LEGAL RIGHTS.
§ 70. =Wrongs.=
We have seen that the law consists of the principles in accordance with
which justice is administered by the state, and that the administration
of justice consists in the use of the physical force of the state in
enforcing rights and punishing the violation of them. The conception of
a right is accordingly one of fundamental significance in legal theory,
and the purpose of this chapter is to analyse it, and to distinguish its
various applications. Before attempting to define a right, however, it
is necessary to define two other terms which are closely connected with
it, namely, wrong and duty.
A wrong is simply a wrong act—an act contrary to the rule of right and
justice. A synonym of it is injury, in its true and primary sense of
_injuria_ (that which is contrary to _jus_), though by a modern
perversion of meaning this term has acquired the secondary sense of harm
or damage (_damnum_) whether rightful or wrongful, and whether inflicted
by human agency or not.
Wrongs or injuries are divisible for our present purpose into two kinds,
being either moral or legal. A moral or natural wrong is an act which is
morally or naturally wrong, being contrary to the rule of natural
justice. A legal wrong is an act which is legally wrong, being contrary
to the rule of legal justice and a violation of the law. It is an act
which is authoritatively determined to be wrong by a rule of law, and is
therefore treated as a wrong in and for the purposes of the
administration of justice by the state. It may or may not be a wrong in
deed and in truth, and conversely a moral wrong may or may not be a
wrong in law. Natural and legal wrongs, like natural and legal justice,
form intersecting circles, this discordance between law and fact being
partly intentional and partly the result of imperfect historical
development.
In all ordinary cases the legal recognition of an act as a wrong
involves the suppression or punishment of it by the physical force of
the state, this being the essential purpose for which the judicial
action of the state is ordained. We shall see later, however, that such
forcible constraint is not an invariable or essential incident, and that
there are other possible forms of effective legal recognition. The
essence of a legal wrong consists in its recognition as wrong by the
law, not in the resulting suppression or punishment of it. A legal wrong
is a violation of _justice according to law_.
§ 71. =Duties.=
A duty is an obligatory act, that is to say, it is an act the opposite
of which would be a wrong. Duties and wrongs are correlatives. The
commission of a wrong is the breach of a duty, and the performance of a
duty is the avoidance of a wrong. A synonym of duty is obligation, in
its widest sense, although in a special and technical application the
latter term denotes one particular kind of duty only, as we shall see
later.
Duties, like wrongs, are of two kinds, being either moral or legal. A
moral or natural duty is an act the opposite of which would be a moral
or natural wrong. A legal duty is an act the opposite of which would be
a legal wrong. It is an act recognised as a duty by the law, and treated
as such in and for the purposes of the administration of justice by the
state. These two classes are partly coincident and partly distinct. A
duty may be moral but not legal, or legal but not moral, or both at
once.
When the law recognises an act as a duty, it commonly enforces the
performance of it, or punishes the disregard of it. But this sanction of
legal force is in exceptional cases absent. A duty is legal because it
is legally recognised, not necessarily because it is legally enforced or
sanctioned. There are legal duties of imperfect obligation, as they are
called, which will be considered by us at a later stage of our inquiry.
§ 72. =Rights.=
A right is an interest recognised and protected by a rule of right. It
is any interest, respect for which is a duty, and the disregard of which
is a wrong.
All that is right or wrong, just or unjust, is so by reason of its
effects upon the interests of mankind,[170] that is to say upon the
various elements of human well-being, such as life, liberty, health,
reputation, and the uses of material objects. If any act is right or
just, it is so because and in so far as it promotes some form of human
interest. If any act is wrong or unjust, it is because the interests of
men are prejudicially affected by it. Conduct which has no influence
upon the interests of any one has no significance either in law or
morals.
Every wrong, therefore, involves some interest attacked by it, and every
duty involves some interest to which it relates, and for whose
protection it exists. The converse, however, is not true. Every attack
upon an interest is not a wrong, either in fact or in law, nor is
respect for every interest a duty, either legal or natural. Many
interests exist _de facto_ and not also _de jure_; they receive no
recognition or protection from any rule of right. The violation of them
is no wrong, and respect for them is no duty. For the interests of men
conflict with each other, and it is impossible for all to receive
rightful recognition. The rule of justice selects some for protection,
and the others are rejected.
The interests which thus receive recognition and protection from the
rules of right are called rights. Every man who has a right to any thing
has an interest in it also, but he may have an interest without having a
right. Whether his interest amounts to a right depends on whether there
exists with respect to it a duty imposed upon any other person. In other
words, a right is an interest the violation of which is a wrong.
Every right corresponds to a rule of right, from which it proceeds, and
it is from this source that it derives its name. That I have _a right_
to a thing means that it is _right_ that I should have that thing. All
right is _the_ right of him for whose benefit it exists, just as all
wrong is _the_ wrong of him whose interests are affected by it. In the
words of Windscheid,[171] “_Das_ Recht ist _sein_ Recht geworden.”
Rights, like wrongs and duties, are either moral or legal. A moral or
natural right is an interest recognised and protected by a rule of
natural justice—an interest the violation of which would be a moral
wrong, and respect for which is a moral duty. A legal right, on the
other hand, is an interest recognised and protected by a rule of legal
justice—an interest the violation of which would be a legal wrong done
to him whose interest it is, and respect for which is a legal duty.
“Rights,” says Ihering,[172] “are legally protected interests.”
Bentham set the fashion, still followed by many, of denying that there
are any such things as natural rights at all. All rights are legal
rights and the creation of the law. “Natural law, natural rights,” he
says,[173] “are two kinds of fictions or metaphors, which play so great
a part in books of legislation, that they deserve to be examined by
themselves.... Rights properly so called are the creatures of law
properly so called; real laws give rise to real rights. Natural rights
are the creatures of natural law; they are a metaphor which derives its
origin from another metaphor.” “In many of the cultivated,” says
Spencer,[174] criticising this opinion, “there has been produced a
confirmed and indeed contemptuous denial of rights. There are no such
things, say they, except such as are conferred by law. Following
Bentham, they affirm that the state is the originator of rights, and
that apart from it there are no rights.”
A complete examination of this opinion would lead us far into the
regions of ethical rather than juridical conceptions, and would here be
out of place. It is sufficient to make two observations with respect to
the matter. In the first place, he who denies the existence of natural
_rights_ must be prepared at the same time to reject natural or moral
_duties_ also. Rights and duties are essentially correlative, and if a
creditor has no natural right to receive his debt, the debtor is under
no moral duty to pay it to him. In the second place, he who rejects
natural _rights_ must at the same time be prepared to reject natural
_right_. He must say with the Greek Sceptics that the distinction
between right and wrong, justice and injustice, is unknown in the nature
of things, and a matter of human institution merely. If there are no
rights save those which the state creates, it logically follows that
nothing is right and nothing wrong save that which the state establishes
and declares as such. If natural justice is a truth and not a delusion,
the same must be admitted of natural rights.[175]
It is to be noticed that in order that an interest should become a
legal right, it must obtain not merely legal protection, but also
legal recognition. The interests of beasts are to some extent
protected by the law, inasmuch as cruelty to animals is a criminal
offence. But beasts are not for this reason possessed of legal rights.
The duty of humanity so enforced is not conceived by the law as a duty
_towards_ beasts, but merely as a duty _in respect_ of them. There is
no bond of legal obligation between mankind and them. The only
interest and the only right which the law recognises in such a case is
the interest and right of society as a whole in the welfare of the
animals belonging to it. He who ill-treats a child violates a duty
which he owes to the child, and a right which is vested in him. But he
who ill-treats a dog breaks no _vinculum juris_ between him and it,
though he disregards the obligation of humane conduct which he owes to
society or the state, and the correlative right which society or the
state possesses. Similarly a man’s interests may obtain legal
protection as against himself, as when drunkenness or suicide is made
a crime. But he has not for this reason a legal right against himself.
The duty to refrain from drunkenness is not conceived by the law as a
duty owing by a man to himself, but as one owing by him to the
community. The only interest which receives legal recognition is that
of the society in the sobriety of its members.
Although a legal right is commonly accompanied by the power of
instituting legal proceedings for the enforcement of it, this is not
invariably the case, and does not pertain to the essence of the
conception. As we shall see, there are classes of legal rights which are
not enforceable by any legal process; for example, debts barred by
prescription or the lapse of time. Just as there are imperfect and
unenforceable legal duties, so there are imperfect and unenforceable
legal rights.
Rights and duties are necessarily correlative. There can be no right
without a corresponding duty, or duty without a corresponding right, any
more than there can be a husband without a wife, or a father without a
child. For every duty must be a duty _towards_ some person or persons,
in whom, therefore, a correlative right is vested. And conversely every
right must be a right _against_ some person or persons, upon whom,
therefore, a correlative duty is imposed. Every right or duty involves a
_vinculum juris_ or bond of legal obligation, by which two or more
persons are bound together. There can be no duty unless there is some
one to whom it is due; there can be no right unless there is some one
from whom it is claimed; and there can be no wrong unless there is some
one who is wronged, that is to say, whose right has been violated.
We must therefore reject the opinion of those writers who distinguish
between _relative_ and _absolute_ duties, the former being those which
have rights corresponding to them, and the latter being those which have
none.[176] This opinion is held by those who conceive it to be of the
essence of a right, that it should be vested in some determinate person,
and be enforceable by some form of legal process instituted by him. On
this view, duties towards the public at large or towards indeterminate
portions of the public have no correlative rights; the duty, for
example, to refrain from committing a public nuisance. There seems no
sufficient reason, however, for defining a right in so exclusive a
manner. All duties towards the public correspond to rights vested in the
public, and a public wrong is necessarily the violation of a public
right. All duties correspond to rights, though they do not all
correspond to private rights vested in determinate individuals.
§ 73. =The Elements of a Legal Right.=
In every legal right the five following elements are involved:—
(1) A _person_ in whom it is vested, and who may be distinguished as the
_owner_ of the right, the _subject_ of it, or the person _entitled_.
(2) A _person_ against whom the right avails, and upon whom the
correlative duty lies. He may be distinguished as the person _bound_, or
as the _subject_ of the duty.
(3) An _act_ or _omission_ which is obligatory on the person bound in
favour of the person entitled. This may be termed the _content_ of the
right.
(4) Some _thing_ to which the act or omission relates, and which may be
termed the _object_ or _subject-matter_ of the right.
(5) A _title_: that is to say, certain facts or events by reason of
which the right has become vested in its owner.
Thus if A. buys a piece of land from B., A. is the subject or owner of
the right so acquired. The persons bound by the correlative duty are
persons in general, for a right of this kind avails against all the
world. The content of the right consists in non-interference with the
purchaser’s exclusive use of the land. The object or subject-matter of
the right is the land. And finally the title of the right is the
conveyance by which it was acquired from its former owner.[177]
Every right, therefore, involves a threefold relation in which the owner
of it stands:—
(1) It is a right _against_ some _person_ or persons.
(2) It is a right _to_ some _act_ or omission of such person or persons.
(3) It is a right _over_ or _to_ some _thing_ to which that act or
omission relates.
An ownerless right is an impossibility. There cannot be a right without
a subject in whom it inheres, any more than there can be weight without
a heavy body; for rights are merely attributes of persons, and can have
no independent existence. Yet although this is so, the ownership of a
right may be merely contingent or uncertain. The owner of it may be a
person indeterminate. He may even be a person who is not yet born, and
may therefore never come into existence. Although every right has an
owner, it need not have a _vested_ and _certain_ owner. Thus the fee
simple of land may be left by will to a person unborn at the death of
the testator. To whom does it belong in the meantime? We cannot say that
it belongs to no one, for the reasons already indicated. We must say
that it is presently owned by the unborn person, but that his ownership
is contingent on his birth.
Who is the owner of a debt in the interval between the death of the
creditor intestate and the vesting of his estate in an administrator?
Roman law in such a case personified the inheritance itself, and
regarded the rights contingently belonging to the heir as presently
vested in the inheritance by virtue of its fictitious personality.
According to English law before the Judicature Act, 1873, the personal
property of an intestate, in the interval between death and the grant of
letters of administration, was deemed to be vested in the Judge of the
Court of Probate, and it may be assumed that it now vests either in the
President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, or in the
Judges of the High Court collectively. But neither the Roman nor the
English fiction is essential. There is no difficulty in saying that the
estate of an intestate is presently owned by an _incerta persona_,
namely by him who is subsequently appointed the administrator of it. The
law, however, abhors a temporary vacuum of vested ownership. It prefers
to regard all rights as presently vested in some determinate person,
subject, if need be, to be divested on the happening of the event on
which the title of the contingent owner depends.[178]
Certain writers define the object of a right with such narrowness that
they are forced to the conclusion that there are some rights which have
no objects. They consider that the object of a right means some material
thing to which it relates; and it is certainly true that in this sense
an object is not an essential element in the conception. Others admit
that a person, as well as a material thing, may be the object of a
right; as in the case of a husband’s right in respect of his wife, or a
father’s in respect of his children. But they go no further, and
consequently deny that the right of reputation, for example, or that of
personal liberty, or the right of a patentee, or a copyright, has any
object at all.
The truth seems to be, however, that an object is an essential element
in the idea of a right. A right without an object in respect of which it
exists is as impossible as a right without a subject to whom it belongs.
A right is, as we have said, a legally protected interest; and the
object of the right is the thing in which the owner has this interest.
It is the thing, material or immaterial, which he desires to keep or to
obtain, and which he is enabled to keep or to obtain by means of the
duty which the law imposes on other persons. We may illustrate this by
classifying the chief kinds of rights by reference to their objects.
(1) _Rights over material things._—In respect of their number and
variety, and of the great mass of legal rules relating to them, these
are by far the most important of legal rights. Their nature is too
familiar to require illustration.
(2) _Rights in respect of one’s own person._—I have a right not to be
killed, and the object of this right is my life. I have a right not to
be physically injured or assaulted, and the object of this right is my
bodily health and integrity. I have a right not to be imprisoned save in
due course of law; the object of this right is my personal liberty—that
is to say, my power of going where I will. I have a right not to be
coerced or deceived into acting contrary to my desires or interests; the
object of this right is my ability to fulfil my desires and protect and
promote my interests by my own activities.
(3) _The right of reputation._—In a man’s reputation, that is to say, in
the good opinion that other persons have of him, he has an interest,
just as he has an interest in the money in his pockets. In each case the
interest has obtained legal recognition and protection as a right, and
in each case the right involves an object in respect of which it exists.
(4) _Rights in respect of domestic relations._—Every man has an interest
and a right in the society, affections, and security of his wife and
children. Any person who without just cause interferes with this
interest, as by the seduction of his wife or daughter, or by taking away
his child, is guilty of a violation of his rights. The wrongdoer has
deprived him of something which was his, no less than if he had robbed
him of his purse.
(5) _Rights in respect of other rights._—In many instances a right has
another right as its subject-matter. I may have a right against A., that
he shall transfer to me some right which is now vested in himself. If I
contract with him for the sale of a piece of land to me, I acquire
thereby a right against him, that he shall so act as to make me the
owner of certain rights now belonging to himself. By the contract I
acquire a right to the right of ownership, and when the conveyance has
been executed, I acquire the right of ownership itself. Similarly a
promise of marriage vests in the woman a right to the rights of a wife;
but the marriage vests in her those rights themselves.[179]
It is commonly a question of importance, whether the right acquired by
an agreement or other transaction is merely a right to a right, or is
one having something else than another right as its immediate object. If
I buy a ton of coal or a flock of sheep, the right which I thereby
acquire may be of either of these kinds according to circumstances. I
may become forthwith the owner of the coal or the sheep; that is to say,
my right may have these material things as its immediate and direct
object. On the other hand, I may acquire merely a right against the
seller, that he by delivery or otherwise shall make me the owner of the
things so purchased. In this case I acquire a right which has, as its
immediate and direct object, nothing more than another right; though its
mediate and indirect object may be said, truly enough, to be the
material things purchased by me.
(6) _Rights over immaterial property._—Examples of these are patent
rights, copyrights, trade-marks, and commercial good-will. The object of
a patent-right is an invention, that is to say, the _idea_ of a new
process, instrument, or manufacture. The patentee has a right to the
exclusive use of this idea. Similarly the object of literary copyright
is the form of literary expression produced by the author of a book. In
this he has a valuable interest by reason of the disposition of the
public to purchase copies of the book, and by the Copyright Act this
interest has been raised to the level of a legal right.
(7) _Rights to services._—Finally we have to take account of rights
vested in one person to the services of another: the rights, for
example, which are created by a contract between master and servant,
physician and patient, or employer and workman. In all such cases the
object of the right is the skill, knowledge, strength, time, and so
forth, of the person bound. If I hire a physician, I obtain thereby a
right to the use and benefit of his skill and knowledge, just as, when I
hire a horse, I acquire a right to the use and benefit of his strength
and speed.
Or we may say, if we prefer it, that the object of a right of personal
service is the _person_ of him who is bound to render it. A man may be
the subject-matter of rights as well as the subject of them. His mind
and body constitute an instrument which is capable of certain uses, just
as a horse or a steam-engine is. In a law which recognises slavery, the
man may be bought and sold, just as the horse or steam-engine may. But
in our own law this is not so, and the only right that can be acquired
over a human being is a temporary and limited right to the use of him,
created by voluntary agreement with him—not a permanent and general
right of ownership over him.
§ 74. =Legal Rights in a wider sense of the term.=
Hitherto we have confined our attention to legal rights in the strictest
and most proper sense. It is in this sense only that we have regarded
them as the correlatives of legal duties, and have defined them as the
interests which the law protects by imposing duties with respect to them
upon other persons. We have now to notice that the term is also used in
a wider and laxer sense, to include any legally recognised interest,
whether it corresponds to a legal duty or not. In this generic sense a
legal right may be defined as any advantage or benefit which is in any
manner conferred upon a person by a rule of law. Of rights in this sense
there are at least three distinct kinds, sufficiently important to call
for separate classification and discussion. These are (1) _Rights_ (in
the strict sense), (2) _Liberties_, and (3) _Powers_. Having already
sufficiently considered the first of these, we shall now deal briefly
with the others.
§ 75. =Liberties.=
Just as my legal rights (in the strict sense) are the benefits which I
derive from legal duties imposed upon other persons, so my legal
liberties are the benefits which I derive from the absence of legal
duties imposed upon myself. They are the various forms assumed by the
interest which I have in doing as I please. They are the things which I
may do without being prevented by the law. The sphere of my legal
liberty is that sphere of activity within which the law is content to
leave me alone. It is clear that the term right is often used in a wide
sense to include such liberty. I have a right (that is to say, I am at
liberty) to do as I please with my own; but I have no right and am not
at liberty to interfere with what is another’s. I have a right to
express my opinions on public affairs, but I have no right to publish a
defamatory or seditious libel. I have a right to defend myself against
violence, but I have no right to take revenge upon him who has injured
me.
The interests of unrestrained activity thus recognised and allowed by
the law constitute a class of legal rights clearly distinguishable from
those which we have already considered. Rights of the one class are
concerned with those things which other persons _ought_ to do for me;
rights of the other class are concerned with those things which I _may_
do for myself. The former pertain to the sphere of obligation or
compulsion; the latter to that of liberty or free will. Both are legally
recognised interests; both are advantages derived from the law by the
subjects of the state; but they are two distinct species of one genus.
It is often said that all rights whatsoever correspond to duties; and
by those who are of this opinion a different explanation is
necessarily given of the class of rights which we have just
considered. It is said that a legal liberty is in reality a legal
right not to be interfered with by other persons in the exercise of
one’s activities. It is alleged that the real meaning of the
proposition that I have a legal right to express what opinions I
please, is that other persons are under a legal duty not to prevent me
from expressing them. So that even in this case the right is the
correlative of a duty. Now there is no doubt that in most cases a
legal liberty of acting is accompanied by a legal right not to be
hindered in so acting. If the law allows me a sphere of lawful and
innocent activity, it usually takes care at the same time to protect
this sphere of activity from alien interference. But in such a case
there are in reality two rights and not merely one; and there are
instances in which liberties are not thus accompanied by protecting
rights. I may have a legal liberty which involves no such duty of
non-interference imposed on others. If a landowner gives me a licence
to go upon his land, I have a right to do so, in the sense in which a
right means a liberty; but I have no right to do so, in the sense in
which a right vested in me is the correlative of a duty imposed upon
him. Though I have a liberty or right to go on his land, he has an
equal right or liberty to prevent me. The licence has no other effect
than to make that lawful which would otherwise be unlawful. The right
which I so acquire is nothing more than an extension of the sphere of
my rightful activity. So a trustee has a right to receive from the
beneficiaries remuneration for his trouble in administering the
estate, in the sense that in doing so he does no wrong. But he has no
right to receive remuneration, in the sense that the beneficiaries are
under any duty to give it to him. So an alien has a right, in the
sense of liberty, to enter British dominions, but the executive
government has an equal right, in the same sense, to keep him
out.[180] That I have a right to destroy my property does not mean
that it is wrong for other persons to prevent me; it means that it is
not wrong for me so to deal with that which is my own. That I have no
right to commit theft does not mean that other persons may lawfully
prevent me from committing such a crime, but that I myself act
illegally in taking property which is not mine.[181]
§ 76. =Powers.=
Yet another class of legal rights consists of those which are termed
powers. Examples of such are the following: the right to make a will, or
to alienate property; the power of sale vested in a mortgagee; a
landlord’s right of re-entry; the right to marry one’s deceased wife’s
sister; that power of obtaining in one’s favour the judgment of a court
of law, which is called a right of action; the right to rescind a
contract for fraud; a power of appointment; the right of issuing
execution on a judgment; the various powers vested in judges and other
officials for the due fulfilment of their functions. All these are legal
rights—they are legally recognised interests—they are advantages
conferred by the law—but they are rights of a different species from the
two classes which we have already considered. They resemble liberties,
and differ from rights _stricto sensu_, inasmuch as they have no duties
corresponding to them. My right to make a will corresponds to no duty in
any one else. A mortgagee’s power of sale is not the correlative of any
duty imposed upon the mortgagor; though it is otherwise with his right
to receive payment of the mortgage debt. A debt is not the same thing as
a right of action for its recovery. The former is a right in the strict
and proper sense, corresponding to the duty of the debtor to pay; the
latter is a legal power, corresponding to the liability of the debtor to
be sued. That the two are distinct appears from the fact that the right
of action may be destroyed (as by prescription) while the debt remains.
It is clear, therefore, that a power is not the same thing as a right of
the first class. Neither is it identical with a right of the second
class, namely, a liberty. That I have a right to make a will does not
mean that in doing so I do no wrong. It does not mean that I _may_ make
a will innocently; it means that I _can_ make a will effectively. That I
have a right to marry my cousin does not mean that such a marriage is
legally innocent, but that it is legally valid. It is not a liberty that
I have, but a power. That a landlord has a right of re-entry on his
tenant does not mean that in re-entering he does the tenant no wrong,
but that by so doing he effectively terminates the lease.[182]
A power may be defined as ability conferred upon a person by the law to
determine, by his own will directed to that end, the rights, duties,
liabilities, or other legal relations, either of himself or of other
persons. Powers are either public or private. The former are those which
are vested in a person as an agent or instrument of the functions of the
state; they comprise the various forms of legislative, judicial, and
executive authority. Private powers, on the other hand, are those which
are vested in persons to be exercised for their own purposes, and not as
agents of the state. Power is either ability to determine the legal
relations of other persons, or ability to determine one’s own. The first
of these—power over other persons—is commonly called _authority_; the
second—power over oneself—is usually termed _capacity_.[183]
These, then, are the three chief classes of benefits, privileges, or
rights conferred by the law: liberty, when the law allows to my will a
sphere of unrestrained activity; power, when the law actively assists me
in making my will effective; right in the strict sense, when the law
limits the liberty of others in my behalf. A liberty is that which I
_may_ do innocently; a power is that which I _can_ do effectively; a
right in the narrow sense is that which other persons _ought_ to do on
my behalf. I use my liberties with the acquiescence of the law; I use my
powers with its active assistance in making itself the instrument of my
will; I enjoy my rights through the control exercised by it over the
acts of others on my behalf.[184][185]
§ 77. =Duties, Disabilities, and Liabilities.=
There is no generic term which is the correlative of right in the wide
sense, and includes all the burdens imposed by the law, as a right
includes all the benefits conferred by it. These legal burdens are of
three kinds, being either _Duties_, _Disabilities_, or _Liabilities_. A
duty is the absence of liberty; a disability is the absence of power; a
liability is the presence either of liberty or of power vested in some
one else as against the person liable. Examples of liabilities
correlative to liberties are the liability of a trespasser to be
forcibly ejected, that of a defaulting tenant to have his goods seized
for rent, and that of the owner of a building to have his windows
darkened or his foundations weakened by the building or excavations of
his neighbours. Examples of liabilities correlative to powers are the
liability of a tenant to have his lease determined by re-entry, that of
a mortgagor to have the property sold by the mortgagee, that of a
judgment debtor to have execution issued against him, and that of an
unfaithful wife to be divorced.
The most important form of liability is that which corresponds to the
various powers of action and prosecution arising from the different
forms of wrongdoing. There is accordingly a narrow sense of the word
liability, in which it covers this case exclusively. Liability in this
sense is the correlative of a legal remedy. A synonym for it is
responsibility. It is either civil or criminal according as it
corresponds to a right of action or to a right of prosecution.[186][187]
SUMMARY.
The nature of a Wrong.
Moral and legal wrongs.
The nature of a Duty.
Moral and legal duties.
The nature of a Right.
Interests.
Their protection by the rule of right.
Interests and rights.
Moral and legal rights.
The denial of moral rights.
The correlation of rights and duties.
No rights without duties.
No duties without rights.
The elements of a legal right.
1. Person entitled, or owner.
2. Person bound.
3. Content.
4. Object or subject-matter.
5. Title.
No rights without owners.
No rights without objects.
{1. Material things.
{2. One’s own person.
{3. Reputation.
Objects of rights {4. Domestic relations.
{5. Other rights.
{6. Immaterial property.
{7. Services.
Rights in the generic sense—Any benefit conferred by the law.
{1. Rights (_stricto sensu_)—correlative to Duties.
{2. Liberties—correlative to Liabilities.
{3. Powers—correlative to Liabilities.
{1. Rights (_stricto sensu_)—what others _must_ do for me.
{2. Liberties—what I _may_ do for myself.
{3. Powers—what I _can_ do as against others.
Duties, Liabilities, Disabilities.