REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE'S "VISUAL ANGLE" THEORY.

2. Some[51] hold that distant objects seem to us lesser only because

they are seen under a smaller visual angle. Elsewhere[52] we have shown

that this is wrong; and here we shall limit ourselves to the following

considerations. The assertion that a distant object seems less because

it is perceived under a smaller visual angle supposes that the rest

of the eye still sees something outside of this object, whether this

be some other object, or something external, such as the air. But if

we suppose that the eye sees nothing outside of this object, whether

this object, as would a great mountain, occupy the whole extent of the

glance, and permit nothing beyond it to be seen; or whether it even

extend beyond the sweep of the glance on both sides, then this object

should not, as it actually does, seem smaller than it really is, even

though it fill the whole extension of the glance. The truth of this

observation can be verified by a mere glance at the sky. Not in a

single glance can the whole hemisphere be perceived, for the glance

could not be extended widely enough to embrace so vast an expanse. Even

if we grant the possibility of this, and that the whole glance embraces

the whole hemisphere; still the real magnitude of the heaven is greater

than its apparent magnitude. How then by the diminution of the visual

angle could we explain the smallness of the apparent magnitude of the

sky, on the hypothesis that it is the diminution of the visual angle

which makes distant objects appear smaller?

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