STUDY OF THE TRIANGLE.

Now let us consider the triangle, which is formed of three lines. Why

should it not belong to quantity? Would it be so, because it is not

constituted by three lines merely, but by three lines arranged in some

particular manner? But a quadrilateral would also be constituted by

four lines arranged in some particular manner. (But being arranged in

some particular manner does not hinder a figure from being a quantity).

The straight line, indeed, is arranged in some particular manner, and

is none the less a quantity. Now if the straight line be not simply a

quantity, why could this not also be said of a limited line? For the

limit of the line is a point, and the point does not belong to any

genus other than the line. Consequently, a limited surface is also

a quantity, because it is limited by lines, which even more belong

to quantity. If then the limited surface be contained in the genus

of quantity, whether the surface be a triangle, a quadrilateral, a

hexagon, or any other polygon, all figures whatever will belong to the

genus of quantity. But if we assigned the triangle or quadrilateral

to the genus of quality merely because we are speaking of some one

definite triangle or quadrilateral, nothing would hinder one and the

same thing from being subsumed under several categories. A triangle

would then be a quantity so far as it was both a general and particular

magnitude, and would be a quality by virtue of its possessing a

particular form. The same might be predicated of the Triangle in

itself because of its possessing a particular form; and so also with

the sphere. By following this line of argument, geometry would be

turned into a study of qualities, instead of that of quantities,

which of course it is. The existing differences between magnitudes

do not deprive them of their property of being magnitudes, just as

the difference between essences does not affect their essentiality.

Besides, every surface is limited, because an infinite surface is

impossible. Further, when I consider a difference that pertains to

essence, I call it an essential difference. So much the more, on

considering figures, I am considering differences of magnitude. For

if the differences were not of magnitude, of what would they be

differences? If then they be differences of magnitude, the different

magnitudes which are derived from differences of magnitude should

be classified according to the species constituted by them (when

considered in the light of being magnitudes).

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 372 / 442 题