STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
If the two preceding chapters have shown that the larger social and
economic interests tended strongly toward the elimination of sectional
hostility, political conditions and party vows gave even stronger
assurances that there should be no more conflicts like those of 1833 and
1850. Yet there was one section of the country which was a sort of storm
center, the Northwest. There a wide expanse of rich lands held by
Indians, a rapidly increasing population, and great annual harvests of
wheat and corn, selling at high prices, created a condition not unlike
that of the lower South when Jackson became President. Removal of the
Indians from the fertile areas of the Nebraska country, the creation of
new Territories, and the building of railroads connecting the wheat and
corn areas with Chicago and the Eastern markets were the demands of the
Northwest in 1853, and a really great party leader would have seen the
problem and his duty.
But Pierce was not a great leader. In the make-up of his Cabinet he
chose William L. Marcy, of New York, for Secretary of State, James
Campbell, of Pennsylvania, for Postmaster-General, and Caleb Cushing, of
Massachusetts, for Attorney-General, all of whom were close political
allies of the South. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, became Secretary
of War, and James C. Dobbin, of North Carolina, Secretary of the Navy.
Both of these were extreme pro-slavery men. From the West, James
Guthrie, of Kentucky, and Robert McClelland, of Michigan, were taken
into the President's Council, the one to be Secretary of the Treasury
and the other the head of the Department of the Interior. Although
Douglas had been the strongest candidate for the nomination for the
Presidency before the recent Democratic Convention, neither he nor any
of his friends was selected. Nor did it seem wise to those who were then
shaping the destinies of the country to conciliate the still powerful
anti-slavery element of the East.
Looking backwards the new Administration found three lines of procedure
open to it, all suggested by President Polk in his later messages to
Congress. One of these was the closer attachment of California to the
rest of the country, another was the purchase of Cuba as a makeweight to
the growing Northwest, and the third was the rapid expansion of American
commerce by federal subsidies to shipping and the opening of new
channels of trade.
To carry into effect the first of these, James Gadsden, an able railroad
president of South Carolina, was sent to Mexico to purchase a large
strip of land lying along the southern border of New Mexico and thus
make easy the building of a national railway from Memphis to San
Francisco, for the lowest passes over the Rocky Mountains were in this
region. Gadsden returned in the autumn successful. For $10,000,000 he
had secured 50,000 square miles of territory, and the way was open for
the Government to lay its plans for the greatest undertaking ever
proposed by the most latitudinarian politicians. Davis, hitherto an
extreme States-rights leader and disciple of Calhoun, worked out the
program. The constitutional authority for building a Pacific railroad
was deduced from the "war powers" of the Federal Government, and, though
it was not definitely stated that the road should pass through the
recent annexation, it was commonly understood that such was the purpose
of the President and that the lower South was to be the economic and
social beneficiary of the great improvement. Arkansas, Texas, and
California were willing and anxious to build the parts of the road that
passed through their territory. With the exception of a group of
Gulf-city representatives and some of the up-country Democrats of the
older South, the leaders of the party approved the plan, and Pierce made
the Pacific railroad the burden of his first annual message to Congress.
Congress voted the money for the preliminary survey of five routes to
the Pacific, and confided the work to Jefferson Davis, the recognized
leader of the Administration. The people of the country, long familiar
with the arguments of Asa Whitney and others in favor of such an
undertaking, made no objection, though men of political foresight saw
the far-reaching purposes of the scheme.
To effect the second object of the Democratic program, the purchase of
Cuba, Pierre Soulé, of Louisiana, was sent to Spain. Soulé was one of
the most ardent of Southern expansionists, and his mission was not
relished at Madrid any more than it was approved by conservative
Eastern Democrats. In support of the new Spanish Minister, John Y.
Mason, of Virginia, and James Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, both former
members of the Polk Cabinet, were sent as Ministers to France and
England respectively. Soulé made little progress till the Black Warrior,
an American coasting vessel, was seized in 1854 by the Spanish
authorities in Havana and searched in the expectation of finding
evidence that the people of the United States were still assisting the
Cuban insurrectionists. No proof was discovered, and the people of the
country, especially those of the South, were greatly excited; for a time
it seemed that war would ensue. Davis and Soulé pressed the case upon
the President, at the risk of war and perhaps in the hope that war would
follow and that thus Cuba, so long coveted, would fall into the lap of
the United States. But Marcy, though ambitious of annexing Cuba, was
hard pressed by Eastern public opinion, and he persuaded Pierce to
recall his hasty minister. This was not done, however, until the three
ministers concerned had met at Ostend in the autumn of 1855 and
published to the world the manifesto which declared it to be the purpose
of their Government not to allow any other European country to get
possession of Cuba, and which further stated that the United States was
always ready to pay a fair price for the island. A more moderate man
succeeded Soulé, but the subject was pressed at Madrid with increasing
persistence during the remainder of that and the next Administration.
The third item of the Democratic policy, the expansion of American
commerce, was furthered by a continuation of the subsidies to steamship
companies like the Collins line, which put upon the ocean many vessels
of the best and largest build. Even more was planned in offering Robert
J. Walker the mission to China, and the appointment of Townsend Harris,
a wealthy New York merchant, as consul to Ningpo, Japan. Walker
declined, but Harris accepted, and within two years, with the assistance
of Commodore Perry, he succeeded in opening the hermit kingdom to the
civilization and commerce of the United States. It was the beginning of
modern Japan, and it marked a new stage in the development of American
trade in the Orient. In all these measures Pierce met with some
opposition in the East, particularly in the rough handling of the Cuban
question; and there was much dislike of the Southern filibustering
against Lower California and, especially at the close of the
Administration, against Nicaragua, which was seized by William Walker,
the Tennessee imperialist already mentioned, and proclaimed in 1856 a
slave State. But the opposition was rather to the spirit and tone of
things, and the very plain subserviency of the President to Southern
wishes, than against expansion as such. The real resistance to Pierce
came on another matter and in the most unexpected way, in the struggle
over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.
The stone rejected of the builders really became the head of the corner,
for in spite of all that the Pierce Administration could do, the problem
of the Northwest, which Douglas personified, became the bone of
contention between the sections, and again, as in 1850, the South, the
East, and the Northwest struggled for supremacy. When the Davis plans
for a southern Pacific railroad were maturing, Senator Douglas, the head
of the Senate Committee on Territories, was preparing to renew his
six-year fight for the opening of the wide Nebraska hinterland of his
section. The squatters of the Kansas and the Platte River Valleys were
already confronted with hostile Indians who protested against the
unlawful seizure of their lands. And now that wheat and corn were
becoming great staple crops, the Northwestern pioneers were loudly
demanding that the natives should not be permitted to cumber the ground.
They must move on to the arid desert beyond or be carried into the
Southern country, which Davis, as we have seen, was trying to open to
Southern pioneers. It was a real conflict of interest between the lower
South and the Northwest, and in order to win, the Northwestern
politicians must find allies in the East as Clay had done in 1825-36,
though Douglas as an "old-line" Democrat could not so readily see this.
He resorted to management and _finesse_. He found two delegates from
Nebraska in Washington in December, 1853, one from what was soon to be
Kansas, the other from the pioneers of Nebraska. It was natural,
therefore, for him to change his Nebraska bill of the former sessions
into a bill for the creation of two Territories, with the two rival
delegates as their prospective spokesmen in Congress. Besides, Douglas,
who was a consummate politician, would have two more loyal followers and
two other embryo States in his wing of the Democratic party.
[Illustration: Conflicting Sectional Interests, 1850-1860]
Hence Douglas prepared for the removal of the Indians, for the creation
of two Territories instead of one, and he enlisted in his cause the
Senators and Representatives of Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin,
by showing them that their own schemes for the granting of public lands
to assist in the building of railroads would be furthered by their
voting for the opening of Nebraska. Every economic and political
instinct of the people of the Northwest tended to enlist them in the
cause of Douglas and Nebraska. And it was known to most of the Chicago
public and big business men that a Pacific railroad was to be laid from
Council Bluffs, a point already in railroad connection with Chicago, to
San Francisco, in the event of the rapid development of the Platte River
country. But St. Louis and Missouri leaders would oppose this because
they had been fighting since 1848 to get a railway to the Pacific
directly from Kansas City.
There was, however, a vigorous pro-slavery party in Missouri, led by
David Atchison. This party had overthrown Benton, and their first
purpose was the making of Kansas a slave State. It was the western half
of Missouri which now controlled the State, and the commercial element
of St. Louis, to which the Pacific railroad was so attractive, was in
the minority. Douglas won Atchison and western Missouri to his plans by
holding out to them that their contention, as old as Missouri itself,
that the Compromise of 1820 was unconstitutional, might be granted by
Congress. When this was fully appreciated, Kentucky and Tennessee
leaders became interested. Southern newspapers took up the discussion
and Douglas immediately became a statesman. Even Jefferson Davis was led
to commit himself to the new Kansas-Nebraska Bill when the anti-slavery
men of the East began to attack it. And on Sunday, January 22, Pierce
promised Douglas the official support of the Administration.
The bill now provided for two Territories west of the Missouri River,
for the formal repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and for the adoption
of the old Cass doctrine of popular sovereignty, whereby the settlers in
the new communities were to determine for themselves whether they would
have slaves or not. If any dispute arose as to this a test was to be
made of the question in the United States courts. This looked like a
surrender of a large part of the public domain to the South, and the
repeal of the semi-sacred Compromise was perhaps the boldest proposition
that had ever been offered in Congress. Still the great purpose was the
development of the Northwest, and wise public men might have seen that
the populous free States of the Northwest would inevitably win and make
the 400,000 square miles of Nebraska free territory; and if the railroad
bills which Douglas supported and tied to his main measure by all kinds
of promises passed, the supremacy of the Northwest would be certain.
But the weakness of popular government is the fact that public men are
seldom strong enough to deny themselves the opportunity of an appeal to
the people on a side issue, if such appeal promises political victory.
The day that Douglas introduced his bill, there appeared in the New
York papers, _The Appeal of the Independent Democrats_, signed by
Senators Chase and Sumner and the Free-Soil members of the House. It was
an able protest against the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and a
denunciation of the "unscrupulous politician" who made this surrender of
national and free States rights in order to secure for himself the
coveted Presidency. The essential purpose of the Douglas legislation,
the rapid upbuilding of the Northwest and the blocking of the Davis
plans for a Pacific railroad, were entirely overlooked. A wave of
excitement swept over the East and the New England colonies of the
Northwest. Petitions poured into Congress, meetings were held to
denounce Douglas as a second Benedict Arnold, and he was burned in
effigy by thousands who never took the trouble to read the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill or seriously contemplated its effects. In Congress
Chase, Sumner, Seward, and even moderates like Edward Everett denounced
the ambitious politician from Illinois who had dared to "sell the
birthright of the free States for a mess of pottage." It was a revival
of the sectional hatred, as well as of the fears of the aggressive
planters who had enticed Douglas to go one step farther than he had
intended.
Though the South had begun to fear the consequences of popular
sovereignty and to see that Douglas was only making the more certain the
power of his group of States, its spokesmen felt compelled to support
him in a fight against abolitionists and anti-slavery agitators.
Alexander Stephens, an able Whig leader of Georgia, and most other
members of that party in the South, gave Douglas hearty support. The
struggle developed into a fight between the East and the South. A great
many of the followers of Douglas were won away from the original program
when it seemed a mere question of slavery extension, and the Democrats
of the Northwest divided sharply. After four months of angry debate and
unprecedented log-rolling the bill became law, and the President
promptly organized Kansas and Nebraska as Territories. Members of
Congress went home after the adjournment to face their constituents, and
a most exciting campaign followed. In Wisconsin and Michigan a new party
was organized. Its appeal was to the fundamental American doctrines that
all men are equal and that no great interests should rule the country.
It received immediate support in the two States mentioned, and in all
the counties of the Northwest where the New England influence was
predominant, in northern Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Naturally the
remnants of the old party organizations, the Whigs and the Free-Soilers,
lent enthusiastic support.
Chase and Sumner had called into being a new idealist movement
resembling that which had overwhelmed the Federalists in 1800, and a
group of new leaders, soon to become famous, emerged. In addition to the
well-known names already mentioned, there now appeared the kindly,
shrewd Abraham Lincoln, of Kentucky and Illinois; J. W. Grimes arose in
Iowa to threaten a Democratic machine which had never known defeat;
Zachary Chandler, of Michigan, was making ready the stroke which was to
unhorse the great and popular Cass; and Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio,
joined Chase and Giddings, thus making up the trio which was to rule
that State for years to come. The young and vigorous Republican party of
the Northwest, guided by this company of ambitious "new" politicians,
readily effected the union of East and Northwest which Adams and Clay
had long striven in vain to perfect. The work of Chase, Seward, Lincoln,
and Sumner of these years paralleled that of Calhoun, Jackson, and
Benton in 1828; and as a result the Democrats lost their hold on the
legislatures of nearly all the States above the Ohio and the Missouri
Rivers, and their overwhelming majority in the Federal House of
Representatives disappeared as if overnight.
While the new Republican party, almost wholly sectional in its origin
and perhaps in its purposes, was winning leadership in the country, the
more conservative Whigs of the East sought to affiliate with a small
organization of nativists who called themselves Americans and whose
slogan was "America for Americans." Foreigners should be barred from
citizenship and Catholics should be ostracized. In the South most
followers of Clay and in the East many admirers of Webster avoided a
complete surrender to the Democrats by stopping in this halfway house.
The "Know-Nothings," as the party was called in derision of their
failure to answer questions about their platform, gained so many
followers from the dissatisfied elements of the older parties that in
1855 it seemed likely they would sweep the country. In Virginia they
made their most spectacular campaign. Henry A. Wise, a Whig who had
gone into the Democratic party with Stephens, was their greatest
opponent, and in the gubernatorial campaign of 1855 he completely
discomfited them; in Georgia they likewise lost their contest. The South
was accepting the Democratic leadership and becoming solid, as Calhoun
had prayed that it might become. In the East, Seward and Weed persuaded
most of the Whigs to unite with the Republicans, and when the first
national convention of the Americans met in 1856, it was clear that its
leaders could not hold the Southern and Eastern wings together on the
slavery question. The anti-slavery Americans bolted, and the remnant
which remained nominated ex-President Fillmore, who in the succeeding
election received a majority in only one State, Maryland, though his
popular vote was nearly a million. The parties of the future were
plainly the Democratic, Southern, pro-slavery, and well organized, and
the Republican, Northern, we may now say, anti-slavery, and also well
organized.
Meanwhile the frontiersmen from Iowa and Missouri were trying to work
out the principle of popular sovereignty in Kansas, and their Governor,
Andrew Reeder, was doing what he could to assist them. Anti-slavery aid
societies in the East sent resolute men to Kansas to vote and save the
Territory from slavery, and pro-slavery lodges in Missouri went across
the border to vote against and perhaps to shoot Free-State men who
disputed the right of the South to plant and to maintain slavery there.
Under these circumstances the first election for members of the
territorial legislature was a farce. Yet Reeder felt obliged to let the
new assembly go on with its work of making easy the immigration of
masters with their "property"; when he went East a little later he took
occasion to protest in a public address against the intrusion of
Missouri voters. He was regretfully removed from office, though he
returned to Kansas to coöperate with Charles Robinson, a Californian of
political experience, in the organization of the Free-State party, which
refused to recognize the territorial legislature and which met in
voluntary convention at Topeka in the autumn of 1855 and drew a state
constitution. In this document slavery was outlawed. Following the
example of California, representatives of the new government asked for
prompt admission to the Union.
The Southerners had never recognized California as properly within the
Union, and the pro-Southern party in Kansas made open war upon the
Topeka party in December. Lawrence, the anti-slavery headquarters, was
besieged, but the new governor managed to compromise so as to prevent
bloodshed, and the two governments of Kansas continued to exist. The
Federal Congress was compelled to decide which of the questionable
governments should be recognized as lawful. Since the Senate was
Democratic and pro-Southern, and the House Republican and pro-Northern,
a decision was impossible. The Topeka constitution was supported by the
House, and even the fair and reasonable bill of the Senate offered by
Toombs in 1856 was rejected. This called for a submission of both
parties in Kansas to an election safeguarded against unlawful
interference from any source. It seemed that Seward, Chase, and their
friends did not desire a settlement before the election. And Sumner's
speech on the "Crime of Kansas" was a challenge to war. He compared
Douglas to "the noisome squat and nameless animal whose tongue switched
a perpetual stench," and Senator Butler, of South Carolina, a leader of
the highest character, was a man who could not open his mouth but to
lie.
The war of the sections was now renewed in the most bitter form, as was
shown when Preston Brooks, a kinsman of Butler, assaulted Sumner a day
or two after the speech, resigned his seat in the House as
Representative from South Carolina, and was immediately reëlected.
Sumner retired from the Senate, a hero in all New England, and
Massachusetts ostentatiously refused to fill the vacant seat during the
next three years, thus constantly reminding her people of Sumner's
vituperation and the South Carolina assault.
When the Democrats met in their national convention in Cincinnati in
June, the struggle in Kansas still went on, and the excitement of the
Sumner-Brooks affair had not subsided. All elements of the South were
represented, and the American party showed no signs of being able to
carry a single Southern State. The convention accepted Douglas's popular
sovereignty as its platform, but nominated Buchanan as its candidate. He
was "available" because he had been out of the country for four years
and had said nothing on the Kansas quarrel. John C. Breckinridge, of
Kentucky, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency in the hope of winning
Tennessee and Kentucky, which had not voted for a Democratic candidate
since Jackson.
The Republicans used the "Crime of Kansas" as politicians always use
such opportunities, and they made an appeal to the Revolutionary
tradition by calling their convention on the anniversary of the battle
of Bunker Hill, June 17. They had not a _bona fide_ delegation from any
Southern State. But the Declaration of Independence, overlooked by both
parties for many years, was made a part of the platform. The Pacific
railway was indorsed and internal improvements at federal expense were
again recommended to the country. John C. Frémont, son-in-law of Benton
and an explorer of national fame, was nominated for the Presidency. The
campaign had already been waging since the introduction of the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill. It now became intense. Douglas gave Buchanan his
loyal support, and the great Southern planters united with New York
merchants and New England conservatives to make the Democratic ticket
successful. Even Edward Everett and Rufus Choate made public
announcement of their conversion to Democracy. Large sums of money were
sent to Pennsylvania to influence the vote. Southern governors in a
conference at Raleigh proposed secession if the Democrats failed, and
Eastern radicals urged the break-up of the Union if the slave power
continued in control.
The result was a victory for the conservatives, or "reactionaries," as
we should perhaps say. The solid South voted for Buchanan; and
Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, and California were found in the same
column. Frémont received the support of a solid East and all the
Northwest except the States just mentioned. The fear of radicalism and
the distrust of men of great wealth everywhere had defeated the young
Republicans; the returns showed that the Democrats had polled 200,000
more votes than in 1852, and there was no reason to believe that the
874,000 which had been cast for Fillmore would not in the end be given
to the conservative Democrats in preference to the sectional
Republicans. There was no chance for the enthusiastic followers of
Seward and Chase unless the majority party could be broken into
factions, and this a wise and able Democratic leadership would avoid.
Strangely Buchanan formed his Cabinet without consulting Douglas, so far
as can now be ascertained. No friend of his was appointed to high
office, yet the support of the Northwest was the one condition of
continued success. In the foreign policy the new Administration made no
change. A part of northern Mexico and all of Cuba were still coveted
and, till the outbreak of the Civil War, efforts were made to obtain
both. Howell Cobb, of Georgia, was the master spirit of the Cabinet, and
Jefferson Davis was the Administration leader in the Senate.
The Supreme Court, composed of seven pro-Southern members as against two
anti-slavery men, undertook to give a _coup de grace_ to the quarrel
about slavery in the Territories. The Missouri Compromise had never been
passed upon by the court. Now a case came before the august tribunal
which gave opportunity for the judges to say whether slavery could be
prohibited by federal authority in the public domain. Dred Scott, a
slave belonging to a Missouri master, had been carried into Minnesota
and there held in bondage. He sued for his freedom on the ground that
slavery was unlawful in free territory, under the Compromise. The case
was before the court nearly a year before the judges gave out their
opinion that Scott was not a citizen of the United States, and that,
therefore, he could not sue in the federal courts. The case was
dismissed. But the judges granted a rehearing of the case, and in March,
1857, hoping to assist the country to a peaceful solution of the slavery
problem, gave out a so-called _dictum_, which it had been the custom of
the court occasionally to submit to the public.[9] In this document the
judges said that the negro was property, and that as such the Federal
Government must protect it in the Territories. This was the Calhoun
doctrine, and the South rejoiced immoderately; the Republicans now began
to realize that the courts were in alliance with the slave-power, and
they were forced to attack the most sacred political institution in the
country.
[Footnote 9: Chief Justice Marshall had set the example for this in his
Marbury _vs._ Madison _dictum_.]
Both parties turned to Kansas to see what could be won there. During the
spring of 1856, when Sumner and Brooks were manifesting the spirit of
the members of Congress, the Southern and Northern groups in Kansas
carried their warfare to similar extremes. Lawrence was destroyed by the
pro-slavery men; the anti-slavery men returned the stroke in the
massacres on Pottawatomie Creek. John Brown, a fanatical New England
emigrant, imagined himself to be commissioned of Heaven to kill all the
pro-slavery people who fell into his hands, and he did a bloody work
which under other conditions would have been counted as murder and
denounced everywhere. But in the autumn of 1856 wealthy and benevolent
men in the North applauded him, gave him money, and held meetings in his
honor.
Into a Kansas frenzied with the work of Brown on the one side and that
of the "border ruffians," as the Missourians were called, on the other,
the President sent Robert J. Walker as governor, commissioned to solve
the insoluble problem. So great was the faith of the country in Walker
that he was hailed as the next President of the United States by
fair-minded men and important newspapers. Walker called an election for
a constitutional convention. Again the Missourians participated, and the
Lecompton constitution was the result. The Free-State men refused to
recognize the convention unless the new constitution should be submitted
to a fair vote. This the convention refused to do, and the governor
appealed to the President to compel submission. This was denied, and
Walker resigned. The Lecompton, pro-slavery constitution of Kansas was
submitted to the first Congress of Buchanan in December, 1857, and the
Administration urged its adoption. Walker openly condemned Buchanan for
deserting him, and he declared the Lecompton constitution to be a fraud.
Yet the leaders of the South, resentful and angry, supported it, and the
majority of the Senate was on the same side. The judges of the Supreme
Court were known to favor it. The Republicans urged the adoption of the
Topeka constitution of 1855, and the majority of the people seemed to be
of the same view. What was the way out of the dangerous _impasse_?
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Most interesting and trustworthy accounts of subjects discussed in the
chapter are: T. C. Smith's _Parties and Slavery_, in _American Nation_
series; F. Bancroft's _The Life of William H. Seward_ (1900); Allen
Johnson's _The Life of Stephen A. Douglas_ (1908); O. G. Villard's _John
Brown; a Biography_ (1910); L. D. Scisco's _Political Nativism in New
York_ (1901); William Salter's _Life of James W. Grimes_ (1876); George
W. Julian's _Life of Joshua R. Giddings_ (1892). Rhodes, McMaster, and
Schouler treat the period critically. Some special studies of importance
are P. O. Ray's _Repeal of the Missouri Compromise_ (1909); Allen
Johnson's _Genesis of Popular Sovereignty_ (_Iowa Journal of History and
Politics_, _III_); F. H. Hodder's _Douglas and the Kansas-Nebraska Act_
(_Wisconsin Historical Society Proceedings_, 1912); and E. S. Corwin's
_The Dred Scott Decision_ (_American Historical Review_, _XVII_).
Some of the most instructive contemporary narratives will be found in M.
W. Cluskey's _Political Text Book_ (1857), and _Speeches, Messages, and
other Writings of A. G. Brown_ (1859); H. Wilson's _Rise and Fall of the
Slave Power_ (1872-77); Horace Greeley's _The American Conflict_ (1864);
Mrs. Jefferson Davis's _Jefferson Davis; a Memoir_ (1890); J. M. Cutts's
_Constitutional and Party Questions_ (1866); S. J. May's _Recollections
of the Anti-Slavery Conflict_ (1869); _Works of Charles Sumner_
(1874-83), and many other works of a similar character.
William McDonald's _Select Documents_ gives the most important sources
for this whole period. But the _Congressional Globe_, _U.S. Documents,
House Reports_, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. _II_, must be studied in
order to get the spirit of the times.