“The first German U-boat was commissioned 29 June 1935. The
procuring of parts to build U-boats had started correspondingly
earlier.”
I wish to remind you that, when the first submarine was commissioned,
the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, according to which submarine
construction was permitted, was already in existence. I will ask if this
statement of Admiral Lohmann is correct.
RAEDER: Yes. It entirely corresponds with the facts.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I come to Prosecution Document C-141, Exhibit USA-47.
This is in the Raeder Document Book Number 10, on Page 22, in the
compilation of the British Delegation. This is your letter of 10
February 1932 in regard to torpedo armament of the S-boats, the speed
boats.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this in Document Book 10a or 10?
DR. SIEMERS: Document Book 10. The old document book.
THE PRESIDENT: I’ve got my pages wrongly marked somehow. It is all
right.
DR. SIEMERS: Please excuse me. That is how the page numbers were given
to me.
THE PRESIDENT: It is correct in the other members’ books.
DR. SIEMERS: The torpedo armament of speed boats was not expressly
permitted in the Versailles Treaty and for that reason you are accused
in this connection. Did this involve only the five speed boats mentioned
in this document?
RAEDER: Yes. There were five boats which we had ordered for use as
patrol boats in the shipbuilding replacement program and which in
themselves had no armament.
DR. SIEMERS: How big were these boats?
RAEDER: Certainly not bigger than 40 tons, probably considerably
smaller.
DR. SIEMERS: Were more boats of this type built during the Versailles
Treaty?
RAEDER: I cannot say with certainty. In any case, we had no armed boats
in addition.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, excuse me, that is what I mean—more armed boats.
RAEDER: No. We could build 12 plus 4, which makes 16 torpedo boats of
200 tons. A torpedo boat of 200 tons could not be produced in a
practical manner at that time because of the question of the motors and
the question of seaworthiness. For that reason we did not build these
torpedo boats for the time being but kept in service a number of quite
old torpedo boats, built at the beginning of the century, in order to be
able to train crews with them. We could no longer use these boats for
fighting. But so that—as long as we could not replace these boats—we
might have a few boats capable of action, however small, which could be
of use in blocking the Baltic, I ordered that these patrol boats should
be equipped to take torpedo tubes on board.
However, so that in 1932 we should not make our situation worse by open
breaches of the Treaty, when we hoped that at the Disarmament Conference
we might make some progress, I had one boat at a time armed in order to
fit and test the armament; and I then had the armament dismounted again
so that there was always only one boat available with armament at any
one time. We planned to put the torpedo tubes on board the speed boats
only if the political situation, that is, the situation after the
Disarmament Conference, would permit it. That is what I say in Number 3
in the concluding sentence.
DR. SIEMERS: I can take it then that we were allowed to build 16 torpedo
boats making 3,200 tons in all?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And instead we built only five speed boats totalling 200
tons?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Concerning the accusation made by the Prosecution that you
did not count the speed boats against the torpedo boats you actually did
not intend to keep anything secret; but you wanted to discuss it with
the Control Commission when the time came?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the most extensive document in regard to
breaches which the Prosecution submitted, Document C-32, USA-50. The
document is in Document Book 10a, Page 8; in the new document book of
the British Delegation.
In this list all breaches are included under date 9 September 1933. The
Prosecution justly points out that this compilation is very thorough;
and the Prosecution presented it just as thoroughly, although, as I
believe I can prove, they are, in the last analysis, small matters. I am
compelled to ask the witness to answer these points in detail since they
were brought up in detail. Breach Number 1 concerns the exceeding of the
permitted number of mines. In Column 2 it states that according to the
Versailles Treaty, that is, by the Commission, 1,665 mines were
permitted; but we owned 3,675 mines. That is 2,000 too many. Will you
please tell the Court the significance of this breach; it doubtlessly
was a breach.
RAEDER: I should like to say in advance that this list was prepared for
our Navy representative at the Disarmament Conference, so that if these
things should be mentioned, he could give them an explanation. That is
why it was so explicit, even though most of the things it contains are
of minor importance. I should like to add to what I said previously, in
regard to the danger of attacks by Poland, that in view of the political
situation at that time we always feared that the Poles, if they should
undertake an invasion of our country, might receive certain support from
the sea by France, inasmuch as French ships, which at that time often
visited the Polish port of Gdynia, could attack our coast through the
Baltic entrances, the Belt, and the Sound. For this reason the defense
of the Baltic entrances by mines played an important role. Thus, we
undertook this breach of the Treaty in order to be able to close at
least the Baltic entrances at the narrow points, which was of course
possible only for a certain time. With these mines only a stretch of 27
nautical miles could have been closed. Thus, we would have been able to
close a part of Danzig Bay on which Gdynia was situated, or a part of
the Belt, by laying several rows of mines. This was the only method
which could be effective for any length of time. This was purely a
question of defense, but still they exceeded the number of mines
permitted from the war supplies still available.
DR. SIEMERS: Just now in the calculation of the 27 nautical miles you
included the total number which Germany had at that time.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Not just the number which exceeded that which was
permitted?
RAEDER: No, the total.
DR. SIEMERS: So that the number in excess is only half this number?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And then I should like to have an approximate comparison. I
was told, by way of comparison, that the British in the first World War
laid about 400,000 to 500,000 mines in the North Sea. Do you recall if
this number is approximately right?
RAEDER: Approximately it may be right. I cannot say exactly from memory.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe the approximation suffices to give a picture of
the relative values.
A second small question now. Is it true that for mining English ports
Reich Marshal Göring’s Luftwaffe in one action alone used 30,000 to
50,000 mines? Do you know of that?
RAEDER: I have heard so.
DR. SIEMERS: Then there is a second point. I quote, “Continuous storing
of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries.”
This involves 96 guns, only 6 of which are of large caliber, the others
of smaller caliber. May I ask you to explain this breach of the Treaty?
RAEDER: This is quite a small breach. We were allowed a comparatively
large number of guns on the North Sea coast. On the other hand,
according to plans the Baltic coast was comparatively bare of guns,
since they wanted to retain free entry to the Baltic, whereas we had the
greatest interest in closing the Baltic against attacks. For this reason
we stored the gun barrels, which belonged in the North Sea but which had
been brought to the Baltic for repairs, in sheds in the Baltic area for
a long time in order to be able to mount these guns on the Baltic coast
in case of attack. The North Sea coast had many guns; and because of the
shallowness, it was much easier to defend than the Baltic coast. That
was the breach.
DR. SIEMERS: In practice it only involved moving them from the North Sea
to the Baltic coast. That is, not mounting them, but merely storing
them.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Then under Figure 3, another charge, “non-scrapping of
guns.” A total of 99 guns is mentioned of which the ten largest, of 28
centimeters, were actually scrapped. Please comment on this.
RAEDER: When we acquired new guns, as for example, for the battleship
_Deutschland_, six 28-centimeter guns were constructed, or for the
_Deutschland_ and the cruisers, forty-eight 15-centimeter guns, we had
to scrap a corresponding number of old guns. Ten of this number were
actually scrapped. All the guns were turned over to the Army for
scrapping and we received a receipt for them, saying that the guns had
been scrapped. We learned, however, that the Army in fact had not
scrapped the guns, but with the exception of the ten 28-centimeter guns,
it intended to use them for arming the fortifications to be built in
case of attack, since the Army had no such guns at all.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to make the time clear. This must have been a
breach of the Treaty which occurred long before the time you took office
as Chief of the Navy Command.
RAEDER: This happened between 1919 and 1925 for the most part. In any
case I had nothing to do with these matters.
DR. SIEMERS: Number 4 is very simple: “Deviation from the places settled
by the Entente for the disposition of coastal batteries.”
RAEDER: Previously, up to the time of the World War, especially the
heavy batteries and the medium-sized batteries were placed very close to
each other, or rather in the batteries the guns were placed very close
to each other. According to our experience in the World War the heavy
and medium-sized guns within the batteries were placed further apart, so
that a single hit would not destroy several guns at once. For this
reason we re-arranged these heavy and medium batteries and moved the
guns a little further apart. For that reason they were no longer exactly
in the places where they had been at the time of the Treaty. Otherwise
nothing was changed.
DR. SIEMERS: Would not these things have been approved by the Control
Commission because they were purely technical?
RAEDER: I cannot say, I never took part in these negotiations.
DR. SIEMERS: Number 5 concerns the laying of gun platforms for artillery
batteries and the storing of A. A. ammunition. In Column 2 there is
again the question of changing to a different place than that allowed by
the Entente. Does the same thing apply here as to Number 4?
RAEDER: No, not completely. We wanted to put the A. A. batteries where
they were particularly useful and could be fully utilized, whereas the
Commission did not want to have them at these places. As a result we
left the A. A. batteries where they were; but at other points we
prepared so-called gun platforms, which were improvised wooden
platforms, so that in case of attack from any enemy we could set up the
A. A. guns in order to use them most effectively. In the same way...
DR. SIEMERS: This is only a question then of platforms for an A. A.
battery, only the foundations for a defense?
RAEDER: Yes, only foundations.
DR. SIEMERS: Then comes Number 6: “Laying gun platforms in the Kiel
area.”
RAEDER: The Kiel area was especially bared of guns, because the entrance
through the Belt to Kiel was to be as little armed and as open as
possible. For this reason the setting up of guns in the Kiel area was
especially forbidden; and in order to be able to set up some guns in a
hurry, in case of necessity, gun platforms were prepared there also.
DR. SIEMERS: The next point the Prosecution gives comes under Number 7:
“Exceeding the caliber permitted for coastal batteries.” “Coastal
batteries” shows that it is for defense, but nevertheless it was brought
up as an accusation.
RAEDER: Yes. It says here that instead of six 15-centimeter, three
17-centimeter guns were built. Of course, it is a deviation, insofar as
the guns were to stay there; but it is open to doubt whether these six
15-centimeter guns might not have been better along the coast than the
three 17-centimeter guns.
DR. SIEMERS: I see, you mean that they are actually less than the number
permitted?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Instead of five 15-centimeter there were only three
17-centimeter?
RAEDER: Instead of six.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, instead of six only three, and the caliber was 2
centimeter larger.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Then comes Number 8, the arming of M-boats. M-boats are
mine sweepers.
RAEDER: We had the old mine sweepers which in case of attack on the
Baltic were to serve the double purpose of finding the mines and of
guarding the mine barrage which we wanted to lay in the exits of the
Belt in order to close the Baltic, and of defending it against light
enemy forces. For this reason we gave each one a 10.5-centimeter gun and
one machine gun C-30.
DR. SIEMERS: Actually a minimum armament?
RAEDER: Yes, quite a minimum armament.
DR. SIEMERS: Number 9 can be quickly settled, I believe: “Arming of six
S-boats and eight R-boats.”
The six S-boats are those which were discussed in the Document C-141?
RAEDER: Yes, it says here boats armed with torpedoes.
DR. SIEMERS: Number 10: “Setting up practice A. A. batteries.” Is that a
breach of the Treaty?
RAEDER: Yes, it was, after all, an A. A. battery. It was only because
near the garrisons where there were barracks with our men we wanted an
opportunity to practice A. A. firing exercise. That is why we set up
these batteries near the barracks. There was no intention of using them
in this place for defense. It was only a matter of expediency for
training.
DR. SIEMERS: Then comes Number 11.
RAEDER: The individual cases are gradually becoming more ridiculous. I
consider it a waste of time.
DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry, Admiral, that I must put you to this trouble;
but I believe it is necessary, since the Prosecution read almost all
these items into the record and wanted to put a construction on them
which puts you at a disadvantage.
RAEDER: Then there is the “Salute Battery Friedrichsort.”
Friedrichsort is the entrance to Kiel where foreign ships salute when
they enter, and the salute must be returned. Two 7.7-centimeter field
guns which had been rendered unserviceable had been approved for this
purpose. With these guns, sharp-shooting was not possible; it was since
there was a battery foundation already available there, that instead of
these two 7.7-centimeter guns we should set up four 8.8-centimeter A. A.
guns which were ready for full use. But this too was long before the
time when I was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 16 May 1946, at 1000 hours._]