It would seem that (physical) "being" is that which is not predicated
of anything else;[355] for whiteness and blackness may, for instance,
be predicated of some white or black subject. Likewise with the idea
of "doubleness";--I mean here not the doubleness which is the opposite
of one half, but the doubleness predicated of some subject, as when
one says "this wood is double." So also paternity, and science, are
attributes of another subject, of which that is said. So space is that
which limits, and time that which measures something else. But fire,
or wood considered as such, are not attributes. Neither are Socrates,
nor composite being (composed of matter and form), nor form which is
in the "being," because it is not a modification of any other subject.
Indeed, form is not an attribute of matter; it is an element of the
combination. "Man" and "form of man" are one and the same thing.[356]
Matter also is an element of the combination; under this respect, it
may be predicated of a subject, but this subject is identical with
itself. On the contrary, whiteness, considered in itself, exists only
in the subject of which it may be predicated. Consequently, the thing
which exists only in the subject of which it is predicated is not
(physical) "being."[356] "Being," on the contrary, is that which is
what it is by itself. In case it form part of some subject, then it
completes the combination; whose elements exist each in itself, and
which are predicated of the combination only in a condition other than
that of existing in it. Considered as a part, "being" is relative to
something other than itself; but considered in itself, in its nature,
in what it is, it is not predicable of anything.[357]