It may be objected that a color cannot be less large, and that it
can only be less vivid. However, there is a common characteristic in
something smaller and less vivid; namely, that it is less than what
it is its being to be. As to color, diminution implies weakness;
as to size, smallness. Magnitude connected with color diminishes
proportionally with it. This is evident in the perception of a varied
object, as, for instance, in the perception of mountains covered with
houses, forests, and many other objects; here the distinctness of
detail affords a standard by which to judge of the whole. But when the
view of the details does not impress itself on the eye, the latter
no longer grasps the extent of the whole through measurement of the
extent offered to its contemplation by the details. Even in the case
where the objects are near and varied, if we include them all in one
glance without distinguishing all their parts, the more parts our
glance loses, the smaller do the objects seem. On the contrary, if we
distinguish all their details, the more exactly do we measure them,
and learn their real size. Magnitudes of uniform color deceive the eye
because the latter can no longer measure their extent by its parts; and
because, even if the eye attempt to do so, it loses itself, not knowing
where to stop, for lack of difference between the parts.