The reaction produced by the downfall of the Türgesh power was manifested
in Transoxania in the first place by an increased regard for China. The
princes had found the Türgesh yoke no less galling in the end than that
of the Arabs[99]; the country was as wasted and impoverished by their
continual raids as it had been under the latter. The profitable native
and transit trade, the source of the entire wealth of the cities, must
have shrunk to negligible proportions if it had not wholly ceased. All
classes of the people therefore were weary of war and sought only a
peace consonant with their self-respect. For the attainment of these
aims it was vain to look to China; the granting of bombastic titles
to a few princes brought neither comfort nor aid. A final opportunity
was thus offered to wise statesmanship to swing the whole country
round to the Arabs almost without a blow. For two years, however, the
situation seemed to remain much as it was, except for an expedition into
Khuttal, probably on the pretext of assisting the ruling house against
a usurper from Bamiyān. Nevertheless some progress had been made by the
administration in regaining the prestige it had lost. This was due not
merely to the effect of the victories over _H_ārith and the Türgesh, but
even more to Asad’s personal relations with the dihqāns. He had, as we
have seen, gratified the national pride of the people of _T_ukhāristān by
transferring the seat of power from Merv, the capital of the foreigners,
to Balkh, the centre of their national life. As had been the case even
in his first term of office, he was able to attract to his side many of
the more influential elements in Lower _T_ukhāristān and the Ephthalite
lands—to this, in fact, was largely due his success in the struggle with
the Turks. More striking evidence still is afforded by the conversion of
the dihqāns at this period, amongst them the minor chief Sāmān-Khudāh and
probably also the Barmak. By this means Asad laid the foundations for a
true reconciliation and Narshakhī’s work amply attests the honour which
later generations attached to his name. His work was of course incomplete
in that it was practically confined to the ruling classes and naturally
did not extend to the now independent dihqāns of _S_ughd.
Early in 120/738 Asad died, and after a lapse of some months the
governorship was conferred by Hishām on Na_s_r b. Sayyār. For the subject
peoples no choice could have been more opportunely made. Na_s_r was
one of the few men who had come with honour and reputation through the
external and internal conflicts of the last thirty years. Belonging
to the small and almost neutral tribe of Kināna, his position bore a
strong similarity to that of Qutayba in that both were more dependent on
the support of a powerful patron than on their tribal connexions, and
therefore, though favouring Qays, less frantically partisan. In contrast
to Qutayba, however, Na_s_r, after thirty years of active leadership,
knew the situation in Khurāsān, Transoxania, and Central Asia as no
Arab governor had ever done. He had seen the futility of trying to hold
the country by mere brute force, and the equal futility of trying to
dispense with force. While he held the support of Hishām, therefore, he
set himself to restore Arab authority in Transoxania. The appointment
of Qa_t_an b. Qutayba, who had inherited much of his father’s ability,
to command the forces beyond the river gave earnest of an aggressive
policy. The appointment was not to Samarqand, as Wellhausen says, but
“over _S_ughd,” _i.e._, the garrisons in Bukhārā and probably Kish, who
were responsible in the first place for keeping the surrounding districts
in subjection. The governor himself then carried out a brief expedition,
intended apparently to punish some rebels in the neighbourhood of the
Iron Gate, possibly in Shūmān. Having thus vindicated the authority of
the administration, Na_s_r returned to Merv and delivered the famous
Khu_t_ba in which the system of taxation and conditions of amnesty were
at last laid down in a form satisfactory to the mawālī and the subject
peoples[100]. The results were as he had foreseen. The princes and people
of Transoxania submitted, as far as we can judge, without opposition when
Na_s_r with his army marched through _S_ughd to re-establish the Arab
garrison and administration in Samarqand.
This expedition may in all probability be dated in 121/739. A year or
two later, Na_s_r collected his forces, which included levies from
Transoxania, for an attack on Shāsh. Wellhausen considers that the first
two expeditions were only stages of the third, but the expedition to
Shāsh can hardly have taken place earlier than 122/740, in view of the
fact that the armies of Shāsh and Farghāna were engaged with the Türgesh
in 739, and of Narshakhī’s statement[101], which there is no reason to
dispute, that _T_ughshāda was assassinated in the thirty-second year of
his reign. Reckoning in lunar years this gives 122 (91-122), in solar
years 123 (710-741), as the date. This is confirmed by the Chinese
record of an embassy from Shāsh in 741 complaining that “Now that the
Turks have become subject to China, it is only the Arabs that are a
curse to the Kingdoms”[102]. 123 is also the date given for the return
of the _S_ughdians[103]. It is most unlikely that the intervening year
or years passed without expeditions altogether, and the most reasonable
supposition is that they were occupied in the pacification of _S_ughd.
The expedition marched eastward through Ushrūsana, whose prince, as
usual, paid his allegiance to the victor on his passage, but on reaching
the Jaxartes Na_s_r found his crossing opposed by the army of Shāsh,
together with _H_ārith b. Surayj and some Turkish troops. It would seem
that he was unable to come to blows with the main body of the enemy,
but made a treaty with the king by which the latter agreed to accept an
Arab resident and to expel _H_ārith, who was accordingly deported to
Fārāb. As usual, later tradition magnified the exploits of the Arabs by
crediting Na_s_r with the capture and execution of Kūr_s_ūl, the Türgesh
leader who had been scarcely less redoubtable than the Khāqān himself.
If the story has any foundation it is probably a legendary development
from the capture of a Turkish chief Al-Akhram, related by _T_abarī in a
variant account. The presence of Kūr_s_ūl with a Türgesh force on this
occasion is not in itself impossible, but if his identification with
Baga Tarkhan is sound, we know that he was executed by the Chinese in
744/126[104]. The expulsion of _H_ārith was probably the object for which
the expedition had been undertaken; before returning, however, the Arabs
entered Farghāna and pursued its king as far as Qubā before bringing him
to terms. The negotiations were carried out between Sulaymān b. _S_ūl,
one of the princes of Jūrjān, and the Queen-Mother. This invasion of
Farghāna is related in three (or four) different versions, some of which
may possibly refer to a second expedition mentioned by _T_abarī later.
In the same year, on returning from the expedition to Shāsh, Na_s_r was
met at Samarqand by the Bukhār Khudāh _T_ughshāda and two of his dihqāns.
The nobles laid a complaint against the prince, but as Na_s_r seemed
indisposed to redress their grievance, they attempted to assassinate both
the Bukhār Khudāh and the Arab intendant at Bukhārā, Wā_s_il b. ʿAmr. The
former was mortally wounded, and succeeded by his son Qutayba, so named
in honour of the conqueror. The incident is related also by Narshakhī
with some additional details which profess to explain the assassination.
The two narratives present such a remarkable similarity of phrase,
however, even though they are in different languages, that it is rather
more likely that the Persian version has elaborated the story than that
_T_abarī deliberately suppressed any offensive statements, as argued by
van Vloten[105].
Except for a possible second expedition to Farghāna, no other campaigns
into Transoxania are recorded of Na_s_r, unless Balādhurī’s tradition
(from Abū ʿUbayda) of an unsuccessful attack on Ushrūsana refers to a
separate expedition. This is unlikely, and the account conflicts with
that given in _T_abarī. Ushrūsana, however, was never really subdued
until nearly a century later. _T_ukhāristān, if it had not already been
recovered by Asad, may have made submission of its own accord. Since the
defeat of the Türgesh and the flight of _H_ārith it had ceased to hold
any menace to the Arabs, and Na_s_r had accordingly retransferred the
capital to Merv on his appointment.
The governor now turned his attention to restoring the prosperity of the
country and developing a policy of co-operation with the subject peoples.
Na_s_r was the first Arab ruler of Transoxania to realise that the
government depended for support in the last resort on the middle classes
and agriculturalists. Both these classes were of greater political
importance perhaps in Transoxania, with its centuries of mercantile
tradition, than any other were in the Empire. It was in the same way
that in later years the _T_āhirids and Sāmānids established their
ascendancy[106]. He was thus able not only to complete the work begun by
Asad b. ʿAbdullah, but to settle it on more stable foundations. Shortly
after his recapture of Samarqand he had sent an embassy to China. This
was followed up in 126/744 by a much more elaborate embassy, obviously
intended to regulate commercial relations in the most complete manner
possible, in which the Arabs were accompanied by ambassadors not only
from the Sogdian cities and _T_ukhāristān, but even from Zābulistān,
Shāsh, and the Türgesh. Two other Arab embassies are also recorded in
745 and 747. There can be no doubt that it was not so much the justice
of Na_s_r’s rule as his personal influence and honesty that reconciled
the peoples of Transoxania. Even the _S_ughdian refugees, stranded after
the dissolution of the Türgesh confederacy, trusted him to honour the
conditions upon which they had agreed to return, and were not deceived
although his concessions raised a storm of protest, and the Caliph
himself was brought to confirm them only for the sake of restoring peace.
It is not surprising, however, that the princes were dissatisfied with
the success which had attended the pacification of Transoxania. The
people were “becoming Arabs” too rapidly and their own authority was
menaced in consequence. They were still hopeful of regaining their
independence, especially when Na_s_r’s position became less secure after
the death of Hishām. We hear therefore of sporadic embassies to China,
such as that sent from Ishtīkhan in 745 asking for annexation to China
“like a little circumscription.” That the governor was aware of this
undercurrent may be judged from the fact that he felt it necessary to
have _H_ārith b. Surayj pardoned, in case he should again bring in the
Turks to attack the government[107]. But the people as a whole held
for Na_s_r. The respect and even affection which he inspired held all
Transoxania true to him during the last troubled years. No tribute could
be more eloquent than the facts that not a single city in Transoxania
took advantage of the revolutionary movements in Khurāsān to withdraw
its allegiance, that Abū Muslim’s missionaries went no further than
the Arab colonies at Āmul, Bukhārā, and Khwārizm, and that the loyal
garrison of Balkh found first support and then refuge in Chaghāniān and
_T_ukhāristān. On these facts the various authorities whose narratives
are related by _T_abarī completely agree, and by their agreement
disprove the exaggerated account given by Dīnawarī (359 f.) that “Abū
Muslim sent his envoys (duʿāt) to all quarters of Khurāsān, and the
people rallied _en masse_ to Abū Muslim from Herāt, Būshanj, Merv-Rūdh,
_T_ālaqān, Merv, Nasā, Abīward, _T_ūs, Naysābūr, Sarakhs, Balkh,
Chaghāniān, _T_ukhāristān, Khuttalān, Kish, and Nasaf.” Dīnawarī himself
states a little later that Samarqand joined Abū Muslim only after the
death of Na_s_r. Abū Muslim’s main strength, in fact, was drawn from
Lower _T_ukhāristān and the neighbourhood of Merv-Rūdh, several of the
princes of which, including the ruler of Būshanj and Khālid b. Barmak,
declared for him. But even here the people were not solidly against
the administration. We are told that a camp was established at Jīranj
(south of Merv) “to cut off the reinforcements of Na_s_r b. Sayyār from
Merv-Rūdh, Balkh, and the districts of (Lower) _T_ukhāristān.” Herāt fell
to Abū Muslim by force of arms. The Syrian garrison of Balkh, together
with the Mu_d_arite party, were supported by the rulers of both Upper and
Lower _T_ukhāristān, and twice recaptured the city from their stronghold
at Tirmidh. An example of Abū Muslim’s efforts to gain over the Iranians
is afforded by an incident when, having taken 300 Khwārizmian prisoners
in an engagement, he treated them well and set them free[108].
The tradition of the enthusiasm of the Iranians for Abū Muslim is true
only of the period after his success. In our most authentic records there
is no trace of a mass movement such as has so often been portrayed. His
following was at first comparatively so small that had the Arabs been
more willing to support Na_s_r at the outset, it is practically certain
that it would have melted away as rapidly as the following of _H_ārith
b. Surayj at the first reverse. “Nothing succeeds like success,” and
Abū Muslim, once victorious on so imposing a scale, and that with the
aid of Iranians, became a heroic figure among the peoples of Eastern
Khurāsān. The legend penetrated but slowly into Transoxania. When by
130/748, however, the whole of Eastern Khurāsān had fallen to Abū Muslim
and Na_s_r no longer held authority, his governors in Transoxania were
replaced by the nominees of Abū Muslim without outward disturbance. But
the recrudescence of embassies to China shows that under the surface
currents were stirring. Shāsh had already thrown off its allegiance
and the Sogdian princes had by no means lost all hope of regaining
independence in spite of the tranquillity of the last few years. As it
happened, however, the first revolt was not on their part but by the Arab
garrison of Bukhārā under Sharīk b. Shaykh in 133/750-751. The rising,
which was due to their resentment at the seizure of the Caliphate by the
ʿAbbāsids and the passing over of the ʿAlid house, was suppressed with
some difficulty by Abū Muslim’s lieutenant Ziyād b. Sāli_h_ assisted by
the Bukhār Khudāh. The fact that the Bukhār-Khudāh assisted the troops
of Abū Muslim against Sharīk might be regarded as an indication that
he belonged to the party of the former. This inference is more than
doubtful, however. Of the 30,000 men, who, we are told, joined the
rebels, probably the greater part were the townsmen, or “popular party,”
of Bukhārā. The revolt thus assumed the domestic character of a movement
against the aristocratic party, who, led by the Bukhār-Khudāh, naturally
cooperated with the Government in its suppression. The events of the
following year are sufficient evidence against any other explanation.
According to Narshakhī, who gives by far the fullest account of this
revolt, Ziyād had also to suppress a similar movement in Samarqand. In
the same year an expedition was sent into Khuttal by Abū Dāwud, the
governor of Balkh. Al-_H_anash at first offered no opposition; later in
the campaign he attempted to hold out against the Arabs but was forced
to fly to the Turks and thence to China where he was given the title of
Jabghu in recompense for his resistance[109]. By this expedition Khuttal
was effectively annexed to the Arab government for the first time.
Of much greater, and indeed decisive, importance were the results of
an expedition under Ziyād b. Sāli_h_ into the Turkish lands beyond
the Jaxartes. It is surprising to find no reference to this either in
_T_abarī or any other of the early historians. A short notice is given
by Ibn al-Athīr, drawn from some source which is now apparently lost.
The earliest reference which we find in the Arabic histories seems to
be a passing mention of Ziyād b. Sāli_h_’s expedition “into _S_īn”
in a monograph on Baghdād by Ibn _T_ayfūr (d. 250/983)[110]. For a
detailed account of the battle we are therefore dependent on the Chinese
sources[111]. In 747 and 749 the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān had appealed
to China for aid against certain petty chiefs who were giving trouble
in the Gilghit and Chitral valleys. The governor of Kucha despatched on
this duty a Corean officer, Kao-hsien-shih, who punished the offenders
in a series of amazing campaigns over the high passes of the Karakorum.
Before returning to Kucha after the last campaign he was called in by the
King of Farghāna to assist him against the king of Shāsh. Kao-hsien-shih
at first came to terms with the king of Shāsh but when on some pretext
he broke his word and seized the city, the heir to the kingdom fled to
_S_ughd for assistance and persuaded Abū Muslim to intervene. A strong
force was accordingly despatched under Ziyād b. Sāli_h_. The Chinese,
with the army of Farghāna and the Karluks (who had succeeded the Türgesh
in the hegemony of the Western Turks), gave battle at Athlakh, near
_T_arāz, in July 751 (Dhuʾl-_h_ijja 133). During the engagement the
Karluks deserted and Kao-hsien-shih, caught between them and the Arabs,
suffered a crushing defeat. Though this battle marks the end of Chinese
power in the West, it was in consequence of internal disruption rather
than external pressure. Nothing was further at first from the minds of
the princes of _S_ughd than the passing of the long tradition of Chinese
sovereignty, indeed it blazed up more strongly than ever. For had not
a Chinese army actually visited Shāsh on their very borders; even if
the Arabs had won the first battle, would they not return to avenge the
defeat? For the last time the Shao-wu princes planned a concerted rising
in Bukhārā, Kish, _S_ughd, and Ushrūsana. But China gave neither aid
nor encouragement; the presence of Abū Muslim at Samarqand overawed the
_S_ughdians, and only at Kish did the revolt assume serious proportions.
Abū Dāwud’s army easily crushed the insurgents in a pitched battle at
Kandak, near Kish, killing the king Al-Ikhrīd and many of the other
dihqāns. Amongst the treasures of the royal palace which were sent to
Samarqand were “many articles of rare Chinese workmanship, vessels inlaid
with gold, saddles, brocades, and other objects d’art.” The Bukhār-Khudāh
Qutayba and the dihqāns of _S_ughd also paid for their complicity with
their lives[112].
So ended the last attempt at restoring an independent Sogdiana under
the old régime. For some years yet the princes of _S_ughd, Khwārizm,
and _T_ukhāristān continued to send appeals to China. The Emperor,
however, “preoccupied with maintaining peace, praised them all and gave
them consolation, then having warned them sent them back to assure
tranquillity in the Western lands.” Abū Muslim had also, it would seem,
realised the importance of maintaining relations with the Chinese court,
for a succession of embassies from “the Arabs with black garments” is
reported, beginning in the year following the battle of the Talas.
As many as three are mentioned in a single year. It is possible that
these embassies were in part intended to keep the government informed
on the progress of the civil wars in China, though the active interest
of the new administration in their commerce would, as before, tend to
reconcile the influential mercantile communities to ʿAbbāsid rule. The
actual deathblow to the tradition of Chinese overlordship in Western
Central Asia was given, not by any such isolated incident as the battle
of the Talas, but by the participation of Central Asian contingents in
the restoration of the Emperor to his capital in 757[113]. Men from the
distant lands to whom China had seemed an immeasurably powerful and
unconquerable Empire now saw with their own eyes the fatal weaknesses
that Chinese diplomacy had so skilfully concealed. From this blow Chinese
prestige never recovered.
The complete shattering of the Western Turkish empires by the Chinese
policy had also put an end to all possibility of intervention from that
side. Transoxania, therefore, was unable to look for outside support,
while the reorganization of the Muslim Empire by the early ʿAbbāsid
Caliphs prevented, not indeed sporadic though sometimes serious risings,
but any repetition of the concerted efforts at national independence.
The Shao-wu princes and the more important dihqāns continued to exercise
a nominal rule until the advent of the Sāmānids, but many of them
found that the new policy of the Empire offered them an opportunity of
honourable and lucrative service in its behalf and were quick to take
advantage of it. On the other hand the frequent revolts in Eastern
Khurāsān under the guise of religious movements show that the mass of the
people remained unalterably hostile to their conquerors[114]. In none of
these, however, was the whole of Transoxania involved until the rising
organized by Rāfiʿ b. Layth three years after the fall of the Barmakids.
The extraordinary success of his movement may partly be ascribed to
resentment at their disgrace, but it perhaps counted for something that
he was the grandson of Na_s_r b. Sayyār. Though the revolt failed it led
directly to the only solution by which Transoxania could ever become
reconciled to inclusion in the Empire of the ʿAbbāsids. Whether by wise
judgment or happy chance, to Maʿmūn belongs the credit of laying the
foundations of the brilliant Muhammadan civilisation which the Iranian
peoples of Central Asia were to enjoy under the rule of a dynasty of
their own race.