THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS HISTORICAL POSITION.
[A. Inner connection of the Stoic system.]
Having now investigated the Stoic system in detail, we are in a
position to pass a definite judgment on the scope of the Stoic
philosophy, the import and the relation of its various parts, and its
historical position. Its peculiar character manifests itself before all
things in the three points to which attention was drawn at the outset:
[1031]—its pre-eminently practical tone, the determination of this
practical tendency by the notions of the good and of virtue, and the
use of logic and natural science as a scientific basis. Speculative
knowledge is not, as we have seen, to the Stoics an end in itself, but
only a means for producing a right moral attitude; all philosophical
research stands directly or indirectly in the service of virtue. Both
in the earlier and in the later days of its existence the Stoic School
advocated this principle in the most determined and exclusive manner,
nor was it even denied by Chrysippus, the chief representative of its
science and learning.
[(1) Ethical side of Stoicism.]
If it be then asked what is the right moral attitude, the Stoics reply:
action conformable to nature and reason—in other words, virtue. Virtue,
however, implies two things. On the one hand it implies the resignation
of the individual to the universe, obedience to the universal law; on
the other hand it implies the harmony of man with himself, the dominion
of the higher over the lower nature, of reason over emotion, and the
rising superior to everything which does not belong to his true nature.
Both statements may be reconciled, because the law of morality is
addressed only to reasonable beings, and is the law of their nature,
and can only be carried into execution by their own exertions. Still,
in the Stoic ethics, two currents of thought may be clearly
distinguished, which from time to time come into actual collision; the
one requiring the individual to live for the common good and for
society, the other impelling him to live for himself only, to
emancipate himself from all that is not himself, and to console himself
with the feeling of virtue. The first of these tendencies impels man to
seek the society of others; the second enables him to dispense with it.
From the former spring the virtues of justice, sociability, love of
man; from the latter, the inner freedom and happiness of the virtuous
man. The former culminates in citizenship of the world; the latter in
the self-sufficingness of the wise man. In as far as virtue includes
everything that can be required of man, happiness depends on it alone;
nothing is good but virtue, nothing is evil but vice; all that is not
connected with the moral nature is indifferent. On the other hand, in
as far as virtue is based on human nature, it stands on the same
footing with all else that is conformable with nature. If its own
peculiar value cannot be surrendered, no more can it be required that
we should be indifferent to its conformity to nature, that it should
not have for us some positive or negative value, or in some way affect
our feelings. Therewith the doctrine of things indifferent and the wise
man’s freedom from emotions begins to totter. Lastly, if we look at the
way in which virtue exists in man, we arrive at different results,
according as we look at its essence or its manifestation. Virtue
consists in acting conformably with reason, and reason is one and
undivided; hence it appears that virtue forms an undivided unity, and
must be possessed whole and entire or not at all. From this proposition
the contrast of the wise and foolish man, with all its bluntness and
extravagances, is only a legitimate consequence. Or, again, if we look
at the conditions upon which, owing to human nature, the acquisition
and possession of virtue depends, the conviction is inevitable that the
wise man as drawn by the Stoics never occurs in reality. Hence the
conclusion is undeniable that the contrast between wise men and fools
is more uncertain than it at first appeared to be. Thus all the main
features of the Stoic ethics may be simply deduced from their one
fundamental notion, that rational action or virtue is the only good.
[(2) Scientific side of the Stoic system.]
Not only does this view of ethics require a peculiar theory of the
world to serve as its scientific basis, but it has a reflex action
also, influencing alike the tone and the results of theoretic enquiry.
If the duty of man is declared to consist in bringing his actions into
harmony with the laws of the universe, it becomes also necessary that
he should endeavour himself to know the world and its laws. The more
his knowledge of the world increases, the greater will be the value
which he attaches to the forms of scientific procedure. If, moreover,
man is required to be nothing more than an instrument of the universal
law, it is only consistent to suppose an absolute regularity of
procedure in the universe, an unbroken connection of cause and effect,
and ultimately to refer everything to one highest all-moving cause, and
to include everything under one primary substance. If in human life the
individual has no rights as against the laws of the universe, then all
that is of individual occurrence in the world is powerless against
universal necessity. On the other hand, if in the case of man
everything turns upon strength of will, then likewise in the universe
the acting power must be regarded as the highest and most exalted.
There arises thus that view of the world as a series of forces which
constitutes one of the most peculiar and thorough-going characteristics
of the Stoic view of nature. [1032] Lastly, if such excessive
importance is attached to practical conduct as is done by the Stoics,
that sensuous view of the world which finds its crudest expression in
the Stoic Materialism and reliance on the senses, [1033] will most
nearly accord with speculation. At the same time the Materialism of the
Stoics is limited and corrected by the conception of the universe and
of a divine all-penetrating power and reason, just as their appeal to
the senses is by the demand for the formation of conceptions, and the
general application of the process of demonstration; the truth of
knowledge itself is based on a practical postulate, the greater or less
certainty of which is measured by the strength of personal conviction.
If these elements proved too contradictory to be harmonised; if the
Materialism of the Stoics was at variance with their view of the world
as a series of forces; if appeals to the senses were obviously in
conflict with logical method, it was at least thereby clearly
established that a practical and not a purely intellectual interest lay
at the root of their system.
[(3) Connection of the moral and scientific elements.]
This statement must of course not be taken to mean that the Stoics
first developed their ethical principles independently of their theory
of the universe, and afterwards brought the two into connection with
each other. On the contrary, it was by the peculiar connection of
theory and practice that Stoicism itself first came into existence. The
leading thought of Zeno consists in the attempt to vindicate the
supremacy of virtue by a scientific knowledge of the laws of the world;
and he becomes the founder of a new School only by bringing to Cynicism
those scientific ideas and aims which he had learned himself in the
School of Polemo, Stilpo, and Diodorus, or otherwise gathered from a
study of ancient philosophy. These elements are not therefore
accidentally brought together in Stoicism, but they are co-extensive,
and dependent one upon the other. As in the natural science and theory
of knowledge of the Stoics, the experimental basis on which their
system was built may be easily seen, so the peculiar development of
their ethics supposes all those positions respecting the universe and
the powers therein at work, which form the most important part of their
natural science. Only by a scientific treatment of this kind was
Stoicism at all able to improve upon the imperfection of the Cynic
ethics, so far at least as it really did so, and to accommodate itself
to the wants of human nature, so far as to be able to exercise an
influence at large. Upon this union of ethics and metaphysics that
religious attitude of the Stoic system reposes, to which it owes in a
great measure its historical importance. Thereby it occupies so
influential a position in an age in which intellectual power was indeed
declining, but in which the interest for science was keen. But that
Stoic physics and metaphysics should have adopted this line, and no
other; that Zeno and his followers, who draw on former systems for
their own on the most extensive scale, should have borrowed from these
systems these and no other positions, and expanded them in this and no
other direction; these results are, doubtless, ultimately due to their
moral attitude. All that bore on the subject of ethics, and supported
it, they appropriated; all that was opposed thereto they rejected. The
Stoic system as such owes its rise to a union of ethical and
speculative elements, in which both were more definitely determined by
one another; still the ethical platform is the one on which its
formation commences, and which primarily determined its course and
results.
[B. Relation of Stoicism to previous systems.]
[(1) Its relation to Socrates and the Cynics.]
In order to obtain a more accurate notion of the rise of Stoicism, the
premises on which it proceeds, and the grounds on which it is based, we
must take a glance at its relation to preceding systems. The Stoics
themselves deduced their philosophical pedigree directly from
Antisthenes, and indirectly from Socrates. [1034] Clear as is their
connection with both these philosophers, it would nevertheless be a
mistake to regard their teaching as a revival of Cynicism, still more
to regard it as a simple following of Socrates. From both it
undoubtedly borrowed much. The self-sufficiency of virtue, the
distinction of things good, evil, and indifferent, the ideal picture of
the wise man, the whole withdrawal from the outer world within the
precincts of the mind, and the strength of moral will, are ideas taken
from the Cynics. In the spirit of Cynicism, too, it explained general
ideas as simply names. Not to mention many peculiarities of ethics, the
contrasting of one God with the many popular Gods, and the allegorical
explanation of myths, were likewise points borrowed from Cynicism. The
identification of virtue with intelligence, the belief that virtue was
one, and could be imparted by teaching, were at once in the spirit of
Socrates and also in that of the Cynics. The argument for the existence
of God based on the subordination of means to ends, the whole view of
the world as a system of means and ends, and the Stoic theory of
Providence, are views peculiarly Socratic; [1035] and the Stoics
followed Socrates in ethics by identifying the good and the useful.
And yet the greatness of the interval which separates the Stoics even
from the Cynics becomes at once apparent on considering the relation of
Aristo to the rest of the Stoic School. In refusing to meddle with
natural or mental science, or even with ethical considerations at all,
Aristo faithfully reflects the principles of Antisthenes. In asserting
the unity of virtue to such an extent that all virtues are merged in
one, he was only repeating similar expressions of Antisthenes. In
denying any difference in value to things morally indifferent, and in
placing the highest morality in this indifference, he was, according to
the older writers, reasserting a Cynic tenet. [1036] Conversely in
denying these statements, as the great majority of Stoics did, the
points are indicated in which Stoicism differed from Cynicism. [1037]
In the feeling of moral independence, and in invincible strength of
will, the Cynic is opposed to the whole world; he needs for virtue no
scientific knowledge of the world and its laws; he regards nothing
external to himself; he allows nothing to influence his conduct, and
attaches value to nothing; but, in consequence, he remains with his
virtue confined to himself; virtue makes him independent of men and
circumstances, but it has neither the will nor the power to interpose
effectively in the affairs of life, and to infuse therein new moral
notions. Stoicism insists upon the self-sufficiency of virtue quite as
strongly as Cynicism, and will allow quite as little that anything
except virtue can be a good in the strictest sense of the term. But in
Stoicism the individual is not nearly so sharply opposed to the outer
world as in Cynicism. The Stoic is too cultivated; he knows too well
that he is a part of the universe to ignore the value of an
intellectual view of the world, or to neglect the natural conditions of
moral action, as things of no moment. What he aims at is not only a
negation—independence from externals—but a positive position—life
according to nature; and that life only he considers according to
nature which is in harmony with the laws of the universe as well as
with those of human nature. Hence Stoicism is not only far in advance
of Cynicism by its intellectual attitude, but its moral philosophy also
breathes a freer and milder spirit. Let only the principles of the
Stoics on the necessity and value of scientific knowledge be compared
with the sophistical assertions of Antisthenes, destructive of all
knowledge; or the cultivated logical form of the intellectual edifice
of the Stoics, with the chaotic condition of Cynic thought; or the
careful metaphysical and psychological researches and the copious
learning of the School of Chrysippus, with the Cynics’ contempt for all
theory and all learned research, and it becomes apparent at once how
deep-seated is the difference between the two systems, and how little
Stoicism as a philosophic system can be deduced from Cynicism.
In ethics, too, the difference of the two Schools is also fully
apparent. Stoic morality recognises, at least conditionally, a positive
and negative value in external things and circumstances; the Cynic
allows to these absolutely no value. The former forbids affection
contrary to reason, the latter any and every kind of affection. [1038]
The former throws the individual back upon human society, the latter
isolates him. The former teaches citizenship of the world in a positive
sense, requiring all to feel themselves one with their fellow-men; the
latter in a negative sense, that of feeling indifferent to home and
family. The former has a pantheistic tone about it, due to the lively
feeling of the connection between man and the universe, and a definite
theological stamp owing to its taking a stand by positive religion; the
latter has a rationalistic character, owing to the enfranchisement of
the wise man from the prejudices of popular belief, with which it has
exclusively to do. In all these respects Stoicism preserves the
original character of the Socratic philosophy far better than Cynicism,
which only caricatured them. Still it departs from that character in
two respects. In point of theory the Stoic doctrine received a
systematic form and development such as Socrates never contemplated;
and in natural science, it cultivated a field avoided by Socrates on
principle, however much its doctrine of Providence, and its view of
nature as a system of means subordinated to ends, may remind of
Socrates. On the other hand, interest in science, although limited to
the subject of ethics, is with Socrates far deeper and stronger than
with the Stoics, the latter pursuing scientific research only as a
means for solving moral problems. Hence the Socratic theory of a
knowledge of conceptions, simple though it may sound, contained a
fruitful germ of unexpanded speculation, in comparison with which all
that the Stoics did is fragmentary. The Stoic ethics are not only more
expanded and more carefully worked out in detail than those of
Socrates, but they are also more logical in clinging to the principle
that virtue alone is an unconditional good. There are no concessions to
current modes of thought, such as Socrates allowed, who practically
based his doctrine of morals upon utility. On the other hand, the moral
science of the Stoics also falls far short of the frankness and
cheerfulness of the Socratic view of life. If in many respects it toned
down the asperities of Cynicism, still it appropriated its leading
principles far too unreservedly to avoid accepting a great number of
its conclusions.
Asking in the next place in how far the Stoics were induced by other
influences to change and extend the platform of the Socratic
philosophy, we have for determining the practical side of their system,
besides the general tendency of the post-Aristotelian [(2) Relation to
Megarians and Heraclitus.] philosophy, the example of Cynicism. Its
speculative development, on the other hand, is partly connected with
the Megarians, partly with Heraclitus; to the Megarians the personal
connection of Zeno with Stilpo points, to Heraclitus the fact that from
him the Stoics themselves deduced their views on natural science, which
they expanded in commentaries on his writings. [1039]
[(a) The Megarians.]
Probably the Megarian influence must not be rated too high. Zeno may
have thence received an impulse to that reasoning habit which appears
with him in a preference for compressed sharp-pointed syllogisms;
[1040] but in post-Aristotelian times, contact with Megarians was no
longer wanted for this, and the greatest reasoner among the Stoics,
Chrysippus, appears not only to have had no personal relations to them,
but his logic is throughout a simple continuation of that of Aristotle.
[(b) Heraclitus.]
Far greater, and more generally recognised, is the importance of the
influence which the views on nature of the philosopher of Ephesus
exercised on the Stoics. A system which laid such emphasis on the
subordination of everything individual to the law of the universe,
which singled out universal reason from the flux of things as the one
thing everlastingly and permanently the same—a system in many other
ways so nearly related to their own, must have strongly commended
itself to their notice, and offered them many points with which to
connect their own. If to us the view that life is dependent for its
existence on matter is repulsive, it was otherwise to the Stoics; for
them this very theory possessed special attractions. Hence, with the
exception of the threefold division of the elements, there is hardly a
single point in the Heraclitean theory of nature which the Stoics did
not appropriate:—fire or ether as the primary element, the oneness of
this element with universal reason, the law of the universe, destiny,
God, the flux of things, the gradual change of the primary element into
the four elements, and of these back to the primary element, the
regular alternation of creation and conflagration in the world, the
oneness and eternity of the universe, the description of the soul as
fiery breath, the identification of the mind with the demon, the
unconditional sovereignty of the universal law over individuals—these
and many other points in the Stoic system, originally derived from
Heraclitus, [1041] prove how greatly this system is indebted to him.
Nor must it be forgotten that there is nothing in Heraclitus analogous
to the reasoning forms of the Stoics, nor can their ethical views be
referred to his few and undeveloped hints. With all the importance the
Stoics attached to natural science, it is with them only subordinate to
moral science; and the very fact that it is referred to Heraclitus as
its author, proves its inferior position, and the want of any
independent interest in the subject. It is also unmistakeable that even
in natural science the Stoics only partially follow Heraclitus, and
that principles taken from Heraclitus often bear an altered meaning
when wrought into the Stoic system. Omitting minor points, not only is
the Stoic doctrine of nature in a formal point of view far more
developed, and with regard to its extension far more comprehensive,
than the corresponding doctrine of Heraclitus, but the whole Stoic view
of the world is by no means so completely identical with his as might
be supposed. The flux of things, which the Stoics teach equally with
Heraclitus, [1042] has not for them that overwhelming importance that
it had for him. The matter of which the universe consists may be always
going over into new forms, but, at the same time, it is for them the
permanent material and essence of things. [1043] Individual substances,
too, are treated by the Stoics as corporeally permanent. [1044]
Moreover, from the material they distinguish the active principle,
Reason or deity, far more definitely than Heraclitus had done, and the
same distinction is carried into individual things in the contrast
between matter and quality. Thereby it becomes possible for them to
contrast much more sharply than their predecessor had done the reason
of the world, and the blindly working power of nature. Heraclitus, it
would appear, confined his attention to observing nature and describing
its elementary meteorological processes. But the natural science of the
Stoics includes the idea of means working for ends. It sees the object
in referring the whole arrangement of the world to man, and it pursues
this line of thought exclusively, neglecting in consequence science
proper. Hence the idea of sovereign reason or the universal law had not
the same meaning in the minds of both. Heraclitus sees this reason,
primarily and chiefly, in the ordinary sequence of natural phenomena,
in the regularity of the course by which to each individual phenomenon
its place in the world, its extent and duration are prescribed—in
short, in the unchanging coherence of nature. Without excluding this
aspect in their proofs of the existence of God and the rule of
Providence, the Stoics attach the chief importance to the
serviceableness of the order of nature. The reason which rules the
world appears in Heraclitus primarily as a natural power; in the
Stoics, as intelligence working with a purpose. For Heraclitus Nature
is the highest object, the object of independent and absolute interest;
and hence the infinite Being is no more than the power which forms the
world. The Stoics regard nature from the platform of humanity, as a
means for the wellbeing and activity of man. Their deity accordingly
does not work as a simple power of nature, but essentially as the
wisdom which cares for the wellbeing of man. The highest conception in
the system of Heraclitus is that of nature or destiny. Stoicism
accepted this conception also, but at the same time developed it to the
higher idea of Providence.
[(3) Connection with Aristotle.]
Shall we be wrong if we attribute this modification of the Heraclitean
theory of nature by the Stoics partly to the influence of Socrates’ and
Plato’s theory of final causes, but in a still greater degree to the
influence of the Aristotelian philosophy? To Aristotle belongs properly
the idea of matter without qualities, no less than the distinction
between a material and a formal cause. Aristotle applied the idea of
purpose to natural science far more extensively than any other system
had done before; and although the mode in which the Stoics expressed
this idea has more resemblance to the popular theological statements of
Socrates and Plato than to Aristotle, still the Stoic conception of a
natural power working with a purpose, such as is contained in the idea
of artificial fire and λόγοι σπερματικοὶ, is essentially Aristotelian.
Even many positions which appear to be advanced in opposition to
Aristotle were yet connected with him. Thus the existence of ether as a
body distinct from the four elements is denied, and yet in point of
fact it is asserted under a new name—that of artificial fire. The
Peripatetic doctrine of the origin of the rational soul is contradicted
by the Stoic theory of development, and yet the latter is based on a
statement in Aristotle to the effect that the germ of the animal soul
lies in the warm air [1045] which surrounds the seed, warm air which
Aristotle distinguishes from fire quite as carefully as Zeno and
Cleanthes distinguished the two kinds of fire. Even the point of
greatest divergence from Aristotelian teaching—the transformation of
the human soul and the divine spirit into something corporeal—might yet
be connected with Aristotle, and, indeed, the Peripatetic School here
comes to their assistance. For had not Aristotle described the ether as
the most divine body, the stars formed out of it as divine and happy
beings? Had he not brought down the acting and moving forces from a
heavenly sphere to the region of earth? Had he not, as we have just
seen, sought the germ of the soul in an ethereal matter? And might not
others go a little further and arrive at materialistic views? and all
the more so, seeing how hard it is to conceive the extra-mundane
intelligence of Aristotle, at once as incorporeal, and yet touching and
encircling the world of matter, and to make personal unity in the human
soul accord with an origin in a reason coming from above?
The way for Stoicism was more directly paved by the Aristotelian
speculations as to the origin of notions and conceptions. Here the
Stoics did little more than omit (in conformity with their principles)
what their predecessor had said as to an original possession and
immediate knowledge of truth. It has been remarked on an earlier
occasion how closely their formal logic followed that of Aristotle;
they contented themselves with building on Aristotelian foundations,
and even their additions have more reference to grammar than to logic.
The actual influence of Peripatetic views on those of the Stoics
appears to have been least in the province of ethics. Here the crudity
of the Stoic conception of virtue, the entire suppression of emotions,
the absolute exclusion of everything external from the circle of moral
goods, the distinction between the wise and the foolish man, the
attacks on a purely speculative life, present a sharp contrast to the
caution and many-sidedness of Aristotle’s moral theory, to his careful
weighing of current opinions and their practicability, to his
recognition of propriety in every shape and form, and to the praise
which he lavishes on a purely speculative life. What the Stoics chiefly
owe to Aristotle is the formal treatment of the materials and the
psychological analysis of individual moral faculties. On the other
hand, the province of ethics must be looked to for traces of the
teaching which Zeno received from Polemo, perhaps even from Xenocrates.
[(4) Connection with Plato.]
The speculative portions of Plato’s teaching could offer no great
attractions to practical men and materialists like the Stoics, either
in their original form or in the form which they assumed in the older
Academy under Pythagorean influence. On the other hand, such points in
Platonism as the Socratic habit of making knowledge the foundation of
virtue, the comparative depreciation of external goods, the
disparagement of all that is sensual, the elevation and the purity of
moral idealism, and, in the older Academy, the demand for life
according to nature, the doctrine of the self-sufficingness of virtue,
and the growing tendency to confine philosophy to practical issues—all
these were questions for a Stoic full of interest. Unfounded as the
notion of the later Eclectics is, [1046] that the Stoic and Academician
systems of morality were altogether the same, the Stoics, nevertheless,
appear to have received suggestions from the Academy which they carried
out in a more determined spirit. Thus the theory of living according to
nature belongs originally to the Academy, although the Stoics adopted
it with a peculiar and somewhat different meaning. Besides influencing
the moral doctrines of the Stoics, the attitude assumed by the older
Academy towards positive religion may also have had some influence on
their orthodoxy; their most prominent representative, Cleanthes, is in
his whole philosophic character the counterpart of Xenocrates. Although
later in its origin than Stoicism, the new Academy was not without
important influence on that system, through the person of Chrysippus,
but this influence was at first only of an indirect kind, inasmuch as
it obliged the Stoics by its logical contradiction to look about for a
more logical basis for their system, and therewith to attempt a more
systematic expansion of their teaching. [1047] Somewhat similar is the
effect of Epicureanism, which by its strong opposition in the field of
ethics imparted decision and accuracy to the Stoic doctrine, and thus
indirectly helped to form it.
[C. The Stoic philosophy as a whole.]
[(1) Its historical position.]
By the aid of these remarks it now becomes possible to give a
satisfactory account of the history of Stoicism. Belonging to an age of
moral debasement and political oppression, its founder, Zeno, conceived
the idea of liberating himself and all who were able to follow him from
its degeneracy and slavery by means of a philosophy which, by purity
and strength of moral will, would procure independence from all
external things, and unruffled inward peace. That his endeavours should
have taken this practical turn, that he should have proposed to himself
not knowledge as such, but the moral exercise of knowledge as the
object to be realised, was in part due to his own personal character,
and may be in part referred to the general circumstances of the times.
On nobler and more serious minds, these circumstances weighed too
heavily not to call forth opposition and resistance in place of
listless contemplation. The sway of the Macedonian, and afterwards of
the Roman Empire, was far too despotic to allow the least prospect of
open resistance. Nor must it be overlooked that philosophy itself had
reached a pass at which satisfactory answers to speculative problems
were no longer forthcoming; hence attention was naturally directed to
questions of morals.
Haunted by this longing for virtue, Zeno must have felt attracted by a
system of philosophy which had at an earlier period followed a similar
course with marked success, viz. the system of the Cynics, and what he
doubtless identified therewith, the old Socratic teaching. [1048]
Anxious to find a positive meaning and scientific basis for virtue, he
strove to appropriate from every system whatever agreed with the bent
of his own mind. By using all the labours of his predecessors, and
keeping his eye steadily fixed upon the practical end of philosophy, he
succeeded in forming a new and more comprehensive system, which was
afterwards completed by Chrysippus. In point of form this system was
most indebted to the Peripatetic philosophy; in point of matter, next
to its debt to the Cynics, which has been already mentioned, its chief
obligation was to Heraclitus. But the moral theory of the Stoics was as
little identical with that of the Cynics, as the natural science of the
Stoics was with that of Heraclitus. If the divergence was, in the first
instance, due to the influence of the Stoic principles, still the
influence of the Peripatetic teaching is unmistakeable in the natural
and speculative science of the Stoics, and the influence of the Academy
in their moral science. Stoicism does not, therefore, appear simply as
a continuation of Cynicism, nor yet as an isolated innovation, but,
like every other form of thought which marks an epoch, it worked up
into itself all previous materials, and produced from their combination
a new result. In this process of assimilation much that was beautiful
and full of meaning was omitted; everything was absorbed that could be
of use in the new career on which the Greek mind was about to enter.
[(2) Its onesidedness.]
It was the fault of the age that it could no longer come up to the
many-sidedness of an Aristotle or a Plato. Stoicism, it is true,
approximates thereto more nearly than any other of the
post-Aristotelian systems. But in its practical view of philosophy, in
its materialistic appeal to the senses, in its theoretical
self-sufficiency, setting up the wise man as superior to the weaknesses
and wants of human nature; in its citizenship of the world, throwing
political interests into the background; and in so many other traits it
is the fit exponent of an epoch in which the taste for purely
scientific research and the delight in ethical speculation were at an
end, whilst out of the overthrow of states, and the growth of freedom,
the idea of humanity was coming to the fore. Stoicism represented most
powerfully the moral and religious convictions of such an age, yet not
without onesidedness and exaggeration. By exercise of the will and by
rational understanding, man is to become free and happy. This aim is,
however, pursued so persistently that the natural conditions of human
existence and the claims of individuality are ignored. To man, regarded
as the exponent of universal law, as little freedom of will is allowed
by the Stoic natural science in face of the inexorable course of nature
as freedom of action is allowed by the Stoic ethics in face of the
demands of duty. The universal claims of morality are alone
acknowledged; the right of the individual to act according to his
peculiar character, and to develop that character, is almost ignored.
The individual, as such, dwindles into obscurity, whilst a high place
in the world is assigned to mankind collectively. The individual is
subordinated to the law of the whole; but by regarding nature as a
system of means and ends, and introducing the belief in Providence and
Prophecy, the universe is again subordinated to the interests of man—a
view against which a more careful research has many objections to urge.
In both respects Epicureanism is in decided contrast to Stoicism,
though agreeing with it in the general tone of its practical philosophy
and in its aim to make man independent of the outer world and happy in
himself.
PART III.
THE EPICUREANS.
CHAPTER XV.
EPICURUS AND THE EPICUREAN SCHOOL. [1049]
[A. Epicurus.]
Epicurus, the son of the Athenian Neocles, [1050] was born in Samos
[1051] in the year 342 or 341 B.C. [1052] His early education appears
to have been neglected; [1053] and his knowledge of previous
philosophic systems was very superficial, even at the time when he
first came forward as an independent teacher. Still he can hardly have
been so entirely self-taught as he wished to appear at a later period
in life. The names, at least, of the individuals are on record who
instructed him in the systems of Democritus and Plato; [1054] and
although it is by no means an ascertained fact that he subsequently
attended the lectures of Xenocrates, [1055] on the occasion of a visit
to Athens, [1056] no doubt can be felt that he was acquainted with the
writings of previous philosophers, from whom he borrowed important
parts of his system [1057] and more particularly with those of
Democritus.
After having been engaged as a teacher in several Schools [1058] in
Asia Minor, he repaired to Athens about the year 306 B.C., [1059] and
there founded a School of his own. [1060] The meeting-place of this
School was the founder’s garden, [1061] and its centre of attraction
was the founder himself, around whom a circle of friends gathered, knit
together by a common set of principles, by a common affection for a
master whom they almost worshipped, and by a common enjoyment of
cultivated society. [1062] Opponents charged the Epicureans with gross
impropriety, because they admitted not only women, [1063] but women of
loose morality, [1064] to this circle of philosophic culture; but in
the then state of Greek society, such conduct does not appear
extraordinary. Here Epicurus laboured for six and thirty years, during
which he succeeded in impressing a stamp on his School which is now
seen definite and unchanged after the lapse of centuries. In the year
270 B.C. [1065] he succumbed to disease, the pains and troubles of
which he bore with great fortitude. [1066] Out of the multitude of his
writings [1067] only a few have come down to us, and these are for the
most part unimportant ones. [1068] On the whole, these fragments [1069]
bear out the unfavourable opinions which opponents have expressed with
regard to his style. [1070]
[B. Scholars of Epicurus.]
Among the numerous scholars of Epicurus [1071] the best known are
Metrodorus [1072] and Polyænus, [1073] both of whom died before their
master; Hermarchus, [1074] upon whom the presidency of the School
devolved after the death of Epicurus; [1075] and Colotes, [1076]
against whom Plutarch, four hundred years later, wrote a treatise. Many
others are also known, at least by name. [1077] The garden which
Epicurus in his will left to the School [1078] continued after his
death to be the external rallying-point for his followers. Hermarchus
was succeeded by Polystratus, [1079] with whom Hippoclides is also
mentioned [1080] as joint-president. Hermarchus and Hippoclides were
succeeded by Dionysius, and Dionysius again by Basilides. [1081]
Protarchus of Bargylium, [1082] and his pupil, Demetrius the Laconian,
[1083] appear to belong to the second century before Christ; but the
time in which these philosophers flourished cannot be established with
certainty; and the same remark applies to several others whose names
are on record. [1084]
[C. Epicureans of the Roman period.]
Before the middle of the second century B.C. Epicureanism is said to
have obtained a footing in Rome. [1085] It is certain that it existed
there not long afterwards. C. Amafinius is mentioned as the first who
paved the way for the spread of Epicurean doctrines by discussing them
in Latin; [1086] and it is stated that these doctrines soon found many
supporters, attracted partly by their merits, but more often by the
simplicity and the ease with which they could be understood. [1087]
Towards the close of the second century Apollodorus, one of the most
voluminous writers on philosophy, taught at Athens. [1088] His pupil,
Zeno of Sidon, the most important among the Epicureans of that age,
laboured for a long time successfully, both orally and in writing.
[1089] About the same time Phædrus is heard of in Rome and Athens,
[1090] and at a little later period Philodemus, [1091] and Syro or
Sciro in Rome, [1092] and Patro, [1093] the successor of Phædrus, in
Athens. The number of Epicureans at Rome, known to us chiefly from
Cicero’s writings, [1094] is not small. No one of them has obtained a
higher repute than T. Lucretius Carus. [1095] His poem, carefully
reproducing the Epicurean notions on natural science, is one of the
most valuable sources for the knowledge of their system. Contemporary
with Lucretius was the celebrated physician Asclepiades of Bithynia,
[1096] who resided at Rome, but to judge by the views on nature
attributed to him, he was no genuine Epicurean, although connected with
the Epicurean School. [1097]
In the following century several supporters of the practical philosophy
of the Epicureans are known to us, [1098] but no one apparently
approaching Zeno or Phædrus in scientific importance. Rehabilitated
under the Antonines by the establishment of a public chair in Athens,
the Epicurean School outlived most other systems, and continued to
exist as late as the fourth century after Christ. [1099]
CHAPTER XVI.
CHARACTER AND DIVISIONS OF THE EPICUREAN TEACHING: THE TEST-SCIENCE OF
TRUTH.
[A. Character of Epicurean system.]
[(1) Its power of self-preservation.]
The scientific value and capacity for development of Epicureanism are
out of all proportion to its extensive diffusion and the length of time
during which it continued to flourish. No other system troubled itself
so little about the foundation on which it rested; none confined itself
so exclusively to the utterances of its founder. Such was the dogmatism
with which Epicurus propounded his precepts, such the conviction he
entertained of their excellence, that his pupils were required to
commit summaries of them to memory; [1100] and the superstitious
devotion for the founder was with his approval [1101] carried to such a
length, that on no single point was the slightest deviation from his
tenets permitted. Although, even in Cicero’s time, the writings of
Epicurus and Metrodorus found hardly a reader outside the School,
[1102] yet it is asserted that as late as the first and second
centuries after Christ the Epicureans clung tenaciously to their
master’s teaching. [1103] Probably it was easier for an Epicurean than
for any other thinker to act thus. Like his master, [1104] he was
indifferent to the labours of other philosophers, or unable to
appreciate their merits. [1105] For us this conduct of theirs has one
advantage: we can be far more certain that the Epicurean teaching
reflects that of the founder than we can that this is so in the case of
the Stoics. But this philosophical sterility, this mechanical handing
down of unchangeable principles, places the intellectual value of
Epicureanism on the lowest level. The servile dependence of the
Epicurean School on its founder can neither excuse its mental idleness
nor recommend a system so powerless to give an independent training to
its supporters.
[(2) Aim of philosophy according to the Epicureans.]
The want of intellectual taste here displayed appears also in the view
taken by Epicurus of the aim and business of philosophy. If among the
Stoics the subordination of theory to practice was frequently felt,
among the Epicureans this subordination was carried to such an extent
as to lead to a depreciation of all science. The aim of philosophy was,
with them, to promote human happiness. Indeed, philosophy is nothing
else than an activity helping us to happiness by means of speech and
thought. [1106] Nor is happiness, according to Epicurus, directly
promoted by knowledge, but only indirectly in as far as knowledge
ministers to practical needs, or clears away hindrances to their
attainment. All science which does not serve this end is superfluous
and worthless. [1107] Epicurus, therefore, despised learning and
culture, the researches of grammarians, and the lore of historians, and
declared it a piece of good fortune for simplicity of feeling to be
uncontaminated by learned rubbish. [1108] Nor was his opinion different
respecting mathematical science, of which he was wholly ignorant.
[1109] The calculations of mathematicians, he maintained, are based on
false principles; [1110] at any rate, they contribute nothing to human
happiness, and it is therefore useless and foolish to trouble oneself
about them. [1111] The theory of music and poetry he likewise found
exceedingly irksome, although he took pleasure in music itself and the
theatre; [1112] and rhetoric, as an artificial guide to eloquence,
seemed to him as worthless as the show-speeches which are the only
result of the study of it. The power of public speaking is a matter of
practice and of momentary feeling, and hence the skilful speaker is far
from being a good statesman. [1113] The greater part of logical
enquiries fared no better in his judgment. Himself no logician, he set
little store by logic. Definitions are of no use; the theory of
division and proof may be dispensed with; the philosopher does best to
confine himself to words, and to leave all the logical ballast alone.
[1114] Of all the questions which engrossed the attention of Stoic
logicians, one only, the theory of knowledge, was studied by Epicurus,
and that in a very superficial way. [1115]
Far greater, comparatively, was the importance he attached to the study
of nature, [1116] but even natural science was deemed valuable not so
much for its own sake as because of its practical use. The knowledge of
natural causes is the only means of liberating the soul from the
shackles of superstition; this is the only use of natural science. If
it were not for the thought of God and the fear of death, there would
be no need of studying nature. [1117] The investigation of our
instincts is also of use, because it helps us to control them, and to
keep them within their natural bounds. [1118] Thus the onesided
practical view of philosophy which we have already encountered in
Stoicism was carried by the Epicureans to an extreme length.
[(3) Divisions of philosophy.]
Nor is it otherwise than in harmony herewith that logic did not receive
a fuller or more perfect treatment in the further development of their
system. Even the study of nature, going far more fully into particulars
than logic, was guided entirely by practical considerations, all
scientific interest in nature being ignored. Following the usual
method, however, the Epicureans divided philosophy into three parts
[1119]—logic, natural science, and moral science. Limiting the first of
these parts to one branch of logic, the part which deals with the
characteristics of truth, and which they therefore called neither
logic, nor dialectic, but Canonic, they really reduced this part to a
mere introductory appendage to the two other parts, [1120] and studied
Canonic as a part of natural science. [1121] Natural science moreover
was so entirely subordinated to moral science, that we might almost
feel tempted to follow some modern writers [1122] in their view of the
Epicurean system, by giving to moral science precedence of the two
other parts, or at least of natural science. [1123] The School,
however, followed the usual order, and not without reason; [1124] for
although the whole tendency of the Epicurean Canonic and natural
science can only, like the Stoic, be explained by a reference to moral
science, yet moral science with them presupposes the test-science of
truth and natural science. We shall, therefore, do well to treat of
Canonic in the first place, and subsequently to prove how this branch
of study depends on Ethics.
[B. Canonic or the test-science of truth.]
[(1) Sensation and perception.]
Canonic or the test-science of truth, as has been observed, is occupied
with investigating the standard of truth, and with enquiring into the
mode of acquiring knowledge. The whole of formal logic, the doctrine of
the formation of conceptions and conclusions, is omitted by Epicurus.
[1125] Even the theory of the acquisition of knowledge assumes with him
a very simple form. If the Stoics were fain, notwithstanding their
ideal ethics and their pantheistic speculations, ultimately to take
their stand on materialism, could Epicurus avoid doing the same? In
seeking a speculative basis for a view of life which refers everything
to the feeling of pleasure or pain, he appealed far more unreservedly
than they had done to sensation. Now, since the senses can alone inform
us what is pleasant or unpleasant, and what is desirable or the
contrary, our judgment as to truth or falsehood must ultimately depend
on the senses. Viewed speculatively, sensation is the standard of
truth; viewed practically, the feeling of pleasure or pain. [1126] If
the senses may not be trusted, still less may knowledge derived from
reason be trusted, since reason itself is primarily and entirely
derived from the senses. There remains, therefore, no distinctive mark
of truth, and no possibility of certain conviction. We are at the mercy
of unlimited doubt. If, however, this doubt is contradictory of
itself—for how can men declare they know, that they can know
nothing?—it is also contradictory of human nature, since it would do
away not only with all knowledge but with every possibility of
action—in short, with all the conditions on which human life depends.
[1127] To avoid doubt we must allow that sensation as such is always,
and under all circumstances, to be trusted; nor ought the delusions of
the senses to shake our belief; the causes of these deceptions do not
lie in sensation as such, but in our judgment about sensation. What the
senses supply is only that an object produces this or that effect upon
us, and that this or that picture has impressed our soul. The facts
thus supplied are always true, only it does not follow that the object
exactly corresponds with the impression we receive of it, or that it
produces on others the same impression that it produces on us. Many
different pictures may emanate from one and the same object, and these
pictures may be changed on their way to the ear or eye. Pictures, too,
may strike our senses with which no real objects correspond. To
confound the picture with the thing, the impression made with the
object making the impression, is certainly an error, but this error
must not be laid to the charge of the senses, but to that of opinion.
[1128] Indeed, how is it possible, asks Epicurus, [1129] to refute the
testimony of the senses? Can reason refute it? But reason is itself
dependent on the senses, and cannot bear testimony against that on
which its own claims to belief depend. Or can one sense convict another
of error? But different sensations do not refer to the same object, and
similar sensations have equal value. Nothing remains, therefore, but to
attach implicit belief to every impression of the senses. Every such
impression is directly certain, and is accordingly termed by Epicurus
clear evidence (ἐνάργεια). [1130] Nay, more, its truth is so paramount
that the impressions of madmen, and appearances in dreams, are true
because they are caused by something real, [1131] and error only
becomes possible when we go beyond sensation.
[(2) Notions.]
This going beyond sensation becomes, however, a necessity. By a
repetition of the same perception a notion (πρόληψις) arises. A notion,
therefore, is nothing else than the general picture retained in the
mind of what has been perceived. [1132] On these notions retained by
memory depend all speaking and thinking. They are what commonly go
under the name of things; and speech is only a means of recalling
definite perceptions [1133] to the memory. Notions are presupposed in
all scientific knowledge. [1134] Together with sensations they form the
measure of the truth of our convictions; [1135] and it holds true of
them as it did of sensations—that they are true in themselves and need
no proof. [1136] Taken by themselves, notions, like perceptions, are
reflections in the soul of things on which the transforming action of
the mind, changing external impressions into conceptions, has not as
yet been brought to bear.
[(3) Opinion.]
For this very reason notion are not sufficient. From appearances we
must advance to their secret causes; from the known to the unknown.
[1137] Far too little value was attached by Epicurus to the logical
forms of thought, or he would have investigated more accurately the
nature of this process of advancing. [1138] Thoughts, in his view,
result from sensations spontaneously, and although a certain amount of
reflection is necessary for the process, yet it requires no scientific
guidance. [1139] The thoughts arrived at in this way do not stand as a
higher genus above perceptions, but they are only opinions (ὑπόληψις,
δόξα) without a note of truth in themselves, and depending for their
truth upon sensation. That opinion may be considered a true one which
is based on the testimony of the senses, or is at least not contrary to
the senses, and that a false opinion in which the opposite is the case.
[1140] Sometimes we suppose that upon certain present impressions other
impressions will follow: for instance, that a tower which appears round
at a distance will appear round close at hand. In that case, if the
real perception corresponds with the assumption, the opinion is true,
otherwise it is false. [1141] At other times we suppose that certain
appearances are due to secret causes: for instance, that empty space is
the cause of motion. If all appearances tally with their explanations,
we may consider our assumptions correct; if not, our assumptions are
incorrect. [1142] In the first case the test of the truth of an opinion
is that it is supported by experience; in the latter that it is not
refuted by experience. [1143] Have we not here all the leading features
of a theory of knowledge based purely on sensation? The Epicurean’s
interest in these questions was, however, far too slight to construct
with them a developed theory of materialism.
[(4) Standard of truth subjective.]
Little pains seem to have been taken by Epicurus to overcome the
difficulties by which this view was beset. If all sensations as such
are true, the saying of Protagoras necessarily follows that for each
individual that is true which seems to him to be true, that contrary
impressions about one and the same object are true, and that deceptions
of the senses, so many instances of which are supplied by experience,
are really impossible. To avoid these conclusions, Epicurus maintained
that for each different impression there is a different object-picture.
What immediately affects our senses is not the object itself, but a
picture of the object, and these pictures may be innumerable, a
different one being the cause of each separate sensation. Moreover,
although the pictures emanating from the same object are in general
nearly alike, it is possible that they may differ from one another
owing to a variety of causes. If, therefore, the same object appears
different to different individuals, the cause of these different
sensations is not one and the same, but a different one, and different
pictures must have affected their senses. If our own sensations deceive
us, the blame does not belong to our senses, as though they had
depicted to us unreal objects, but to our judgment for drawing
unwarranted inferences from pictures [1144] as to their causes.
This line of argument, however, only removes the difficulty one step
further. Sensation is said always to reproduce faithfully the picture
which affects the organs of sense, but the pictures do not always
reproduce the object with equal faithfulness. How then can a faithful
picture be known from one which is not faithful? To this question the
Epicurean system can furnish no real answer. To say that the wise man
knows how to distinguish a faithful from an unfaithful picture [1145]
is to despair of an absolute standard at all, and to make the decision
of truth or error depend upon the individual’s judgment. Such a
statement reduces all our impressions of the properties of things to a
relative level. If sensation does not show us things themselves, but
only those impressions of them which happen to affect us, it does not
supply us with a knowledge of things as they are, but as they happen to
be related to us. It was, therefore, a legitimate inference from this
theory of knowledge for Epicurus to deny that colour belongs to bodies
in themselves, since some only see colour in the dark, whilst others do
not. [1146] Like his predecessor, Democritus, he must have been brought
to this view by his theory of atoms. Few of the properties belong to
atoms which we perceive in things, and hence all other properties must
be explained as not belonging to the essence, but only to the
appearance of things. [1147] The taste for speculation was, however,
too weak, and the need of a direct truth of the senses too strong in
Epicurus for him to be able to turn his thoughts in this direction for
long. Whilst allowing to certain properties of things only a relative
value, he had no wish to doubt the reality of objects, nor to disparage
the object-pictures which furnish us with sensations. [1148]
CHAPTER XVII.
THE EPICUREAN VIEWS ON NATURE.
[A. General views on nature.]
[(1) Object, value, and method of the study of nature.]
If Epicurus and his followers underrated logic, to natural science they
attached a considerable value. This value was, however, exclusively
derived from a sense of the practical advantages which a knowledge of
nature confers in opposing superstition. Without such an object the
study of nature would have seemed wholly superfluous. [1149] Such being
their attitude of mind, the Epicureans were, as might have been
expected, indifferent about giving a complete and accurate explanation
of phenomena. Their one aim was to put forward such a view of nature as
would do away with the necessity for supernatural intervention, without
at the same time pretending to offer a sufficient solution of the
problems raised by science. [1150] Whilst, therefore, he devoted
considerable attention to natural science, [1151] Epicurus does not
seem to have considered certainty to be of importance, or even to be
possible, in dealing with details of scientific study. Of the general
causes of things we can and ought to entertain a firm conviction, since
the possibility of overcoming religious prejudices and the fears
occasioned by them depends on these convictions. No such result,
however, follows from the investigation of details, which, on the
contrary, only tends to confirm prejudices in those who are not already
emancipated from them. In dealing with details, therefore, it is enough
for Epicurus to show that various natural causes for phenomena may be
imagined, and to offer various suggestions which dispense with the
intervention of the Gods and the myths of a belief in Providence.
[1152] To say that any one of these suggestions is the only possible
one, is in most cases to exceed the bounds of experience and human
knowledge, and to go back to the capricious explanations of mythology.
[1153] Possibly the world may move, and possibly it may be at rest.
Possibly it may be round, or else it may be triangular, or have any
other shape. Possibly the sun and the stars may be extinguished at
setting, and be lighted afresh at rising. It is, however, equally
possible that they may only disappear under the earth and reappear
again, or that their rising and setting may be due to yet other causes.
Possibly the waxing and waning of the moon may be caused by the moon’s
revolving; or it may be due to an atmospheric change, or to an actual
increase and decrease in the moon’s size, or to some other cause.
Possibly the moon may shine with borrowed light, or it may shine with
its own, experience supplying us with instances of bodies which give
their own light, and of those which have their light borrowed. [1154]
From these and such-like statements it appears that questions of
natural science in themselves have no value for Epicurus. Whilst
granting that only one natural explanation of phenomena is generally
possible, yet in any particular case he is perfectly indifferent which
explanation is adopted.
[(2) Mechanical explanation of nature.]
Great stress is, however, laid by him on the general explanation. In
contrast with the religious view which regards the world as a system of
means leading to ends, the leading business of the natural science of
the Epicureans is to refer all phenomena to natural causes. To an
Epicurean nothing appeals more absurd than to suppose that the
arrangements of nature have for their object the well-being of mankind,
or that they have any object at all. The tongue is not given us for the
purpose of speaking, nor the ears for the purpose of hearing. As a
matter of fact, it would, indeed, be more correct to say, that we speak
because we have a tongue, and hear because we have ears. Natural powers
have acted purely according to the law of necessity, and among their
various products there could not fail to be some presenting the
appearance of purpose in their arrangement. In the case of man there
have resulted many such products and powers. But this result is by no
means intentional; it is an accidental consequence of natural causes.
In explaining nature all thought of Gods must be put out of sight. For
their happiness would be inconceivable, on the supposition that they
cared for man and his welfare. [1155]
Confining his interest in nature, as Epicurus did, entirely to this
general view of things, he was all the more inclined, in carrying it
into details, to rely upon some older system. No system, however,
appeared to correspond better with his tone of mind than that of
Democritus, which, moreover, commended itself to him not only by
absolutely banishing the idea of final cause, but by referring
everything to matter, and by its theory of atoms. As Epicurus places in
each individual thing taken by itself the ultimate end of action, so
Democritus had theoretically made all that is real to consist in what
is absolutely individual or in atoms. His natural science, therefore,
seemed to present the most natural basis for the Epicurean Ethics. If
the Stoics, in their views of nature, closely followed Heraclitus,
Epicurus in his followed Democritus still more closely, and hence, with
the exception of one single point, the additions made by Epicurus to
the theory of this philosopher are of no philosophical importance.
[(3) Atoms and empty space.]
With Democritus Epicurus agreed in holding that there is no other form
of reality except that of bodily reality. Every substance, he says in
the words of the Stoics, must affect others, and be affected by them;
and whatever affects others or is itself affected, is corporeal.
Corporeal substance is, therefore, the only kind of substance. [1156]
The various qualities of things, essential as well as accidental
qualities, are accordingly not incorporeal existences, but simply
chance modes of body, the former being called by Epicurus συμβεβηκότα,
the latter συμπτώματα. [1157] But a second something is necessary
besides corporeal substance in order to explain phenomena, viz. empty
space. That empty space exists is proved by the differences of weight
in bodies. For what else could be the cause of this difference? [1158]
It is proved still more conclusively by motion, motion being impossible
without empty space. [1159] Mind as a moving cause, however, seems to
Epicurus altogether superfluous. Everything that exists consists of
bodies and empty space, and there is no third thing. [1160]
Democritus had resolved the two conceptions of body and empty space
into the conceptions of being and not being. True to his position,
Epicurus dispensed with this speculative basis, and clinging to the
ordinary notions of empty space, and of a material filling space,
[1161] he simply proves these notions by the qualities of phenomena.
For this very reason Democritus’s division of body into innumerable
primary particles or atoms appeared to him most necessary. All bodies
known to us by sensation are composed of parts. [1162] If the process
of division were infinitely continued, all things would ultimately be
resolved into the non-existent—in this Epicurus and Democritus
agree;—and conversely all things must have been formed out of the
non-existent, in defiance of the first principle of natural science
that nothing can come from nothing, and that nothing can be resolved
into nothing. [1163] Hence, we must conclude that the primary component
parts of things can neither have come into existence nor cease to
exist, nor yet be changed in their nature. [1164] These primary bodies
contain no empty space in themselves, and hence can neither be divided
nor destroyed, nor be changed in any way. [1165] They are so small that
they do not impress the senses, and as a matter of fact we do not see
them. Nevertheless they must not be regarded as mathematical atoms, the
name atoms being assigned to them only because their bodily structure
will not admit of division. [1166] They have neither colour, warmth,
smell, nor any other property; properties belong only to distinct
materials; [1167] and for this reason they must not be sought in the
four elements, all of which, as experience shows, come into being and
pass away. [1168] They possess only the universal qualities of all
corporeal things, viz. shape, size, and weight. [1169]
Not only must atoms, like all other bodies, have shape, but there must
exist among them indefinitely many varieties of shape, or it would be
impossible to account for the innumerable differences of things. There
cannot, however, be really an infinite number of shapes, as Democritus
maintained, in any limited body—this is intelligible of itself—nor yet
in the whole universe, [1170] since an unlimited number would make the
arrangement of the world impossible, everything in the world being
circumscribed by certain containing limits. [1171] Again, atoms must be
different in point of size; for all materials cannot be divided into
particles of equal size. Yet even to this difference there must be some
limitation. An atom must neither be so large as to become an object of
sense, nor can it, after what has been said, be infinitely small.
[1172] From difference in point of size the difference of atoms in
point of weight follows. [1173] In point of number atoms must be
innumerable, and in the same way empty space must be unbounded also.
For since everything bounded must be bounded by something, it is
impossible to imagine any bounds of the universe beyond which nothing
exists, and hence there can be no bounds at all. The absence of bounds
must, apply to the mass of atoms quite as much as to empty space. If an
infinite number of atoms would not find room in a limited space,
conversely a limited number of atoms would be lost in empty space, and
never able to form a world. [1174] In all these views Epicurus closely
follows Democritus, no doubt agreeing with him also in explaining the
qualities of things by the composition of their atoms. [1175]
[B. The world.]
[(1) The swerving aside of atoms.]
In deducing the origin of things from their primary causes, Epicurus,
however, deviates widely from his predecessor. Atoms—so it was taught
by both—have by virtue of their weight been eternally engaged in a
downward motion. [1176] That all bodies should move downwards in empty
space seemed to Epicurus a matter of course; for whatever is heavy must
fall unless it is supported. [1177] He was therefore opposed to the
Aristotelian view that heaviness shows itself in the form of attraction
towards a centre, and consequently to his further supposition that
downward mode of motion belongs only to certain bodies, circular motion
being for others more natural. [1178] The objection that in endless
space there is no above or below he could meet only by appealing to
experience; [1179] some things always appear above our heads, others
beneath our feet. [1180] But whilst Democritus held that atoms in their
downward motion meet together, thus giving rise to a rotatory motion,
no such view commended itself to Epicurus. Nay rather in his view all
atoms will fall equally fast, since empty space offers no resistance,
and falling perpendicularly it is impossible to see how they can meet.
[1181] To render a meeting possible he supposes the smallest possible
swerving aside from the perpendicular line in falling. This assumption
seemed to him indispensable, since it would be otherwise impossible to
assert the freedom of the human will. For how can the will be free if
everything falls according to the strict law of gravity? For the same
reason this swerving aside was not supposed to proceed from any natural
necessity, but simply from the power of self-motion in the atoms.
[1182] In consequence of their meeting one part of the atoms
rebounds—so Democritus also taught; the lighter ones are forced
upwards, and from the upward and downward motions combined a rotatory
motion arises. [1183] When this motion takes place a clustering of
atoms is the consequence, which by their own motion separate themselves
from the remaining mass, and form a world of themselves. [1184] Atoms
being eternal and unchangeable, the process of forming worlds must go
on without beginning or end; [1185] and inasmuch as they are also
infinite in number, and empty space is infinite also, there must be an
innumerable number of worlds. [1186] In the character of these worlds
the greatest possible variety may be supposed, since it is most
unlikely that the innumerable combinations of atoms all brought about
at random will fall out alike. Equally impossible is it to assert that
all these worlds are absolutely dissimilar. In general, Epicurus
assumed that they are extremely different both in point of size and
arrangement, and that here and there one may be similar to our own.
[1187] Moreover, since eternity affords time for all imaginable
combinations of atoms, nothing can ever be brought about now which has
not already existed. [1188] In one respect all worlds are alike; they
come into existence, are liable to decay, and, like all other
individual elements, are exposed to a gradual increase and decrease.
[1189] So we might have assumed from other positions in his system.
Between the individual worlds both Democritus and Epicurus insert
intermediate world-spaces, in which by the clustering of atoms from
time to time new worlds come into being. [1190]
[(2) Origin of the world.]
The origin of our world is thus described. At a certain period of
time—Lucretius [1191] believes at no very distant period—a cluster of
atoms of varying shape and size was formed in this definite portion of
space. These atoms meeting, there first arose from the pressure and
rebound of the quickly falling particles motions of every variety in
every direction. Soon the greater atoms pressing downwards, by dint of
weight forced upwards the smaller and lighter atoms, the fiery ones
topmost and with the greatest impetus to form the ether, and afterwards
those which form the air. [1192] The upper pressure ceasing, these
masses, under the pressure of particles still joining it from below,
spread forth sidewards, and thus the belts of fire and air were formed.
Next uprose those atoms out of which the sun and stars are formed into
the heights, and at the same time the earth settled down, its inner
part being partially exhausted in those places where the sea now is. By
the influence of the warmth of the ether, and the sun-heat, the
earth-mass was bound together more closely, the sea was pressed out of
it, and the surface assumed an uneven character. [1193] The world is
shut off from other worlds and from empty space by those bodies which
form its external boundary. [1194]
[(3) Arrangement of the universe.]
Asking, in the next place, what idea must be formed of the arrangement
of the world, we are met by the two principles which Epicurus is never
weary of inculcating; one, that we must explain nothing as an
intentional arrangement by deity, but refer everything simply and
solely to mechanical causes; the other, that in explaining phenomena
the widest possible room must be given for hypotheses of every kind,
and that nothing is more absurd than to abridge the wide range of
possible explanations by exclusively deciding in favour of any one.
[1195] Thereby the investigation of nature loses for him its value as
such, nor is it of any great interest to us to follow his speculations
on nature into detail. On one point he dogmatises, protesting that the
framework of heaven must not be considered the work of God, [1196] nor
must life and reason be attributed to the stars. [1197] Otherwise, on
nearly all the questions which engaged the attention of astronomers at
that time, he observes the greatest indifference, treating the views of
his predecessors, good and bad alike, with an easy superficiality which
can only be explained by supposing him altogether indifferent [1198] as
to their truth. The state of his own astronomical knowledge can,
moreover, be easily seen by recalling the notorious assertion [1199]
that the sun, the moon, and the stars are either not at all, or only a
little larger, and may possibly be even less than they appear to be.
The Epicureans also thought to support their theory that the earth,
borne by the air, reposes in the middle of the world—a theory which on
their hypothesis of the weight of bodies is impossible [1200]—by the
gradual diminution in weight of the surrounding bodies. [1201] It would
be impossible here to go through the treatment which they gave to
atmospheric and terrestrial phenomena, particularly as the principle
already indicated was most freely used, and many explanations were
given as being all equally possible. [1202]
[(4) Plants and animals.]
Out of the newly made earth plants at first grew, [1203] and afterwards
animals came forth, since the latter, according to Lucretius, can by no
possibility have fallen from heaven. [1204] In other worlds, likewise,
living beings came into existence, though not necessarily in all.
[1205] Among these beings were originally, as Empedocles had previously
supposed, [1206] all sorts of composite or deformed creatures. Those,
however, alone continued to exist which were fitted by nature to find
support, to propagate, and to protect themselves from danger. Romantic
creatures, such as centaurs of chimæras, can never have existed here,
because the beings of which they are compounded would require
conditions of life [1207] altogether different.
[C. Mankind.]
[(1) Origin of the human race.]
Aiming, as the Epicureans did, at explaining the origin of men and
animals in a purely natural manner, they likewise tried to form an
idea, equally according to nature, of the original state and historical
development of the human race. In this attempt they ignored all
legendary notions, and, notwithstanding their leaning towards
materialism, they on the whole advocated perfectly sound views. The men
of early times, so thought Lucretius, were stronger and more powerful
than the men of to-day. Rude and ignorant as beasts, they lived in the
woods in a perpetual state of warfare with the wild animals, without
justice or society. [1208] The first and most important step in a
social direction was the discovery of fire, the learning to build huts,
and to clothe themselves in skins; then began marriage and domestic
life, [1209] and speech, originally not a matter of convention, but,
like the noises of animals, the natural expression of thoughts and
feelings, was developed. [1210] The older the human race grew, the more
they learned of the arts and skill which minister to the preservation
and enjoyment of life. These arts were first learnt by experience,
under the pressure of nature, or the compulsion of want. What had thus
been discovered was completed by reflection, the more gifted preceding
the rest as teachers. [1211] In exactly the same way civil society was
developed. Individuals built strongholds, and made themselves rulers.
In time the power of kings aroused envy, and they were massacred. To
crush the anarchy which then arose, magistrates were chosen, and order
established by penal laws. [1212] It will subsequently be seen that
Epicurus explained religion in the same way by natural growth.
[(2) The soul.]
The apotheosis of nature, which has been apparent in Epicurus’s whole
view of history, becomes specially prominent in his treatment of
psychology. This treatment could, after all that has been said, be only
purely materialistic. The soul, like every other real being, is a body.
In support of this view the Epicureans appealed to the mutual relations
of the body and the soul, agreeing on this point with the Stoics.
[1213] The body of the soul, however, consists of the finest, lightest,
and most easily moved atoms, as is manifest from the speed of thought,
from the instantaneous dissolution of the soul after death, and,
moreover, from the fact that the soulless body is as heavy as the body
in which there is a soul. [1214] Hence Epicurus, again agreeing with
the Stoics, describes the soul as a material resembling fire and air,
[1215] or, more accurately, as composed of four elements, fire, air,
vapour, and a fourth nameless element. It consists of the finest atoms,
and is the cause of feeling, [1216] and according as one or other of
these elements preponderates, the character of man is of one or the
other kind. [1217] Like the Stoics, Epicurus believed that the
soul-element is received by generation from the parents’ souls, [1218]
and that it is spread over the whole body, [1219] growing as the body
grows. [1220] At the same time he makes a distinction somewhat similar
to that made by the Stoics in their doctrine of the sovereign part of
the soul (ἡγεμονικόν). [1221] Only the irrational part of the soul is
diffused as a principle of life over the whole body; the rational part
has its seat in the breast. [1222] To the rational part belong mental
activity, sensation, and perception, the motion of the will and the
mind, and in this latter sense life itself; both parts together make up
one being, yet they may exist in different conditions. The mind may be
cheerful whilst the body and the irrational soul feel pain, or the
reverse may be the case. It is even possible that portions of the
irrational soul may be lost by the mutilation of the body, without
detriment to the rational soul, or consequently to life. [1223] When,
however, the connection between soul and body is fully severed, then
the soul can no longer exist. Deprived of the surrounding shelter of
the body, its atoms are dispersed in a moment, owing to their
lightness; and the body in consequence, being unable to exist without
the soul, goes over into corruption. [1224] If this view appears to
hold out the most gloomy prospect for the future, Epicurus considers
that it cannot really be so. With life every feeling of evil ceases,
[1225] and the time when we shall no longer exist affects us just as
little as the time before we existed. [1226] Nay, more, he entertains
the opinion that his teaching alone can reconcile us to death by
removing all fear of the nether world and its terrors. [1227]
Allowing that many of these statements are natural consequences of the
principles of Epicurus, the distinction between a rational and an
irrational soul must, nevertheless, at first sight seem strange in a
system so thoroughly materialistic as was that of the Epicureans. And
yet this distinction is not stranger than the corresponding parts of
the Stoic teaching. If the Stoic views may be referred to the
distinction which they drew in morals between the senses and the
reason, not less are the Epicurean ethics marked by the same contrast
between the general and the sensuous side of the mind. Hence Epicurus
shares the Stoic belief in an ethereal origin of the human race; [1228]
and although this belief as at first expressed only implies that man,
like other living beings, is composed of ethereal elements, yet there
is connected with it the distinction already discussed in the case of
the Stoics between the higher and the lower parts of man, which
ultimately comes to be simply another mode of expressing the difference
between mind and matter.
[(3) Sensation.]
Among the phenomena of the soul’s life sensation is made to harmonise
with the general principles of the Epicurean view of nature by the aid
of Democritus’s doctrine of atom-pictures (εἴδωλα). From the surface of
bodies—this is the pith of that doctrine—the finest possible particles
are constantly being thrown off, which by virtue of their fineness
traverse the furthest spaces in an infinitely short time, hurrying
through the void. [1229] Many of these exhalations are arrested by some
obstacle soon after coming forth, or are otherwise thrown into
confusion. In the case of others the atoms for a long time retain the
same position and connection which they had in bodies themselves, thus
presenting a picture of things, and only lacking corporeal solidity. As
these pictures are conveyed to the soul by the various organs of sense,
our impressions of things arise. [1230] Even those impressions, which
have no corresponding real object, must be referred to such pictures
present in the soul. [1231] For often pictures last longer than things
themselves; [1232] and often by a casual combination of atoms pictures
are formed in the air resembling no one single thing. Sometimes, too,
pictures of various kinds are combined on their way to the senses;
thus, for instance, the notion of a Centaur is caused by the union of
the picture of a man with that of a horse, not only in our imagination,
but already previously in the atom-picture. [1233] If, therefore,
sensation distorts or imperfectly represents real objects, it must be
explained as being due to some change or mutilation in the
atom-pictures before they reach our senses. [1234]
In thus explaining mental impressions, the Epicureans do not allow
themselves to be disturbed by the fact that we can recall at pleasure
the ideas of all possible things. The cause of this power was rather
supposed to be the circumstance that we are always surrounded by an
innumerable number of atom-pictures, none of which we perceive unless
our attention is directed to them. Likewise the seeming motion of forms
which we behold in dreams is explained by the hasty succession of
similar atom-pictures, appearing to us as changes of one and the same
picture. [1235] But besides receiving pictures supplied from without,
spontaneous motion with regard to these pictures takes place on our
part, a motion connected in the first instance with the soul’s motion
when it receives the outward impression, but not to be regarded as a
simple continuation thereof. This independent motion gives rise to
opinion, and hence opinion is not so necessary or so universally true
as feeling. It may agree with feeling, or it may not agree with it. It
may be true or it may be false. [1236] The conditions of its being true
or false have been previously investigated. [1237]
[(4) Will.]
Impressions also give rise to will and action, the soul being set in
motion by impressions, and this motion extending from the soul to the
body. [1238] Into the nature of will, however, Epicurus does not appear
to have instituted a more careful psychological investigation. It was
enough for him to assert the freedom of the will. This freedom he
considers absolutely indispensable, if anything we do is to be
considered our own, unless we are prepared to despair of moral
responsibility altogether, and to resign ourselves to a comfortless and
inexorable necessity. [1239] To make freedom possible, Epicurus had
introduced accident into the motion of atoms, and for the same reason
he denies the truth of disjunctive propositions which apply to the
future. [1240] In the latter respect, he, no doubt, only attacked the
material truth of two clauses, without impugning the formal accuracy of
the disjunction, [1241] i.e. he did not deny that of two contradictory
cases either one or the other must happen, nor did he deny the truth of
saying: To-morrow Epicurus will either be alive or not alive. But he
disputed the truth of each clause taken by itself. He denied the truth
of the sentence, Epicurus will be alive; and equally that of its
contradictory, Epicurus will not be alive; on the ground that the one
or the other statement only becomes true by the actual realisation of
an event at present uncertain. [1242] For this he deserves little
blame. Our real charge against him is that he did not more thoroughly
investigate the nature of the will and the conception of freedom, and
that he treats the subject of the soul as scantily and superficially as
he had treated the subject of nature.
CHAPTER XVIII.
VIEWS OF EPICURUS ON RELIGION.
[A. Criticism of the gods and the popular faith.]
Satisfied with the results of his own enquiries into nature, Epicurus
hoped by his view of the causes of things not only to displace the
superstitions of a polytheistic worship, but also to uproot the
prejudice in favour of Providence. Indeed, these two objects were
placed by him on exactly the same footing. So absurd did he consider
the popular notions respecting the Gods, that instead of blaming those
who attacked them, [1243] he believed it impious to acquiesce in them.
Religion being, according to Lucretius, the cause of the greatest
evils, [1244] he who displaces it to make way for rational views of
nature deserves praise as having overcome the most dangerous enemy of
mankind. All the language of Epicurus in disparagement of the art of
poetry applies in a still higher degree to the religious errors
fostered by poetry. [1245] Nor is it better with belief in Providence
than with the popular faith. This belief is also included in the
category of romance; [1246] and the doctrine of fatalism, which was the
Stoic form for the same belief, was denounced as even worse than the
popular faith. [1247] For how, asks the Epicurean, could divine
Providence have created a world in which evil abounds, in which virtue
often fares ill, whilst vice is triumphant? How could a world have been
made for the sake of man, when man can only inhabit a very small
portion of it? How could nature be intended to promote man’s well-being
when it so often imperils his life and labour, and sends him into the
world more helpless than any animal? How can we form a conception of
beings ruling over an infinite universe, and everywhere present to
administer everything in every place? [1248] What could have induced
these beings to create a world, and how and whence could they have
known how to create it, had not nature supplied them with an example?
[1249] In fine, how could God be the happy Being He must be if the
whole burden of caring for all things and all events lay upon Him, or
He were swayed to and fro together with the body of the world? [1250]
Or how could we feel any other feeling than that of fear in the
presence of such a God who troubles himself about everything? [1251]
[B. The gods according to Epicurus.]
[(1) Reasons for his belief.]
With the denial of the popular Gods, the denial of demons, [1252] of
course, goes hand in hand; and, together with Providence, the need of
prayer [1253] and of prophecy is at the same time negatived. [1254] All
these notions, according to Epicurus, are the result of ignorance and
fear. Pictures seen in dreams have been confounded with real
existences; regularity of motion in the heavenly bodies has been
mistaken by the ignorant for the work of God; events which accidentally
happened in combination with others have been regarded as portents;
terrific natural phenomena, storms and earthquakes, have engendered in
men’s minds the fear of higher powers. [1255] Fear is therefore the
basis of religion; [1256] and, on the other hand, freedom from fear is
the primary object aimed at by philosophy.
For all that, Epicurus was unwilling to renounce belief in the Gods,
[1257] nor is it credible that this unwillingness was simply a yielding
to popular opinion. [1258] The language used by the Epicureans
certainly gives the impression of sincerity; and the time was past when
avowed atheism was attended with danger. Atheism would have been as
readily condoned in the time of Epicurus as the deism which denied most
unreservedly the popular faith. It is, however, possible to trace the
causes which led Epicurus to believe that there are Gods. There was
first the general diffusion of a belief in Gods which appeared to him
to establish the truth of this belief, and hence he declared the
existence of Gods to be something directly certain, and grounded on a
primary notion (πρόληψις). [1259] Moreover, with his materialistic
theory of knowledge he no doubt supposed that the primary notion which
convinces us of the existence of Gods arises from the actual
contemplation of divine beings, and from the perception of those
atom-pictures from which Democritus had already deduced the belief in
Gods. [1260] And in addition to these theoretical reasons, Epicurus had
also another, half æsthetical, half religious—the wish to see his ideal
of happiness realised in the person of the Gods, [1261] and it is this
ideal which determines the character of all his notions respecting
them. His Gods are therefore, throughout, human beings. Religious
belief only knows beings such as these, or, as Epicurus expresses it,
only such beings come before us in those pictures of the Gods which
present themselves to our minds, sometimes in sleep, sometimes when we
are awake. Reflection, too, convinces us that the human form is the
most beautiful, that to it alone reason belongs, and that it is the
most appropriate form for perfectly happy beings. [1262] Epicurus even
went so far as to attribute to the Gods difference of sex. [1263] At
the same time everything must be eliminated which is not appropriate to
a divine being.
[(2) Nature of the Epicurean gods.]
The two essential characteristics of the Gods, according to Epicurus,
are immortality and perfect happiness. [1264] Both of these
characteristics would be impaired were we to attribute to the bodies of
the Gods the same dense corporeity which belongs to our own. We must,
therefore, only assign to them a body analogous to our body, ethereal,
and consisting of the finest atoms. [1265] Such bodies would be of
little use in a world like ours. In fact, they could not live in any
world without being exposed to the temporal ruin which will in time
overwhelm it, and, meantime, to a state of fear, which would mar their
bliss. Epicurus, therefore, assigns the space between the worlds for
their habitation, where, as Lucretius remarks, troubled by no storms,
they live under a sky ever serene. [1266]
Nor can these Gods be supposed to care for the world and the affairs of
men, else their happiness would be marred by the most distressing
occupation; but perfectly free from care and trouble, and absolutely
regardless of the world, in eternal contemplation of their unchanging
perfection, they enjoy the most unalloyed happiness. [1267] The view
which the School formed to itself of this happiness we learn from
Philodemus. [1268] The Gods are exempt from sleep, sleep being a
partial death, and not needed by beings who live without any exertion.
And yet he believes that they require nourishment, though this must, of
course, be of a kind suited to their nature. They also need dwellings,
[1269] since every being requires some place wherein to dwell. Were
powers of speech to be refused to them, they would be deprived of the
highest means of enjoyment—the power of conversing with their equals.
Philodemus thinks it probable they use the Greek or some other closely
allied language. [1270] In short, he imagines the Gods to be a society
of Epicurean philosophers, who have everything that they can
desire—everlasting life, no care, and perpetual opportunities of sweet
converse. Only such Gods,—the Epicureans thought, [1271]—need not be
feared. Only such Gods are free and pure, and worshipped because of
this very perfection. [1272] Moreover, these Gods are innumerable. If
the number of mortal beings is infinite, the law of counterpoise
requires that the number of immortal beings must not be less. [1273] If
we have only the idea of a limited number of Gods, it is because, owing
to their being so much alike, [1274] we confound in our minds the
innumerable pictures of the Gods which are conveyed to our souls.
Priding themselves, in contrast to the Stoics, on their agreement by
means of this theology with the anthropomorphic views of the popular
belief, and even outdoing polytheism in the assumption of innumerable
Gods, [1275] the Epicureans were willing to join in the customary
services of religion, [1276] without being nearly so anxious as the
Stoics to prove themselves in harmony with the popular creed. Whilst
the Stoics in their anxiety to do this had plunged head over heels into
allegory, no such tendency is observed on the part of the Epicureans.
Only the poet of the School gives a few allegorical interpretations of
mythical ideas, and he does it with more taste and skill than is usual
with the Stoics. [1277] On other points the Epicureans, not excluding
Lucretius, observe towards the popular faith a negative attitude, that
of opposing it by explanations; and by this attitude, without doubt,
they rendered one of the most important services to humanity.
CHAPTER XIX.
THE MORAL SCIENCE OF THE EPICUREANS. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
[A. Pleasure.]
[(1) Pleasure the highest good.]
Natural science is intended to overcome the prejudices which stand in
the way of happiness; moral science to give positive instruction as to
the nature and means of attaining to happiness. The speculative parts
of the Epicurean system had already worked out the idea that reality
belongs only to individual things, and that all general order must be
referred to the accidental harmony of individual forces. The same idea
is now met with in the sphere of morals, individual feeling being made
the standard, and individual well-being the object of all human
activity. Natural science, beginning with external phenomena, went back
to the secret principles of these phenomena, accessible only to
thought. It led from an apparently accidental movement of atoms to a
universe of regular motions. Not otherwise was the course followed by
Epicurus in moral science. Not content with human feelings alone, nor
with selfishly referring everything to the individual taken by himself
alone, that science, in more accurately defining the conception of
well-being, ascertained that the same can only be found by rising
superior to feelings and purely individual aims, in short by that very
process of referring consciousness to itself and its universal being,
which the Stoics declared to be the only path to happiness. It is for
us now to portray this development of the Epicurean philosophy in its
most prominent features.
The only unconditional good, according to Epicurus, is pleasure; the
only unconditional evil is pain. [1278] No proof of this proposition
seemed to him to be necessary; it rests on a conviction supplied by
nature herself, and is the ground and basis of all our doing and not
doing. [1279] If proof, however, were required, he appealed to the fact
that all living beings from the first moment of their existence pursue
pleasure and avoid pain, [1280] and that consequently pleasure is a
natural good, and the normal condition of every being. [1281] Hence
follows the proposition to which Epicurus in common with all the
philosophers of pleasure appealed, that pleasure must be the object of
life.
[(2) Freedom from pain.]
At the same time, this proposition was restricted in the Epicurean
system by several considerations. In the first place, neither pleasure
nor pain is a simple thing. There are many varieties and degrees of
pleasure and pain, and the case may occur in which pleasure has to be
secured by the loss of other pleasures, or even by pain, or in which
pain can only be avoided by submitting to another pain, or at the cost
of some pleasure. In this case Epicurus would have the various feelings
of pleasure and pain carefully weighed, and in consideration of the
advantages and disadvantages which they confer, would under
circumstances advise the good to be treated as an evil, and the evil as
a good. He would have pleasure forsworn if it would entail a greater
corresponding pain, and pain submitted to if it holds out the prospect
of greater pleasure. [1282] He also agrees with Plato in holding that
every positive pleasure presupposes a want, i.e. a pain which it
proposes to remove; and hence he concludes that the real aim and object
of all pleasure consists in obtaining freedom from pain, [1283] and
that the good is nothing else but emancipation from evil. [1284] By a
Cyrenaic neither repose of soul nor freedom from pain, but a gentle
motion of the soul or positive pleasure was proposed as the object of
life; and hence happiness was not made to depend on man’s general state
of mind, but on the sum-total of his actual enjoyments. But Epicurus,
advancing beyond this position, recognised both the positive and the
negative side of pleasures, both pleasure as repose, and pleasure as
motion. [1285] Both aspects of pleasure, however, do not stand on the
same footing in his system. On the contrary, the essential and
immediate cause of happiness is repose of mind—ἀταραξία. Positive
pleasure is only an indirect cause of ἀταραξία in that it removes the
pain of unsatisfied craving. [1286] This mental repose, however,
depends essentially on the character of a man’s mind, just as
conversely positive pleasure in systems so materialistic must depend on
sensuous attractions. It was consistent, therefore, on the part of
Aristippus to consider bodily gratification the highest pleasure; and
conversely Epicurus was no less consistent in subordinating it to
gratification of mind.
[B. Intellectual happiness.]
In calling pleasure the highest object in life, says Epicurus, we do
not mean the pleasures of profligacy, nor indeed sensual enjoyments at
all, but the freedom of the body from pain, and the freedom of the soul
from disturbance. Neither feasts nor banquets, neither the lawful nor
unlawful indulgence of the passions, nor the joys of the table, make
life happy, but a sober judgment, investigating the motives for action
and for inaction, and dispelling those greatest enemies of our peace,
prejudices. The root from which it springs,
[(1) Intelligence.]
and, therefore, the highest good, is intelligence. [1287] It is
intelligence that leaves us free to acquire possession thereof, without
being ever too early or too late. [1288] Our indispensable wants are
simple, little being necessary to ensure freedom from pain; other
things only afford change in enjoyment, by which the quantity is not
increased, or else they rest on a mere sentiment. [1289] The little we
need may be easily attained. Nature makes ample provision for our
happiness, would we only receive her gifts thankfully, not forgetting
what she gives in thinking what we desire. [1290] He who lives
according to nature is never poor; the wise man living on bread and
water has no reason to envy Zeus; [1291] chance has little hold on him;
with him judgment is everything, [1292] and if that be right, he need
trouble himself but little about external mishaps. [1293] Not even
bodily pain appeared to Epicurus so irresistible as to be able to cloud
the wise man’s happiness. Although he regards as unnatural the Stoic’s
insensibility to pain, [1294] still he is of opinion that the wise man
may be happy on the rack, and can smile at pains the most violent,
exclaiming in the midst of torture, How sweet! [1295] A touch of forced
sentiment may be discerned in the last expression, and a trace of
self-satisfied exaggeration is manifest even in the beautiful language
of the dying philosopher on the pains of disease. [1296] Nevertheless,
the principle involved is based in the spirit of the Epicurean
philosophy, and borne out by the testimony of the founder. The main
thing, according to Epicurus, is not the state of the body, but the
state of the mind; bodily pleasure being of short duration, and having
much about it to unsettle; mental enjoyments only being pure and
incorruptible. For the same reason mental sufferings are more severe
than those of the body, since the body only suffers from present ills,
whilst the soul feels those past and those to come. [1297] In a life of
limited duration the pleasures of the flesh never attain their
consummation. Mind only, by consoling us for the limited nature of our
bodily existence, can produce a life complete in itself, and not
standing in need of unlimited duration. [1298]
[(2) Reasons for rising superior to the senses.]
At the same time, the Epicureans, if consistent with their principles,
could not deny that bodily pleasure is the earlier form, and likewise
the ultimate source, of all pleasure, and neither Epicurus nor his
favourite pupil Metrodorus shrank from making this admission; Epicurus
declaring that he could form no conception of the good apart from
enjoyments [1299] of the senses; Metrodorus asserting that everything
good has reference to the belly. [1300] For all that the Epicureans did
not feel themselves driven to give up the pre-eminence which they
claimed for goods of the soul over those of the body. Did even the
Stoics, notwithstanding the grossness of their theory of knowledge,
ever abate their demand for a knowledge of conceptions; or cease to
subordinate the senses to reason, although they built their theory of
morals on nature? But all definite character has vanished from these
intellectual joys and pains. The only distinctive feature which they
possess is the addition either of memory, or of hope, or of fear [1301]
to the present feeling of pleasure or pain; and their greater
importance is simply ascribed to the greater force or duration
belonging to ideal feelings as compared with the attractions which
momentarily impress the senses. [1302] Incidentally the remembrance of
philosophic discourses is mentioned [1303] as a counterpoise to bodily
pain; properly speaking, mental pleasures and pains are not different
from other pleasures in kind, but only in degree, by reason of their
being stronger and more enduring. Accordingly Epicurus cannot escape
the admission that we have no cause for rejecting gross and carnal
enjoyments if these can liberate us from the fear of higher powers, of
death, and of sufferings; [1304] and thus the only consolation he can
offer in pain is the uncertain one that the most violent pains either
do not last long, or else put an end to life; and the less violent ones
ought to be endured since they do not exclude a counterbalancing
pleasure. [1305] Hence victory over the impression of the moment must
be won, not so much by mental force stemming the tide of feeling, as by
a proper estimate of the conditions and actions of the senses.
[(3) Virtue.]
In no other way can the necessity of virtue be established in the
Epicurean system. Agreeing with the strictest moralists, so far as to
hold that virtue can be as little separated from happiness as happiness
from virtue, [1306] having even the testimony of opponents as to the
purity and integrity of his moral teaching, which in its results
differed in no wise from that of the Stoics; [1307] Epicurus,
nevertheless, holds a position of strong contrast to the Stoics in
respect of the grounds on which his moral theory is based. To demand
virtue for its own sake seemed to him a mere phantom of the
imagination. Those only who make pleasure their aim have a real object
in life. [1308] Virtue has only a conditional value [1309] as a means
to happiness; or, as it is otherwise expressed, [1310] Virtue taken by
itself does not render a man happy, but the pleasure arising from the
exercise of virtue. This pleasure the Epicurean system does not seek in
the consciousness of duty fulfilled, or of virtuous action, but in the
freedom from disquiet, fear, and dangers, which follows as a
consequence from virtue. Wisdom and intelligence contribute to
happiness by liberating us from the fear of the Gods and of death, by
making us independent of immoderate passions and vain desires, by
teaching us to bear pain as something subordinate and passing, and by
pointing the way to a more cheerful and natural life. [1311]
Self-control aids, in that it points out the attitude to be assumed
towards pleasure and pain, so as to receive the maximum of enjoyment
and the minimum of suffering; [1312] valour, in that it enables us to
overcome fear and pain; [1313] justice, in that it makes life possible
without that fear of Gods and men, which ever haunts the transgressor.
[1314] To the Epicurean virtue is never an end in itself, but only a
means to an end lying beyond—a happy life—but withal a means so certain
and necessary, that virtue can neither be conceived without happiness,
nor happiness without virtue. However unnecessary it may seem, still
Epicurus would ever insist that an action to be right must be done not
according to the letter, but according to the spirit of the law, not
simply from regard to others, or by compulsion, but from delight in
what is good. [1315]
[C. The wise man.]
The same claims were advanced by Epicurus on behalf of his wise man as
the Stoics had urged on behalf of theirs. Not only does he attribute to
him a control over pain, in nothing inferior to the Stoic insensibility
of feeling, but he endeavours himself to describe the wise man’s life
as most perfect and satisfactory in itself. Albeit not free from
emotions, and in particular susceptible to the higher feelings of the
soul such as compassion, the wise man finds his philosophic activity in
no wise thereby impaired. [1316] Without despising enjoyment, he is
altogether master of his desires, and knows how to restrain them by
intelligence, so that they never exercise a harmful influence on life.
He alone has an unwavering certainty of conviction; [1317] he alone
knows how to do the right thing in the right way; he alone, as
Metrodorus observes, [1318] knows how to be thankful. Nay, more, he is
so far exalted above ordinary men, that Epicurus promises his pupils
that, by carefully observing his teaching, they will dwell as Gods
among men; [1319] so little can destiny influence him, that he calls
him happy under all circumstances. [1320] Happiness may, indeed, depend
on certain external conditions; it may even be allowed that the
disposition to happiness is not found in every nature, nor in every
person; [1321] but still, when it is found, its stability is sure, nor
can time affect its duration. For wisdom—so Epicurus and the Stoics
alike believed—is indestructible, [1322] and the wise man’s happiness
can never be increased by time. A life, therefore, bounded by time can
be quite as complete as one not so bounded. [1323]
Different as are the principles and the tone of the systems of the
Stoics and of Epicurus, one and the same tendency may yet be traced in
both—the tendency which characterises all the post-Aristotelian
philosophy—the desire to place man in a position of absolute
independence by emancipating him from connection with the external
world, and by awakening in him the consciousness of the infinite
freedom of thought. [1324]
CHAPTER XX.
THE EPICUREAN ETHICS CONTINUED: SPECIAL POINTS.
[A. The individual.]
The general principles already laid down determine likewise the
character of particular points in the moral science of the Epicureans.
Epicurus, it is true, never developed his moral views to a systematic
theory of moral actions and states, however much his pupils,
particularly in later times, busied themselves with morality and
special points in a system of morals. [1325] Moreover, his fragmentary
statements and precepts are very imperfectly recorded. Still, all that
is known corresponds with the notion which we must form in accordance
with those general views. All the practical rules given by Epicurus aim
at conducting man to happiness by controlling passions and desires. The
wise man is easily satisfied. He sees that little is necessary for
supplying the wants of nature, and for emancipating from pain; that
imaginary wealth knows no limit, whereas the riches required by nature
may be easily acquired; [1326] that the most simple nourishment affords
as much enjoyment as the most luxurious, and is at the same time far
more conducive to health; [1327] that therefore the restriction of
wants rather than the increase of possessions makes really rich; [1328]
and that he who is not satisfied with little will never be satisfied at
all. [1329] He therefore can like Epicurus live upon bread and water,
[1330] and at the same time think himself as happy as Zeus. [1331] He
eschews passions which disturb peace of mind and the repose of life;
considering it foolish to throw away the present in order to obtain an
uncertain future, or to sacrifice life itself for the means of life,
seeing he can only once enjoy it. [1332] He therefore neither gives way
to passionate love, nor to forbidden acts of profligacy. [1333] Fame he
does not covet; and for the opinions of men he cares only so far as to
wish not to be despised, since being despised would expose him to
danger. [1334] Injuries he can bear with calmness. [1335] He cares not
what may happen to him after death; [1336] nor envies any one the
possessions which he does not himself value. [1337]
It has been already seen how Epicurus thought to rise above pains, and
to emancipate himself from the fear of the Gods and death. [1338] And
it has been further noticed that he thinks to secure by means of his
principles the same independence and happiness which the Stoics aspired
to by means of theirs. But whilst the Stoics hoped to attain this
independence by crushing the senses, Epicurus was content to restrain
and regulate them. Desires he would not have uprooted, but he would
have them brought into proper proportion to the collective end and
condition of life, into the equilibrium necessary for perfect repose of
mind. Hence, notwithstanding his own simplicity, Epicurus is far from
disapproving, under all circumstances, of a fuller enjoyment of life.
The wise man will not live as a Cynic or a beggar. [1339] Care for
business he will not neglect; only he will not trouble himself too much
about it, and will prefer the business of education to any and every
other. [1340] Nor will he despise the attractions of art, although he
is satisfied when obliged to do without them. [1341] In short, his
self-sufficiency will not consist in using little, but in needing
little; and it is this freedom from wants which adds flavour to his
more luxurious enjoyments. [1342] His attitude to death is the same.
Not fearing death, rather seeking it when he has no other mode of
escaping unendurable suffering, he will resort to suicide if necessary,
but the cases will be rare, because he has learnt to be happy under all
bodily pains. The Stoic’s recommendation of suicide finds no favour
with him. [1343]
[B. Civil society and the family.]
[(1) Civil society.]
However self-sufficing the wise man may be, still Epicurus will not
separate him from connection with others. Not, indeed, that he believed
with the Stoics in the natural relationship of all rational beings.
[1344] Yet even he could form no idea of human life except in
connection with human society. He does not, however, assign the same
value to all forms of social life. Civil society and the state have for
him the least attraction. Civil society is only an external association
for the purpose of protection. Justice reposes originally on a contract
entered into for purposes of mutual security. [1345] Laws are made for
the sake of the wise, not to prevent their committing, but to prevent
their suffering injustice. [1346] Law and justice are not, therefore,
binding for their own sake, but for the general good; nor is injustice
to be condemned for its own sake, but only because the offender can
never be free from fear of discovery and punishment. [1347] There is
not, therefore, any such thing as universal, unchangeable justice. The
claims of justice only extend to a limited number of beings and
nations—those, in fact, which are able and willing to enter into the
social compact. And the particular applications of justice which
constitute positive right differ in different cases, and change with
circumstances. What is felt to be conducive to mutual security must
pass for justice, and whenever a law is seen to be inexpedient it is no
longer binding. [1348] The wise man will therefore only enter into
political life in case and in as far as this is necessary for his own
safety. Sovereign power is a good, inasmuch as it protects from harm.
He who pursues it, without thereby attaining this object, acts most
foolishly. [1349] Since private individuals live as a rule much more
quietly and safely than statesmen, it was natural that the Epicureans
should be averse to public affairs; public life, after all, is a
hindrance to what is the real end-in-chief—wisdom and happiness. [1350]
Their watchword is Λάθε βιώσας. [1351] To them the golden mean seemed
by far the most desirable lot in life. [1352] They only advise citizens
to take part in public affairs when special circumstances render it
necessary, [1353] or when an individual has such a restless nature that
he cannot be content with the quiet of private life. [1354] Otherwise
they are too deeply convinced of the impossibility of pleasing the
masses to wish even to make the attempt. [1355] For the same reason
they appear to have been partisans of monarchy. The stern and
unflinching moral teaching of the Stoics had found its political
expression in the unbending republican spirit, so often encountered at
Rome. Naturally the soft and timid spirit of the Epicureans took
shelter under a monarchical constitution. Of their political principles
one thing at least is known, that they did not consider it degrading
for a wise man to pay court to princes, and under all circumstances
they recommended unconditional obedience to the powers that be. [1356]
[(2) Family life.]
Family life is said to have been deprecated by Epicurus equally with
civil life. [1357] Stated thus baldly, this is an exaggeration. It
appears, however, to be established, that Epicurus believed it to be
generally better for the wise man to forego marriage and the rearing
of children, since he would thereby save himself many disturbances.
[1358] It is also quite credible that he declared the love of children
towards parents to be no inborn feeling. [1359] This view is, after
all, only a legitimate consequence of his materialism; but it did not
oblige him to give up parental love altogether. Nay, it is asserted of
him that he was anything but a stranger to family affections. [1360]
[C. Friendship.]
The highest form of social life was considered by Epicurus to be
friendship—a view which is peculiar in a system that regarded the
individual as the atom of society. Such a system naturally attributes
more value to a connection with others freely entered upon and based on
individual character and personal inclination, than to one in which a
man finds himself placed without any choice, as a member of a society
founded on nature or history. The basis, however, on which the
Epicurean friendship rests is very superficial; regard is mainly had to
its advantages, and in some degree to the natural effects of common
enjoyments; [1361] but it is also treated in such a way, that its
scientific imperfection has no influence on its moral importance. Only
one section of the School, and that not the most consistent, maintained
that friendship is pursued in the first instance for the sake of its
own use and pleasure, but that it subsequently becomes an unselfish
love. [1362] The assumption that among the wise there exists a tacit
agreement requiring them to love one another as much as they love
themselves, is clearly only a lame shift. [1363] Still, the Epicureans
were of opinion that a grounding of friendship on motives of utility
was not inconsistent with holding it in the highest esteem. Friendly
connection with others affords so pleasant a feeling of security, that
it entails the most enjoyable consequences; and since this connection
can only exist when friends love one another as themselves, it follows
that self-love and the love of a friend must be equally strong. [1364]
Even this inference sounds forced, nor does it fully state the grounds
on which Epicurus’s view of the value of friendship reposes. That view,
in fact, was anterior to all the necessary props of the system. What
Epicurus requires is primarily enjoyment. The first conditions of such
enjoyment, however, are inward repose of mind, and the removal of fear
of disturbances. But Epicurus was far too effeminate and dependent on
externals to trust his own powers to satisfy these conditions. He
needed the support of others, not only to obtain their help in
necessity and trouble, and to console himself for the uncertainty of
the future, but still more, to make sure of himself and his principles
by having the approval of others, and thus obtaining an inward
satisfaction which he could not otherwise have had. Thus, the approval
of friends is to him the pledge of the truth of his convictions. In
sympathy with friends his mind first attains to a strength by which it
is able to rise above the changing circumstances of life. General ideas
are for him too abstract, too unreal. A philosopher who considers
individual beings as alone real, and perceptions as absolutely true,
cannot feel quite happy and sure of his ground, unless he finds others
to go with him. [1365] The enjoyment which he seeks is the enjoyment of
his own cultivated personality; and wherever this standard prevails,
particular value is attached to the personal relations of society, and
to friendship. [1366]
Hence Epicurus uses language on the value and necessity of friendship
which goes far beyond the grounds on which he bases it. Friendship is
unconditionally the highest of earthly goods. [1367] It is far more
important in whose company we eat and drink, than what we eat and
drink. [1368] In case of emergency, the wise man will not shrink from
suffering the greatest pains, even death, for his friend. [1369]
It is well known that the conduct of Epicurus and his followers was in
harmony with these professions. The Epicurean friendship is hardly less
celebrated than the Pythagorean. [1370] There may be an offensive
mawkishness and a tendency to mutual admiration apparent in the
relations of Epicurus to his friends, [1371] but of the sincerity of
his feelings there can be no doubt. One single expression referring to
the property of friends, [1372] is enough to prove what a high view
Epicurus held of friendship; and there is evidence to show that he
aimed at a higher improvement of his associates. [1373]
In other respects Epicurus bore the reputation of being a kind,
benevolent, and genial companion. [1374] His teaching bears the same
impress. It meets the inexorable sternness of the Stoics by insisting
on compassion and forgiveness, [1375] and supersedes its own egotism by
the maxim that it is more blessed to give than to receive. [1376] The
number of such maxims on record is, no doubt, limited; nevertheless,
the whole tone of the Epicurean School is a pledge of the humane and
generous character of its moral teaching. [1377] To this trait that
School owes its chief importance in history. By its theory of utility
it undoubtedly did much harm, partly exposing, partly helping forward,
the moral decline of the classic nations. Still, by drawing man away
from the outer world within himself, by teaching him to seek happiness
in the beautiful type of a cultivated mind content with itself, it
contributed quite as much as Stoicism, though after a gentler fashion,
to the development and the extension of a more independent and more
universal morality.
CHAPTER XXI.
THE EPICUREAN SYSTEM AS A WHOLE; ITS POSITION IN HISTORY.
[A. Inner connection of the Epicurean teaching.]
It has often been urged against the Epicurean philosophy, that it is
deficient both in coherence and consistency. Nor is this objection
without foundation. If we come to the study of it, looking for a
complete scientific groundwork, or a strictly logical development, we
shall certainly be disappointed. It is not difficult to show in what
contradictions Epicurus was involved; in professing to trust the senses
wholly and entirely, and yet going beyond the senses to the hidden
causes of things; in despising logical forms and laws, and at the same
time building up his whole system on deductions; in holding that all
sensations are true, but yet maintaining that a portion of the
realities which they represent as belonging to things is only relative.
Nor were these the only inconsistencies. At one time only natural
causes and laws are acknowledged, and any such thing as free will and
imagination is ignored; at another, by the doctrine of the swerving
aside of atoms and of the human will, unexplained caprice is elevated
to the rank of law. Pleasures and pains are all referred to bodily
sensations, and yet mental states are called higher and more important;
nay, more, even from a basis of selfishness rules and precepts of
humanity, justice, love, faithfulness, and devotion are deduced. It
ought not, however, to be forgotten that the Stoics, to whom the claim
of clear and consistent thought cannot be denied, were involved in
similar difficulties. They, like the Epicureans, built up a rational
system on a basis of the senses. They, too, constructed an ideal theory
of morals on a material groundwork of metaphysics. They, too, declared
that universal law is the only active power, whilst they maintained
that reality belongs only to the world of matter. They, too, deduced a
strict theory of virtue from the principle of self-preservation; not to
mention the inconsistent attitude which they assumed towards the
popular religion. To deny to the Stoics a unity and connectedness of
system, because of these scientific defects and inconsistencies, would
be felt to be doing them an injustice. And can Epicureanism be fairly
condemned, when its faults are essentially of the same kind (though a
little more obvious) as those of the Stoics, without a single
extenuating circumstance which can be urged on its behalf?