“III. Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to
build 32 destroyers and/or torpedo boats. Germany, however,
built only 12 destroyers and no torpedo boats.”
According to this, in building up the Navy, Germany in no way took
advantage of the possibilities of the Versailles Treaty, and if I
understand correctly, she specifically omitted the construction of
offensive weapons, namely, the large ships.
May I ask you to make a statement about this.
RAEDER: That is entirely correct. It is astonishing that at this period
of time so little advantage was taken of the Versailles Treaty. I was
reproached for this later when the National Socialist government came to
power. They did not bear in mind, however, that the government at that
time, and the Reichstag, were not inclined to let us have these ships.
We had to fight hard for permission. But this failure to build up the
Navy to the strength permitted has no relationship to the small breaches
of the Versailles Treaty, which we committed mainly in order to build
up, one could say, a pitiable defense of the coast in the event of
extreme emergency.
DR. SIEMERS: I shall come back to Document C-32. It is established that
during the time of the Versailles Treaty, Germany did not take advantage
of the provisions of the Treaty, particularly in regard to offensive
weapons. On the other hand, on the basis of the documents submitted by
the Prosecution, it has been established and it is also historically
known, that the Navy in building itself up committed breaches of the
Versailles Treaty in other directions. I should like to discuss with you
the individual breaches which were presented with great precision by the
Prosecution. But first I should like to discuss the general accusation,
which I have already mentioned, that these breaches were committed
behind the back of the Reichstag and the Government.
Is this accusation justified?
RAEDER: Not at all. I must repeat that I was connected with these
breaches only when on 1 October 1928, I became Chief of the Navy Command
in Berlin. I had nothing to do with things which had been done
previously.
When I came to Berlin, the Lohmann case, which you mentioned previously,
had already been concluded. It was in the process of being liquidated;
and the Reich Defense Minister Gröner, when the affair was first
discovered, ordered the Army as well as the Navy to report to him all
breaches which were in process; and from then on he was going to deal
with these things together with Colonel Von Schleicher, his political
adviser. He liquidated the Lohmann affair, and this liquidation was
still in progress when I came there.
On 1 October 1928 he had already come to the decision to transfer the
responsibility for all these evasions and breaches of the Versailles
Treaty to the Reich Government, as a whole, at that time the
Müller-Severing-Stresemann Government, since he believed that he could
no longer bear the responsibility alone.
As a result on 18 October, when I had just become acquainted with these
matters, he called a cabinet meeting to which the Chief of the Army
Command, General Heye, and I, as well as some office chiefs in both
administrations, were called. At this cabinet meeting, General Heye and
I had to report openly and fully before all the Ministers as to what
breaches there were on the part of the Army and the Navy. The
Müller-Severing-Stresemann government took full responsibility and
exonerated the Reich Defense Minister, who, however, continued to be
responsible for carrying things through. We had to report to the Reich
Defense Minister everything which happened in the future and were not
allowed to undertake any steps alone. The Reich Defense Minister handled
matters together with the Reich Minister of the Interior, Severing, who
showed great understanding for the various requirements.
DR. SIEMERS: At this cabinet meeting you and General Heye as Chief of
the Army Command submitted a list of the individual small breaches?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And thereupon the Government told you, “We will take the
responsibility”?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Accordingly, in the following years did you always act in
agreement with the Reich Government?
RAEDER: Yes, the Reich Defense Minister, Gröner, was extremely sensitive
on this point. He had dissolved all the so-called “black” funds which
existed and insisted absolutely that he should know about everything and
should sanction everything. He thought that only in this way could he
take the responsibility towards the Government.
I had nothing whatever to do with the Reichstag. The military chiefs
were not allowed to have contact with the members of the Reichstag in
such matters. All negotiations with the Reichstag were carried out
through the Reich Defense Minister or by Colonel Von Schleicher on his
behalf. I was therefore in no position to go behind the back of the
Reichstag in any way. I could discuss budget matters with the Reichstag
members only in the so-called Budget Committee, where I sat next to the
Reich Defense Minister and made technical explanations to his
statements.
DR. SIEMERS: From 1928 on, that is from your time on, there were no
longer any secret budgets within the construction program of the Navy
without the approval of the Reich Government?
RAEDER: Without the approval of the Reich Government and, above all, of
the Reich Defense Minister who allotted the money to us exactly as the
other budgets were allotted.
DR. SIEMERS: May I ask the Tribunal in this connection to look at
Document Exhibit Number Raeder-3 which has already been submitted,
“Constitution of the German Reich,” Document Book 1, Page 10, Article
50; it is brief and reads:
“In order to be valid, all decrees and orders issued by the
Reich President, including those pertaining to the Armed Forces,
must be countersigned by the Reich Chancellor or the competent
Reich Minister. By the act of countersigning, responsibility is
accepted by the Reich Chancellor.”
That is the constitutional principle which the Reich Government at that
time—Stresemann, Müller, Severing—insisted upon in October 1928.
An important part of the building up of the Navy consisted in renewing
the old capital ships and cruisers from the last war. In this
connection, I take the liberty of submitting to the Tribunal Exhibit
Number Raeder-7, Document Book 1, Page 23. This document deals with the
so-called ship replacement construction plan. This ship replacement
construction plan was, as Page 24 of the document book shows, Paragraph
2, Figure 2, submitted by a resolution of the Reichstag. I should like
to refer you to Page 24, Figure 3, of the document which shows that this
ship replacement construction plan covered three armored ships, and it
adds that the construction might last until 1938.
May it please the Tribunal, this figure is important. The Prosecution
desired to construe the chance fact that in 1933 a construction plan was
drawn up to extend until 1938, to mean that there were aggressive
intentions.
This ship replacement construction plan of the year 1930 had the same
goal in 1938 and, as the Prosecution will admit, can have nothing to do
with a war of aggression.
The plan was submitted then, Witness, through the Reich Government and
you did only the preparatory work?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Is this only true of the ship replacement plan for 1930, or
was it always handled in the same way in subsequent years?
RAEDER: The plan as submitted was approved in principle by the
Reichstag. Each individual ship, however, had to be approved again in
the budget plan of the year in which the construction was to begin. The
whole construction program was thus always in close agreement with the
Reich Government and the Reichstag.
DR. SIEMERS: In connection with this ship replacement program within the
framework of the documentary evidence, I should like to refer to two
points which will greatly shorten the questioning of the witness.
For the time being I do not want to quote from Page 26. I ask you to
take judicial notice of the rest of the contents, and wish merely to
point out that this refers to the great age of all capital ships, and
their replacement which this necessitated.
On Page 27 of the document book it expressly mentions that the Reichstag
in its 89th session of 18 June 1929 asked the Reich Government for an
extension of the period for the construction program. The general
opinion at that time was, as the ship replacement program shows, set out
in the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of 15 August 1928, where the _Frankfurter
Zeitung_ points out that an armored cruiser gains its full value only
when it forms part of a squadron. The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ was, as is
well known, the best German newspaper; and it was banned only in 1943
during the war by the National Socialist dictatorship which was growing
ever stronger.