THE DOWNFALL OF VON TIRPITZ AND VON FALKENHAYN
After the sinking of the _Arabic_ the German Foreign Office intimated
to the United States Government and to the American correspondents that
methods of submarine warfare would be altered and that ships would be
warned before they were torpedoed. But when the Navy heard that the
Foreign Office was inclined to listen to Mr. Wilson's protests it made
no attempt to conceal its opposition. Gottlieb von Jagow, the
Secretary of State, although he was an intimate friend of the Kaiser
and an officer in the German Army, was at heart a pacifist. Every time
an opportunity presented itself he tried to mobilise the peace forces
of the world to make peace. From time to time, the German financiers
and propaganda leaders in the United States, as well as influential
Germans in the neutral European countries, sent out peace "feelers."
Von Jagow realised that the sooner peace was made, the better it would
be for Germany and the easier it would be for the Foreign Office to
defeat the military party at home. He saw that the more victories the
army had and the more victories it could announce to the people the
more lustful the General Staff would be for a war of exhaustion. Army
leaders have always had more confidence in their ability to defeat the
world than the Foreign Office. The army looked at the map of Europe
and saw so many hundred thousand square miles of territory under
occupation. The Foreign Office saw Germany in its relation to the
world. Von Jagow knew that every new square mile of territory gained
was being paid for, not only by the cost of German blood, but by the
more terrible cost of public opinion and German influence abroad. But
Germany was under martial law and the Foreign Office had nothing to say
about military plans. The Foreign Office also had little to say about
naval warfare. The Navy was building submarines as fast as it could
and the number of ships lost encouraged the people to believe that the
more intensified the submarine war became, the quicker the war would
end in Germany's favour. So the Navy kept sinking ships and relying
upon the Foreign Office to make excuses and keep America out of the war.
The repeated violations of the pledges made by the Foreign Office to
the United States aroused American public opinion to white heat, and
justly so, because the people here did not understand that the real
submarine crisis was not between President Wilson and Berlin but
between Admiral von Tirpitz and Secretary von Jagow and their
followers. President Wilson was at the limit of his patience with
Germany and the German people, who were becoming impatient over the
long drawn out proceedings, began to accept the inspired thinking of
the Navy and to believe that Wilson was working for the defeat of
Germany by interfering with submarine activities.
On February 22nd, 1916, in one of my despatches I said: "The patient
attitude toward America displayed during the _Lusitania_ negotiations,
it is plain to-day, no longer exists because of the popular feeling
that America has already hindered so many of Germany's plans." At that
time it appeared to observers in Berlin that unless President Wilson
could show more patience than the German Government the next submarine
accident would bring about a break in relations. Commenting on this
despatch the _Indianapolis News_ the next day said:
"In this country the people feel that all the patience has been shown
by their government. We believe that history will sustain that view.
Almost ten months ago more than 100 American citizens were deliberately
done to death by the German Government, for it is understood that the
submarine commander acted under instructions, and that Germany refuses
to disavow on the ground that the murderous act was the act of the
German Government. Yet, after all this time, the _Lusitania_ case is
still unsettled. The administration has, with marvellous
self-restraint, recognised that public opinion in Germany was not
normal, and for that reason it has done everything in its power to
smooth the way to a settlement by making it as easy as possible for the
Imperial Government to meet our just demands. Indeed, the President
has gone so far as to expose himself to severe criticism at home. We
believe that he would have been sustained if he had, immediately after
the sinking of the _Lusitania_, broken off diplomatic relations.
"But he has stood out against public opinion in his own country, waited
ten months for an answer, and done everything that he could in honour
due to soften the feeling here. Yet just on the eve of a settlement
that would have been unsatisfactory to many of our people, Germany
announced the policy that we had condemned as illegal, and that plainly
is illegal. The trouble in Berlin is an utter inability to see
anything wrong in the attack on the _Lusitania_, or to appreciate the
sense of horror that was stirred in this country by it. The idea seems
to be that the policy of frightfulness could be extended to the high
seas without in any way shocking the American people. Nothing has come
from Berlin that indicates any feeling of guilt on the part of the
German people or their Government.
"In the United States, on the contrary, the act is regarded as one of
the blackest crimes of history. And yet, in spite of that feeling, we
have waited patiently for ten months in the hope that the German
Government would do justice, and clear its name of reproach. Yet now
we are told that it is Germany that has shown a 'patient attitude,' the
implication or insinuation being that our long suffering administration
has been unreasonable and impatient. That will not be the verdict of
history, as it is not the verdict of our own people. We have made
every allowance for the conditions existing in Germany, and have
resolutely refused to take advantage of her distress. We doubt whether
there is any other government in the world that would have shown the
patience and moderation, under like provocation, that have been shown
by the American Government in these _Lusitania_ negotiations."
I sent the editorial to von Jagow, who returned it the next day with
the brief comment on one of his calling cards: "With many thanks."
About this time Count Reventlow and the other naval writers began to
refer to everything President Wilson did as a "bluff." When Col. E. M.
House came to Berlin early in 1916, he tried to impress the officials
with the fact that Mr. Wilson was not only not bluffing, but that the
American people would support him in whatever he did in dealing with
the German Government. Mr. Gerard tried too to impress the Foreign
Office but because he could only deal with that branch of the
Government, he could not change the Navy's impression, which was that
Wilson would never take a definite stand against Germany. On the 8th
of February, the _London Times_ printed the following despatch which I
had sent to the United States:
"Mr. Gerard has been accused of not being forceful enough in dealing
with the Berlin Foreign Office. In Berlin he has been criticised for
just the opposite. It has been stated frequently that he was too
aggressive. The Ambassador's position was that he must carry out Mr.
Wilson's ideas. So he tried for days and weeks to impress officials
with the seriousness of the situation. At the critical point in the
negotiations various unofficial diplomats began to arrive and they
seriously interfered with negotiations. One of these was a politician
who through his credentials from Mr. Bryan met many high officials, and
informed them that President Wilson was writing his notes for 'home
consumption.' Mr. Gerard, however, appealed to Washington to know what
was meant by the moves of this American with authority from Mr. Bryan.
This was the beginning of the reason for Secretary Bryan's resigning.
"Secretary Bryan had informed also former Ambassador Dumba that the
United States would never take any position against Germany even though
it was hinted so in the _Lusitania_ note. Dumba telegraphed this to
Vienna and Berlin was informed immediately. Because of Mr. Gerard's
personal friendship and personal association with Secretary of State
von Jagow and Under Secretary of State Zimmermann, he was acquainted
with Secretary Bryan's move. He telegraphed to President Wilson and
the result was the resignation of Mr. Bryan."
In December, the _Ancona_ was torpedoed and it was officially explained
that the act was that of an Austrian submarine commander. Wilson's
note to Vienna brought about a near rupture between Austria-Hungary and
Germany because Austria and Hungary at that time were much opposed to
Germany's submarine methods. Although the submarines operating in the
Mediterranean were flying the Austrian flag, they were German
submarines, and members of the crews were German. Throughout the life
of the Emperor Franz Josef the Dual Monarchy was ruled, not from
Vienna, but from Budapest by Count Stefan Tisza, the Hungarian Premier.
I was in Budapest at the time and one evening saw Count Tisza at his
palace, which stands on the rocky cliff opposite the main part of
Budapest, and which overlooks the valley of the Danube for many miles.
Tisza, as well as all Hungarians, is pro-American before he is
pro-German.
"To think of trouble between Austria-Hungary and the United States is
sheer nonsense," he said in his quiet but forceful manner. "I must
confess, however, that we were greatly surprised to get the American
note. It is far from our intention to get into any quarrel with
America. Perhaps I should not say quarrel, because I know it would not
be that, but of course matters do not depend upon us entirely. There
is no reason for any trouble over the _Ancona_ question. It must be
settled satisfactorily," he said emphatically, "not only from the
standpoint of the United States, but from our standpoint."
The _Ancona_ crisis brought the Foreign Office new and unexpected
support. Hungary was opposed to a dispute with America. In the first
place, Hungarians are more of a liberty loving people than the Germans,
and public opinion in Hungary rules the country. While there is a
strong Government press, which is loyal to the Tisza party, there is an
equally powerful opposition press which follows the leadership of Count
Albert Apponyi and Count Julius Andrassy, the two most popular men in
Hungarian public life. Apponyi told me on one occasion that while the
Government was controlled by Tisza a great majority of the people sided
with the opposition. He added that the constant antagonism of the
Liberals and Democrats kept the Government within bounds.
Hungarians resented the stain upon their honour of the _Ancona_
incident and they were on the verge of compelling Berlin to assume
responsibility for the sinking and adjust the matter. But Berlin
feared that if the _Ancona_ crime was accredited to the real murderers
it would bring about another, and perhaps a fatal crisis with the
United States. So Vienna assumed responsibility and promised to punish
the submarine commander who torpedoed the ship.
This opposition from Hungary embittered the German Navy but it was
helpless. The growing fear of the effects which President Wilson's
notes were having upon Americans and upon the outside neutral world
caused opposition to von Tirpitz to gain more force. In desperation
von Tirpitz and his followers extended the anti-American propaganda and
began personal attacks upon von Bethmann-Hollweg.
Bitterness between these two men became so great that neither of them
would go to the Great Headquarters to confer with the Kaiser if the
other was there. The personal opposition reached the point where the
Kaiser could not keep both men in his cabinet. Von Tirpitz, who
thought he was the hero of the German people because of the submarine
policy, believed he had so much power that he could shake the hold
which the Kaiser had upon the people and frighten the Emperor into the
belief that unless he supported him against the Chancellor and the
United States, the people would overthrow the Hohenzollern dynasty.
But von Tirpitz had made a good many personal enemies especially among
financiers and business men. So the Kaiser, instead of ousting the
Chancellor, asked von Tirpitz to resign and appointed Admiral von
Capelle, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and a friend of the
Chancellor, as von Tirpitz' successor. Admiral von Mueller, Chief of
the Naval Cabinet, who was always at Great Headquarters as the Kaiser's
personal adviser on naval affairs, was opposed to von Tirpitz and
exposed him at the Great Headquarters conferences by saying that von
Tirpitz had falsified the Navy's figures as to the number of submarines
available for a blockade of England. Von Capelle supported von Mueller
and when the friends of von Tirpitz in the Reichstag demanded an
explanation for the ousting of their idol, both the Chancellor and von
Capelle explained that Germany could not continue submarine warfare
which von Tirpitz had started, because of the lack of the necessary
submarines.
This was the first big victory of the Foreign Office. The democratic
forces in Germany which had been fighting von Tirpitz for over a year
were jubilant. Every one in Germany who realised that not until the
hold of the military party upon the Kaiser and the Government was
dislodged, would the Government be able to make peace now breathed
sighs of relief and began to make plans for the adjustment of all
differences with the United States and for a peace without annexation.
Von Tirpitz had had the support of all the forces in Germany which
looked forward to the annexation of Belgium and the richest portions of
Northern France. Von Tirpitz was supported by the men who wanted the
eastern border of Germany extended far into Poland and Lithuania.
Even Americans were delighted. Washington for the first time began to
see that eleven months of patience was bearing fruit. But this period
of exaltation was not destined to last very long. While the Chancellor
had cleaned house in the Navy Department at Berlin he had overlooked
Kiel. There were admirals and officers in charge there who were making
preparations for the Navy. They were the men who talked to the
submarine commanders before they started out on their lawless sea
voyages.
On March 24th the whole world was shocked by another U-boat crime. The
_Sussex_, a French channel steamer, plying between Folkstone and
Dieppe, was torpedoed without warning and Americans were among the
passengers killed and wounded. When the news reached Berlin, not only
the Chancellor and the Foreign Office were shocked and horrified, but
the American Embassy began to doubt whether the Chancellor really meant
what he said when he informed Gerard confidentially that now that von
Tirpitz was gone there would be no new danger from the submarines.
Even the new Admiralty administration was loathe to believe that a
German submarine was responsible.
By April 5th it was apparent to every one in Berlin that there would be
another submarine crisis with the United States and that the
reactionary forces in Germany would attempt again to overthrow the
Chancellor. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, who had been doing everything
possible to get some one to propose peace, decided to address the
Reichstag again on Germany's peace aims. It was announced in the
newspapers only a few days beforehand. The demand for tickets of
admission was so great that early in the morning on the day scheduled
for the address such dense crowds surrounded the Reichstag building
that the police had to make passages so the military automobiles could
reach the building to bring the officials there.
The Chamber itself was crowded to the rafters. On the floor of the
House practically every member was in his seat. On the rostrum were
several hundred army and naval officers, all members of the cabinet,
prominent business men and financiers. Every one awaited the entrance
of the Chancellor with great expectations. The National Liberals, who
had been clamouring for the annexation of Belgium, the conservatives,
who wanted a stronger war policy against England, the Socialists, who
wanted real guarantees for the German people for the future and a peace
without annexation, sat quietly in their seats anxiously awaiting the
Chancellor's remarks which were expected to satisfy all wants.
The Chancellor entered the chamber from the rear of the rostrum and
proceeded to his desk in the front platform row, facing the House and
galleries. After a few preliminary remarks by President Kaempf, the
Chancellor arose. To the Chancellor's left, near the rear of the hall
among his Socialist colleagues, sat a nervous, determined and defiant
radical. He was dressed in the uniform of a common soldier. Although
he had been at the front several months and in the firing line, he had
not received the iron cross of the second class which practically every
soldier who had seen service had been decorated with. His clothes were
soiled, trousers stuffed into the top of heavy military boots. His
thick, curly hair was rumpled. At this session of the Reichstag the
Chancellor was to have his first encounter with Dr. Karl Liebknecht,
the Socialist radical, who in his soldier's uniform was ready to
challenge anything the Chancellor said.
The Chancellor began his address, as he began all others, by referring
to the strong military position of the German army. He led up,
gradually, to the subject of peace. When the Chancellor said: "We
could have gotten what we wanted by peaceful work. Our enemies chose
war." Liebknecht interjected in his sharp, shrill voice, "_You_ chose
the war!" There was great excitement and hissing; the President called
for order. Members shouted: "Throw him out!" But Liebknecht sat there
more determined than ever.
The Chancellor continued for a few minutes until he reached the
discussion of the establishment of a Flemish nation in Belgium, when
Liebknecht again interrupted, but the Chancellor continued: "Gentlemen,
we want neighbours who will not again unite against us in order to
strangle us, but such that we can work with them and they with us to
our mutual advantage." A storm of applause greeted this remark.
Liebknecht was again on his feet and shouted, "Then you will fall upon
them!"
"The Europe which will arise from this, the most gigantic of all
crises, will in many respects not resemble the old one," continued von
Bethmann-Hollweg. "The blood which has been shed will never come back;
the wealth which has been wasted will come back but only slowly. In
any case, it must become, for all living in it, a Europe of peaceful
labour. The peace which shall end this war must be a lasting one and
not containing the germ of a fresh war, but establishing a final and
peaceful order of things in European affairs."
Before the applause had gotten a good start the fiery private in the
Socialists' rank was again on his feet, this time shouting, "Liberate
the German people first!"
Throughout the Chancellor's speech there was not one reference to the
Sussex. The Chancellor was anxious if he could to turn the world's
attention from the Sussex to the larger question of peace, but the
world was not so inclined. On the 18th of April I asked Admiral von
Holtzendorff, Chief of the Admiralty Staff, for his opinion about the
_Sussex_. Two days later he approved the interview, in which I quoted
him as saying:
"We did not sink the _Sussex_. I am as convinced of that as of
anything which has happened in this war. If you read the definite
instructions, the exact orders each submarine commander has you would
understand that the torpedoing of the _Sussex_ was impossible. Many of
our submarines have returned from rounding up British vessels. They
sighted scores of passenger ships going between England and America but
not one of these was touched.
"We have definitely agreed to warn the crews and passengers of
passenger liners. We have lived up to that promise in every way. We
are not out to torpedo without warning neutral ships bound for England.
Our submarines have respected every one of them so far, and they have
met scores in the North Sea, the Channel and the Atlantic."
On the same day that Ambassador Gerard handed von Jagow Secretary
Lansing's note, Under Secretary of State Zimmermann approved the von
Holtzendorff interview. Zimmermann could not make himself believe that
a German submarine was responsible and the Government had decided to
disavow all responsibility. But such convincing reports began to
arrive from the United States and from neutral European countries which
proved beyond a doubt that a German submarine was responsible, that the
Government had to again bring up the submarine issue at Great
Headquarters. When the von Holtzendorff interview was published in the
United States it caused a sensation because if Germany maintained the
attitude which the Chief of the Admiralty Staff had taken with the
approval of the Foreign Office, a break in diplomatic relations could
not be avoided. Secretary Lansing telegraphed Ambassador Gerard to
inquire at the Foreign Office whether the statements of von
Holtzendorff represented the opinions of the German Government. Gerard
called me to the Embassy but before I arrived Dr. Heckscher, of the
Reichstag Foreign Relations Committee, came. Gerard called me in in
Heckscher's presence to ask if I knew that the von Holtzendorff
interview would bring about a break in diplomatic relations unless it
was immediately disavowed. He told Dr. Heckscher to inform Zimmermann
that if the Chief of the Admiralty Staff was going to direct Germany's
foreign policies he would ask his government to accredit him to the
naval authorities and not to the Foreign Office. Heckscher would not
believe my statement that Zimmermann had approved the interview and
assured Gerard that within a very short time the Foreign Office would
disavow von Holtzendorff's statements. When he arrived at the Foreign
Office, however, Zimmermann not only refused to disavow the Admiral's
statement but informed Heckscher that he had the same opinions.
President Wilson was at the end of his patience. Probably he began to
doubt whether he could rely upon the reports of Ambassador Gerard that
there was a chance of the democratic forces in Germany coming out ahead
of the military caste. Wilson showed his attitude plainly in the
_Sussex_ note when he said:
"The Government of the United States has been very patient. At every
stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has
sought to be governed by the most thoughtful considerations of the
extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war and to be guided by
sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and the Government
of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and assurances
of the Imperial Government as of course given in entire sincerity and
good faith, and has hoped even against hope that it would prove to be
possible for the Imperial Government so to order and control the acts
of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognised
principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made
every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to
wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only
one interpretation. It now owes it to a just regard, for its own
rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It
has become painfully evident to it that the position which it took at
the very outset is inevitable, namely that the use of submarines for
the destruction of enemy commerce is of necessity, because of the very
character of the vessels employed and the very methods, of attack which
their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the
principles of humanity, the long established and incontrovertible
rights of neutrals and the sacred immunities of non-combatants.
"If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute
relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by
the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the
United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of
international law and the universally recognised dictates of humanity,
the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion
that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial
Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of
its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight
carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no
choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Government
altogether. This action the Government of the United States
contemplates with the greatest reluctance but feels constrained to take
in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations."
After von Jagow read the note the Foreign Office Telegraph Bureau sent
it to Great Headquarters, which at this time was still located in
Charleville, France, for the information of the Kaiser and General von
Falkenhayn. It was evident to every one in Berlin that again, not only
the submarine issue was to be debated at Great Headquarters, but that
the Kaiser was to be forced again to decide between the Chancellor and
his democratic supporters and von Falkenhayn and the military party.
Before the Conference convened General Headquarters sent inquiries to
five government departments, the Foreign Office, the Navy, the Ministry
of War, the Treasury, and Interior. The Ministers at the head of these
departments were asked to state whether in their opinion the
controversy with America should be adjusted, or whether the submarine
warfare should be continued. Dr. Karl Helfferich, the Vice Chancellor
and Minister of Interior, Secretary of State von Jagow, and Count von
Roedern, Minister of Finance, replied to adjust the difficulty. The
Army and Navy said in effect: "If you can adjust it without stopping
the submarine warfare and without breaking with the United States do
so."
The latter part of April the Kaiser summoned all of his ministers and
his leading generals to the French chateau which he used as his
headquarters in Charleville. This city is one of the most picturesque
cities in the occupied districts of northern France. It is located on
the banks of the Meuse and contains many historic, old ruins. At one
end of the town is a large stone castle, surrounded by a moat. This
was made the headquarters of the General Staff after the Germans
invaded this section of France. Near the railroad station there was a
public park. Facing it was a French chateau, a beautiful, comfortable
home. This was the Kaiser's residence. All streets leading in this
direction were barricaded and guarded by sentries. No one could pass
without a special written permit from the Chief of the General Staff.
Von Falkenhayn had his home nearby in another of the beautiful chateaux
there. The chief of every department of the General Staff lived in
princely fashion in houses which in peace time were homes for
distinguished Frenchmen. There were left in Charleville scarcely a
hundred French citizens, because obviously French people, who were
enemies of Germany, could not he permitted to go back and forth in the
city which was the centre of German militarism.
When the ministers arrived at the Kaiser's headquarters, His Majesty
asked each one to make a complete report on the submarine war as it
affected his department. Dr. Helfferich was asked to go into the
question of German finance and the relation of America to it. Dr.
Solf, the Colonial Minister, who had been a very good friend of
Ambassador Gerard, discussed the question of the submarine warfare from
the stand-point of its relation to Germany's position as a world power.
Admiral von Capelle placed before the Kaiser the figures of the number
of ships sunk, their tonnage, the number of submarines operating, the
number under construction and the number lost. General von Falkenhayn
reported on the military situation and discussed the hypothetical
question as to what effect American intervention would have upon the
European war theatres.
While the conferences were going on, Dr. Heckscher and Under Secretary
Zimmermann, who at that time were anxious to avoid a break with the
United States, sounded Ambassador Gerard as to whether he would be
willing to go to Great Headquarters to confer with the Kaiser. The
Foreign Office at the same time suggested the matter to the General
Staff and within a few hours Mr. Gerard was invited to go to
Charleville. Before the ambassador arrived the Kaiser called all of
his ministers together for a joint session and asked them to make a
brief summary of their arguments. This was not a peace meeting. Not
only opponents of submarine warfare but its advocates mobilised all
their forces in a final attempt to win the Kaiser's approval. His
Majesty, at this time, was inclined towards peace with America and was
very much impressed by the arguments which the Chancellor and Dr.
Helfferich presented. But, at this meeting, while Helfferich was
talking and pointing to the moral effect which the ruthless torpedoing
of ships was having upon neutral countries, von Falkenhayn interrupted
with the succinct statement:
"Neutrals? Damn the neutrals! Win the war! Our task is to win. If
we win we will have the neutrals with us; if we lose we lose."
"Falkenhayn, when you are versed in foreign affairs I'll ask you to
speak," interrupted the Kaiser. "Proceed, Dr. Helfferich."
Gentleman that he is, von Falkenhayn accepted the Imperial rebuke, but
not long afterward his resignation was submitted.
As a result of these conferences and the arguments advanced by
Ambassador Gerard, Secretary von Jagow on May 4th handed the Ambassador
the German note in reply to President Wilson's _Sussex_ ultimatum. In
this communication Germany said:
"Fully conscious of its strength, the German Government has twice in
the course of the past few months expressed itself before all the world
as prepared to conclude a peace safeguarding the vital interests of
Germany. In doing so, it gave expression to the fact that it was not
its fault if peace was further withheld from the peoples of Europe.
With a correspondingly greater claim of justification, the German
Government may proclaim its unwillingness before mankind and history to
undertake the responsibility, after twenty-one months of war, to allow
the controversy that has arisen over the submarine question to take a
turn which might seriously affect the maintenance of peace between
these two nations.
"The German Government guided by this idea notifies the Government of
the United States _that instructions have been issued to German naval
commanders that the precepts of the general international fundamental
principles be observed as regards stopping, searching and destruction
of merchant vessels within the war zone and that such vessels shall not
be sunk without warning and without saving human life unless the ship
attempts to escape or offers resistance_."
At the beginning of the war it was a group of military leaders
consisting of General von Moltke, General von Falkenhayn, General von
Mackensen, General von Herringen, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, and a few
of the Prussian military clique, which prevailed upon the Kaiser to go
to war after the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne and
his wife. The Allies proclaimed in their publications, in the press
and in Parliaments that they were fighting to destroy and overthrow the
military party in Germany which could make war without public consent.
Millions of Allied soldiers were mobilised and fighting in almost a
complete ring surrounding Germany, Austria Hungary, Bulgaria and
Turkey. They had been fighting since August, 1914, for twenty-one
months, and still their fighting had not shattered or weakened the hold
which the military party had upon the people and the Kaiser. Von
Tirpitz and von Falkenhayn, who, shortly after the war began, became
the ringleaders of Germany's organised Might, had fallen not _before
the armed foes on the battlefield but before an unarmed nation with a
president whose only weapon was public opinion_. First, von Tirpitz
fell because he was ready to defy the United States. Then came the
downfall of von Falkenhayn, because he was prepared to damn the United
States and all neutrals. Surely a nation and a government after
thirteen months of patience and hope had a right to believe that after
all public opinion was a weapon which was sometimes more effective than
any other. Mr. Wilson and the State Department were justified in
feeling that their policy toward Germany was after all successful not
alone because it had solved the vexing submarine issue, but because it
had aided the forces of democracy in Germany. Because, with the
downfall of von Falkenhayn and von Tirpitz, there was only one
recognised authority in Germany. That was the Chancellor and the
Foreign Office, supported almost unanimously by the Socialists and by
the Liberal forces which were at work to reform the German Government.
But this was in May, 1916, scarcely eight months before the Kaiser
_changed his mind and again decided to support the people who were
clamouring for a ruthless, murderous, defiant war against the whole
world_, if the world was "foolish" enough to join in.