30. It is absurd to assign the third rank to modalities, and even
assign to them any place whatever; for all modalities refer to matter.
It may however be objected to this that there are differences between
the modalities; the various modifications that matter undergoes are
not the same thing as the modalities; the qualities are doubtless
modalities of matter, but the modalities, in the strict sense of
the word, refer to qualities. (The answer to this is that) since the
qualities are only modalities of matter, the technical modalities
mentioned by the (Stoics) themselves reduce to matter, and necessarily
relate thereto. In view of the many differences obtaining between them,
how otherwise could modalities form a category? How could one reduce to
a single classification the length of three feet, and whiteness--since
one is a quantity, and the other a quality? How could time and place
be reduced thereto? Besides, how would it be possible to consider
as modalities such expressions as "yesterday," "formerly," "in the
Lyceum," and, "in the Academy"? How could time be explained as a
modality? Neither time, nor things which are in time, nor place, nor
the things which are in place, could be modalities. How is "to act" a
modality, since he who acts is not himself a modality, but rather acts
within some modality, or even, acts simply? Nor is he who undergoes an
experience any more of a modality; he experiences something rather in
a modality, or rather, he undergoes some experience in such a manner.
Modality rather suits the (Aristotelian) categories of situation and
possession; and as to possession, no man even possesses "in such or
such a modality," but possesses purely and simply.