_Further Decline of the Dutch Trade—Degradation of the Japanese
Coins—The Dutch threaten to withdraw from Japan—Restrictions on
the Chinese Trade—Probable Cause of the Policy adopted by the
Japanese—Drain of the Precious Metals—New Basis upon which Future
Trade must be arranged._
Notwithstanding the lamentations uttered by Kämpfer in the name of the
Dutch factors, the trade to Japan had by no means in his time reached
its lowest level, and it was subjected soon after his departure to new
and more stringent limitations.
In the year 1696 appeared a new kind of koban. The old koban was twenty
carats eight and a half, and even ten, grains fine; that is, supposing
it divided into twenty-four parts, twenty parts and a half were fine
gold.[35] The new koban was thirteen carats six or seven grains fine,
containing, consequently, only two-thirds as much gold as the old one,
and yet the Dutch were required to receive it at the same rate of
sixty-eight mas of silver.
The old koban had returned on the coast of Coromandel a profit of
twenty-five per cent, the new produced a loss of fifteen or sixteen per
cent; but some of the old koban being still paid over at the same rate
as the new, some profits continued to be derived from the gold, till,
in 1710, the Japanese made a still more serious change in their coin,
by reducing the weight of the koban nearly one-half, from forty-seven
kanderins (two hundred and seventy-four grains) to twenty-five
kanderins (one hundred and forty-six grains), which, as the Dutch were
still obliged to receive these new koban at the rate of sixty-eight
mas, caused a loss of from thirty-four to thirty-six per cent. From
this time the old koban passed as double koban, being reckoned at twice
their former weight. The koban of the coinage of 1730 were about five
per cent better than the preceding ones; but the Dutch trade continued
rapidly to decline, especially after the exportation of copper was
limited, in 1714, to fifteen thousand chests, or piculs, and, in 1721,
to ten thousand piculs annually. From this time, two ships sufficed for
the Dutch trade.
For thirty years previous to 1743, the annual gross profits on the
Japanese trade had amounted to five hundred thousand florins (two
hundred thousand dollars), and some years to six hundred thousand
(two hundred and forty thousand dollars); but in 1743 they sunk below
two hundred thousand florins (eighty thousand dollars), which was the
annual cost of maintaining the establishment at Deshima.
Upon this occasion, a “Memoir on the Trade of Japan, and the Causes of
its Decline,” was drawn up by Imhoff, at that time governor-general
at Batavia, which affords information on the change in the value of
the koban, and other matters relating to the Dutch trade to Japan, not
elsewhere to be found.[36] It is apparent from his memoir that the
trade was not managed with the sagacity which might have been expected
from private merchants. The cargoes were ill assorted, and did not
correspond to the requisitions of the Japanese. They, on the other
hand, had repeatedly offered several new articles of export, which the
Company had declined, because, in the old routine of their trade, no
profitable market appeared for these articles at the prices asked for
them.
The Dutch attempted to frighten the Japanese by threatening to close
their factory altogether, but this did not produce much effect, and,
since the date of Imhoff’s memoir, the factory appears not to have
done much more than to pay its expenses. That the Japanese were not
very anxious for foreign trade, appears by their having restricted
the Chinese, previous to 1740, to twenty junks annually, and at a
subsequent period to ten junks.
The Dutch imagined that the above-mentioned changes in the coins of
Japan were made solely with a view to their trade and to curtail their
profits. Raffles suggests, on the other hand, that this degradation of
the Japanese coins was the natural result of the immense export of the
precious metals, which, in the course of the two hundred years from
1540 to 1740, must have drained Japan of specie to the value of perhaps
not less than two hundred millions of dollars. The exports of foreign
nations, as we have seen, were almost entirely metallic, and the mines
of Japan were by no means so productive as to be able to withstand this
constant drain. The export of silver was first stopped. Then gold was
raised to such a value as effectually to stop the exportation of that,
and restrictions were, at the same time, put upon the exportation
of copper. This sagacious conjecture of Raffles is confirmed by a
tract on the Origin of the Riches of Japan, written, in 1708, by Arai
Chikugo-no-Kami [Arai Hakuseki], a person of high distinction at
the emperor’s court, of which the original was brought to Europe by
Titsingh, and of which Klaproth has given a translation, in the second
volume of the “Nouveau Journal Asiatique.” The author of this tract
states, perhaps from official documents, the amount of gold and silver
exported from Nagasaki, from 1611 to 1706, as follows: Gold, 6,192,600
koban; silver, 112,268,700 taels. Of this amount, 2,397,600 koban and
37,420,900 taels of silver had been exported since 1646. The exports of
copper from 1663 to 1708 are stated at 1,114,446,700 katties.
This export is represented as having commenced in the time of
Nobunaga,[37] when the mines of Japan had first begun to be largely
productive, and, previous to 1611, to have been much greater than
afterwards, which is ascribed by this author in part to the amounts
sent out of the country, by the Catholic natives, to purchase masses
for their souls. Much alarm is expressed lest, with the decreased
product of the mines, and continual exportation, Japan should be
reduced to poverty. Titsingh ascribes the origin of this tract to
the extravagance of the reigning emperor, which it was desired to
check by good advice; but the exportation of the precious metals by
foreigners is evidently the point aimed at.
[Illustration: VIEW OF HAKONE; LAKE BIWA]
“There goes out of the empire annually,” says this writer, “about
one hundred and fifty thousand koban, or a million and a half in ten
years. It is, therefore, of the highest importance to the public
prosperity to put a stop to these exportations, which will end in
draining us entirely. Nothing is thought of but the procuring foreign
productions, expensive stuffs, elegant utensils, and other things not
known in the good old times. Since Gongen, gold, silver, and copper
have been abundantly produced; unfortunately the greater part of this
wealth has gone for things we could have done quite as well without.
The successors of Gongen ought to reflect upon this, in order that
the wealth of the empire may be as lasting as the heavens and the
earth.” Ideas like those broached in this tract seem to be the basis
of the existing policy of Japan on the subject of foreign trade; and,
independently of this, the failure of the Japanese mines renders any
return to the old system of the Portuguese and Dutch traffic quite out
of the question. Japan has no longer gold and silver to export, and if
a new trade is to be established with her, it must be on an entirely
new basis, the exports to consist of something else than metallic
products.