THE GOOD CANNOT BE PLEASURE WHICH IS CHANGEABLE AND RESTLESS.

Now when a being has attained the good it was pursuing it is sure of

possessing it as soon as it feels that it is better, feels no regret,

is satisfied, takes pleasure therein, and seeks nothing beyond. What

shows the insufficiency of pleasure is that one does not always like

the same thing; doubtless pleasure ever charms, but the object which

produces it is not the same; it is always the newest object that

pleases most. Now the good to which we aspire must not be a simple

affection, existing only in him who feels it; for he who mistakes

this affection for the Good remains unsatisfied, he has nothing but

an affection that somebody else might equally feel in presence of

the Good. Consequently no one will succeed in making himself enjoy a

pleasure he has not achieved[122]; such as, for instance, rejoicing in

the presence of an absent son; or, for a glutton to relish imaginary

food; or, for a lover, to tremble at the touch of his absent mistress,

or (to thrill in a theoretic) orgasm.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 120 / 442 题