The achievements of the Muslim armies in Central Asia during the reign of
Walīd I were due in the first place to the complete co-operation between
the directive genius of _H_ajjāj and the military capacity of Qutayba.
Qutayba’s strategic abilities have been somewhat overrated, though the
Arabic texts are at no pains to conceal the fact that his gifts fell
something short of genius. On more than one occasion we are shown in what
constant touch the viceroy was kept with the progress of his armies,
and how large a part he took in drawing up the plan of campaign, though
the credit of carrying it through to a successful issue rightly belongs
to Qutayba. _H_ajjāj seems to have had the fullest confidence in his
lieutenant, and if he did not hesitate to utter reproof and warning
when occasion required, he was equally quick to express appreciation of
Qutayba’s success. The Arabs of all parties soon realised that behind
their general lay the authority of _H_ajjāj, the wholesome respect
inspired by whom prevented any open breach during his lifetime. The
second factor which materially assisted the conquests was that in their
prosecution Qutayba united all parties in Khurāsān, Persians and Arabs,
Qays and Yemen. It was no small matter to keep their enthusiasm unabated
in the face of campaigns so protracted and severe, nor can the enthusiasm
be explained only by the attraction of a rich booty. It is by no means
improbable that Qutayba’s success was really due more to his talent for
administration than to his generalship. He seems to have realised, as no
other Arab governor in the east had yet done, that in such a province
as Khurāsān the safety and security of the Arab government must depend
in the long run on the co-operation of the Persian populace, who formed
so great a majority in the country. The bitterness of factional strife
had shown how unsafe it was to rely on the support of the Arabs alone,
especially in the face of such a movement as Yazīd had provoked. By his
conciliatory attitude, therefore, Qutayba earned the confidence of the
Persians and repaid it with confidence; from his constant employment
of Persian agents and his growing preference for Persian governors, it
would seem even that he came to regard them as forming the “ʿAshīra”
he lacked among the Arabs. Although it earned him the ill-will of the
Arabs and played a great part in his fall, it may be that in this he was
instrumental in giving the first impulse to the recovery of a national
sentiment amongst the Persians of Khurāsān.
The situation in Central Asia was also favourable for a renewal of the
attempt to annex to the Arab dominions the rich lands of Transoxania,
though it is doubtful how much information the Arabs possessed on this
point. In 682, while China, weakened internally by the intrigues of the
Empress Wu, had her hands tied by the wars with Tibet, the Eastern or
Northern Turks had re-asserted their independence. The new Empire never
regained its authority over all the western territories of the former
Khans, but by constant campaigns had extended its rule over the Ten
Tribes of the Ili and Chu, who, we are told, were “almost annihilated.”
In 701 the Eastern Turks invaded Sogdiana, but there is no reason to
assume, though it has frequently been suggested, that Muhallab’s forces
at Kish were affected by this raid. As the necessity of securing hostages
for the safety even of the lines of communication shows, the hostility of
the local forces is sufficient to explain all the encounters narrated.
The devastation and loss that invariably accompanied these raids must
have still further weakened the resources of the subject princes, to
whom there was small consolation in the appointment of a son of the Khan
to command the Ten Tribes. In any case the unceasing warfare which the
Eastern Turks had to wage against the Türgesh from 699 to 711 effectually
prevented them from sending assistance in response to any appeals for
support which may have reached them from Sogdiana[41]. Equally if not
more impossible was it for the Türgesh to intervene in Sogdiana during
the same period[42]. By the “Turks,” as we have seen, the Arab historians
mean as a general rule the local inhabitants, amongst whom there may
quite possibly have been included at that time Turkish elements.
Occasional references to the Khāqān (unless they may be taken to refer
to local chiefs, which is improbable) are obvious _fakhr_-developments.
The narrative of 98 A.H. on which the theory of Türgesh intervention is
mainly based, is a pure Bāhilite invention. Finally, the experience of
the Arabs in later years shows us that, if the resistance of Sogdiana had
been backed by large forces of Turks, it would have been impossible for
Qutayba to achieve so large a measure of success.
The conquests of Qutayba fall naturally into four periods: