There is indeed no reasoning in the divinity. When we speak of it,
in connection with the divinity, it is only to explain that He has
regulated everything as might have been done by some wise man, who
would have reasoned about results. Attributing foresight to the
divinity indicates merely that He has disposed everything as might have
been done by some wise man who had foreseen results.[70] Indeed the
only use of reasoning is to put in order things whose existence is not
anterior to that of reasoning, every time that that (Intelligence),
the power superior to reasoning, is not strong enough. Likewise,
prevision is necessary in this case, because he who makes use of it
does not possess a power that would enable him to forego or do without
it. Prevision proposes to effect some one thing instead of another,
and seems to fear that that which it desires might not occur. But,
for a (being) which can do but one thing, both foresight and the
reasoning that decides between contraries, are useless; for there is
no need of reasoning when, of two contrary courses of action, one only
is possible. How would the Principle which is single, unitary and
simple, have need to reflect that He must do one thing, so that some
other might not take place, or to judge that the second would occur as
alternative to the first? How could He say that experience has already
demonstrated the utility of some one thing, and that it is well to make
use of it? If the divinity acted thus, then indeed would He have had
recourse to prevision, and consequently, to reasoning. It is on this
hypothesis that we said above that the divinity gave animals senses
and faculties; but it is quite a problem to know what and how He really
gave them.
IN GOD ALL THINGS WERE SIMULTANEOUS, THOUGH WHEN REALIZED THEY
DEVELOPED.
Indeed, if it be admitted that in the divinity no actualization is
imperfect, if it be impossible to conceive in Him anything that is not
total or universal, each one of the things that He contains comprises
within Himself all things. Thus as, to the divinity, the future is
already present, there could not be anything posterior to Him; but what
is already present in Him becomes posterior in some other (being). Now
if the future be already present in the divinity, it must be present
in Him as if what will happen were already known; that is, it must be
so disposed as to find itself sufficiently provided for, so as not to
stand in need of anything. Therefore, as all things existed already
within the divinity (when living beings were created), they had been
there from all eternity; and that in a manner such that it would later
be possible to say, "this occurred after that." Indeed, when the things
that are in the divinity later develop and reveal themselves, then one
sees that the one is after the other; but, so far as they exist all
together, they constitute the universal (Being), that is, the principle
which includes its own cause.
IN THE INTELLIGIBLE, EVERYTHING POSSESSES ITS REASON AS WELL AS ITS
FORM.
2. (By this process) we also know the nature of Intelligence, which
we see still better than the other things, though we cannot grasp
its magnitude. We admit, in fact, that it possesses the whatness
(essence[71]), of everything, but not its "whyness" (its cause); or,
if we grant (that this "cause" be in Intelligence), we do not think
that it is separated (from its "whatness" (or, essence[72]). Let
us suppose that, for instance, the man, or, if possible, the eye,
should offer itself to our contemplation (in the intelligible world)
as a statue, or as a part of it, would do. The man that we see on
high is both essence[73] and cause. As well as the eye, he must be
intellectual, and contain his cause. Otherwise, he could not exist in
the intelligible world. Here below, just as each part is separated from
the others, so is the cause separated (from the essence). On high, on
the contrary, all things exist in unity, and each thing is identical
with its cause. This identity may often be noticed even here below, as
for instance, in eclipses.[74] It would therefore seem probable that
in the intelligible world everything would, besides the rest, possess
its cause, and that its cause constitutes its essence. This must be
admitted; and that is the reason why those who apply themselves to
grasp the characteristic[75] of each being succeed (in also grasping
its cause). Indeed that which each (being) is, depends on the "cause of
such a form."[76] To repeat: not only is a (being's) form its cause,
(which is incontestable), but yet, if one analyses each form considered
in itself, its cause will be found. The only things which do not
contain their causes are those whose life is without reality, and whose
existence is shadowy.