10. We are now to consider quality, on account of which a being is said
to be "such." What can be the nature of this quality that it exerts the
power of deciding of the phenomena of objects? Is there a same, single
quality which is something common to all qualities, and which, by its
differences, forms classifications? Or are the qualities so different
that they could not constitute one and the same classification? What
is there in common between capacity and disposition[261] (that is, the
physical power), the affective quality, the figure, and the exterior
form?[262]
THE LACK OF POWERS CANNOT BE SUBSUMED UNDER THE SAME CATEGORY AS THE
POWERS.
What shall be said of thickness and thinness, of fatness and leanness?
If the element common to these conceptions be a power belonging to
the capacities, dispositions, and physical powers, which gives to
each object the power it possesses, the statements of the absence of
power will no longer be classified along with (the powers). Besides,
in what sense can we call the figure and form of each thing a "power?"
Further, essence would have been deprived of all powers that were
essential, retaining only those it might have received. Then, quality
would comprehend all actualizations of the beings, which, properly,
are actualizations only so far as they act spontaneously; and also
all actualizations of these properties, but only so far as they
really exist. But quality consists in (unessential) powers (such
as habituations and dispositions) classified below beings.[263]
For instance, boxing ability does not belong among necessary human
qualifications, such as rational functions. The latter would not be
called a quality (as we would speak of boxing ability); and reasoning
would be considered a quality only figuratively.