Is the content of ("seminal) reason" and of a particular reason,
identical with what appears, or does it apply thereto only by a
figure of speech?[343] Should it properly be classified among the
intelligible, or the sense-objects? Sensual beauty of course evidently
differs from intelligible beauty; but what of ugliness--in which
classification does it belong? Must virtue be classified among
intelligible or sensual qualities, or should we locate some in each
class? (All this uncertainty is excusable, inasmuch) as it may be asked
whether even the arts, which are "reasons," should be classified among
sense-qualities? If these reasons be united to a matter, they must have
matter as their very soul. But what is their condition here below, when
united to some matter? These reasons are in a case similar to song
accompanied by a lyre;[398] this song, being uttered by a sense-voice,
is in relation with the strings of the lyre, while simultaneously being
part of the art (which is one of these "seminal reasons"). Likewise,
it might be said that virtues are actualizations, and not parts (of
the soul). Are they sense-actualizations? (This seems probable), for
although the beauty contained in the body be incorporeal, we still
classify it among the things which refer to the body, and belong
to it. As to arithmetic, and geometry, two different kinds must be
distinguished: the first kind deals with visible objects, and must
be classified among sense-objects; but the second kind deals with
studies suitable to the soul, and should therefore be classified among
intelligible entities. Plato[399] considers that music and astronomy
are in the same condition.