How can the thing qualified by a quality refer to the quality? This
must be studied, because the thing qualified and the quality do not
belong to a common kind. If the man capable of boxing be related to
the quality, why should not the same quality obtain between the active
man and activity? If then the active man be something qualified,
"activity" and "passivity" should not be referred to relation. It would
seem preferable to relate the active man to the quality if he be active
by virtue of a power, for a power is a quality; but if the power be
essential, in so far as it is a power, it is not something relative,
nor even something qualified. We should not consider that activity
corresponds to increase; for the increase, so far as it increases,
stands in relation only to the less; while activity is such by itself.
To the objection that activity, so far as it is such, is something
qualified, it might be answered that, at the same time, as far as it
can act on something else, and that it is thus called active, it is
something relative. In this case the man capable of boxing and the art
of boxing itself must be in relation. For the art of boxing implies a
relation; all the knowledge it imparts is relative to something else.
As to the other arts, or at least, as to the greater number of other
arts, it may, after examination, be said that they are qualities, so
far as they give a disposition to the soul; as far as they act, they
are active, and, from this standpoint, they refer to something else,
and are relative; and besides, they are relative in the sense that they
are habituations.