Woods.
The defence of woods was formerly an important branch of field
defences. Abatis and entanglements could readily be extemporized,
trunks of trees made strong breastworks, and the wood concealed the
numbers of the defenders. A wood was therefore generally considered a
useful addition to a line of defence. It was customary to hold the
front edge of the wood, the irregularities of the outline being
utilized for frontal and flanking fire, while obstacles were disposed
some 50 yds. in front. In a carefully prepared position, clearings
would be made parallel to the front and some distance back from it,
for support positions, and great attention was paid (in theory at
least) to clearing communications, erections, signposts, &c., so that
the defending troops might move freely in any desired direction.
Woods, however, had their inherent drawbacks. The ground is hard to
dig, clearing involves great labour; and communication, at the best,
is cramped. Nowadays a wood can hardly be considered a strong
defensive element in a line. The front of it is an excellent ranging
mark for artillery, and positions within the wood are not easily made,
because of the difficulty of trenching, and the fact that no
reasonable amount of timber will make a breastwork proof against the
modern bullet. Once an enemy gets a footing within a wood, the
position is more favourable to offensive than to defensive action. If
a wood has to be occupied in a line of defence, it is probable that in
most cases the rear edge or a line slightly behind it would be the
best to fortify, though the front edge would no doubt be held by the
fighting line at the outset.
Villages.
The defence of villages is another question which has been much
affected by recent improvements in artillery. Formerly villages were
very important adjuncts to a line of defence, and strong points for a
detached force to hold. There were indeed always drawbacks. The
preparations for defence entailed a good deal of labour, and the
defending force was scattered in houses and enclosures, so that
control and united action were difficult. But the value of the
ready-made protection afforded by walls was so great--and sometimes
even decisive--that villages were occupied as a matter of course. This
is certainly now changed, but precisely to what extent it will be
impossible to say, until after the next European war. A village under
fire is not now an ideal defensive position. A single shrapnel
penetrating the outer wall may kill all the occupants of a room; a
single field-howitzer shell may practically ruin a house. At the same
time, a house or line of houses may (without any preliminary labour at
all) give very good protection against shell fire to troops _behind_
them. Further, the value to the defence of the slightest cover, once
the infantry attack has developed, is so great that the ruins of walls
and houses occupied at the right moment may prove an impregnable
stronghold. This class of fighting, however, does not properly come
under the present heading. For the details of the defence of walls,
houses, &c., see the official _Mil. Engineering_ (1908).
_Entrenching under Fire._--Progress in this direction has been delayed
by the reluctance of military authorities to add a portable
entrenching tool to the heavy burden already carried by the infantry
soldier. Further delay has resulted from the attempts of enthusiastic
inventors to produce a tool that shall weigh nothing, go easily in the
pocket, and be available as a pick, shovel, saw, hand-axe or
corkscrew. A tool that will serve more than one use is seldom
satisfactory for any.
Extemporized cover.
The object of entrenching under fire is to enable attacking infantry,
when their advance is checked by the enemy's fire, to maintain the
ground they have won by extemporizing cover where none exists. The
need of this was first felt in the American Civil War, and towards the
close of it a small entrenching spade 22 in. long and weighing only
1-1/2 lb. was introduced by Brigadier-General H.W. Benham into the
Army of the Potomac. Since that time a great number of patterns have
been tried, including shovel, trowel and adze types. The most popular
of these has been the Linnemann spade, which is used by most
continental armies and by the Japanese. The Austrian form of this tool
is a rectangular spade with straight handle. The length over all is a
little less than 20 in. The blade is 8 in. long by 6 wide. One side of
it has a saw edge, and the other a cutting edge. For carriage, the
blade is enclosed in a leather case, which is strapped to the pack or
the waist-belt. In the British army the Wallace combined pick and
shovel was used for some time, but was eventually dropped. There was
always great doubt whether the utility of a portable entrenching tool
was such as to justify the inconvenience caused to the soldier in
carrying it. But the experience of the Russo-Japanese War seems to
have finally established the necessity of it, and also the fact that
it must generally be used lying down. For this purpose and for
convenience in carrying it on the person, a very light short-handled
tool is required.
The soldier lying down cannot attempt to dig a trench, but can make a
little hole by his side as he lies, and put the earth in front of his
head. A method introduced by the Japanese is that at each check in the
advance the front line should do this, and, as they go forward, the
supporting lines in succession should improve the cover thus
commenced.
General remarks.
There are few things that soldiers dislike more, in the way of
training, than trenchwork. For men unused to it, it is tiring and
tedious work, and it is difficult for them to realize its importance.
At the same time it is a commonplace of recent history that men who
have been in action a few times develop a great affection for the
shovel. The need of trenches grows with the growth of firearms, and
the latest feature of modern tactics is the use of them in attack as
well as in defence. The observation has often been made--with what
truth as a general proposition we cannot here discuss--that modern
battles tend more and more to resemble a siege. The weaker side, it is
said, entrenches itself; the other bombards and attacks. After gaining
as much ground as they can, the attacking troops wait for nightfall
and entrench; perhaps making a further advance and entrenchment before
dawn. In the last stage the attack might even be reduced to gaining
ground by sapping. In open and featureless ground, where the rifle and
gun have full play, the trench is to the modern soldier very much what
the breast-plate was to the man-at-arms, an absolute essential.
The most important point in connexion with modern field fortification
is the effect on both strategy and tactics of the increased resisting
power of the defence. A small force well entrenched can check the
frontal attack of a very much larger force, and while holding its
position can make itself felt over a wider radius than ever before.
This must needs have a marked effect on strategy, and it is quite
possible to foresee such an ultimate triumph of field fortification as
that one force should succeed in surrounding another stronger than
itself, and by entrenching prevent the latter from breaking out and
compel its surrender.