to the Grecian republics, and therefore it behoved him, from views of
safety more than from emulation, to interest himself in their quarrels,
and to support the weaker side in every contest. This was the advice
given by Alcibiades to Tissaphernes, and it prolonged near a century
the date of the Persian empire; till the neglect of it for a moment,
after the first appearance of the aspiring genius of Philip, brought
that lofty and frail edifice to the ground with a rapidity of which
there are few instances in the history of mankind.
The successors of Alexander showed an infinite jealousy of the balance
of power, a jealousy founded on true politics and prudence, and which
preserved distinct for several ages the partitions made after the death
of that famous conqueror. The fortune and ambition of Antigonus
threatened them anew with a universal monarchy, but their combination
and their victory at Ipsus saved them; and in after times we find that
as the Eastern princes considered the Greeks and Macedonians as the
only real military force with whom they had any intercourse, they kept
always a watchful eye over that part of the world. The Ptolemies, in
particular, supported first Aratus and the Achæans, and then Cleomenes
King of Sparta, from no other view than as a counterbalance to the
Macedonian monarchs; for this is the account which Polybius gives of
the Egyptian politics.
The reason why it is supposed that the ancients were entirely ignorant
of the balance of power seems to be drawn from the Roman history more
than the Grecian, and as the transactions of the former are generally
the most familiar to us, we have thence formed all our conclusions.
It must be owned that the Romans never met with any such general
combination or confederacy against them as might naturally be expected
from their rapid conquests and declared ambition, but were allowed
peaceably to subdue their neighbours, one after another, till they
extended their dominion over the whole known world. Not to mention
the fabulous history of their Italic wars, there was, upon Hannibal’s
invasion of the Roman state, a very remarkable crisis which ought to
have called up the attention of all civilized nations. It appeared
afterwards (nor was it difficult to be observed at the time[22]) that
this was a contest for universal empire, and yet no prince or state
seems to have been in the least alarmed about the event or issue of the
quarrel. Philip of Macedon remained neuter till he saw the victories
of Hannibal, and then most imprudently formed an alliance with the
conqueror, upon terms still more imprudent. He stipulated that he was
to assist the Carthaginian state in their conquest of Italy, after
which they engaged to send over forces into Greece, to assist him
in subduing the Grecian commonwealths.
The Rhodean and Achæan republics are much celebrated by ancient
historians for their wisdom and sound policy; yet both of them
assisted the Romans in their wars against Philip and Antiochus. And
what may be esteemed still a stronger proof that this maxim was not
familiarly known in those ages, no ancient author has ever remarked the
imprudence of these measures, nor has even blamed that absurd treaty
above-mentioned made by Philip with the Carthaginians. Princes and
statesmen may in all ages be blinded in their reasonings with regard
to events beforehand, but it is somewhat extraordinary that historians
afterwards should not form a sounder judgment of them.
Massinissa, Attalus, Prusias, in satisfying their private passions,
were all of them the instruments of the Roman greatness, and never seem
to have suspected that they were forging their own chains while they
advanced the conquests of their ally. A simple treaty and agreement
between Massinissa and the Carthaginians, so much required by mutual
interest, barred the Romans from all entrance into Africa, and
preserved liberty to mankind.
The only prince we meet with in the Roman history who seems to have
understood the balance of power is Hiero, King of Syracuse. Though
the ally of Rome, he sent assistance to the Carthaginians during the
war of the auxiliaries: “Esteeming it requisite,” says Polybius,
“both in order to retain his dominions in Sicily and to preserve the
Roman friendship, that Carthage should be safe; lest by its fall
the remaining power should be able, without contrast or opposition,
to execute every purpose and undertaking. And here he acted with
great wisdom and prudence; for that is never, on any account, to be
overlooked, nor ought such a force ever to be thrown into one hand as
to incapacitate the neighbouring states from defending their rights
against it.” Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express
terms.
In short, the maxim of preserving the balance of power is
founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning that it is
impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity, where we
find, in other particulars, so many marks of deep penetration and
discernment. If it was not so generally known and acknowledged as
at present, it had at least an influence on all the wiser and more
experienced princes and politicians; and indeed, even at present,
however generally known and acknowledged among speculative reasoners,
it has not, in practice, an authority much more extensive among those
who govern the world.
After the fall of the Roman Empire the form of government established
by the northern conquerors incapacitated them in a great measure
from further conquests, and long maintained each state in its proper
boundaries; but when vassalage and the feudal militia were abolished
mankind were anew alarmed by the danger of universal monarchy, from
the union of so many kingdoms and principalities in the person of the
Emperor Charles. But the power of the house of Austria, founded on
extensive but divided dominions, and their riches, derived chiefly from
mines of gold and silver, were more likely to decay, of themselves,
from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raised
against them. In less than a century the force of that violent and
haughty race was shattered, their opulence dissipated, their splendour
eclipsed. A new power succeeded, more formidable to the liberties of
Europe, possessing all the advantages of the former and labouring under
none of its defects, except a share of that spirit of bigotry and
persecution with which the house of Austria were so long and still are
so much infatuated.
Europe has now, for above a century, remained on the defensive against
the greatest force that ever perhaps was formed by the civil or
political combination of mankind. And such is the influence of the
maxim here treated of, that though that ambitious nation in the five
last general wars has been victorious in four,[23] and unsuccessful
only in one,[24] they have not much enlarged their dominions,
nor acquired a total ascendant over Europe. There remains rather room
to hope that by maintaining the resistance some time the natural
revolutions of human affairs, together with unforeseen events and
accidents, may guard us against universal monarchy, and preserve the
world from so great an evil.
In the three last of these general wars Britain has stood foremost in
the glorious struggle, and she still maintains her station as guardian
of the general liberties of Europe, and patron of mankind. Beside her
advantages of riches and situation, her people are animated with such a
national spirit, and are so fully sensible of the inestimable blessings
of their government, that we may hope their vigour never will languish
in so necessary and so just a cause. On the contrary, if we may judge
by the past, their passionate ardour seems rather to require some
moderation, and they have oftener erred from a laudable excess than
from a blameable deficiency.
In the first place, we seem to have been more possessed with the
ancient Greek spirit of jealous emulation than actuated with the
prudent views of modern politics. Our wars with France have been begun
with justice, and even, perhaps, from necessity; but have always
been too far pushed from obstinacy and passion. The same peace which
was afterwards made at Ryswick in 1697 was offered so early as the
ninety-two; that concluded at Utrecht in 1712 might have been finished
on as good conditions at Gertruytenberg in the eight; and we might have
given at Frankfort in 1743 the same terms which we were glad to accept
of at Aix-la-Chapelle in the forty-eight. Here then we see that above
half of our wars with France, and all our public debts, are owing more
to our own imprudent vehemence than to the ambition of our neighbours.
In the second place, we are so declared in our opposition to French
power, and so alert in defence of our allies, that they always
reckon upon our force as upon their own, and expecting to carry on war
at our expense, refuse all reasonable terms of accommodation. _Habent
subjectos, tanquam suos; viles, ut alienos._ All the world knows that
the factious vote of the House of Commons in the beginning of the last
Parliament, with the professed humour of the nation, made the Queen
of Hungary inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with
Prussia which would immediately have restored the general tranquillity
of Europe.
In the third place, we are such true combatants that, when once
engaged, we lose all concern for ourselves and our posterity, and
consider only how we may best annoy the enemy. To mortgage our revenues
at so deep a rate in wars where we are only accessories was surely the
most fatal delusion that a nation, who had any pretension to politics
and prudence, has ever yet been guilty of. That remedy of funding—if
it be a remedy and not rather a poison—ought, in all reason, to be
reserved to the last extremity, and no evil but the greatest and most
urgent should ever induce us to embrace so dangerous an expedient.
These excesses to which we have been carried are prejudicial, and
may perhaps in time become still more prejudicial another way, by
begetting, as is usual, the opposite extreme, and rendering us totally
careless and supine with regard to the fate of Europe. The Athenians,
from the most bustling, intriguing, warlike people of Greece, finding
their error in thrusting themselves into every quarrel, abandoned all
attention to foreign affairs, and in no contest ever took party on
either side, except by their flatteries and complaisance to the victor.
Enormous monarchies are probably destructive to human nature—in their
progress, in their continuance,[25] and even in their downfall,
which never can be very distant from their establishment.
The military genius which aggrandized the monarchy soon leaves the
court, the capital, and the centre of such a government; while the
wars are carried on at a great distance, and interest so small a
part of the state. The ancient nobility, whose affections attach
them to their sovereign, live all at court; and never will accept of
military employments which would carry them to remote and barbarous
frontiers, where they are distant both from their pleasures and their
fortune. The arms of the state must therefore be trusted to mercenary
strangers, without zeal, without attachment, without honour, ready
on every occasion to turn them against the prince, and join each
desperate malcontent who offers pay and plunder. This is the necessary
progress of human affairs; thus human nature checks itself in its
airy elevations, thus ambition blindly labours for the destruction of
the conqueror, of his family, and of everything near and dear to him.
The Bourbons, trusting to the support of their brave, faithful, and
affectionate nobility, would push their advantage without reserve or
limitation. These, while fired with glory and emulation, can bear the
fatigues and dangers of war; but never would submit to languish in the
garrisons of Hungary or Lithuania, forgot at court, and sacrificed to
the intrigues of every minion or mistress who approaches the prince.
The troops are filled with Cravates and Tartars, Hussars and Cossacks,
intermingled perhaps with a few soldiers of fortune from the better
provinces; and the melancholy fate of the Roman emperors, from the same
cause, is renewed over and over again till the final dissolution of the
monarchy.
NOTES, OF THE BALANCE OF POWER.
[22] It was observed by some, as appears from the speech of Agelaus of
Naupactum, in the general congress of Greece. See Polyb., lib. 5, cap.
104.
[23] Those concluded by the Peace of the Pyrenees, Nimeguen, Ryswick,
and Aix-la-Chapelle.
[24] That concluded by the Peace of Utrecht.
[25] If the Roman Empire was of advantage, it could only proceed from
this, that mankind were generally in a very disorderly, uncivilized
condition before its establishment.
OF TAXES.
There is a maxim that prevails among those whom in this country we call
“ways and means” men, and who are denominated financiers and maltotiers
in France, that every new tax creates a new ability in the subject to
bear it, and that each increase of public burdens increases
proportionably the industry of the people. This maxim is of such a
nature as is most likely to be extremely abused, and is so much the
more dangerous, as its truth cannot be altogether denied; but it must
be owned, when kept within certain bounds, to have some foundation in
reason and experience.
When a tax is laid upon commodities which are consumed by the common
people, the necessary consequence may seem to be that either the poor
must retrench something from their way of living, or raise their wages
so as to make the burden of the tax fall entirely upon the rich. But
there is a third consequence which very often follows upon taxes—viz.,
that the poor increase their industry, perform more work, and live as
well as before without demanding more for their labour. Where taxes
are moderate, are laid on gradually, and affect not the necessaries of
life, this consequence naturally follows; and it is certain that such
difficulties often serve to excite the industry of a people, and render
them more opulent and laborious than others who enjoy the greatest
advantages. For we may observe, as a parallel instance, that the most
commercial nations have not always possessed the greatest extent of
fertile land; but, on the contrary, that they have laboured under many
natural disadvantages. Tyre, Athens, Carthage, Rhodes, Genoa, Venice,
Holland are strong examples to this purpose; and in all history we
find only three instances of large and fertile countries which have
possessed much trade—the Netherlands, England, and France. The two
former seem to have been allured by the advantages of their maritime
situation, and the necessity they lay under of frequenting foreign
ports in order to procure what their own climate refused them; and as
to France, trade has come very late into the kingdom, and seems to
have been the effect of reflection and observation in an ingenious and
enterprising people, who remarked the immense riches acquired by such
of the neighbouring nations as cultivated navigation and commerce.
The places mentioned by Cicero as possessed of the greatest
commerce of his time are Alexandria, Colchos, Tyre, Sidon, Andros,
Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, Lesbos, Smyrna,
Miletum, Coos. All these, except Alexandria, were either small islands
or narrow territories; and that city owed its trade entirely to the
happiness of its situation.
Since, therefore, some natural necessities or disadvantages may be
thought favourable to industries, why may not artificial burdens have
the same effect? Sir William Temple,[26] we may observe, ascribes the
industry of the Dutch entirely to necessity, proceeding from their
natural disadvantages; and illustrates his doctrine by a very striking
comparison with Ireland, “where,” says he, “by the largeness and plenty
of the soil, and scarcity of people, all things necessary to life are
so cheap that an industrious man by two days’ labour may gain enough to
feed him the rest of the week. Which I take to be a very plain ground
of the laziness attributed to the people. For men naturally prefer ease
before labour, and will not take pains if they can live idle; though
when, by necessity, they have been inured to it, they cannot leave
it, being grown a custom necessary to their health, and to their very
entertainment. Nor perhaps is the change harder from constant ease
to labour than from constant labour to ease.” After which the author
proceeds to confirm his doctrine by enumerating as above the places
where trade has most flourished in ancient and modern times, and which
are commonly observed by such narrow, confined territories as beget a
necessity for industry.
It is always observed in years of scarcity, if it be not extreme, that
the poor labour more and really live better than in years of great
plenty, when they indulge themselves in idleness and riot. I have been
told by a considerable manufacturer that in the year 1740, when bread
and provisions of all kinds were very dear, his workmen not only made
a shift to live, but paid debts which they had contracted in
former years that were much more favourable and abundant.
This doctrine, therefore, with regard to taxes may be admitted to
some degree, but beware of the abuse. Exorbitant taxes, like extreme
necessity, destroy industry by producing despair; and even before they
reach this pitch they raise the wages of the labourer and manufacturer,
and heighten the price of all commodities. An attentive, disinterested
legislature will observe the point when the emolument ceases and the
prejudice begins; but as the contrary character is much more common,
it is to be feared that taxes all over Europe are multiplying to
such a degree as will entirely crush all art and industry; though
perhaps their first increase, together with circumstances, might have
contributed to the growth of these advantages.
The best taxes are such as are levied upon consumptions, especially
those of luxury, because such taxes are less felt by the people. They
seem, in some measure, voluntary, since a man may choose how far
he will use the commodity which is taxed: they are paid gradually
and insensibly, and being confounded with the natural price of the
commodity, they are scarcely perceived by the consumers. Their only
disadvantage is that they are expensive in the levying.
Taxes upon possessions are levied without expense, but have every other
disadvantage. Most states, however, are obliged to have recourse to
them, in order to supply the deficiencies of the other.
But the most pernicious of all taxes are those which are arbitrary.
They are commonly converted by their management into punishments on
industry; and also by their unavoidable inequality are more grievous
than by the real burden which they impose. It is surprising, therefore,
to see them have place among any civilized people.
In general, all poll-taxes, even when not arbitrary—which they commonly
are—may be esteemed dangerous; because it is so easy for the sovereign
to add a little more and a little more to the sum demanded, that these
taxes are apt to become altogether oppressive and intolerable. On the
other hand, a duty upon commodities checks itself, and a prince
will soon find that an increase of the impost is no increase of his
revenue. It is not easy, therefore, for a people to be altogether
ruined by such taxes.
Historians inform us that one of the chief causes of the destruction
of the Roman state was the alteration which Constantine introduced
into the finances, by substituting a universal poll-tax in lieu of
almost all the tithes, customs, and excises which formerly composed the
revenue of the empire. The people in all the provinces were so grinded
and oppressed by the publicans that they were glad to take refuge under
the conquering arms of the barbarians, whose dominion, as they had
fewer necessities and less art, was found preferable to the refined
tyranny of the Romans.
There is a prevailing opinion that all taxes, however levied, fall upon
the land at last. Such an opinion may be useful in Britain, by checking
the landed gentlemen, in whose hands our legislature is chiefly lodged,
and making them preserve great regard for trade and industry; but I
must confess that this principle, though first advanced by a celebrated
writer, has so little appearance of reason that were it not for his
authority it had never been received by anybody. Every man, to be sure,
is desirous of pushing off from himself the burden of any tax which
is imposed, and laying it upon others; but as every man has the same
inclination, and is upon the defensive, no set of men can be supposed
to prevail altogether in this contest. And why the landed gentleman
should be the victim of the whole, and should not be able to defend
himself as well as others are, I cannot readily imagine. All tradesmen,
indeed, would willingly prey upon him and divide him among them if they
could; but this inclination they always have, though no taxes were
levied; and the same methods by which he guards against the imposition
of tradesmen before taxes will serve him afterwards, and make them
share the burden with him. No labour in any commodities that are
exported can be very considerably raised in the price without losing
the foreign market; and as some part of almost every manufactory
is exported, this circumstance keeps the price of most species of
labour nearly the same after the imposition of taxes. I may add that it
has this effect upon the whole, for were any kind of labour paid beyond
its proportion all hands would flock to it, and would soon sink it to a
level with the rest.
I shall conclude this subject with observing that we have with
regard to taxes an instance of what frequently happens in political
institutions, that the consequence of things are diametrically opposite
to what we should expect on the first appearance. It is regarded as a
fundamental maxim of the Turkish Government that the Grand Seignior,
though absolute master of the lives and fortunes of each individual,
has no authority to impose a new tax; and every Ottoman prince who
has made such an attempt either has been obliged to retract, or has
found the fatal effects of his perseverance. One would imagine that
this prejudice or established opinion were the firmest barrier in the
world against oppression, yet it is certain that its effect is quite
contrary. The emperor, having no regular method of increasing his
revenue, must allow all the pashas and governors to oppress and abuse
the subjects, and these he squeezes after their return from their
government; whereas, if he could impose a new tax, like our European
princes, his interest would so far be united with that of his people
that he would immediately feel the bad effects of these disorderly
levies of money, and would find that a pound raised by general
imposition would have less pernicious effects than a shilling taken in
so unequal and arbitrary a manner.
NOTE, OF TAXES.
[26] _Account of the Netherlands_, chap. vi.
OF PUBLIC CREDIT.
It appears to have been the common practice of antiquity to make
provision in times of peace for the necessities of war, and to hoard
up treasures beforehand as the instruments either of conquest or
defence, without trusting to extraordinary imposts, much less to
borrowing, in times of disorder and confusion. Besides the immense sums
above mentioned[27] which were amassed by Athens, and by the Ptolemies
and other successors of Alexander, we learn from Plato that the frugal
Lacedemonians had also collected a great treasure; and Arrian and
Plutarch[28] specify the riches which Alexander got possession of on
the conquest of Susa and Ecbatana, and which were reserved, some of
them, from the time of Cyrus. If I remember right, the Scripture also
mentions the treasure of Hezekiah and the Jewish princes, as profane
history does that of Philip and Perseus, kings of Macedon. The ancient
republics of Gaul had commonly large sums in reserve. Every one knows
the treasure seized in Rome by Julius Cæsar during the civil wars,
and we find afterwards that the wiser emperors, Augustus, Tiberius,
Vespasian, Severus, etc., always discovered the prudent foresight of
saving great sums against any public exigency.