THE GOOD IS FREE, BUT NOT MERELY BY CHANCE.

Here some rash person,[186] drawing his arguments from some other

school of thought, may object that, "If the Good be indeed good, this

occurs only by chance. A man is not master of what he is (that is,

of his own nature), because his own nature does not depend on himself

(that is, is not due to self-determination). Consequently, he enjoys

neither freedom nor independence, as he acts or withholds action as

he is forced by necessity." Such an assertion is gratuitous, and even

self-contradictory. It destroys all conception of will, liberty and

independence, reducing these terms to being labels, and illusions. He

who advances such an opinion is forced to maintain not only that it

is not within the power of anybody to do or not to do some thing, but

also that the word "liberty" arouses no conception in his mind, and is

meaningless. If however he insist that he does understand it, he will

soon be forced to acknowledge that the conception of liberty bears a

conformity with the reality which he at first denied. The conception

of a thing exerts no interference on its substance ("being"); it can

do nothing by itself, nor can it lead to hypostatic existence. It is

limited to pointing out to us which being obeys others, which being

possesses free will, which being depends on no other, but is master of

its own action, a privilege characteristic of eternal beings so far as

they are eternal, or to beings which attain the Good without obstacle

(like the Soul), or possess it (like Intelligence). It is therefore

absurd to say that the Good, which is above them, seeks other higher

good beyond itself.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 165 / 442 题