THE STUDY OF NATURE. COURSE, CHARACTER, AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNIVERSE.
[A. The general course of the universe.]
[(1) Origin of the world.]
By virtue of a law inherent in nature, Primary Being passes over into
particular objects; for, involving as it does the conception of a
forming and creating force, it must as necessarily develop into a
universe, as a seed or ovum must develop into a plant or animal. [335]
Primary fire—so taught the Stoics, following Heraclitus—first goes over
into vapour, then into moisture; one part of this moisture is
precipitated in the form of earth, another remains as water, whilst a
third part evaporating constitutes atmospheric air, and air, again,
enkindles fire out of itself. By the mutual play of these four elements
the world is formed, [336] built round the earth as a centre; [337]
heat, as it is developed out of water, [338] moulding the chaotic mass.
By the separation of these elements, a distinction between the active
and the passive powers of nature—between the soul of the world and the
body of the world—becomes apparent. The moisture into which the primary
fire was first changed represents the body, just as the heat [339]
latent in it represents the soul; [340] or, taking the later fourfold
division of the elements, the two lower ones correspond to matter, the
two higher ones to acting force. [341]
[(2) End of the world.]
As the distinction between matter and force has its origin in time, so
it will also have an end in time. [342] Matter which primary Being has
separated from itself to form its body is being gradually resolved into
primary Being again; so that, at the end of the present course of
things, a general conflagration of the world will restore all things to
their original form, in which everything derivative will have ceased to
exist, and pure Deity, or primary fire, will alone remain in its
original purity. [343] This resolution of the world into fire or ether,
[344] the Stoics thought, would take place, through the same
intermediate stages as its generation from the primary fire. [345]
Cleanthes, following his peculiar view as to the seat of the governing
[346] force in the world, supposed that its destruction would come from
the sun. [347]
[(3) Cycles in the world’s course.]
No sooner, however, will everything have returned to its original
unity, [348] and the course of the world have come to an end, than the
formation of a new world will begin, [349] so exactly corresponding
with the previous world that every particular thing, every particular
person, and every occurrence will recur in it, [350] precisely as they
occurred in the world preceding. Hence the history of the world and of
Deity—as, indeed, with the eternity of matter and acting force, must
necessarily be the case—revolves in an endless cycle through exactly
the same stages. [351] Still there were not wanting, even in
comparatively early times, members of the Stoic School who entertained
doubts on this teaching; and among the most distinguished of the later
Stoics some gave it up altogether. [352] Besides the periodical
destruction by fire, periodical destructions by floods [353] were also
assumed; there being, however, a difference of opinion as to whether
the whole universe, or only the earth and its inhabitants, were subject
to these floods. [354]
[B. Government of the world.]
[(1) Nature of Destiny.]
[(a) Destiny as Providence.]
One point established by the generation and destruction of the
world—the uncertainty of all particular things, and the unconditional
dependence of everything on a universal law and the course of the
universe—is a leading one in the Stoic enquiries into nature. All
things in nature come about by virtue of a natural and unchangeable
connection of cause and effect, as the nature of the universe and the
general law require. This absolute necessity, regulating all Being and
Becoming, is expressed in the conception of Fate or Destiny (ἡ
εἱμαρμένη). [355] Viewed from the point of view of natural science,
Destiny is only another name for primary Being, for the all-pervading,
all-producing Breath, for the artistic fire which is the soul of the
world. [356] But again the activity of this Being being always rational
and according to law, Destiny may also be described as the Reason of
the World, as universal Law, as the rational form of the world’s
course. [357] When regarded as the groundwork of natural formations,
this primary Being or general Law is called Nature; but when it appears
as the cause of the orderly arrangement and development of the world,
it is known as Providence; [358] or in popular language it is called
Zeus, or the will of Zeus; and in this sense it is said that nothing
happens without the will of Zeus. [359]
[(b) Destiny as generative reason.]
In action as the creative force in nature, this universal Reason also
bears the name of Generative Reason (λόγος σπερματικός). It bears this
name more immediately in relation to the universe, not only as being
the generating power by which all things are produced from primary fire
as from seed according to an inner law, but because in the present
condition of things all form and shape, all life and reason, grow out
of it, in short, because primary fire and reason contain in themselves
the germ of all things. [360] In the same sense, generative powers in
the plural, or λόγοι σπερματικοί, are spoken of as belonging to Deity
and Nature; and in treating of man, λόγοι σπερματικοί denote the
generative powers as a part of the soul, and must be thought of as
bearing the same relation to the individual soul that the generative
powers of Nature do to the soul of nature. [361] By the term Generative
Reason, therefore, must be understood the creative and forming forces
in nature, which have collectively produced the universe, and
particular exercises of which produce individual things. These forces,
agreeably with the ordinary Stoic speculations, are spoken of as the
original material, or material germ of things. On the other hand, they
also constitute the form of things—the law which determines their shape
and qualities, the λόγος—only we must beware of trying to think of form
apart from matter. Just as the igneous or ethereal material of primary
Being is in itself the same as the forming and creating element in
things, the Reason of the world or the Soul of nature; so the
atmospheric substance in the seeds of individual things, in which the
Stoics thought the generative power (σπέρμα) alone resides, [362] is in
itself the germ out of which the corresponding thing is produced by
virtue of an inherent law. [363] The inward form is the only permanent
element in things amid the perpetual change of materials. [364] It
constitutes the identity of the universe; and whereas matter is
constantly changing from one form to another, [365] the universal law
of the process alone continues unchangeably the same.
[(2) Arguments in favour of Providence.]
All parts of the Stoic system lead so unmistakeably to the conclusion,
not only that the world as a whole is governed by Providence, but that
every part of it is subject to the same unchangeable laws, that no
definite arguments would appear necessary to establish this point.
Nevertheless, the Stoics lost no opportunity of meeting objections to
their views [(a) Argument from the general convictions of mankind.] in
the fullest manner. [366] In the true spirit of a Stoic, Chrysippus
appealed to the general conviction of mankind, as expressed in the
names used to denote fate and destiny, [367] and to the language of
poetry. [368] [(b) Argument from the perfection of God.] Nor was it
difficult to show [369] that a divine government of the world followed
of necessity from the Stoic conception of the perfection of God.
Besides, in proving the existence of a God by the argument drawn from
the adaptation of means to ends, a providential government of the world
was at the same [(c) Argument from the theory of necessity.] time
proved. [370] Chrysippus also thought to defend his theory of necessity
in the same strictly logical manner. For must not every judgment be
either true or false? [371] And does not this apply to judgments which
refer to future events, as well as to others? Judgments, however,
referring to the future can only be true when what they affirm must
come to pass of necessity; they can only be false when what they affirm
is impossible; and, accordingly, everything that takes place must
follow of necessity from the causes which produce it. [372]
[(d) Argument from foreknowledge of God.]
The same process of reasoning, transferred from the outer world to the
inner world of mind, underlies the argument from the foreknowledge of
God. [373] If in the one case it is alleged that whatever is true,
before it comes to pass, is necessary, so in the other it is said to be
necessary, if it can be truly known before it comes to pass.
[(e) Argument from the existence of divination.]
To this argument may be added a further one to which the Stoics
attached great importance—the argument from the existence of
divination. [374] If it is impossible to know beforehand with certainty
what is accidental, it is also impossible to predict it.
[(3) The idea of Providence determined.]
[(a) Providence as necessity.]
But the real kernel of the Stoic fatalism is expressed in the maxim,
that nothing can take place without a sufficient cause, nor, under
given circumstances, can happen differently from what has happened.
[375] This were as impossible, according to the Stoics, as for
something to come out of nothing; [376] were it possible, the unity of
the world would be at an end, consisting, as it does, in the chain-like
dependence of cause upon cause, and in the absolute necessity of
everything and of every change. [377] The Stoic doctrine of necessity
was the direct consequence of the Stoic pantheism. The divine power
which rules the world could not be the absolute uniting cause of all
things, if there existed anything in any sense independent of it, and
unless one unchanging causal connection governed every thing.
[(b) Providence directed immediately to the universe, indirectly to
individuals.]
Divine Providence, therefore, does not extend to individual things
taken by themselves, but only to things in their relation to the whole.
Everything being in every respect determined by this relation, and
being consequently subject to the general order of the world, it
follows that we may say that God cares not only for the universe, but
for all individual members of the universe. [378] The converse of this
may also be asserted with equal justice, viz. that God’s care is
directed to the whole, and not to individuals, and that it extends to
things great, but not to things small. [379] Directly it always extends
to the whole, indirectly to individuals throughout the whole, in so far
as they are therein contained, and their condition is determined by its
condition. [380] The Stoic notion of Providence is therefore entirely
based on a view of the universe as a whole; individual things and
persons can only come into consideration as dependent parts of this
whole.
[(c) Difficulties connected with the theory of necessity.]
[(α) Statement of several difficulties.]
The Stoics were thus involved in a difficulty which besets every theory
of necessity—the difficulty of doing justice to the claims of morality,
and of vindicating the existence of moral responsibility. This
difficulty became for them all the more pressing the higher those
claims were advanced, and the more severely they judged the great
majority of their fellow-men. [381] To overcome it, Chrysippus appears
to have made most energetic efforts. [382] The existence of chance he
could not allow, it being his aim to establish that what seems to be
accidental has always some hidden cause. [383] Nor would he allow that
everything is necessary, since that can only be called necessary which
depends on no external conditions, and is therefore always true; [384]
in other words, what is eternal and unchangeable, not that which comes
to pass in time, however inevitable it may be. [385] And, by a similar
process of reasoning, he still tried to rescue the idea of the
Possible, little as that idea accords with the Stoic system. [386]
[(β) Moral responsibility vindicated.]
In reference to human actions, the Stoics did not allow the freedom of
the will, in the proper sense of the term; [387] but were of opinion
that absence of freedom does not prejudice the character of the will as
a deciding power. For is not one and the same all-determining power
everywhere active, working in each particular being according to the
law of its nature, in one way in organic beings, in another in
inorganic beings, differently again in animals and plants, in rational
and irrational creatures? [388] And albeit every action may be brought
about by the co-operation of causes depending on the nature of things
and the character of the agent, is it not still free, the resultant of
our own impulses and decision? [389] Involuntary it would only be were
it produced by external causes alone, without any co-operation, on the
part of our wills, with external causes. [390] Moral responsibility,
according to the Stoics, depends only on freedom of the will. What
emanates from my will is my action, no matter whether it be possible
for me to act differently or not. [391] Praise and blame, rewards and
punishment, express the judgment of society relative to the character
of certain persons or actions. [392] Whether they could have been
different, or not, is irrelevant. Otherwise virtue and vice must be set
down as things not in our power, for which, consequently, we are not
responsible, seeing that when a man is once virtuous or vicious, he
cannot be otherwise; [393] and the highest perfection, that of the
Gods, is absolutely unchangeable. [394] Chrysippus [395] even
endeavoured to show, not only that his whole theory of destiny was in
harmony with the claims of morality and moral responsibility, but that
it presupposed their existence. The arrangement of the universe, he
argued, involves law, and law involves the distinction between what is
conventionally right and what is conventionally wrong, between what
deserves praise and what deserves blame. [396] Moreover, it is
impossible to think of destiny without thinking of the world, or to
think of the world without thinking of the Gods, who are supremely
good. Hence the idea of destiny involves also that of goodness, which
again includes the contrast between virtue and vice, between what is
praiseworthy and what is blameworthy. [397] If his opponents objected
that, if everything is determined by destiny, individual action is
superfluous, since what has been once foreordained must happen, come
what may, Chrysippus replied:—There is a distinction to be made between
simple and complex predestination; the consequences of human actions
being simply results of those actions, are quite as much foreordained
as the actions themselves. [398]
From these observations, it appears that the Stoics never intended to
allow man to hold a different position, in regard to destiny, from that
held by other beings. All the actions of man—in fact, his destiny—are
decided by his relation to things: one individual only differs from
another in that one acts on his own impulse, and agreeably with his own
feelings, whereas another, under compulsion and against his will,
conforms to the eternal law of the world. [399]
[C. Nature of the world.]
Everything in the world being produced by one and the same divine
power, the world, as regards its structure, is an organic whole, in
respect of its [(1) Its unity and perfections.] constitution perfect.
The unity of the world, a doctrine distinguishing the Stoics from the
Epicureans, followed as a corollary from the unity of primary substance
and of primary force. [400] It was further proved by the intimate
connection, or, as the Stoics called it, the sympathy of all its parts,
and, in particular, by the coincidence of the phenomena of earth and
heaven. [401] The perfection of the world follows generally from a
consideration of fundamental principles. [402] But the Stoics made use
of many arguments in support of its perfection, appealing, after the
example of preceding philosophers, sometimes to its beauty, and, at
other times, to the adaptation of means to ends. [403] An appeal to
beauty is the assertion of Chrysippus, that nature made many creatures
for the sake of beauty, the peacock, for instance, for the sake of its
tail [404];—and the dictum of Marcus Aurelius, that what is purely
subsidiary and subservient to no purpose, even what is ugly or
frightful in nature, has peculiar attractions of its own; [405] and the
same kind of consideration may have led to the Stoic assertion, that no
two things in nature are altogether alike. [406] Their chief argument,
however, for the beauty of the world, was based on the shape, the size,
and the colour of the heavenly structure. [407]
The other line of argument is followed not so much in individual
expressions. But owing no doubt to the pre-eminently practical
character of its treatment of things, the Stoic view of nature, like
the Socratic, has ever an eye on the adaptation of means to ends in the
world. As, on the one hand, this adaptation of means to ends is the
most convincing proof of the existence of deity, so, on the other hand,
by it, more than by anything else, the divine government of the world
makes itself manifest. [408] Like Socrates, however, they took a very
superficial view of the adaptation of means to ends, arguing that
everything in the world was created for the benefit of some other
thing—plants for the support of animals, animals for the support and
the service of man, [409] the world for the benefit of Gods and men
[410]—not unfrequently degenerating into the ridiculous and pedantic,
in their endeavours to trace the special end for which each thing
exists. [411] But, in asking the further question, For what purpose do
Gods and men exist? they could not help being at length carried beyond
the idea of a relative end to the idea of an end-in-itself. The end for
which Gods and men exist is that of mutual society. [412] Or,
expressing the same idea in language more philosophical, the end of man
is the contemplation and imitation of the world; man has only
importance as being a part of a whole; only this whole is perfect and
an end-in-itself. [413]
[(2) Moral theory of the world.]
The greater the importance attached by the Stoics to the perfection of
the world, the less were they able to avoid the difficult problem of
reconciling the various forms of evil in the world. By the attention
which, following the example of Plato, they gave to this question, they
may be said to be the real creators of the moral theory of the world.
[414] The character of this moral theory was already determined by
their system. Subordinating individuals, as that system did, to the law
of the whole, it met the charges preferred against the evil found in
the world by the general maxim, that imperfection in details is
necessary for the perfection of the whole. [415] This maxim, however,
might be explained in several ways, according to the meaning assigned
to the term necessary. If necessity is taken to be physical, the
existence of evil is excused as being a natural necessity, from which
not even deity could grant exemption. If, on the other hand, the
necessity is not a physical one, but one arising from the relation of
means to ends, evil is justified as a condition or necessary means for
bringing about good. Both views are combined in the three chief
questions involved in the moral theory of the world: the existence of
physical evil, the existence of moral evil, and the relation of outward
circumstances to morality.
[(a) Existence of physical evil.]
The existence of physical evil gave the Stoics little trouble, since
they refused to regard it as an evil at all, as will be seen in
treating of their ethical system. It was enough for them to refer evils
of this kind—diseases, for instance—to natural causes, and to regard
them as the inevitable consequences of causes framed by nature to serve
a definite purpose. [416] Still, they did not fail to point out that
many things only become evil by a perverted use, [417] and that other
things, ordinarily regarded as evils, are of the greatest value. [418]
[(b) Existence of moral evil]
Greater difficulty was found by the Stoics to beset the attempt to
justify the existence of moral evil, and the difficulty was enhanced in
their case by the prevalence and intensity of moral evil in the world
[419] according to their view. By their theory of necessity they were
prevented from shifting the responsibility for moral evil from natural
law or deity on to man, which is one way out of the difficulty. In not
altogether eschewing this course, and yet refusing to allow to deity
any participation in evil, and referring evil to the free will and
intention of man, [420] they acted as other systems of necessity have
done before, [421] reserving the final word. The real solution which
they gave to the difficulty is to be found partly in the assertion that
even the deity is not able to keep human nature free from faults, [422]
and partly in the consideration that the existence of evil is
necessary, as a counterpart and supplement to good, [423] and that, in
the long run, evil will be turned by the deity into good. [424]
[(c) Connection between virtue and happiness.]
The third point in their moral theory of the world, the connection
between moral worth and happiness, engaged all the subtlety of
Chrysippus and his followers. To deny any connection between them would
have been to contradict the ordinary views of the relation of means to
ends. Besides, they were prepared to regard some part of the evils of
life as divine judgments. [425] Still there were facts which could not
be reconciled with this view—the misfortunes of the virtuous, the good
fortune of the vicious—and these required explanation. The task of
explaining them appears to have involved the Stoics in considerable
embarrassment, nor were their answers altogether satisfactory. [426]
The spirit of their system, however, rendered only one explanation
possible: no real evil could happen to the virtuous, no real good
fortune could fall to the lot of the vicious. [427] Apparent misfortune
will be regarded by the wise man partly as a natural consequence,
partly as a wholesome training for his moral powers; [428] there is
nothing which is not matter for rational action: everything that
happens, when rightly considered, contributes to our good; nothing that
is secured by moral depravity is in itself desirable. [429] With this
view it was possible to connect a belief in divine punishment, by
saying that what to a good man is a training of his powers, is a real
misfortune and consequently a punishment to a bad man; but we are not
in a position to say whether the scattered hints of Chrysippus really
bear this meaning.
The whole investigation is one involving much doubt and inconsistency.
Natural considerations frequently intertwine with considerations based
on the adaptation of means to ends; the divine power is oftentimes
treated as a will working towards a definite purpose, at one time
arranging all things for the best with unlimited power, at another time
according to an unchangeable law of nature; [430] but all these
inconsistencies and defects belong to other moral theories of the
world, quite as much as they belong to that of the Stoics.