AS ADDITION IS POSSIBLE WITH TIME, WHY CANNOT HAPPINESS INCREASE?

7. It might be objected that it is inconsistent to consider the present

only, exclusive of the past (as in the case of happiness), when we

do not do so in respect of time. For the addition of past to present

unquestionably lengthens time. If then we may properly say that time

becomes longer, why may we not say the same of happiness?--Were we to

do so, we would be applying happiness to divisions of time, while it

is precisely to bring out the indivisibility of happiness that it is

considered to be measured by the present exclusively. While considering

time, in respect of things that have vanished, such as, for instance,

the dead, it is perfectly reasonable to reckon the past; but it would

be unreasonable to compare past happiness with present happiness

in respect to duration, because it would be treating happiness as

something accidental and temporary. Whatever might be the length of

time that preceded the present, all that can be said of it is, that

it is no more. To regard duration while considering happiness is to

try to disperse and fraction something that is one and indivisible,

something that exists only in the present. That is why time is called

an image of eternity, inasmuch as it tends to destroy eternity's

permanence through its own dispersion.[57] By abstracting permanence

from eternity, and appropriating it, time destroys eternity; for a

short period, permanence may survive in association with time; but as

soon as it becomes fused with it, eternity perishes. Now as happiness

consists in the enjoyment of a life that is good, namely in that which

is proper to Essence (in itself), because none better exists, it must,

instead of time, have, as a measure, eternity itself, a principle

which admits neither increase nor diminution, which cannot be compared

to any length, whose nature it is to be indivisible, and superior to

time. No comparison, therefore, should be instituted between essence

and non-essence, eternity and time, the perpetual and the eternal;

nor should extension be predicated of the indivisible. If we regard

existence of Essence in itself, it will be necessary to regard it

entire; to consider it, not as the perpetuity of time, but as the very

life of eternity, a life which instead of consisting of a series of

centuries, exists entire since all centuries.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 59 / 442 题