If we deny that sensations are images impressed on the soul, similar
to the impression of a seal,[226] we shall also, for the sake of
consistency, have to deny that memories are notions or sensations
preserved in the soul by the permanence of the impression, inasmuch
as, according to our opinion, the soul did not originally receive any
impression. The two questions, therefore, hang together. Either we
shall have to insist that sensation consists in an image impressed on
the soul, and memory, in its preservation; or, if either one of these
opinions be rejected, the other will have to be rejected also. However,
since we regard both of them as false, we shall have to consider the
true operation of both sensation and memory; for we declare that
sensation is as little the impression of an image as memory is its
permanence. The true solution of the question, on the contrary, will
be disclosed by an examination of the most penetrating sense,[227] and
then by induction transferring the same laws to the other senses.