The fortification of these three bridge-heads are said to have cost
about L1,100,000. But the system of "armoured fronts" is never likely
to be reproduced, having been condemned by all authoritative
continental opinion. Its defects have been summarized by Schroeter as
follows: weakness of artillery at long ranges, want of security
against a surprise rush, the neglect of the use of infantry in the
defence, and the difficulty of command. This last is the most serious
of all. It is indeed difficult to conceive that any one should expect
half-a-dozen expert gunners, each shut up in an iron box with a gun,
to stop the rush of a thousand men, even by day. But imagine the
feelings of the gunner on the night of a big attack, alone in his box,
his nerves already strained by a preliminary bombardment and nights of
watching. He hears the sounds of battle all around; he knows nothing
of the progress of the attack, but expects everything, and feels every
moment the door of his box being opened and the bayonet entering his
back. No wise commander would submit his troops to such a test.
_Sir George Clarke and Unarmoured Systems._--Before leaving the subject
of fortresses it is necessary to consider the ideas of those who, while
recognizing the necessity for places permanently organized for defence,
prefer to treat them more from the point of view of perfected field
defences. It is to the credit of English military science that Sir
George Clarke may be taken as the representative of this school of
thought. His study of fortification, as he tells us, began with a
history of the defence of Plevna (q.v.). He was led to compare the
resistance made behind extemporized defences at such places as
Sevastopol, Kars and Plevna, with those at other places fortified in the
most complete manner known to science. From this comparison he drew the
conclusion that the true strength of fortification does not depend on
great masonry works intricately pieced together at vast expense, but on
organization, communications and invisibility. In his 1907 edition he
says:--
"Future defences will divide themselves naturally into the following
categories: (1) Permanent works wholly constructed in peace time and
forming the key points of the position. (2) Gun emplacements,
magazines and shelters for men in rear of the main line, all concrete
structures and platforms to be completed, though some earthwork may be
left until the position is placed in a state of defence. (3) Field
works, trenches, &c., guarding the intervals between the permanent
defences in the main line, or providing rear positions. These should
be deliberately planned in time of peace ready to be put in hand at
short notice. The essence of a well-fortified position is that the
weapons of the defender shall obtain the utmost possible scope of
action, and that those of the attacker shall have the minimum chances
of effecting injury."
[Illustration: Drawn from illustration in Leithner's _Bestandige
Befestigung_, by permission.