The word has plainly to do with 'leo' in some shape or other; but are

these verses leonine from one Leo or Leolinus, who first composed them?

or because, as the lion is king of beasts, so this, in monkish

estimation, was the king of metres? or from some other cause which none

have so much as guessed at? [Footnote: See my _Sacred Latin Poetry_,

3rd edit. p. 32.] It is a mystery which none has solved. That frightful

system of fagging which made in the seventeenth century the German

Universities a sort of hell upon earth, and which was known by the name

of 'pennalism,' we can scarcely disconnect from 'penna'; while yet this

does not help us to any effectual scattering of the mystery which rests

upon the term. [Footnote: See my _Gustavus Adolphus in Germany_, p. 131.

[_Pennal_ meant 'a freshman,' a term given by the elder students in

mockery, because the student in his first year was generally more

industrious, and might be often seen with his _pennal_ or pen-case

about him.]] The connexion of 'dictator' with 'dicere', 'dictare,' is

obvious; not so the reason why the 'dictator' obtained his name.

'Sycophant' and 'superstition' are words, one Greek and one Latin, of

the same character. No one doubts of what elements they are composed;

and yet their secret has been so lost, that, except as a more or less

plausible guess, it can never now be recovered. [Footnote: For a good

recapitulation of what best has been written on 'superstitio' see Pott,

_Etym. Forschungen_, vol. ii. p. 921.]

But I must conclude. I may seem in this present lecture a little to

have outrun your needs, and to have sometimes moved in a sphere too

remote from that in which your future work will lie. And yet it is in

truth very difficult to affirm of any words, that they do not touch us,

do not in some way bear upon our studies, on what we shall hereafter

have to teach, or shall desire to learn; that there are any conquests

which language makes that concern only a select few, and may be

regarded indifferently by all others. For it is here as with many

inventions in the arts and luxuries of life; which, being at the first

the exclusive privilege and possession of the wealthy and refined,

gradually descend into lower strata of society, until at length what

were once the elegancies and luxuries of a few, have become the

decencies, well-nigh the necessities, of all. Not otherwise there are

words, once only on the lips of philosophers or theologians, of the

deeper thinkers of their time, or of those directly interested in their

speculations, which step by step have come down, not debasing

themselves in this act of becoming popular, but training and elevating

an ever-increasing number of persons to enter into their meaning, till

at length they have become truly a part of the nation's common stock,

'household words,' used easily and intelligently by nearly all.

I cannot better conclude this lecture than by quoting a passage, one

among many, which expresses with a rare eloquence all I have been

labouring to utter; for this truth, which many have noticed, hardly any

has set forth with the same fulness of illustration, or the same sense

of its importance, as the author of _The Philosophy of the Inductive

Sciences_. 'Language,' he observes, 'is often called an instrument of

thought, but it is also the nutriment of thought; or rather, it is the

atmosphere in which thought lives; a medium essential to the activity

of our speculative powers, although invisible and imperceptible in its

operation; and an element modifying, by its qualities and changes, the

growth and complexion of the faculties which it feeds. In this way the

influence of preceding discoveries upon subsequent ones, of the past

upon the present, is most penetrating and universal, although most

subtle and difficult to trace. The most familiar words and phrases are

connected by imperceptible ties with the reasonings and discoveries of

former men and distant times. Their knowledge is an inseparable part of

ours: the present generation inherits and uses the scientific wealth of

all the past. And this is the fortune, not only of the great and rich

in the intellectual world, of those who have the key to the ancient

storehouses, and who have accumulated treasures of their own, but the

humblest inquirer, while he puts his reasonings into words, benefits by

the labours of the greatest. When he counts his little wealth, he finds

he has in his hands coins which bear the image and superscription of

ancient and modern intellectual dynasties, and that in virtue of this

possession acquisitions are in his power, solid knowledge within his

reach, which none could ever have attained to, if it were not that the

gold of truth once dug out of the mine circulates more and more widely

among mankind.'

LECTURE VI.

ON THE DISTINCTION OF WORDS.

Synonyms, and the study of synonyms, with the advantages to be derived

from a careful noting of the distinction between them, constitute the

subject with which in my present Lecture I shall deal. But what, you

may ask, is meant when, comparing certain words with one another, we

affirm of them that they are synonyms? We imply that, with great and

essential resemblances of meaning, they have at the same time small,

subordinate, and partial differences--these differences being such as

either originally, and on the strength of their etymology, were born

with them; or differences which they have by usage acquired; or such as,

though nearly or altogether latent now, they are capable of receiving

at the hands of wise and discreet masters of language. Synonyms are

thus words of like significance in the main; with a large extent of

ground which they occupy in common, but also with something of their

own, private and peculiar, which they do not share with one another.

[Footnote: The word 'synonym' only found its way into the English

language about the middle of the seventeenth century. Its recent

incoming is marked by the Greek or Latin termination which for a while

it bore; Jeremy Taylor writing 'synonymon,' Hacket 'synonymum,' and

Milton (in the plural) 'synonyma.' Butler has 'synonymas.' On the

subject of this chapter see Marsh, _Lectures on the English Language_,

New York, 1860, p. 571, sqq.]

So soon as the term 'synonym' is defined thus, it will be at once

perceived by any acquainted with its etymology, that, strictly speaking,

it is a misnomer, and is given, with a certain inaccuracy and

impropriety, to words which stand in such relations as I have just

traced to one another; since in strictness of speech the terms,

'synonyms' and 'synonymous' applied to words, affirm of them that they

cover not merely almost, but altogether, the same extent of meaning,

that they are in their signification perfectly identical and

coincident; circles, so to speak, with the same centre and the same

circumference. The term, however, is not ordinarily so used; it

evidently is not so by such as undertake to trace out the distinction

between synonyms; for, without venturing to deny that there may be such

perfect synonyms, words, that is, with this absolute coincidence of the

one with the other, yet these could not be the objects of any such

discrimination; since, where no real difference exists, it would be

lost labour and the exercise of a perverse ingenuity to attempt to draw

one out.

There are, indeed, those who assert that words in one language are

never exactly synonymous, or in all respects commensurate, with words

in another; that, when they are compared with one another, there is

always something more, or something less, or something different, in

one as compared with the other, which hinders this complete equivalence.

And, those words being excepted which designate objects in their nature

absolutely incapable of a more or less and of every qualitative

difference, I should be disposed to consider other exceptions to this

assertion exceedingly rare. 'In all languages whatever,' to quote

Bentley's words, 'a word of a moral or of a political significance,

containing several complex ideas arbitrarily joined together, has

seldom any correspondent word in any other language which extends to

all these ideas.' Nor is it hard to trace reasons sufficient why this

should be so. For what, after all, is a word, but the enclosure for

human use of a certain district, larger or smaller, from the vast

outfield of thought or feeling or fact, and in this way a bringing of

it under human cultivation, a rescuing of it for human uses? But how

extremely unlikely it is that nations, drawing quite independently of

one another these lines of enclosure, should draw them in all or most

cases exactly in the same direction, neither narrower nor wider; how

almost inevitable, on the contrary, that very often the lines should

not coincide--and this, even supposing no moral forces at work to

disturb the falling of the lines.

How immense and instructive a field of comparison between languages

does this fact lay open to us; while it is sufficient to drive a

translator with a high ideal of the task which he has undertaken well-

nigh to despair. For indeed in the transferring of any matter of high

worth from one language to another there are losses involved, which no

labour, no skill, no genius, no mastery of one language or of both can

prevent. The translator may have worthily done his part, may have

'turned' and not 'overturned' his original (St. Jerome complains that

in his time many _versiones_ deserved to be called _eversiones_

rather); he may have given the lie to the Italian proverb, 'Traduttori

Traditori,' or 'Translators Traitors,' men, that is, who do not

'render' but' surrender' their author's meaning, and yet for all this

the losses of which I speak will not have been avoided. Translations,

let them have been carried through with what skill they may, are, as

one has said, _belles infideles_ at the best.

How often in the translation of Holy Scripture from the language

wherein it was first delivered into some other which offers more words

than one whereby some all-important word in the original record may be

rendered, the perplexity has been great which of these should be

preferred. Not, indeed, that there was here an embarrassment of riches,

but rather an embarrassment of poverty. Each, it may be, has advantages

of its own, but each also its own drawbacks and shortcomings. There is

nothing but a choice of difficulties anyhow, and whichever is selected,

it will be found that the treasure of God's thought has been committed

to an earthen vessel, and one whose earthiness will not fail at this

point or at that to appear; while yet, with all this, of what far-

reaching importance it is that the best, that is, the least inadequate,

word should be chosen. Thus the missionary translator, if he be at all

aware of the awful implement which he is wielding, of the tremendous

crisis in a people's spiritual life which has arrived, when their

language is first made the vehicle of the truths of Revelation, will

often tremble at the work he has in hand; he will tremble lest he

should permanently lower or confuse the whole spiritual life of a

people, by choosing a meaner and letting go a nobler word for the

setting forth of some leading truth of redemption; and yet the choice

how difficult, the nobler itself falling how infinitely below his

desires, and below the truth of which he would make it the bearer.

Even those who are wholly ignorant of Chinese can yet perceive how vast

the spiritual interests which are at stake in China, how much will be

won or how much lost for the whole spiritual life of its people, it may

be for ages to come, according as the right or the wrong word is

selected by our missionaries there for designating the true and the

living God. As many of us indeed as are ignorant of the language can be

no judges in the controversy which on this matter is, or was lately,

carried on; but we can all feel how vital the question, how enormous

the interests at stake; while, not less, having heard the allegations

on the one side and on the other, we must own that there is only an

alternative of difficulties here. Nearer home there have been

difficulties of the same kind. At the Reformation, for example, when

Latin was still more or less the language of theology, how earnest a

controversy raged round the word in the Greek Testament which we have

rendered 'repentance'; whether 'poenitentia' should be allowed to stand,

hallowed by long usage as it was, or 'resipiscentia,' as many of the

Reformers preferred, should be substituted in its room; and how much on

either side could be urged. Not otherwise, at an earlier date, 'Sermo'

and 'Verbum' contended for the honour of rendering the 'Logos' of St.

John; though here there can be no serious doubt on which side the

advantage lay, and that in 'Verbum' the right word was chosen.

But this of the relation of words in one language to words in another,

and of all the questions which may thus be raised, is a sea too large

for me to launch upon now; and with thus much said to invite you to

have open eyes and ears for such questions, seeing that they are often

full of teaching, [Footnote: Pott in his _Etymol. Forschungen_, vol. v.

p. lxix, and elsewhere, has much interesting instruction on the subject.

There were four attempts to render [Greek: eironeia], itself, it is

true, a very subtle word. They are these: 'dissimulatio' (Cicero);

'illusio' (Quintilian); 'simulatio' and 'irrisio.'] I must leave this

subject, and limit myself in this Lecture to a comparison between words,

not in different languages, but in the same.

Synonyms then, as the term is generally understood, and as I shall use

it, are words in the same language with slight differences either

already established between them, or potentially subsisting in them.

They are not on the one side words absolutely identical, for such, as

has been said already, afford no room for discrimination; but neither

on the other side are they words only remotely similar to one another;

for the differences between these last will be self-evident, will so

lie on the surface and proclaim themselves to all, that it would be as

superfluous an office as holding a candle to the sun to attempt to make

this clearer than it already is. It may be desirable to trace and fix

the difference between scarlet and crimson, for these might easily be

confounded; but who would think of so doing between scarlet and green?

or between covetousness and avarice; while it would be idle and

superfluous to do the same for covetousness and pride. They must be

words more or less liable to confusion, but which yet ought not to be

confounded, as one has said; in which there originally inhered a

difference, or between which, though once absolutely identical, such

has gradually grown up, and so established itself in the use of the

best writers, and in the instinct of the best speakers of the tongue,

that it claims to be openly recognized by all.

But here an interesting question presents itself to us: How do

languages come to possess synonyms of this latter class, which are

differenced not by etymology, nor by any other deep-lying cause, but

only by usage? Now if languages had been made by agreement, of course

no such synonyms as these could exist; for when once a word had been

found which was the adequate representative of a thought, feeling, or

fact, no second one would have been sought. But languages are the

result of processes very different from this, and far less formal and

regular. Various tribes, each with its own dialect, kindred indeed, but

in many respects distinct, coalesce into one people, and cast their

contributions of language into a common stock. Thus the French possess

many synonyms from the _langue d'Oc_ and _langue d'Oil_, each having

contributed its word for one and the same thing; thus 'atre' and

'foyer,' both for hearth. Sometimes different tribes of the same people

have the same word, yet in forms sufficiently different to cause that

both remain, but as words distinct from one another; thus in Latin

'serpo' and 'repo' are dialectic variations of the same word; just as

in German, 'odem' and 'athem' were no more than dialectic differences

at the first. Or again, a conquering people have fixed themselves in

the midst of a conquered; they impose their dominion, but do not

succeed in imposing their language; nay, being few in number, they find

themselves at last compelled to adopt the language of the conquered;

yet not so but that a certain compromise between the two languages

finds place. One carries the day, but on the condition that it shall

admit as naturalized denizens a number of the words of the other; which

in some instances expel, but in many others subsist as synonyms side by

side with, the native words.

These are causes of the existence of synonyms which reach far back into

the history of a nation and a language; but other causes at a later

period are also at work. When a written literature springs up, authors

familiar with various foreign tongues import from one and another words

which are not absolutely required, which are oftentimes rather luxuries

than necessities. Sometimes, having a very sufficient word of their own,

they must needs go and look for a finer one, as they esteem it, from

abroad; as, for instance, the Latin having its own expressive

'succinum' (from 'succus'), for amber, some must import from the Greek

the ambiguous 'electrum.' Of these thus proposed as candidates for

admission, some fail to obtain the rights of citizenship, and after

longer or shorter probation are rejected; it may be, never advance

beyond their first proposer. Enough, however, receive the stamp of

popular allowance to create embarrassment for a while; until, that is,

their relations with the already existing words are adjusted. As a

single illustration of the various quarters from which the English has

thus been augmented and enriched, I would instance the words 'wile,'

'trick,' device,' finesse,' 'artifice,' and 'stratagem.' and remind you

of the various sources from which we have drawn them. Here 'wile,' is

Old-English, 'trick' is Dutch, 'devise' is Old-French, 'finesse' is

French, 'artificium' is Latin, and '[Greek: stratagema]' Greek.

By and by, however, as a language becomes itself an object of closer

attention, at the same time that society, advancing from a simpler to a

more complex condition, has more things to designate, more thoughts to

utter, and more distinctions to draw, it is felt as a waste of

resources to employ two or more words for the designating of one and

the same thing. Men feel, and rightly, that with a boundless world

lying around them and demanding to be catalogued and named, and which

they only make truly their own in the measure and to the extent that

they do name it, with infinite shades and varieties of thought and

feeling subsisting in their own minds, and claiming to find utterance

in words, it is a wanton extravagance to expend two or more signs on

that which could adequately be set forth by one--an extravagance in one

part of their expenditure, which will be almost sure to issue in, and

to be punished by, a corresponding scantness and straitness in another.

Some thought or feeling or fact will wholly want one adequate sign,

because another has two. [Footnote: We have a memorable example of this

in the history of the great controversy of the Church with the Arians,

In the earlier stages of this, the upholders of the orthodox faith used

[Greek: ousia] and [Greek: hypostasis] as identical in force and

meaning with one another, Athanasius, in as many words, affirming them

to be such. As, however, the controversy went forward, it was perceived

that doctrinal results of the highest importance might be fixed and

secured for the Church through the assigning severally to these words

distinct modifications of meaning. This, accordingly, in the Greek

Church, was done; while the Latin, desiring to move _pari passu_ did

yet find itself most seriously embarrassed and hindered in so doing by

the fact that it had, or assumed that it had, but the one word,

'substantia,' to correspond to the two Greek.] Hereupon that which has

been well called the process of 'desynonymizing' begins--that is, of

gradually discriminating in use between words which have hitherto been

accounted perfectly equivalent, and, as such, indifferently employed.

It is a positive enriching of a language when this process is at any

point felt to be accomplished; when two or more words, once

promiscuously used, have had each its own peculiar domain assigned to

it, which it shall not itself overstep, upon which others shall not

encroach. This may seem at first sight only as a better regulation of

old territory; for all practical purposes it is the acquisition of new.

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