ONE NATION OR TWO?
The distressing news of Bull Run brought home to the North the awful
realities of war. Men who had all along distrusted the Republican party
now denounced a war waged for the emancipation of the South's slaves.
Both the President and Congress formally announced that it was a
struggle for the maintenance of the Union and not a war on behalf of the
slaves. It was well that this position was taken, else the North might
have broken into impotent factions. The East hated the South and warred
upon their ancient rivals, the planters; the border States owned slaves,
disliked the Republican party, and feared the purposes of those in
power; while the West loved the Union, held the negro in contempt, and
was committed to the party in power on the smallest possible margin.
None but Lincoln seemed to possess the tact and the ability necessary to
hold together these dissolving elements of a country never yet
thoroughly united; and even he was long doubted and distrusted by many
good men. Strange as it may seem, Douglas had been, until his death,
June 3, 1861, his right arm. Douglas's last speeches and dying words
urged upon the millions of his followers the necessity of giving their
lives to the cause of the Union. So critical was the situation that when
nominations were made for elective office in the Middle States or the
West in 1861, the Administration party took pains to disavow its former
attitude and put forward candidates who had been regular Democrats, thus
following the same compromising policy which Davis inaugurated in the
South. Daniel S. Dickinson, a member of the old Polk and Pierce party of
ruthless expansion, was made leader of the Administration forces in New
York in 1861, and David Tod, a stanch Douglas man in 1860, was elected
Governor of Ohio the same year by Republican votes. John C. Frémont was
removed from the command of the Federal army in St. Louis because he
undertook to emancipate the slaves in his department. The people of the
North were not willing to invade the sister States of the South for any
other cause than to restore the Union. Wealthy bankers, industrial
leaders, and railway magnates might be kept together on a platform of
enlarging the area of their operations, but never on a program which
proposed the confiscation of billions of dollars' worth of property,
which the slaves represented. In this hour of trial the supreme need was
coöperation and union among the diverse elements of the North, for in
1862 another Congress would be chosen, and if party lines were suffered
to be drawn, the South would certainly gain her independence.
[Illustration: One Nation, or Two?]
With this Unionist program perfectly understood, Lincoln asked Congress
for 400,000 men. Congress gave him 500,000. A second wave of warlike
enthusiasm swept over the North, and men enlisted not for three months,
but for three years. The zeal and _abandon_ of the South was hardly
matched, but there was no lack of men or support. With a few exceptions
the newspapers, the pulpits, and the lecture platforms urged most ardent
support of the common cause. But the more difficult problem of finding
money for the vast armies that moved upon the South was not so quickly
solved. Secretary Chase reported the expenditure in the three months of
June, July, and August of a hundred millions--an amount greater far than
the total national debt. Before another three months had passed this
expenditure had doubled, and the Secretary estimated that $500,000,000
would be needed before the end of June, 1862! These were astounding
figures to a country whose normal annual income was about $50,000,000.
And what was worse, the financial men refused to take government bonds
at par, as they had done during the war with Mexico, although they were
now offered interest at the rate of six to eight per cent. The country
had recovered from the panic of 1857, and as business activity increased
and the general prosperity became certain, it was more difficult for the
Government to borrow money. The suspension of specie payments by all the
banks before the end of the year did not mean panic or severe economic
crisis, as had hitherto been the case; rather, a change from metallic to
paper money. Secretary Chase was told by New York leaders in December,
1862, that government bonds bearing six per cent interest would hardly
bring sixty cents on the dollar. Yet business men borrowed money at four
per cent and the wheels of industry and commerce were moving at full
speed. Prosperity in the North was thus almost as fatal to the Union as
adversity in the South was to the Confederacy. Rather than advertise a
collapse of the federal credit by selling bonds at a discount of twenty
to forty per cent the guiding spirits at Washington decided to issue
notes as legal tender to the amount of $150,000,000, increased to
$300,000,000 a little later. Immediately, bankers and business men who
refused to take bonds protested with such vigor and resolution that
Chase and Lincoln, unlearned in the ways of finance, knew not what
course to take. To sell bonds at enormous discounts and high rates of
interest was bad; to tax the people directly for the needs of the
Government would have ruined the party in power; and to issue fiat money
was equivalent to forcing the poor to lend what the rich refused. But
the emergency was great. It was decided to issue and float "greenbacks"
and also to sell bonds in unprecedented numbers. Though the markets of
the world were open to the North and business was as active as ever in
the history of the country, the Federal Government was thus reduced,
like the Confederacy, to the use of paper money, and, surprising as it
may appear, the securities of the latter sold in Europe at a higher
price than those of the former. Gold and silver disappeared entirely in
both sections.
But the eyes of the public were fixed on military movements, not
finance, and as the winter of 1861-62 wore on an army of a hundred
thousand men gathered around Washington for the second invasion of
Virginia. George B. McClellan, the "young Napoleon," drilled and
organized the raw recruits while public opinion began to urge another
march upon Richmond. Other armies nearly a hundred thousand strong
spread over Kentucky and threatened Tennessee at Cumberland Gap, Bowling
Green, and Forts Henry and Donelson. In February Ulysses S. Grant saw
the strategic importance of the forts on the Cumberland and Tennessee
Rivers, and before the first of March he had captured both, and the
whole of West Tennessee lay open to him. Nashville fell as he moved up
the Tennessee, and Commodore Foote opened the Mississippi River almost
to Vicksburg during the early spring. Meanwhile Albert Sidney Johnston
had retreated to northern Mississippi. Finding Grant in a weak position
on the southern bank of the Tennessee near Shiloh Church, he hastily
gathered his discouraged troops about him for a sudden attack upon the
invaders. Grant had nearly 45,000 men and he knew that General Buell was
only a few miles away with 37,000 more. Johnston had 40,000. The purpose
of the Confederate general was known to his men, and all were inspired
with the determination of striking a blow before the two armies of the
enemy could unite. Johnston's assistants in command were Beauregard and
Bragg, both able and experienced officers. On the morning of April 6,
the Confederates fell upon Grant's outposts and drove them headlong
against the main body. Desperate valor was shown in the ensuing attack,
and before the afternoon it seemed that nothing could save the Union
army and its commander from complete disaster. The river was in high
flood, two impassable creeks flanked the Federals, while the victorious
Confederates held the fourth side of the field. At two o'clock Johnston
fell mortally wounded; Beauregard succeeded to command, and about four
o'clock the attack slackened; at six it ceased altogether, though the
Union forces were demoralized and expecting to be captured. Grant was
saved. With the support of Buell at hand he attacked Beauregard on the
morrow and regained some of his lost prestige. The "promenade" up the
Tennessee had been halted; but the loss of Johnston was equal to the
loss of an army. This fighting of South and West was of the most
desperate character, for Grant lost more than 10,000 in killed and
wounded, while Johnston and Beauregard lost 9700.
The march of Grant and Buell across middle and western Tennessee and the
opening of the Mississippi to Memphis was accompanied by the loss to
the Confederates of Missouri and a part of Arkansas. Grant's objective
in the summer and autumn of 1862 was Vicksburg, but the Confederates
held him fast in the neighborhood of Corinth, Mississippi. Buell
withdrew from middle Tennessee in the late summer, when Bragg, commander
of a second Confederate army in the West, moved through eastern
Tennessee into Kentucky, threatening Lexington and Louisville. But Bragg
failed after some successes in September to carry the tide of war back
toward the Ohio, and he was followed in October by the army of the Ohio,
now under the command of General W. S. Rosecrans, toward Murfreesboro,
Tennessee, where another sanguinary battle was fought on the last day of
December, 1862. Rosecrans now had 43,000 men, Bragg 38,000. After a
desperate encounter in which the honors inclined to the Confederate
side, Bragg withdrew toward Chattanooga, his base of operations, and
Rosecrans encamped at Murfreesboro. The Federal losses in this
engagement were more than 13,000, the Confederate somewhat over 9000,
and the only advantage was the gaining of a few miles of territory. The
war in the West which began so brilliantly for the Federals at Forts
Henry and Donelson seemed to have come to a halt. Grant was unable to
penetrate the lower South, and Rosecrans was content to leave Bragg in
undisturbed possession of the region between Murfreesboro and
Chattanooga.
Meanwhile the eyes of the two warring powers were concentrated on the
operations in Virginia. McClellan moved in March, 1862, upon Richmond
by way of the Yorktown Peninsula, a swampy wild region over which it was
difficult, indeed, to move an army. He commanded 125,000 men, and 40,000
more were in the neighborhood of Washington to make a diversion in his
favor in case of necessity. Joseph E. Johnston, who had held chief
command in Virginia since Bull Run, shifted his position promptly from
northern Virginia to Richmond to meet the threatened attack. He had no
more than 55,000 men. As McClellan worked his way slowly up the
peninsula Johnston fortified his position along the ridges east and
north of the Confederate capital, which stood on the hills just above
tidewater. From Hanover Court-House to Malvern Hill, a distance of some
twenty-five miles, the two armies confronted each other in irregular
lines conforming to the topography of the region. Late in May, Johnston
attacked McClellan on the Union right, and the fighting continued two or
three days, now at one point, now at another of the long lines. On May
31, in the battle of Fair Oaks, Johnston was severely wounded and the
command devolved upon Robert E. Lee, whose failure to hold West Virginia
against McClellan during the preceding autumn had temporarily eclipsed
his growing reputation. Lee's management of his forces during the early
days of his new command was faulty; but before the 23d of June he had
received reinforcements from the Carolinas and Georgia which brought his
total almost to 60,000; and he relied on "Stonewall" Jackson, who was
just concluding a wonderful campaign in the Valley of Virginia, to come
to his assistance with his corps of 16,000. But McClellan still had
105,000 fairly trained soldiers, and there was no reason to doubt that a
second Union army was forming near Alexandria. It was a critical moment.
Meanwhile, Jackson's operations in the Shenandoah Valley had so startled
and astounded the Federals that he was able to march, June 20-25,
unobserved, over the passes of the Blue Ridge Mountains to Lee's
assistance. A series of battles began June 26 at Mechanicsville on
McClellan's right, near where Johnston had fought. But the failure of
Jackson to arrive and begin the attack, according to agreement, caused
the first Confederate onset to fail, with heavy losses to the South. The
next day, however, the tide turned the other way and Lee routed
McClellan at Gaines' Mill. McClellan now retreated across White Oak
Swamp towards Harrison's Landing on the James. The weather was hot, the
ground soft from rains, and the underbrush so thick and tangled that men
could not see each other at a distance of ten paces, save in the narrow
roads or small clearings. Realizing the difficulties under which his
opponent labored, Lee ordered hasty pursuit, and ineffective blows were
struck at Savage's Station and in White Oak Swamp. Jackson again failed
to maintain the great reputation he had won in the Valley, and Magruder,
Holmes, and Huger, other lieutenants of Lee, not knowing their own
country as well as did the Federals, suffered their commands to be lost
in the wilderness and thus aided McClellan in his escape from a
dangerous situation. On July 1 the retreating Union army gathered, still
devoted to its commander, on Malvern Hill, within support of the Federal
gunboats in the James River below. The Confederates, confident and
expectant, poured out of the woods from every direction, formed in
battle array, and charged over open fields and rising ground toward the
two hundred and fifty great guns which had been dragged for weeks
through the swamps in the hope of just such an opportunity. The attempt
of Lee to carry this impregnable position lost the Confederates as many
brave men as all the other six days of unremitting warfare. McClellan
held his own till night; Lee withdrew to the neighboring thickets,
surprised at the resolute strength of an opponent who had avoided battle
at every turn since June 26.
The week of fighting and scouring the woods had cost the North nearly
16,000 men; the South, 20,000. The retreat on July 2 to Harrison's
Landing was McClellan's confession of failure, which sorely distressed
his superiors in Washington and greatly depressed the spirits of the
North. Lee's first essay at war on a large scale had saved the
Confederate capital, though at fearful cost, and he was everywhere
regarded as a great general. From this time Davis and the Confederate
Government gave him the fullest confidence, and the people of the South
came to think of him as almost superhuman. Though he was bold in action
and even reckless of human life, his soldiers gave him an obedience and
a reverence which no other commander in American history has ever
received. Jackson, Longstreet, and D. H. and A. P. Hill had also won
fame in this baptism of blood. To the average Southerner the outlook was
once more exceedingly bright. Richmond breathed freely, and the
Government bent its energies to the task of supplying its able officers
with men and means.
While the Federal Government was deciding what to do with McClellan and
his army, still almost twice as large as Lee's, the Confederate
commander sent Jackson with some 20,000 men to the neighborhood of Bull
Run, where the commands of McDowell, Banks, and Frémont had been united
to make a third army of invasion. General John Pope was brought from
successful operations in the West to Washington, where Secretary Edwin
M. Stanton, assuming more and more the directing authority of the
Government, prepared, with the assistance of Senator Benjamin F. Wade, a
proclamation which Pope was to distribute among the troops. "I come from
the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies," ran this
remarkable admonition to Eastern, officers and men. "Let us look before
us and not behind." Most of the 50,000 men who were soon to meet Jackson
and Lee resented the comparison and the affront. On August 9 a sharp
encounter at Cedar Mountain showed how resolute and real was the purpose
of Lee to drive this army out of Virginia. When President Lincoln
removed McClellan and ordered the Army of the Potomac in part to
Washington, in part to Acquia Creek, near Fredericksburg, to support
Pope, and gave the command of all the armies of the East to General H.
W. Halleck, for whom Grant had won high reputation earlier in the year,
Lee hastened northward to defeat Pope before these reinforcements could
arrive. The Union forces north of Bull Run amounted now to nearly 75,000
men; Lee had 55,000, but there was no thought of delay. On the 29th and
30th Pope was crushed and routed completely in a series of maneuvers and
battles which have been pronounced the most masterly in the whole war.
For four days the discouraged and baffled troops and officers of the
Union retreated or ran pell-mell across the northern counties of
Virginia into Washington, to the dismay of Lincoln and the friends of
the Federal cause. It was at this moment, too, that Bragg was advancing,
as already described, into Kentucky and threatening to seize Lexington
and Louisville. It was a dark hour to the patient and patriotic Lincoln,
who had never dreamed that such catastrophes could be the result of his
reluctant decision, in early April, 1861, to hold Fort Sumter.
General Halleck proved uncertain and dilatory; the Army of the Potomac
was generally dissatisfied and clamoring for the restoration of
McClellan, who, like Joseph E. Johnston, of the South, was always
popular with his men; the Cabinet, too, was uncertain and hopelessly
divided in its counsels. The cause of the Union was exceedingly doubtful
in September, 1862, as Lee entered Maryland, publishing abroad his call
to the Southern element of that State to rise and join their brethren of
the Confederacy. Public opinion in the North was divided and depressed.
The abolitionists of the East were pressing every day through Sumner and
Chase for a proclamation emancipating the slaves, which might have
driven Maryland and Kentucky into the arms of the enemy; the Northwest
was in turmoil, for there abolitionism was as unpopular as slavery
itself, and leading men declared that it was a war for the Union, for a
great common country, not a struggle to overthrow the institutions of
the South. There was still no great party, sure of a majority in the
coming elections, upon which the President could rely, and the loss of a
majority in Congress would have been fatal.
Under these circumstances Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson entered Maryland
at a point some fifty miles above Washington, with their army
enthusiastic and self-confident because of recent victories. It seemed
almost certain that another victory, and this on the soil of the North,
would secure Confederate recognition in Europe. Reluctantly Lincoln
restored McClellan to the command of the Union army which was moving
northwestward to confront Lee. An accident, one of those small things in
war which sometimes determines the fate of nations, put into McClellan's
hands the orders of Lee for the Maryland campaign. General D. H. Hill
dropped his copy of these important and highly confidential instructions
upon the ground as he was breaking camp on the morning of the 12th of
September. On the same day this tell-tale document was handed to the
Federal commander. Almost a third of Lee's army was on its way to
Harper's Ferry, many miles to the west, to seize that post, which
McClellan thought had already been evacuated. McClellan began to press
upon the Confederates as they retired from their advanced position to
the valley of Antietam Creek. South Mountain, a spur of the Blue Ridge,
lay between the armies. On September 16, McClellan crossed the passes
and confronted Lee, who was now on the defensive. A most sanguinary
battle followed on the 17th, and the Confederates, having suffered
losses of nearly 12,000 men, retired to northern Virginia. The campaign
was closed, for McClellan was too cautious to risk a second attack, and
Lee retired to a safe position south of the Potomac. The consternation
of the North subsided and President Lincoln gave out the announcement
that if war continued till January he would emancipate the slaves by
executive order in all the States which at that time refused to
recognize the Federal authority.
The elections which came in October and November following ran heavily
against the Administration. New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, Republican States in 1860, went
Democratic. Only in States where the war upon the South, as the ancient
enemy, was popular did the Administration receive hearty support. In the
moderate States like Pennsylvania and the border States like Kentucky,
the Republican party had practically ceased to exist. The Emancipation
Proclamation had served to emphasize the almost fatal cleavage in
Northern public opinion.
But the fortunes of both sides depended on victory in the field as well
as votes in Congress, and all eyes turned again to the movements of Lee.
The failure of McClellan to follow Lee and deliver battle led to his
second removal from command. Ambrose E. Burnside, a corps commander who
had done good work at Antietam, succeeded, and in obedience to the
orders of the War Department moved directly upon Richmond by way of
Fredericksburg, with an army of 122,000. But Lee confronted him on the
south bank of the Rappahannock, and though his forces were only a little
more than half as strong, there was no uneasiness at Confederate
headquarters. On the 12th of December Burnside crossed the Rappahannock
and attacked Lee, who held the formidable hills on the southern bank of
that stream. Another bloody battle ensued. After a vain and hopeless
sacrifice of 12,000 men, Burnside withdrew to the northern bank of the
river. The active fighting of 1862 had come to a close. In northern
Mississippi Grant and Sherman were blocked; at Murfreesboro, Tennessee,
the armies of Rosecrans and Bragg were about to make their fruitless
onsets already mentioned, and in Virginia the Union outlook was quite as
dark as it had been after the first unfortunate trial at arms in July,
1861. Lincoln thought of removing Grant because of the failure of the
campaign in northern Mississippi, but gave him another opportunity;
Burnside resigned a command he had not sought, and Joseph Hooker took up
the difficult problem of beating Lee.
At Washington the deepest gloom prevailed. On July 2, 1862, before the
news of McClellan's failure to capture Richmond had reached the people,
a call for 300,000 three-year men was made. Then came the disaster of
Second Manassas and the invasion of Maryland. Recruiting went on
drearily during the fall, when most signs pointed to the failure of all
the gigantic efforts to maintain the Union. The writ of _habeas corpus_,
so dear to Anglo-Saxons, had been frequently suspended; arbitrary
arrests were made in all parts of the North, and many well-known men
were held in military and other prisons without warrant or trial.
Stanton and Seward with the approval of the President issued orders for
the seizure of men at night, and the mysterious disappearances of public
men in places where opposition had been shown served to warn people
against displeasing their own officers at the capital. The cost of the
war had mounted to $2,500,000 a day, while the gross receipts of the
Government were not more than $600,000 a day. When the time came to put
into force the Emancipation Proclamation, the people were in greater
doubt than ever about the wisdom of the move, and Secretary Seward wrote
to a friend condemning utterly this effort to raise a servile war in the
South. The letter found its way into the newspapers and showed once more
the cleavage of Northern public opinion. The radical East approved, the
nationalist West disapproved, and business men, bankers, merchants, and
manufacturers, whom Seward best represented, went on their indifferent
ways, refusing to lend money to the Government save on usurious terms,
and at the same time denouncing its policy of paying debts by issuing
irredeemable paper. Lincoln had lost the confidence of the public, even
of Congress; but, as he himself said, no other man possessed more of
that confidence. An honest German merchant wrote home to friends that
if the North could only exchange officers with the Confederates, the war
would be over in a few weeks. In the midst of the depression the
Secretary of the Treasury issued another $100,000,000 of greenbacks to
meet pressing needs; and to fill up the ranks of the armies a Federal
conscript law was enacted in March, 1863, only a little less drastic
than the Confederate measure which was said to "rob both the cradle and
the grave."
Under these circumstances Hooker moved half-heartedly upon Lee. The two
armies, the Union out-numbering the Confederate more than two to one,
met in the dreary and almost impenetrable forest, southwest of
Fredericksburg, known as the Wilderness, though the battle which
followed bears the name of Chancellorsville. For five days the bloody
work went on, with the result that Hooker retired beaten and humiliated
before his enemy. Lee and the South had also lost their greatest
general, Stonewall Jackson, and the people of the South were feeling to
the full the disasters of war. But Lee gathered his forces from Norfolk,
Petersburg, and Richmond, every regiment that could be spared, more than
80,000 men, and set his face once more toward western Maryland and
Pennsylvania, where he confidently expected to wrest a peace from the
stubborn North. The Army of the Potomac moved on interior lines toward
Gettysburg, leaving some regiments in Washington against an emergency.
The people of Pennsylvania and New York were panic-struck; a second time
the evils of war had been transferred from Southern to Northern
territory. Great cities have not been famous for self-control and
philosophy when their banks and their rich storehouses have been
threatened with ruin. Philadelphia and New York were no exceptions to
the rule, and if it had been left to them the war would have been
brought to a close before Lee crossed the Pennsylvania border.
Once more the Union commander was changed. Upon the modest shoulders of
General George Gordon Meade fell the heavy responsibility of saving the
riches of the Middle States and the cause of the Union, for all felt
that a Confederate victory in the heart of the North would bring the
tragedy to a close. Lee was so bold and confident that he was hardly
more cautious in the disposition of his troops than he had been when
fighting on his own soil. Meade secured a strong position on the hills
about the since famous village of Gettysburg, and awaited attack; he had
somewhat more than 90,000 men, who were, however, still laboring under
the delusion that Lee was invincible and that their commanders were
unequal to those of the adversary. Without waiting for the return of his
cavalry and without trying, like Napoleon at Austerlitz, to entice the
Federals away from their fortifications, General Lee pressed forward. On
July 1 the Confederates gained some advantage in the fighting; on the
second day they held their own; but on the third day they attempted,
somewhat after the manner of Burnside at Fredericksburg, the impossible,
and the best army the South ever had was hopelessly beaten. About 30,000
of their brave men were dead, wounded, or missing. Meade had not
suffered so great a loss, and he had saved the cause of his Government.
After a day of waiting the Confederate army took up its march unmolested
toward northern Virginia. While the people of the North rejoiced at
their deliverance, the news came that Grant had captured Vicksburg and
all the 30,000 men who had defended that important point. The
Mississippi went on its way "unvexed to the sea," as Lincoln said, for
New Orleans had long since fallen and the upper river had been cleared
of all resistance. At only one point on the long line from Washington to
Vicksburg had the Confederates held their own--Chattanooga, whence Bragg
had retreated earlier in the year and where the next great battle was to
be fought.
Hastily Davis ordered his available regiments to Bragg, who held the
mountain ridges south of Chattanooga. Lee, who felt strong enough to
hold Meade in check in northern Virginia, sent away Longstreet with his
veterans. September 19, Rosecrans attacked Bragg on his impregnable
hills, and after two days of heroic fighting and appalling losses he
retired to the city. Bragg had won a victory similar in every respect to
that which crowned Meade's efforts at Gettysburg. Though slow, unpopular
with officers and men, and unimaginative, he soon seized the strong
points on the river above and below the city, and Rosecrans was
surrounded, besieged, for the single, almost impassable road to
Nashville and the North would not bear the burden of necessary supplies.
If Bragg had proved watchful and alert, it would have been only a matter
of time when the Federals would have been driven by famine to
surrender.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Mr. Gamaliel Bradford has published some extremely interesting studies
of the war-time leaders, of which, _Lee, the American_ (1912) is by far
the most important, though his _Confederate Portraits_ (1914) including
character sketches of most of the eminent Southern generals, offer a
great deal that is suggestive. In volume _IV_ of Mr. Rhodes's _History_
there are two chapters which treat of the life of the people of North
and South in the most interesting manner. In addition to the more
general works already cited, one may turn to George C. Gorham's _Life
and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton_ (1889); George H. Haynes's
_Charles Sumner_ in _American Crises_ biographies; Henry Cleveland's
_Alexander H. Stephens in Public and in Private_ (1866); A. B. Hart's
_Salmon Portland Chase_ in _American Statesmen_ series; Frederic
Bancroft's _The Life of William H. Seward_ (1900); and Carl Schurz's
_Reminiscences_ (1907-08); H. A. Wise's _Seven Decades of the American
Union_ (1876); and J. W. DuBose's _The Life and Times of William L.
Yancey_ (1892).
The diplomatic history of the war will be found in J. M. Callahan's
_Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy_ (1901); J. W. Foster's
_A Century of American Diplomacy_ (1900); Charles Francis Adams's
_Charles Francis Adams_ (1900), in _American Statesmen_ series; Charles
Francis Adams's _Lee at Appomatox_ (1909); and _Transatlantic
Solidarity_ (1913); and Pierce Butler's _Judah P. Benjamin_, in
_American Crises_ biographies.
Of contemporary accounts to be added to those already mentioned are W.
T. Sherman's _Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman_ (1875), and especially
the _Home Letters of General Sherman_, edited by M. A. DeWolfe Howe
(1909); G. B. McClellan's _McClellan's Own Story_ (1887); E. A.
Pollard's _A Southern History of the War_ (1866); Horace Greeley's _The
American Conflict_ (1864-67); and Jefferson Davis's _Rise and Fall of
the Confederate Government_ (1881).