6. Let us now consider relation. Let us see whether, in relative
matters, there be something common that constitutes a kind, or which is
a point of union in any other manner. Let us, before everything else,
examine whether relation (as, for example, left and right, double and
half, and so forth) be a kind of "hypostasis," or substantial act,
or an habituation; or, whether it be a kind of hypostatic existence
in certain things, while in others it is not so; or whether it be
this under no circumstances. What is there indeed that is particular
in relations such as double and half; surpasser and surpassed; in
possession, and in disposition; lying down, standing, sitting; in
the relation of father and son; of master and slave; in the like and
different; the equal and unequal; the active and passive; measurer and
measured; sensation and knowledge? Knowledge, for instance, relates
to the object which can be known, and sensation to sense-object; for
the relation of knowledge to the object which can be known has a kind
of hypostatic existence in the actualization relative to the form of
the object which can be known; likewise with the relation of sensation
to the sense-object. The same may be said about the relation of the
"active" to the "passive," which results in a single actualization,
as well as about the relation between the measure and the measured
object, from which results mensuration. But what results from the
relation of the similar to the similar? If in this relation there be
nothing begotten, one can at least discover there something which
is its foundation, namely, the identity of quality; nevertheless,
neither of these two terms would then have anything beside their proper
quality. The same may be said of equal things, because the identity
of quantity precedes the manner of being of both things; this manner
of being has no foundation other than our judgment, when we say, This
one or that one are of the same size; this one has begotten that one,
this one surpasses that one. What are standing and sitting outside of
him who stands or sits? As to the possession, if it apply to him who
possesses, it rather signifies the fact of possession; if it apply to
what is possessed, it is a quality. As much can be said of disposition.
What then exists outside of the two relative terms, but the comparison
established by our judgment? In the relation of the thing which
surpasses the thing which is surpassed, the first is some one size,
and the second is some other size; those are two independent things,
while as to the comparison, it does not exist in them, except in our
judgment. The relation of left to right and that of the former to the
latter consist in the different positions. It is we who have imagined
the distinction of right to left; there is nothing in the objects
themselves that answers thereto. The former and the latter are two
relations of time, but it is we who have established that distinction.