When we were treating of things that were qualified, we had already
explained that matter, united to quantity, and taken with other things,
constitutes sense-being; that this "being" seems to be a composite
of several things, that it is not properly a "whatness,"[396] but
rather qualification (or, qualified thing). The ("seminal) reason,"
for instance that of fire, has more of a reference to "whatness,"
while the form that the reason begets is rather a qualification.
Likewise, the ("seminal) reason" of man is a "whatness," whilst the
form that this reason gives to the body, being only an image of reason,
is rather a qualification. Thus if the Socrates that we see was the
genuine Socrates, his mere portrait composed of no more than colors
would also be called Socrates. Likewise, although this ("seminal)
reason" of Socrates be that which constitutes the genuine Socrates, we
nevertheless also apply the name of Socrates to the man that we see;
yet the colors, or the figure of the Socrates we see, are only the
image of those which are contained by his ("seminal) reason." Likewise,
the reason of Socrates is itself only an image of the veritable reason
(of the idea) of the man. This is our solution of the problem.[397]