, the first
movements were concealed by the intensity of our fire, and by smoke
barrages put down by 4-inch Stokes mortars in the valley of the
Ancre and in front of Thiepval village. The troops formed up in "No
Man's Land," facing their objectives, following for the most part,
on the left bank of the Ancre, the line of the sunken Thiepval-Hamel
Road. At 7-15 a.m. the leading companies issued from the gaps cut
in our wire, extended to two paces' interval, and moved forward to
within one hundred and fifty yards of the German trench. The hubbub
of the British bombardment was terrific; over their heads the Stokes
mortars, firing at highest rate, were slinging a hundred shells into
the air at once.
Zero! The hurricane Stokes bombardment ceased. The artillery lifted
off the first line. The whistles of the officers sounded, and the
men sprang up and advanced at steady marching pace on the German
trenches. Those who saw those leading battalions move to the assault,
above all their commanding officers, forbidden to accompany them, who
waved to them from the parapet, received one of the most powerful
and enduring impressions of their lives. Colonel Macrory of the 10th
Inniskillings speaks of "lines of men moving forward, with rifles
sloped and the sun glistening upon their fixed bayonets, keeping
their alignment and distance as well as if on a ceremonial parade,
unfaltering, unwavering." General Ricardo, then commanding the 9th
Inniskillings, wrote a few days later: "I stood on the parapet
between the two centre exits to wish them luck.... They got going
without delay; no fuss, no shouting, no running, everything solid
and thorough--just like the men themselves. Here and there a boy
would wave his hand to me as I shouted good luck to them through my
megaphone. And all had a cheery face. Most were carrying loads. Fancy
advancing against heavy fire with a big roll of barbed wire on your
shoulder!" So they bore upon the German lines, while behind them,
from Thiepval Wood, rocked by exploding shells, sheeted in the smoke
and flame of bursting shrapnel, fresh troops issued and followed upon
their advance in little columns.
It is the custom, kept throughout this History, to describe the
course of battles from the right hand to the left. If here it is
departed from, it is only because the action on the north side of
the Ancre was separate from the other and of lesser importance. Its
description, alas! will occupy small space enough. There was here in
"No Man's Land" a deep ravine, which the map contours show without
giving an idea of its abruptness. The first wave of the 9th Irish
Fusiliers reached this with little trouble, but those which followed
met with very heavy machine-gun fire, and suffered terrible loss.
Advancing at Zero with splendid dash, the survivors of a battalion
which Colonel Blacker's training had made one of the best in the
Division, swept through the enemy's front line trenches. One small
body of the right centre company in particular carried all before it,
and was last seen advancing upon Beaucourt Station. On the left the
12th Rifles had worse fortune. The wire round the German salient over
the hill-brow, less easy to observe, was less completely destroyed
than on the rest of the front. Many gaps were cut, but machine-guns
were trained upon them. Beaten back at the first rush, and having
lost the barrage, the remnants of the battalion were twice re-formed
by devoted officers under that withering hail, and twice again led
forward. It was of no avail. On their left the leading troops of the
next Division crossed the front line trenches, but were assailed from
the rear by machine-gunners emerging from dug-outs. At eight o'clock
the 36th Division was informed that the enemy had retaken his front
line. The attack north of the Ancre was a failure, though gallantry
every whit as great as that of the battalions on the left bank was
behind it.
Elsewhere, for all its losses, the attack was a complete success.
Every objective was reached. Had it been possible to attain the
same results all along the front, the day would have ended with the
greatest British victory of the war.
The leading waves, still moving as on parade, reached the German
front line trench and moved straight across it. They did not suffer
heavily. Hardly were they across, however, when the German barrage
fell upon "No Man's Land," upon the rear companies of the first
line battalions, and upon those of the second line. And immediately
the barrage left it, flanking machine-gun fire burst out from the
dominating position of Thiepval cemetery. The 11th Inniskillings and
14th Rifles, as they emerged from the wood, were literally mown
down, and "No Man's Land" became a ghastly spectacle of dead and
wounded. On the left of the line the 13th Rifles, under long-range
fire from the Beaucourt Redoubt across the river, suffered at this
stage most heavily of all. They had lost the bulk of their officers
ere ever they reached the German trenches. The Division on the right
was never able to clear Thiepval village, and it was that fact which
was responsible for the gravest losses of the 36th.
Under this deadly punishment the men never hesitated. They went
straight forward across the first two lines, sending back the few
prisoners they took. The "B" line was to be reached at 7-48. Despite
the gaps in their ranks the first wave swept upon it at precisely
that moment. There was not much fighting here, but a large number of
prisoners was taken, the German infantry surrendering as our men came
upon them. The 15th Rifles, the supporting battalion of the 108th
Brigade's attack, had, however, to deal with some Germans who came up
out of unnoticed dug-outs after the leading battalions had crossed
the "A" lines, the bombing squads told off to clear the trenches
having been destroyed by machine-gun fire. On pressed the leading
waves. Never losing the barrage, they took the "C" line, including
the north-east corner of the Schwaben Redoubt, at 8-48. Even in
the trenches they suffered loss from the flanking machine-guns,
while movement from front to rear was now all but impossible. The
supporting battalions, or their survivors, were also upon their
objectives. Every man had done what he was set to do, or dropped in
his path. And, to the eternal credit of our artillery, no man appears
to have needed his wire-cutters.
Let us turn to the 107th Brigade, which had meanwhile advanced to the
"A" line. It had moved from Aveluy Wood and across the Ancre to the
western skirts of Thiepval Wood, almost at the bottom of the valley,
assembling at 6-30 about the track known as Speyside. It had an hour
to wait, shell after shell passing just over the heads of the troops
and bursting in the marshes beyond them. At Zero, led by the 10th
Rifles, it moved back east for a short distance, to reach the rides
which were its paths to the front line. Here the men could see the
troops of the Division on the right issuing from their trenches,
and each platoon, as it extended in "No Man's Land," disappearing
before the blast of machine-gun fire that met it. The ride used by
the 10th Rifles on the right had been denuded of its foliage by
the bombardments of several days, and was in view. The battalion
came under machine-gun fire from front, right, and right _rear_
simultaneously. The commanding officer, Colonel Bernard, was killed,
and casualties were high. The final passage had to be carried out by
rushes to the front line. The leading men could even see the German
machine-guns firing at them, so that it is easy to imagine what sort
of target they offered to those guns. Lewis guns were brought forward
to engage them, but their teams were destroyed. The other battalions
suffered considerably less, being screened in their rides, and
further from the Thiepval guns. Before ten o'clock, runners, with the
skill and devotion of their kind, had come back to report that the
"C" line had been reached. Eight minutes past, it may be remembered,
was the hour for the assault upon the "D" line.
To General Nugent it had appeared long before probable that his
troops, if they went forward further as a wedge into the enemy's
defensive system, with not a yard gained on either flank, would go
only to their own destruction. At 8-32 his G.S.O.1., Colonel Place,
had asked the X. Corps whether the 107th Brigade might be stopped
from advancing upon the last line. The reply was that a new attack
was being made on Thiepval, and also by the VIII. Corps north of the
Ancre, and that the 107th Brigade must do its part by continuing
its advance. But three-quarters of an hour later, at 9-16 a.m.,
instructions from the Corps to withhold the 107th Brigade till the
situation upon the flanks had been cleared up were received. General
Withycombe was ordered to stop his troops, and employed every means
in his power to do so. But all the telephone lines taken forward had
been cut by German fire, while for a runner to reach the line now
held by the troops was a very long affair. Fortunate was he if he
crossed that zone of death without scathe. The message arrived too
late; the troops were committed to the attack. With them went forward
some men of the other Brigades.
Of that last wild and desperate venture across a thousand yards of
open country, few returned to tell the tale. Those that did tell
of an entry into that last entrenchment, of desperate hand-to-hand
fighting, and then, when the odds were too great, for the trench
was full of German reserves, of a stubborn retirement to the next
line. And now the German bombers surged up the trenches from St.
Pierre Divion, to be beaten off again and again by the 8th and
15th Rifles, and the handful of the 13th remaining on that flank.
Pressure on the other side did not come so soon: in fact, Lieutenant
Sanderson, of the 9th Rifles, reconnoitred the trench "Mouquet
Switch," on the front of the 32nd Division, and found it unoccupied.
But Thiepval's machine-guns were still firing, and "No Man's Land"
was a land of death. Two companies of the Pioneers were sent up to
dig a communication trench across, which would have permitted the
sending up of bombs and water. But at two o'clock Colonel Leader,
their commanding officer, reported that the machine-gun fire rendered
the task impossible. Supplies had run out, and the little parties
that strove to bear them across were annihilated by fire. After noon
attacks came upon the right flank also, the 11th Inniskillings at
the Crucifix, and the 9th in the Schwaben Redoubt, being hard beset.
The French artillery was ordered to put down a flank barrage on the
right, and carried out its task admirably.
The 146th Brigade of the 49th Division had crossed the Ancre during
the morning. At three p.m. it received orders to attack Thiepval
village under a barrage, after an intense bombardment. The attack
failed completely under terrific machine-gun fire. It was, in fact,
stopped after the leading battalion, the 1/6th West Yorks, had seen
the platoons which strove to deploy wither away. It was about this
time that the Germans launched a counter-attack in the open on the
left flank. Two companies emerged from the trees of the river valley
and advanced on C 11. Caught on the hill by our artillery and the
Lewis guns of the 8th Rifles, they were destroyed. There was a grave
misunderstanding about the employment of the 146th Brigade. At four
o'clock the 36th Division was informed that it was at its disposal.
General Withycombe, the senior Brigadier in Thiepval Wood, was
ordered to send two of its battalions to the Schwaben Redoubt, to
rally the troops beginning to be forced back. But two battalions of
the Brigade were already committed to the attack on Thiepval, while
the two others had moved up behind them into the trenches of the 32nd
Division. Not till 7-18 did six companies move up towards the "C"
line, and now it was too late. On this flank it was already lost, and
the Yorkshiremen were beaten off by German machine-gun fire.
Meanwhile the situation had grown desperate. Major Peacocke,
second-in-command of the 9th Inniskillings, had managed to cross "No
Man's Land" at noon into the front line about A 12, and after beating
off attacks by Germans bombing their way up from Thiepval, collected
a little bodyguard and worked forward to the Crucifix. He speedily
discovered that the holding of the ground here, now slipping from
our hands, was an impossibility unless Thiepval were taken. The men
were still determined, but at their last gasp from fatigue. There was
scarcely any ammunition or water for the Vickers guns, and it was
all but impossible to send it up. A similar report was brought to
General Griffith by Major Blair Oliphant, second-in-command of the
11th Rifles, who carried out an admirable reconnaissance. A final
counter-attack, launched in the dusk by fresh troops that had come
into Grandcourt by train during the evening, drove our men in from
the "B" line. By ten o'clock it did not appear that we had any troops
in the German lines. That which had been won at a sacrifice so vast,
had been lost for lack of support.
Fresh troops for a further attack on Thiepval were put at the
disposal of the 36th Division in the middle of the night. General
Withycombe, at 11-30 p.m., received the 4th York and Lancs, of the
148th Brigade, with the intimation that the 4th and 5th K.O.Y.L.I.'s
of the same Brigade would follow, to retake the Schwaben Redoubt,
with the assistance of the remnants of the 107th and 109th Brigades.
At one o'clock the latter battalions had not arrived. General
Withycombe made the following appreciation of the position:
It was doubtful if it would be possible to organize an attack before
daylight. This was a vital consideration, since an advance by
daylight would be swept by fire from Thiepval, which was not being
attacked that night, and the inevitable result would be a repetition
of the previous day's experiences.
If the troops did succeed in moving off before dawn, it would be
almost impossible for them to keep direction in the darkness, on
ground they did not know.
Lastly, General Withycombe submitted that, if the Schwaben Redoubt
were taken, it could not be held while Thiepval was still in German
occupation.
General Nugent was fully in accord with these views. He submitted the
matter to the Corps Commander, who replied that in such a case the
man on the spot must decide. The proposed operation was therefore
cancelled, and General Withycombe sent the 4th and 5th K.O.Y.L.I.'s
to Aveluy Wood, retaining under his hand the 4th York and Lancs, in
case of emergency.
At seven a.m. next morning, as sun dispersed the first summer
ground-mist, observers on the Mesnil Ridge saw that there were yet
British troops in small numbers in the first two lines of German
trenches. General Nugent ordered General Withycombe to support and
reinforce these troops, and to send forward supplies of bombs,
ammunition, and water. General Withycombe collected a force of four
hundred men of the four battalions of his own Brigade, together
with two guns of the 107th Machine-Gun Company. Under the command
of Major Woods, of the 9th Rifles, this devoted band moved across
"No Man's Land" at two o'clock in artillery formation. It lost a
third of its numbers from the enemy's fire, but it reached its
objectives. Two small parties of the 16th Rifles (Pioneers), with
bombs and ammunition, crossed later in the afternoon, going through
the German barrage in most gallant fashion. On the left flank Major
Woods found Corporal Sanders, of the 7th West Yorks, with a party of
forty men, whom he described as "played out, but full of fight." He
had been beating off German bombing attacks all night, had rescued
several wounded Ulstermen, and taken a number of prisoners. This
stout-hearted N.C.O. was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross.
That night the 36th Division was relieved by the 49th. The 148th
Brigade relieved the 107th in the two lines of trenches now held,
between A 12 and A 19. The relief was not complete till after ten
o'clock the following morning, when a weary, tattered, pitiful
remnant marched into Martinsart and flung themselves down to sleep.
They had brought back to Thiepval Wood fourteen prisoners. The total
number captured by the 36th Division in the offensive was five
hundred and forty-three. Its casualties in the two days amounted to
five thousand five hundred officers and other ranks killed, wounded,
and missing. The whole Province was thrown into mourning for its
sons. Among the dead were Colonel H. C. Bernard, of the 10th Rifles;
Major G. H. Gaffiken, of the 9th, who had led his company to the
final objective; Lieutenant G. St. G. S. Cather, Adjutant of the 9th
Irish Fusiliers, awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his services
in bringing in wounded under machine-gun fire, in the course of which
he lost his life; Captain E. N. F. Bell, 9th Inniskillings, attached
109th Trench Mortar Battery, who likewise had bestowed on him that
last honour. Captain Charles Craig, M.P. for South Antrim, was
wounded and taken prisoner. Some battalions had almost disappeared.
The 9th Irish Fusiliers, for example, had at the end of the first
day none of the officers and only eighty other ranks left unwounded
of the force that took part in the attack. The figures of the 8th
Rifles, as of a battalion below rather than above the average in
casualties, may be given in full. Officers: fifteen wounded, five
missing. Other ranks: twenty-four killed, two hundred and sixteen
wounded, one hundred and eighty-six missing. And of the "missing," it
must be recorded that three-fourths at least were in reality dead,
somewhere out in front of the line finally handed over.
Of the deeds of heroism that day accomplished, it is not possible to
enumerate one-hundredth. Notable among them were the achievements
of junior officers and N.C.O.'s when their seniors had fallen.
Lieutenant H. Gallagher, 11th Inniskillings, was the sole officer
of his battalion to cross the German front line. With his orderly's
rifle he killed six Germans holding up the advance, and then, at the
Crucifix, organized the resistance, being one of the last to quit
the German trenches at night. Lieutenant Sir Harry Macnaghten, 12th
Rifles, twice reformed the tatters of his company in "No Man's Land,"
and led them against gaps in the German wire, to fall himself on the
second occasion. Corporal John Conn, 9th Inniskillings, came upon two
of our machine-guns out of action. He repaired one under fire and
annihilated a German flanking party. He carried both guns himself
most of the way back, but had to abandon one at last owing to utter
exhaustion. These are but examples, picked at random. Another very
remarkable Victoria Cross was that won by Private Quigg, 12th Rifles,
Sir Harry Macnaghten's servant. He had, on July the 1st, advanced
thrice to the attack. Next morning he heard a rumour that his officer
was out wounded in "No Man's Land." Seven times he went out to look
for him, and seven times he brought in a wounded man, the last
dragged on a waterproof sheet from within a few yards of the German
wire.
All arms had supported the infantry finely in their great, heroic
achievement. The work of the artillery could not have been bettered.
It carried out its long and gruelling task to perfection. Even in
front of the "D" line the wire was well cut. One forward battery of
the 172nd Brigade in Hamel, in full view of the enemy, enfiladed his
lines across the Ancre, doing great execution and being handled with
extreme gallantry. The Engineers suffered very heavy casualties in
their devotion to duty, working in the marsh at keeping repaired the
vital pipe-lines, regardless of the shells that all day fell about
them. The stretcher-bearers of the R.A.M.C. were tireless. Often,
owing to break-down on the trench tramway due to shell-fire, they had
to carry wounded right down from Thiepval Wood and across the Ancre
at Authuille. Many dropped from sheer exhaustion, and many refused
to rest when reliefs arrived. The Army Service Corps drivers of the
ambulances kept their cars continuously on the roads for thirty-six
hours. There was throughout no hitch in the medical arrangements,
though at one period of the day the overcrowding of the Main Dressing
Station at Forceville, due to the strain upon the Motor Ambulance
Convoy which evacuated the wounded to the Casualty Clearing Stations,
gave rise to much anxiety.
A volume might be written--the extent of many a volume probably
has--upon the causes of the failure, for such the whole northern
section of the attack undoubtedly was. This is not the place for a
detailed discussion of them. It may at least be said that, while
the work of the artillery could not have been excelled, the whole
scheme of its employment had not reached anything approaching the
science of the following year. Artillerymen of the higher ranks were
to some extent carried away by the weight of metal for the first
time at their disposal, and carried away other arms by their new
enthusiasm. The heavy gunners believed and proclaimed that no life
could endure their fire, and that the battle would resolve itself
into an advance by the infantry to take over shattered and undefended
trenches. They had not realized that the machine-guns would be
comparatively safe under their bombardment, and that it would take
but a few seconds to bring them into action when the barrage was
past. It is probable that at a later stage of the war a fortress
such as Thiepval would not have been attacked directly by infantry
till it had been first encircled and isolated by its advance, being
kept the while under such artillery fire as would have forced the
machine-gunners to lie low, and then rushed from all sides by bombing
parties. It may be said that our organization at the beginning of
the Somme Offensive was in a transitional stage. We had realized
that defence with the machine-gun had beaten attack, and had begun
the process of increasing the quantity and improving the quality of
mechanical accessories. It was still, however, to cost thousands of
lives before the factories could produce sufficient of the latter,
or the higher commands reach the ratio between infantry force and
mechanical aids necessary to the prosecution of a given operation.
But no explanations that can be found stand without ample tribute to
the fighting qualities of the German soldier. The dash and bravery
of the counter-attacks of the bombers moving up from the valley
merit high praise. The highest, however, must be reserved for the
machine-gunners, who had sat for days in their dug-outs without fresh
food, the very earth shaking to the thunders of our artillery, and
then came up and brought their guns into action at the right moment.
On July the 5th the Division moved back to Rubempré and the
neighbouring villages, and five days later to the Bernaville area.
The Artillery remained in line under the orders of the 49th Division,
while the Pioneers, 121st and 122nd Field Companies, were left
several days at work, the former having, amongst other unpleasant
tasks, to make a communication trench across "No Man's Land" to the
new-won ground.[24] The 150th Field Company had a yet harder time. It
was sent to the 12th Division, further south, in the neighbourhood
of Ovillers, where a slight advance had been made. Its work here was
the consolidation of strong points, "before they were taken," as its
commander, Major Boyle, remarks.
[Illustration: Map I.
The Battle of Albert, 1916.]
Orders came at Bernaville for a move to Flanders. The Engineers,
relieved of their task, marched north. The rest of the Division, less
the Artillery, was moved by train from Auxi-le-Château, Frévent, and
Conteville, to Berguette, Thiennes, and Steenbecque, between Aire and
Hazebrouck, on its way to the training area west of St. Omer. The
infantry battalions were but shadows of their former selves. Well
might commanding officers feel appalled at the magnitude of the task
before them in building up anew, without the best of their officers
and N.C.O.'s. The men were very silent in these first few days after
the battle. Not one of the survivors but had lost companions who had
been two years at his side; many, friends of a lifetime. But if ever
gift be God-given, it is the healing effect of time. And in days of
war a week even is a long period. These men, moreover, felt that in
all that had happened there was no reproach for them. They, at least,
had accomplished their task in the face of incredible difficulties.
On the 12th of July, General Nugent and his Staff saw the battalions
of the 107th Brigade marching from the station of Thiennes into
Blaringhem. Sun was shining on the old Flemish village. Officers
and men wore marigolds in caps to honour the day; the bands played
"King William's March." The least practised eye could tell that to
these men confidence was returning; that the worst of the horror they
had endured had been shaken from their shoulders. They marched like
victors, as was their right.
FOOTNOTES:
[19] See Map I.
[20] For a brilliant appreciation of the Somme Battle and its
lessons, General Mangin's book, _Comment finit la Guerre_, should be
read.
[21] The boundaries of the 36th Division, with all names that occur
in the description of the battle, will be found in Map I.
[22] The "A" line consisted of a double line of trenches, a front
line, and immediate support. The second was alluded to as the "A.I."
line.
[23] Z/49 Trench Mortar Battery was attached to the 36th Division for
this operation.
[24] It was not held for long, nor was the Schwaben Redoubt to come
again into British hands for several months.