JACKSON VS. BIDDLE
I
Congress adjourned two days before the second inauguration of Jackson,
which lacked the spectacular features of the first. His brief inaugural
address revealed absolute confidence in the approval of the people.
There was nothing on the surface to warn of his purpose to continue an
aggressive war upon the Bank. The transfer of Livingston from the State
Department to the Legation in Paris necessitated a reorganization of the
Cabinet. Louis McLane, unsympathetic toward the President’s Bank policy,
was moved from the Treasury to the State Department. This left the
secretaryship of the Treasury vacant, and it was of the highest
importance that it be filled by one in complete harmony with the
Executive plans.
The choice finally fell on William J. Duane of Philadelphia, variously
described as “a distinguished lawyer” and as “the bottom of the
Philadelphia bar.” His selection had been recommended by Van Buren[610]
and urged by McLane, who was Van Buren’s intimate at the time.[611] He
was at least known to Jackson as the son of the fighting editor of the
“Aurora,” which had led the fight against the Alien and Sedition
Laws.[612] Assuming in the son the militant qualities of the father, and
actuated partly, perhaps, by the thought that the appointment would
strengthen the Administration in its fight upon the Bank, Duane was
pressed to enter the Cabinet, and consented. The personality and
character of Duane are dim on the page of history. The Democratic press
was apparently hard put to explain the appointment. The “Harrisburg
Chronicle” described him as possessing “a well disciplined mind, severe
habits of business, which, combined with sound Democratic principles and
unbending integrity, are the highest recommendations for office in a
free popular government.” Thomas Ritchie, of the “Richmond Enquirer,”
who made a more studied effort, feared that the appointment would
“scarcely be hailed with the feeling of approbation which it so richly
deserves.” But Duane understood “the character of the Bank of the United
States--its designs and dangers,” and “on that cardinal subject we have
no doubt he will deserve and command the confidence of the friends of
the Constitution.” The “Pennsylvanian” informed the National Democracy
that “Stephen Gerard saw and appreciated his talents,” and that he was
“one of the most sagacious men of the age.”[613] It was only after his
break with Jackson that the champions of the Bank discovered his many
virtues, and Administration circles his utter insignificance. One of
Jackson’s enemies, in berating him, referred to Duane as “that other
darling whom you fished up from the desk of a dead miser, and the bottom
of the Philadelphia bar.”[614] At first, however, Jackson was much
impressed with his discovery, and frequently referred to him as “a chip
of the old block, sir.”
Having reorganized his Cabinet, Jackson now concentrated on his plans
for the invasion of “the enemy’s country”--his New England tour. His
remarkable popularity in that quarter, previously so hostile, grew out
of his vigorous defense of the Union and his new relations with Webster.
In the spring of 1833 these relations were most cordial, and never were
to become personally bitter. At that time he was not on speaking terms
with either Clay or Calhoun, and when he met Adams on the street, by
chance, he bowed stiffly, without a word. But whenever, in his
meanderings about the dingy capital, he encountered Webster, the iron
man would pause for a hearty greeting. And while Webster never ceased to
consider Jackson temperamentally unfit for the Presidency, he never
doubted his integrity or whole-hearted patriotism. “His patriotism,” he
was wont to say, “is no more to be questioned than that of
Washington.”[615]
It was early in June that Jackson set forth in company with Van Buren,
Cass, Woodbury, Donelson, Hill, and the artist, Earle, who lived at the
White House. From the moment the party reached Baltimore it was one
continuous ovation. Received like a conquering hero in Philadelphia,
with an enthusiasm bordering on idolatry in New York City,[616] the
ovations he received in Massachusetts eclipsed them all. Harvard
conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Laws, Everett delivered an
address of welcome at the foot of Bunker Hill, and while the multitude
went wild at sight of him in the streets and on the Common, the gentry
of Beacon Street refused him the homage of appearing at the
windows,[617] and the crabbed Adams, hiding at his Quincy home, a few
miles away, poured forth his spleen upon his journal and mourned the
degradation of his Alma Mater.[618] Under the load of adulation, the old
man’s strength finally failed, and during the last part of his progress
he dragged himself from his bed to the parade, and from the physician
with his barbarous lancet to the master of ceremonies.[619] Throughout
the tour his thoughts were centered on the Bank and his plans for the
removal of the deposits, and but few suspected that the courtly old
man, whose eyes moistened and beamed at the applause of the crowds, was
meditating the step.
When Hamilton called upon him at his hotel in New York, he found him
obsessed with the subject. When the son of the father of the first
National Bank joined him in the presidential suite to accompany him to
the banquet, Jackson placed in his hands papers by several people urging
the removal of the deposits, with the request that he examine them
carefully and give him an opinion. Promising a careful perusal, Hamilton
ventured the suggestion that the proposed step was “a very questionable
one” that would “lead to great disturbances in commercial affairs.”[620]
Meanwhile, when alone with Van Buren, the President was discussing the
project with him to his keen distress.[621] Throughout the tour, sick or
well, Jackson found time to work on the Vice-President and favorite, and
when, at Concord, he finally won him over to the plan, the frail old man
abandoned the tour and hastened back to Washington to begin a new
battle.[622] And Adams, learning of the curtailment of the trip, wrote
that “President Jackson has been obliged by the feeble state of his
health to give up the remainder of his tour.”[623] Just how feeble
Jackson was we shall soon see.
II
It is impossible definitely to determine the time Jackson decided on the
removal of the deposits. The activity of the Bank in the presidential
campaign had not been lost upon him, and he probably had it under
consideration at that time. The historian of the Bank is convinced that
such was the case.[624] Immediately after the election these rumors
multiplied, and Biddle was deluged with warnings, but without disturbing
the sublime serenity of his conceit. The autocrat of the Bank was
satisfied that the Calhoun following would thereafter be arrayed in
favor of the recharter. About this time Dr. Thomas Cooper, then
president of the College of South Carolina and one of the intellectual
leaders of Nullification, wrote him of his allegiance to the cause.[625]
Blair had already charged, in the “Globe,” that there was a coalition
between the forces of Clay, Calhoun, and Biddle, and made much of the
fact that more Bank stock was owned in South Carolina than in all the
other States of the Union south of the Potomac and west of the Alleghany
Mountains.[626] The Democratic disaffection, together with the temporary
alliance between Jackson and Webster, was quite enough to restore
confidence to the ever sanguine Biddle,[627] who took no pains to
conceal his satisfaction. This was water on the wheel of Blair, who,
Iago-like, and always at Jackson’s elbow, kept impressing him with the
idea that the Bank planned and expected an ultimate triumph. In this
work he was ably seconded by Amos Kendall and James A. Hamilton, who
wrote from New York that “a gentleman whose knowledge of the views of
the U.S. Bank is only second to that of its President” had informed him
that it expected to get a new charter.[628] It was firmly believed by
Amos Kendall that the Bank’s purpose in adding $28,000,000 to its
discounts, and multiplying its debtors and dependents, was to serve a
political end in the campaign of 1836, and with characteristic
persistency he urged the removal of the deposits to prevent their use
for political purposes.[629] Jackson himself feared the effect of loans
and legal retainers to members of the Congress. In all these suspicions
there was ample justification.[630] It did not require much, knowing as
he did the character of the banker, to persuade Jackson that his duty
was plain, and during the winter and spring of 1833 he was in frequent
consultation with Roger Taney, Amos Kendall, and Frank Blair, the three
men responsible for the step he took.
During these days of mysterious conferences, the conservative members of
the Cabinet, and Van Buren with the traditional timidity of the
candidate, were gravely concerned. To none was the prospect more
appalling than to Louis McLane, then Secretary of the Treasury, a
conservative, a former Federalist, and a prospective candidate for the
Presidency. In his anxiety he sent for Kendall, avowed his doubts, and
asked for information. In the end he frankly confessed that he was not
satisfied as to the wisdom of the step, but that he would execute the
plan if called upon to do so by the President. The interview was
friendly, and Kendall returned to his office and prepared, for McLane’s
edification, an elaborate argument in favor of the removal. It is
characteristic of Kendall that, while the paper lightly touched upon the
alleged insecurity of the deposits, the greater part of the paper was a
discussion of the political effect. The hostility of the Bank to the
Administration, he thought, could not be intensified. If the deposits
were placed with the State banks, they would become partisans of the
Administration. The people of the Southern and Western States would be
pleased, and the New York banks, always jealous of the financial
preëminence of Philadelphia, would at least secretly rejoice. The New
England States were not concerned, one way or the other, and could be
safely ignored. And in the end, Kendall insisted that a failure to
remove the deposits would make a recharter certain. That this letter,
written March 16, 1833, was promptly placed in the hands of Van Buren,
who was McLane’s sponsor in the Administration, there can be no doubt.
The aftermath of the letter came a few days later, when Van Buren,
meeting Kendall at a White House dinner, warmly protested against the
plans of the Kitchen Cabinet. The genius of that famous group rose from
the table in his excitement, declared that failure to remove the
deposits made a Whig victory certain in 1836, and that he was prepared
to lay down his pen. “I can live under a corrupt despotism,” he
exclaimed, “as well as any other man by keeping out of its way, which I
shall certainly do.”[631] It was the Vice-President and not the auditor
of the Treasury who afterwards apologized.
It was under these conditions that Jackson propounded a series of
questions to his Cabinet, with a preliminary statement that he favored
the removal. The first count of noses in the official household showed
Livingston and Cass for the Bank, Barry and Taney against it, with
Woodbury hedging. McLane, having greater responsibility as the head of
the Treasury, took two months in the preparation of an exhaustive reply
opposing the removal, and his argument was afterwards to be used against
the Administration.
A month after Congress had adjourned there was a relaxation of tension
in Bank circles and among the conservatives of the Administration party,
who assumed that nothing would be done during the congressional recess.
The hostility of a majority of the Cabinet had not abated, and Biddle
thought that the deposits were safe.
But if the official Cabinet was to hear no more, for months, of the
proposed removal, the Kitchen Cabinet went into almost continuous
session for the consideration of this one subject. The disposal of the
deposits, and the time for making the removal, were the principal
subjects discussed during those spring days in the White House, and it
required but little discussion to determine upon the time. Hugh Lawson
White strongly urged the postponement of action until Congress
convened, but this was instantly overruled by Taney and Kendall, who
urged a recess removal for different reasons. The Attorney-General
favored such action “because it is desirable that the members should be
among their constituents when the measure is announced, and should bring
with them when they come here, the feelings and sentiments of the
people.”[632] Kendall suggested another reason, also political. The
conservatives had made some impression on Jackson’s mind with the
warning that, if he removed the deposits, Congress would order them
restored, and he appealed to Kendall for his opinion. “If I were
certain,” said Kendall, “that Congress would direct them to be restored,
still they ought to be removed, and any order by Congress for their
restoration disregarded; for it is the only means by which this
embodiment of power which aims to govern Congress and the country can be
destroyed.” And, to this militant advice, he added his reasons for
favoring the removal during the congressional recess. “Let the removal
take place so early as to give us several months to defend the measure
in the ‘Globe,’ and we will bring up the people to sustain you with a
power which Congress dare not resist.”[633]
Meanwhile Duane had reached Washington and assumed his duties. Soon
after his arrival, Kendall was surprised to find him loath to discuss
the removal, and when the story of this reticence was carried to
Jackson, he explained to his Secretary of the Treasury what was wanted.
When Duane demurred, he was told to take his time and report on the
President’s return from New England. By this time Amos Kendall had
assumed the leadership, and he was instructed to interview the head of
the Treasury during Jackson’s absence.
At this time Van Buren, waiting in New York to join his chief on his
tour, was blissfully ignorant of the embarrassments that awaited him
until he received a letter written on the day Jackson set forth on his
journey. “The Bank and change of deposits have engrossed my mind much,”
he wrote; “it is a perplexing subject, and I wish your opinion before I
finally act.” Three days later, while Jackson was receiving the plaudits
of the multitude, Kendall made the situation clear, in a letter to Van
Buren, announcing that the removal had been determined upon and
outlining the tentative plans. Nothing could have been more painful to
the Vice-President, who had strongly urged that, with the veto of the
recharter bill, the Bank be permitted quietly to go its way to the
termination of its charter.
III
While Jackson between illnesses and ovations was bringing the power of
his compelling personality to bear upon his protégé’s timidity, Kendall
was following instructions in Washington in attempting to ascertain the
intentions of Duane. In this he was wholly unsuccessful. Time and again
the subject was broached only to be brushed aside, and Jackson,
constantly informed, had some savage moments while smiling urbanely upon
the crowds.
Reaching the capital on July 4th, he immediately summoned Duane to a
conference. The Secretary, who had been ill, rose from a sick-bed and
presented himself at the White House looking pale and feeble. At the
sight of his wan adviser, the impulsive Jackson penitently grasped both
his hands, reproved him for venturing forth in such a condition, and
kindly postponed the interview until he had recovered.[634] After an
absence of eight days Duane appeared at the White House again, with a
lengthy letter setting forth his reasons for objecting to the removal
until after Congress had been informed. Three days later, or on July
15th, another conference between Jackson and his rebellious Secretary
was held with Duane stubbornly holding his ground, and Jackson kindness
itself. In truth, it appears that, with the aid of McLane, Duane had
succeeded in arousing some misgivings in Jackson’s mind as to the
possibility of persuading the State banks to accept the deposits.
“Send me to ask them, and I will settle that question,” said Kendall.
“You shall go,” Jackson replied.
Summoning the unhappy Duane, the President announced a postponement of
discussions until the attitude of the State banks could be ascertained.
Kendall was to be the agent of the Treasury on a tour of investigation,
and Duane was to prepare the necessary instructions.
When these instructions were delivered to Kendall, he was amazed. They
merely asked the opinions of the banks on the general question, and, in
view of their well-established hostility, it was clear enough what the
answer would be. Wrathfully hastening to the White House, Kendall
bluntly refused to carry instructions so framed, declaring the sole
purpose of the investigation should be to learn whether State banks
would accept the deposits. He was told to prepare his own instructions,
and thus the head of the Kitchen Cabinet sallied forth on his own terms.
About the same time, Jackson, in need of a rest and release from the
sultry atmosphere of Washington, went to Rip Raps in Hampton Roads,
where he was accustomed to relax in the summer, accompanied by Frank
Blair. Thus, with one member of the Kitchen Cabinet making a tour of the
banks on his own instructions, another was at Jackson’s elbow in the
unconventional environment of Rip Raps.[635] All these various moves
were promptly reported to Biddle by some member of the Administration,
and on the day Kendall was expected in Philadelphia, the financial
autocrat was writing to Dr. Cooper, his new ally, in laudation of the
firmness of Duane and the viciousness of the Kitchen Cabinet.[636]
Meanwhile, in his visits to the banks of Baltimore, Philadelphia, New
York, and Boston, Kendall was pulled and hauled and mauled by both the
servitors of the Bank and the conservatives of the Administration
circle. At Philadelphia it was hinted that a fortune was within his
grasp if he would but avail himself of the opportunity.[637] There, too,
he fell foul of James Gordon Bennett, then editor of the
“Pennsylvanian,” whose mask of cordiality was dropped in the publication
of Kendall’s private letters showing hostility to the Bank--as though
private letters were necessary to the proof.[638]
But more significant, and politically more important, was Kendall’s
interview with Van Buren and McLane in New York City. The three met by
chance in the breakfast room of an hotel, and in an interview, then
arranged, it was proposed by the hedging politicians that the removal of
the deposits be postponed until January when Congress would be in
session. This plan originated with McLane, and Kendall, who suspected it
was proposed with the hope and expectation that Congress would
interpose, replied that he would be satisfied provided McLane, Duane,
and the other Bank Democrats would agree to use their personal influence
with members of Congress to have the deposits removed.[639] It was
agreed that all three should write Jackson at Rip Raps, and, in
complying, Kendall said that the proposal was against his judgment, and
Jackson instantly rejected it.[640]
Throughout July the Opposition and Bank papers were warning the public
of the movement on foot, and the “Intelligencer” was especially
alarmed, dwelling at length on the rumor that Kendall was in
Philadelphia before he had even left Washington. Blair was moved to
mirth. He admitted that Kendall had been seen taking a stage, carrying
with him “a large black trunk,” and that, while he “looked charitable,
his intent may be wicked.” Worse still, “the Editor of the ‘Globe’ left
for the South two days before with baggage enough to last a man a
lifetime.” A mysterious, uncanny combination of events, he conceded,
that “bodes to owners of U.S. Bank stock, who purchased at 50 per cent,
no good.”[641]
This facetiousness enraged and alarmed the Opposition, and its press
began to threaten to impeach Duane if he removed the deposits. Kendall
was scourged with excoriations, and State banks were warned against
taking the deposits on pain of the displeasure of the Biddle
institution. Papers under the influence of the Bank, but still posing as
Jacksonian, were sure that Jackson “and his able Secretary of the
Treasury” would “not be hurried or retarded in his important measure by
the violent and indiscreet denunciations and threats of any set of men,”
and would “act on the deposits at the proper time and in the proper
way.”[642] And Blair, catching the subtle suggestion of Bennett,
hastened to assail him as having been “smuggled into the confidence of
an unsuspecting Democracy as a friend of the cause” and as a
“treacherous instrument of Webb and Biddle,” who had “the impudence to
propose by praise to flatter the President and his Cabinet to adopt the
views of the Bank.”[643] From his sanctum in the office of the “Albany
Journal,” Thurlow Weed, wisest of the Whig journalists, sent forth the
threat of panic. “We are impatient for the removal,” he wrote. “Nothing
short of a general ruin will cure the people of their delusions, and the
sooner it comes, the better.”[644]
IV
Meanwhile Jackson at Rip Raps was in daily conference with Frank Blair
on the problems of the removal. All this time Blair was creating the
impression in the “Globe” that the President’s sole thought was the
recovery of his health. The sea air was “proving advantageous,” his
appetite better, his strength returning. Nothing was more remote from
the thoughts of Jackson. The situation was delicate and politically
mixed. The Cabinet was, for the most part, hostile. Conservative
Democrats were terrified at the thought of such radical action, and
feared the complete disruption of the party and its defeat in 1836.
Kendall does not misstate the conditions when he says that “the
ambitious politicians who still surrounded General Jackson, trembled in
their knees, and were ready to fly,” and that “almost the only fearless
and determined supporters he had around him were Mr. Taney, the editor
of the ‘Globe,’ and its few contributors.”[645] The brilliant, but
ultra-conservative Ritchie, of the “Richmond Enquirer,” feared that the
party would “rue the precipitate step in sackcloth and ashes,” and that
it would “present nothing but a splendid ruin.”[646]
Painful as the situation was to all conservatives, it was maddening to
Van Buren, who thought he saw the Presidency slipping from his grasp. In
his desire to get as far away as possible, he was planning a month’s
outing with Washington Irving among the Dutch settlements of Long Island
and the North River, when a letter reached him from Jackson calling upon
him to take a stand. His reply, under date of August 19th, would have
pleased Talleyrand. Having great confidence in Silas Wright, Senator
from New York, he wrote that he would confer with him and then formulate
his views. A little later he wrote that he and Wright favored the
McLane plan. The tone of sharp surprise in Jackson’s response alarmed
the hard-pressed heir apparent, and he hastily wrote that he would yield
to the wisdom of Jackson. But his troubles were not over. Another letter
from Jackson, more alarming still, pursued him to poison his vacation,
summoning him to Washington for a consultation. The cunning politician
never faced a more painful problem. He could not afford to break with
the all-powerful party dictator in the White House--that would be to
abandon the Presidency. Nor was he at all certain that he could afford
to become intimately identified with the desperate enterprise upon which
the chief was determined to embark. The one would deprive him of the
nomination of his party; the other might make that nomination worthless.
The campaign of 1836 was already in full swing, and the Opposition was
insinuating a directing influence between the most unpopular measures of
the Administration and Van Buren. Timid and cautious by temperament, his
peculiar situation accentuated these traits in the candidate, and the
summons to the seat of war sounded to him like the crack of doom.
But he was equal to the crisis. Writing at once of his willingness to
respond if Jackson thought best, he feared his presence in Washington at
the time of the withdrawal would dim the prestige of the act by giving
it the appearance of having been inspired by the moneyed interests of
New York.[647] Having painted this thought, he added some lines for the
protection of Louis McLane, his friend. He was fearful that, on the
resignation of Duane, McLane might feel that he should also tender his,
and that would be a pity. Would it not be a good idea, in the event the
resignation were offered, to reply that “you confide in him &c.,
notwithstanding the difference between you on this point, and that if he
could consistently remain in the Administration, you would be
gratified?” That the suspicious Jackson was deceived is highly
improbable, albeit where his affections were involved, as in the case of
Van Buren, his vision was apt to be occasionally defective.
But Van Buren and his advice were not needed, for a stronger man, with
courage and an iron will equal to his own, was moving to the side of
Jackson. Throughout the months of conferences and discussions the one
member of his official Cabinet who was in whole-hearted sympathy with
the wishes of the Kitchen Cabinet was Roger Taney, the Attorney-General.
Before leaving for Rip Raps, Jackson had discussed with him the steps to
be taken in the event of a definite refusal from Duane to order the
removal, and had intimated that he would transfer Taney to the office of
the Secretary of the Treasury. Just about the time Jackson was puzzling
over the peculiar hedging of Van Buren, he received a letter from Taney
that delighted him. The latter reiterated his conviction that the
deposits should be removed, and during the congressional recess. He was
sure “the powerful and corrupting monopoly” would “be fatal to the
liberties of the people” unless destroyed, and Jackson alone could
encompass its destruction. The President had “already done more than any
other man has done, or could do, to preserve the simplicity and purity
of our institutions, and to guard the country from this dangerous and
powerful instrument of corruption.” He had “doubted” whether Jackson’s
friends and the country had the right to ask him “to bear the brunt of
such a conflict as the removal of the deposits under present conditions
is likely to produce.” He had no desire for the secretaryship of the
Treasury, but he “would not shrink from the responsibility” if, in the
President’s judgment, “the public exigency would require” him to
undertake it.[648] Here was a man quite as persuasive in his flattery as
Van Buren, and prepared, as Van Buren was not, to stake his future upon
an aggressive support of the removal.
For the time being, then, exit Van Buren.
Enter Roger B. Taney.
By this time Jackson’s mind was thoroughly made up. The tour of Kendall
had not been a complete success. The banks were timid and fearful of the
power of “The Monster.” Catterall credits the report that Kendall
himself had concluded the plan unwise, and had admitted to Jackson that
“the project of removing the deposits must be given up.”[649] This
advice, if given,[650] came too late. The old military leader was in the
saddle, war was declared, retreat was defeat. Thus, a few days after
receiving Taney’s letter, Jackson wrote him that he had considered the
probability that Congress would attempt to overawe him, and had
determined that, when Duane withdrew, Taney should step into the place
and conduct the affairs of the Treasury until toward the close of the
next session of Congress, when the battle would have been won or lost,
and the refusal of the Senate to confirm Taney’s nomination would not
interfere. He was only awaiting proof of the expenditure of $40,000 of
Bank money in the campaign. With this proof, of which he had no doubt,
he would feel justified in removing the deposits. The Bank might “rebel
against our power, and even refuse to pay to the order of the Government
the public money in its vaults, and lay claim to all the money that
remains uncalled for on the books of the loan office.” Everywhere he
found the “assumed power of this monster.” This pretension must be
challenged and tested, and he had no doubt of being “sustained by the
people.”[651]
Thus the die was definitely cast at Rip Raps early in September, and
Jackson returned to Washington determined to force the fighting.
V
As soon as he reached the capital, he began to press Duane more
insistently, with the Secretary stubbornly refusing to budge. Some time
before he had voluntarily given the assurance that if the President
should determine upon the course outlined, and he should be unable to
comply, he would promptly tender his resignation. The President’s
intentions were now thoroughly understood, but Duane gave no indication
of a disposition to relinquish his post, and the pro-Bank papers were
decorating him with laurels. The first covert attack upon him from
Administration circles appeared in the “Globe” of September 12th, when
Blair, taking cognizance of an article in the “Baltimore Chronicle,”
denounced it as a “slanderer of Mr. Duane.” “Would the ‘Chronicle’
convert the Secretary of the Treasury into a Bank officer, and have him
communicating to the corporation what belongs only to his relations with
the President?” Even Duane could not have mistaken the implication. Five
days after this article appeared, the Cabinet was convened, and Jackson
took the opinion of his advisers. McLane, Duane, and Cass were against
the step, with Taney, Barry, and Woodbury (who had previously hedged),
favoring it.
On the following day the Cabinet was again convened to hear the
President’s reasons for his determination, set forth in the famous
“Paper Read to the Cabinet.” This document, as read, had been revised
and rewritten from the notes sent by Jackson from his retreat at Hampton
Roads to Taney, and was to become the storm center of congressional
controversy, although it did not concern the Congress in the least.
Beginning with a confession of a fixed hostility to the Bank on the
conviction of its unconstitutionality and danger to the liberties of the
people, he elaborately reviewed the charter controversy. The people had
passed upon his conduct at the polls and he had been overwhelmingly
vindicated. The Nation, therefore, having definitely decided on the
abandonment of the Bank as a place of deposit, some method should be
devised for the future deposit of the public funds before the expiration
of the charter. Under the law, the Secretary of the Treasury could
withdraw the deposits whenever he saw fit, provided he informed Congress
of his act at the earliest opportunity. To leave the deposits with the
Bank until the day of the expiration of the charter with the expectation
of making the transfer to some other depository at once would mean
“serious inconvenience to the Government and people.” Such work, he
thought, “ought not to be the work of months only, but of years,” for
otherwise “much suffering and distress would be brought upon the
people.” These considerations alone, he thought sufficient to justify
the step he proposed.
But in the conduct of the Bank additional and more pressing reasons
could be found. Knowing of the Government’s decision to appropriate the
greater part of its deposits during 1832 to the payment of the public
debt, the Bank, in the sixteen months preceding May, 1832, had extended
its loans more than $28,000,000, and the maximum of the extension had
been made in May. And two months before that, the Bank had so perfectly
understood its inability to pay over the public deposits when called
upon, that it had secretly negotiated with foreign holders of the three
per cent stock a year’s postponement of a demand for payment after
notice should be given by the Government. “This effort to thwart the
Government in the payment of the public debt,” he said, “that it might
retain the public money to be used for their private interests,
palliated by pretenses notoriously unfounded and insincere, would have
justified the instant withdrawal of the public deposits.”
Since the congressional report in favor of the Bank, other things had
occurred that would surely alter the opinion of the lawmakers. “The fact
that the Bank controls, and in some cases substantially owns, and by
its money supports, some of the leading presses of the country, is now
more clearly established.” Extravagant sums had been loaned to editors
on unusual time and nominal security in 1831 and 1832. And the
proceedings and management of the Bank had been unusual and
indefensible. The terms of the charter had been violated; and when
Government directors undertook to restore methods in conformity with the
terms of the charter, they had been disregarded. Worse still: the most
important transactions involving the credit of the Bank had been turned
over to Biddle, and the committees left in utter ignorance of what he
was doing. He had been given unlimited authority in the use of the
Bank’s money for propaganda purposes. Thousands of dollars had been
squandered in the printing of speeches and pamphlets, not only defending
the Bank, but attacking the chosen representatives of the people. If, as
claimed, the Bank could bring distress and chaos in retaliation, all the
more reason for breaking the power of the tyrannical institution. And he
closed by fixing October 1st as the day for action.
As the members of the Cabinet sat in the White House that day under
conflicting emotions, all appreciating the seriousness of the step, and
some contemplating the closing of a career, there could have been none
unmindful of the fact that the Paper was intended less for them than for
the public. It was characteristic of Jackson in preparing his ground for
a fight to speak over the heads of both Cabinet and Congress to the
people. That Kendall and Blair were in large part responsible for the
original draft which reached Taney for revision, there can be no doubt.
Knowing the real purpose of the Paper, Duane requested a postponement of
publication until he could definitely decide. While the Paper was being
put in type at the “Globe” office, McLane and Cass threatened to resign
rather than accept any responsibility for the act, and Lewis suggested
that they be publicly relieved of responsibility. When Blair hastened
to Jackson with Lewis’s suggestion, the grim man of iron added the
concluding paragraph assuming full personal responsibility--much to the
chagrin and disgust of Taney.[652]
The crisis had now been reached, and the action of Duane was awaited by
the Kitchen Cabinet with the keenest interest, not unmixed with fear
lest Taney decline to take the vacant place and face the bitter fight.
Taking counsel of his fears, Kendall rushed to the Attorney-General and
was reassured. Confessing his fear that his acceptance would mean the
end of his lifelong hopes for a place on the Supreme Bench, Taney
declared himself in the fight to the end.[653]
On September 21st, the “Globe” authoritatively announced that “the
deposits would be changed to State banks” as soon as the necessary
arrangements could be made; and in anticipation of the nature of the war
the Bank would wage, Blair stressed the fact that the deposits would not
be immediately withdrawn, and that the process would be gradual. “It is
believed,” he wrote, “that by this means the change need not produce any
inconvenience to the commercial community.”
Four days later the “Paper Read to the Cabinet” appeared in full in the
“Globe.”
VI
Two days after this publication, Major Lewis wrote Hamilton that “if Mr.
Duane cannot or will not make the order,” he would be superseded by
Taney, “who has been decidedly with the President in relation to this
matter from the beginning to the end,” and discrediting rumors of other
Cabinet resignations.[654] Whatever may have been the feelings of
Hamilton, who looked upon the plan as fraught with possibilities of
disaster, the effect of the “Globe’s” announcement on Thomas H. Benton,
sojourning with relatives in Virginia, was that of a bugle blast to a
war charger. He felt “an emotion of the moral sublime at beholding such
an instance of civic heroism,” and that “a great blow had been struck,
and that a great contest must come on, which could only be crowned with
success by acting up to the spirit with which it was commenced.” He
“repaired to Washington at the approach of the session with a full
determination to stand by the President.”[655]
The day after the reading of the Paper, Jackson called upon Duane for a
decision, and the Secretary begged for time to confer with his venerable
father, then _en route_ to Washington. The same day Major Donelson, the
President’s secretary, informed him of the decision to publish the Paper
in the “Globe” on the morrow, and the hard-pressed Minister protested
against such precipitancy. This protest was followed with a letter to
Donelson reiterating his plea for time, with the assertion that if he
were President he would “consult at least reasonably the feelings of a
man who has already anxiety enough.”[656] Jackson had, in fact,
exercised a most unnatural restraint of his temper, and had been
remarkably considerate of his Minister’s feelings. Even before the
reading of the Paper, and before Duane had made his choice for
martyrdom, Jackson had opened a graceful avenue of escape to the
Legation at St. Petersburg, but the offer had been declined.
On the 21st, Duane appeared at the White House and left his written
decision with Jackson personally. It is a letter of many words,
evidently prepared for publication. After asserting that the Secretary
of the Treasury is, by the terms of the charter, the sole custodian of
the public funds, he finally reached his reasons for refusing to “carry
your directions into effect.” It would be a “breach of public faith,”
would appear as “vindictive and arbitrary,” and “if the Bank has abused
or perverted its powers, the judiciary are able and willing to punish.”
The House of Representatives had declared the funds safe, and, if
anything had happened since its report, “the representatives of the
people, chosen since your appeal to them in your veto message, will in a
few weeks assemble.” Again, “a change to local and irresponsible banks
will tend to shake public confidence,” and “it is not sound policy to
foster local banks.” And so on with other reasons, including the charge
that “persons and presses known to be in the confidence and pay of the
Administration” had tried to intimidate him. There could be no
misunderstanding of the purpose of the letter. It was written in a
spirit bitterly hostile to the Administration, and in the hope of
serving the moneyed institution and having the service rewarded.[657]
Having thus insulted the President, he withdrew his promise of July to
resign if unable to meet his chief’s views, and carefully pointed out
that Jackson had the power of dismissal. Here was a martyr zealously
seeking the cross.
Jackson immediately wrote a brief, dignified reply to the effect that he
could not receive such a communication, nor “enter into further
discussion of the question.” Rather sharply, the grim old man reminded
his subordinate that the imputation in the latter’s letter had no place
in a correspondence between a President and a member of his Cabinet,
that the letter of July offering to resign was before him, and brusquely
demanding a final answer. Early in the afternoon Duane again took his
pen in hand. The result was another tiresome letter concluding with a
distinct refusal to issue the order or to resign, and impudently
protesting against the interference of the Executive in the affairs of a
member of the Cabinet. This second letter could hardly have reached the
White House when Duane, seized with a perfect passion for
self-expression, wrote a third “to present another view.” The burden of
this epistle was that he had been treated unkindly by the “Globe.”
Having started this upon its way by messenger, the superheated Secretary
grasped his pen for another effort, consisting of painful reiterations.
All these letters, thousands of words, and pages of paper, were written
on the 21st, but with the exception of the reply to the first, Jackson
ignored them. Then, two days later, Jackson wrote a short note,
returning the last two letters as containing inaccuracies and being
inadmissible, and closing with a curt dismissal. Thus Duane laid down
his pen, packed his belongings, and passed out of public life.[658]
The day following Duane’s dismissal, written by Taney, Cass and McLane
consulted Jackson as to the desirability of their resignations. This was
almost too much for the old warrior’s patience, and he irritably
reminded them that they had been released from responsibility, and could
remain unless they preferred to join the Opposition. The fire of battle
was now in his blood, and he had no intention of parleying with the
timid in his official household. Three days later, Taney issued his
famous order, McLane and Cass tendered their resignations, and Jackson,
in replying, followed Van Buren’s suggestion, and they remained.
On the publication of the Paper in the “Globe,” the Bank summoned a
meeting of the directors and a committee was appointed to take action.
Writing from Boston to Biddle, Webster made the suggestion, which was
adopted, of a memorial to Congress.[659] This memorial, which referred
to the President of the United States as “Andrew Jackson,” indicated a
disposition to consider the approaching struggle as between “Andrew
Jackson” and Nicholas Biddle, between the Bank and the Administration,
and the ill-advised arrogance of the paper showed all too clearly that
the financiers felt that in such a contest the power and the victory
would be on the side of the Bank. And such was the prestige of that
powerful corporation that not a few Democrats, including friends and
supporters of Jackson, shared in the feeling. When Van Buren was
authorized by Jackson to offer the attorney-generalship to Daniel of
Virginia, that timid lawyer admitted that his fears of Jackson’s
rashness and situation dissuaded him.[660] It was not until early in
November that Benjamin F. Butler, yielding to the personal persuasion of
Van Buren, accepted the post. And to obtain his consent it was necessary
to appeal to personal friendship, private interest, pecuniary benefit,
and the allurements of fame.[661]
And almost immediately the storm broke.
VII
“The times will be hard, and the struggle a great one,” wrote Van Buren
to Hamilton, “but the patriotism and fortitude of the people will
triumph.”[662] And Nicholas Biddle did not propose that the
inconvenience should be slight. He was delighted with the order for the
removal. He was convinced that out of the distress in business circles
would come an irresistible demand, not only for the restoration of the
deposits, but for the rechartering of the Bank. This last act of
Jackson’s was the golden opportunity. The advantage would be followed.
The public, which had sustained Jackson at the polls, was to be
punished, or “disciplined,” as Webster mildly described the process.
“This discipline,” wrote the orator to Biddle, who was his client as
well as his party colleague, “it appears to me, must have very great
effects on the general question of the rechartering of the Bank.”
The “disciplining” of the people began with the Bank’s first
curtailments on August 13, 1833, and practically ended on July 11, 1834,
although it continued to some extent until September. The first move--a
proper one--was to issue an order that the amount of money loaned on
discounts was not to be increased, and that bills of exchange should be
drawn only at short dates and on the Eastern offices. These orders meant
inevitable contraction, but of the sort that could be justified. But
immediately after Taney had issued his order, the Bank adopted
additional measures--the reduction of discounts, the application of the
order of restriction on the drawing of bills to all the offices of the
Bank, the collection of the balances against the State banks, and the
restriction of the receipt of State bank notes. The historian of the
Bank truly says that “on the whole, nothing but peril to the Bank could
excuse such measures.”[663] But even this second step seemed all too
mild to the officers and directors in the marble front building on
Chestnut Street, and three weeks later a third step was taken. The
branch banks in the West were ordered to persevere in “the course of
measures already prescribed,” and instructed that an extraordinary
effort should be made to keep down circulation, and to avoid drafts on
the northern Atlantic offices.[664] One month later, Philip Hone, the
New York banker and business man, was recording in his diary that the
“ill-advised and arbitrary step of the President” was “producing an
awful scarcity of money, with immediate distress and melancholy
forebodings to the merchants and others who require credit to sustain
them”; and that “stocks of every description have fallen--Delaware and
Hudson from one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fourteen,
Boston and Providence from one hundred and fifteen to one hundred and
three,” and that “money cannot be had on bond and mortgage at 7 per
cent, and I am told that good notes will hardly be discounted at 9 per
cent.”[665]
Just about the time Hone was recording these conditions, Biddle was
offering the notorious Samuel Swartwout, the Jacksonian Collector in New
York, whose irregularities in office were to be unmercifully exploited
by the Whigs, a directorship in the Bank, and the latter, declining
because of the onerous duties of his office, advised that since “the
Bank’s power has been shown” in the distress, it might be well now to
manifest mercy.[666] Where Niles had found money scarce in September and
October without being able to conceive a reason, he wrote in November of
“a most severe pressure for money” and the prospect of a “collapse of
business.” That month State bank notes began to depreciate and loans
were at eighteen per cent per annum. With the convening of Congress and
the President’s uncompromising Message in December, Biddle increased the
pressure for the purposes of “discipline.” Business men were unable to
get credit. Factories were shutting down because of the inability of
manufacturers to get loans, and laborers were thrown out into the
street. The Christmas season found New York “gloomy” with “times bad,”
stocks still falling, and a panic prevailing “which will result in
bankruptcies and ruin in many quarters where, a few short weeks ago, the
sun of prosperity shone with unusual brightness.”[667] And three days
later the Lord Holland of the American Whigs, in his misery and
apprehension, was beginning to suspect that politics and the Bank, as
well as Jackson’s “ill-advised and arbitrary step,” might be playing a
part, and concluding that “between them both the community groans under
the distress which these misunderstandings have created.” “A plague on
both your houses,” he wrote, his impartial castigation springing,
perhaps, from the fact that he had lost $20,000.[668]
In January the crash came. Business houses began to fail in New York,
Philadelphia, and Washington, and by the end of the month loans could
not be had in New York and Baltimore at less than one and a half per
cent discount per month. Wages decreased, along with prices, with
laborers out of employment and the real estate values on the slump. And
at this time, with the Opposition in Congress working in hearty
coöperation with the Bank to create the fear that fed the panic, Jackson
sat in the White House one Sunday morning writing to Hamilton: “There is
no real distress. It is only with those who live by borrowing, trade on
loans, and gamblers in stocks. It would be a godsend to society if all
such were put down.... I must stop. The church bells are ringing and I
must attend.”[669] This theory that it would be a “godsend” to rid the
country of the men who live on borrowing was to be used with
considerable effect against Jackson by his congressional enemies.
And at the same time, Biddle was writing to the president of his Boston
branch[670] that “the ties of party allegiance can only be broken by the
actual conviction of existing distress,” and that “nothing but the
evidence of suffering abroad will produce any effect in Congress”; and
to Major Jack Downing in New York that “if the bank were to suffer
itself to be misled into the measure of making money plentiful, it will
only give to its enemies the triumph of having robbed it with
impunity.”[671] Thus the evidence is abundant that the Bank exerted its
power to the utmost to bring the country to the verge of ruin, and so
compel it to consent to a recharter. The fact that the majority of its
victims were among its most zealous supporters did not interest Mr.
Biddle.[672] Two days after writing the letter to Downing, Biddle
determined upon a further contraction in discounts to the amount of
$3,320,000, with orders that this should be made within thirty or sixty
days, and the largest reductions were to be made in the Western and
Southwestern banks. Not content with this, he made another increase in
the rates of exchange, and here again discriminated frankly against the
West. Thus, in eight months the Bank planned a reduction in discounts to
the amount of $13,300,000, which Catterall describes truly as “a
preposterously large sum.”[673] When to this is added the further
restrictions of as much as $5,000,000 through the breaking up of the
exchange dealings of the Bank, the contraction in eight months amounted
to at least $18,300,000.
Had the Bank acted honorably, there would have been an inevitable
depression for the time because of the removal order, but the panic was
the Bank’s panic, deliberately conceived, and cruelly produced, with the
frankly avowed purpose of blackmailing the American people into granting
another charter. In his letter to the president of the Boston branch,
Biddle had bluntly confessed his purpose. “I have no doubt,” he wrote,
“that such a course will ultimately lead to a restoration of the
currency, and the recharter of the Bank.”[674]
During this time there were certain unscrupulous speculators, the
buzzards of the panic, whispering commendation into Biddle’s ear while
feathering their own nests through the distress of the people.[675] But
Webster, alarmed at the havoc, had urged Biddle, through Horace Binney,
“that the Bank ought to reduce as slowly and moderately as they can--and
occasionally to ease off--where it is requisite to prevent extreme
suffering.”[676] This advice aroused the banker’s ire and resulted in no
good. It was Biddle’s idea that the Bank’s senatorial champions,
instead of suggesting a policy of moderation, should be using the
distress as an argument for a new charter. “The relief,” he wrote Joseph
Hopkinson, the distinguished lawyer and jurist, “to be useful or
permanent, must come from Congress, and from Congress alone. If that
body will do its duty, relief will come--if not, the Bank feels no
vocation to redress the wrongs of these miserable people. Rely upon
that. This worthy President thinks that because he has scalped Indians
and imprisoned Judges, he is to have his way with the Bank. He is
mistaken.”[677]
VIII
Meanwhile the Bank was encouraging, inspiring, arranging indignation
meetings of the people, where Jackson was arraigned for bringing ruin
upon the community, and petitions were drawn asking for the restoration
of the deposits. Clay, eager to lash the people into fury, had suggested
the plan. “It would be well,” he wrote, “to have a general meeting of
the people to memorialize Congress in favor of a restoration of the
deposits. Such an example [in Philadelphia] might be followed elsewhere;
and it would be more influential as it might be more general.”[678] The
artificial nature of many of the petitions was well understood by the
Jackson leaders, and the usually elegant John Forsyth had referred to
them in the Senate as “these pot-house memorials,” much to the
astonishment of Adams.[679] These petitions, according to the plan,
were, in many instances, taken to Washington by committees that waited
upon the President before presenting them to Congress. Here they were
presented in lugubrious speeches calculatingly designed further to fan
the fears of the people and keep the panic going. When the New York
merchants adopted a memorial and secured the signatures of three
thousand people, Tammany Hall ordered meetings in every ward in the city
to approve of Jackson’s actions.[680] A few days later, between twelve
and fifteen thousand friends of “sound currency by means of a national
bank” met at noon in the park. When Hone, selected to preside, reached
the park, he found an “immense crowd” composed in large part “of the
most respectable mechanics and others of the city--men of character,
respectability, and personal worth, with a few miscreants who went,
perhaps, of their own accord, but were probably sent there to excite
disturbances.” In truth, “the rabble had gotten possession of the
chair,” and it required “some hard thumps” from the men of character,
respectability, and personal worth to clear the way sufficiently for the
presiding genius of the Whig dinner table to reach the platform. When he
attempted to speak, the “yells of the mob” rendered all the chairman’s
efforts “unavailing”; so he “put the question upon the resolutions which
were carried by an immense majority,” and the meeting adjourned.
Unhappily the “mob” did not disperse for some time afterwards.[681]
When these committees, composed of bitter enemies of the President,
began to pour into the capital and knock at the White House door, they
were received, at first, with urbanity and heard with patience. The
committeemen, however, carried back “grossly colored” stories of the
interviews, and Jackson thereafter decided to hear and dismiss them
without discussion.[682] In these stories Jackson is pictured as raving
and ranting, spluttering and spouting imprecations and profanity.
McMaster, however, accepts as true that he received these committees
“with that stately courtesy for which he was so justly distinguished,”
and concludes from the evidence that he “soon began to lecture
them.”[683] In these lectures Jackson is reported to have told the
committees to “go to the Bank” or to “go to Biddle” for relief. No less
an authority than Catterall has concluded that he was not far wrong. On
one occasion he did use extreme language to a committee which implied
the threat of rebellion. “If that be your game,” he exclaimed, “come
with your armed Bank mercenaries, and, by the Eternal, I will hang you
around the Capitol on gallows higher than Haman.”[684] There is no doubt
that he did harangue the committees with bitter denunciations of “The
Monster” and properly ascribed a large part of the distress to the
deliberate purpose of the Bank to “discipline” the Nation. Some
historians have suggested that these outbursts were staged, and it is
recorded as a fact by Henry A. Wise, the brilliant Virginia Whig. “When
a Bank committee would come ...” he writes, “he would lay down his pipe,
rise to the full height of his stature and voice, and seem to foam at
the mouth whilst declaiming vehemently against the dangers of money
monopoly. The committee would retire in disgust, thinking they were
leaving a mad man, and as soon as they were gone, he would resume his
pipe, and, chuckling, say, ‘They thought I was mad,’ and coolly comment
on the policy of never never compromising a vital issue.”[685] This
interpretation of Jackson’s tempests and whirlwinds of passion, coming
from a severe critic of his Bank policy, is the most dependable of all
the opinions that have been expressed by friend or foe.
IX
And while the committees may have hooted the idea that the Bank was
responsible for the severity and continuance of the panic, it very
slowly began to dawn upon the New York merchants that possibly the
“Emperor Nicholas” might be able to alleviate conditions without in the
least compromising the safety of the Bank. Some of his champions were
slow to realize or loath to concede this declining popularity. In
February the bankers and merchants of New York appointed a committee to
wait upon him and urge a suspension of the contraction, and Albert
Gallatin, former Secretary of the Treasury, pointedly warned him that
the committee was satisfied of his ability to grant relief, and would so
report to the New York merchants. Thus cornered and threatened with the
desertion of its friends, the Bank finally agreed that up to May 1st
there should be no further contraction. This was a fatal concession in
that it was a confession that relief had been previously deliberately
denied.[686] Even such champions of the Bank as James Watson Webb found
real cause for melancholy complaint in heavy losses in Bank stock, and
we find him whining that he had lost all except his paper, and that
other speculators, including Alexander Hamilton, Jr., had been among the
victims.
Thus the drift against the Bank, which began when Governor Wolf of
Pennsylvania denounced its actions in his Message to the Legislature,
increased alarmingly. The fact that the Governor had been a firm
supporter gave tremendous weight to his act. The friends of the
institution were stunned, and, as we shall see a little later, the
Governor was bitterly denounced and warmly defended in the Senate. Thus
the advice of Jackson to “see Biddle,” so mirthfully related by the
committees at the time, and so much ridiculed by some historians since,
was demonstrating its wisdom. One month after Wolf acted, Governor Marcy
of New York imitated his example with the recommendation of a State plan
of relief. His proposal to issue $6,000,000 of five per cent State stock
to be loaned to State banks was adopted.
The Bank, in its game of “disciplining” the people, had vastly
overplayed its hand, and, by its cruel, implacable policy of ruining
friends as well as foes, had begun to lose ground in the late winter and
early spring. Even among the ultra-conservatives of business, the
feeling was germinating that Jackson was not far wrong in the
conclusion that a moneyed institution possessing the power to
precipitate panics to influence governmental action, was dangerous to
the peace, prosperity, and liberty of the people.
X
But the politicians in the Congress were the last to see the drift. Long
after the bankers and merchants had lost interest in the fate of
Biddle’s Bank, they continued their fight in its behalf throughout the
most bitter congressional session the Republic had ever known. The
actions of the Bank, the tumult of the market-places, the proceedings of
the merchants, are all intimately interwoven with the activities of the
Bank’s champions in House and Senate. There the last stand was taken,
there the battle was definitely lost. And there the most dramatic
feature of the fight was staged. It was at this juncture that three
important figures, not hitherto intimately identified with or against
the Administration, moved to the firing line. Thomas H. Benton assumed
the leadership of the Jacksonian forces, and Clay’s fighters were
brilliantly augmented by the advent of two Senators, William Campbell
Preston of South Carolina, and Benjamin Watkins Leigh of Virginia.
The complete harmony between Benton’s views and Jackson’s actions in the
Bank controversy has given an overshadowing prominence to his
leadership. For thirty years he was a constructive force in legislation,
associating his name with more important measures written into law than
Clay, Webster, and Calhoun combined. In the Senate his faults of
mannerism, his arrogance, and stupendous conceit, together with the
interminable length of his speeches and his diffusive tendencies, served
to overshadow his very substantial contributions to the discussions. The
fact that the Chamber emptied and the galleries cleared when he arose
did not disturb him in the least. He spoke from the Chamber to the
country, and his carefully prepared speeches, especially during the Bank
fight, were treatises intended for the education of the people. His
personal life was above reproach. His austerity, his imposing dignity,
discouraged attempts at intimacy in a day when men loved conviviality
and were a trifle lax in their morals. He was one of the colossal
figures of American politics and he never loomed larger than in his
fight for Jackson.
William C. Preston, fresh from oratorical triumphs in the Nullification
contest, entered the Senate at the age of thirty-eight. Few have made a
more favorable début in that body. His fame as an orator had preceded
him, and Clay’s plans had dedicated the panic session to perfervid
oratory. It is impossible to understand, from his speeches in the
“Congressional Globe,” the extravagant enthusiasm of so stern a critic
as Adams. But we cannot discount the common verdict of his
contemporaries who considered him one of the most consummate of orators,
and “one of the greatest rhetoricians and declaimers of his
generation.”[687] From another we learn that “many thought him the most
finished orator the South had produced,” and that he “could arouse his
audiences to enthusiasm, and then move them to tears.”[688] Not least
among the truimphs of his art was his power to sway a mob in the street
as well as move the case-hardened critics of the Senate house. Poet and
painter, as he was, it is not surprising that in the heat of advocacy
his feelings often predominated over his judgment, and his superheated
imagination sometimes led him beyond the realms of reality, but these
very weaknesses were to delight the enemies of the Jackson
Administration, led to the daily assault by Clay. Thus, in his first
year in the Senate, he took his place, far in advance of most of his
colleagues, and side by side with Clay, Webster, Calhoun, and Clayton.
In addition to Preston, the Opposition was to be further strengthened
by the arrival with the panic session of Leigh. Intellectually, he was
one of the strongest men in a State of strong men, and at the bar he was
recognized as a great constitutional and civil lawyer. As an orator, he
was fluent, fiery, intense, impressive. Wise, who was himself no mean
master of English, has described him as “a purist in his Anglo-Saxon,”
and as having a style “equal to that of the Elizabethan age of English
literature.”[689] Like Prentiss, he was a small man who loomed large
when speaking, and, like him, too, he had one short leg and wore a cork
on the sole of his shoe. Unlike Prentiss, he capitalized his infirmity
oratorically. Wise found that, while his mannerisms were not graceful,
they “always excited sympathy for his infirmity.” His voice, which was
no small part of his oratorical equipment, has been described as “clear,
soft, flute-like, not loud, but like murmuring music.”[690] His manner,
his speaking method, his very appearance, fitted in well with Clay’s
programme of dramatic, lugubrious oratory, and he at once moved to his
place beside the panic orators, and played a conspicuous and theatrical
part.
Thus, with the panic at its flood, with Benton moving to the front of
the Administration forces, and with Clay’s oratorical battery
strengthened, it is time to look in upon the Senate.