All these things derive from one and the same source; it is neither a
breath nor a single heat; but rather a single quality, which contains
and preserves within itself all the qualities, the sweetness of the
most fragrant perfumes, the flavor of the wine, and of the finest tasty
juices, the gleam of the most flashing colors, the softness of the
objects which flatter touch with the greatest delicacy, the rhythm and
harmony of all the kinds of sounds which can charm the hearing.
SIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS, BUT INFERS
HEIGHT OF SOURCE.
13. Neither Intelligence, nor the Soul that proceeds therefrom, are
simple; both contain the universality of things with their infinite
variety, so far as these are simple, meaning that they are not
composite, but that they are principles and actualizations; for, in
the intelligible world, the actualization of what occupies the last
rank is simple; the actualization of what occupies the first rank is
universal. Intelligence, in its uniform movement, always trends towards
similar and identical things; nevertheless, each of them is identical
and single, without being a part; it is on the contrary universal,
because what, in the intelligible world, is a part, is not a simple
unit, but a unity that is infinitely divisible. In this movement,
Intelligence starts from one object, and goes to another object which
is its goal. But does all that is intermediary resemble a straight
line, or to a uniform and homogeneous body? There would be nothing
remarkable about that; for if Intelligence did not contain differences,
if no diversity awoke it to life, it would not be an actualization; its
state would not differ from inactivity. If its movement were determined
in a single manner, it would possess but a single kind of (restricted)
life, instead of possessing the universal Life. Now it should contain
an universal and omnipresent Life; consequently, it must move, or
rather have been moved towards all (beings). If it were to move in a
simple and uniform manner, it would possess but a single thing, would
be identical with it, and no longer proceed towards anything different.
If however it should move towards something different, it would have
to become something different, and be two things. If these two things
were then to be identical, Intelligence would still remain one, and
there would be no progress left; if, on the contrary, these two things
were to be different, it would be proceeding with this difference, and
it would, by virtue of this difference joined to its divinity, beget
some third thing. By its origin, the latter is simultaneously identical
and different; not of some particular difference, but of all kinds
of difference, because the identity it contains is itself universal.
Thus being universal difference as well as universal identity, this
thing possesses all that is said to be different; for its nature
is to be universal differentiation (to spread over everything, to
become everything else). If all these differences preceded this
(Intelligence), the latter would be modified by them. If this be not
the case, Intelligence must have begotten all the differences, or
rather, be their universality.