AUTHORITIES FOR THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY: ITS PROBLEM AND DIVISIONS.
[A. Authorities for the Stoic philosophy.]
[(1) Review of authorities.]
To give a faithful exposition of the Stoic philosophy is a work of more
than ordinary difficulty, owing to the circumstance that all the
writings of the earlier Stoics, with the exception of a few fragments,
have been lost. [67] Those Stoics whose complete works are still
extant—Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Heraclitus, Cornutus—lived
under the Roman Empire, and therefore belong to a time in which all
Schools alike exposed to foreign influences had surrendered or lost
sight of many of their original peculiarities, and had substituted new
elements in their place. The same remark applies to writers like
Cicero, Plutarch, Diogenes, Sextus Empiricus, and the commentators on
Aristotle, who may be considered as authorities at second hand for the
teaching of the Stoics; but it is more than doubtful whether everything
which they mention as Stoic teaching really belongs to the older
members of that School. That teaching can, however, be ascertained with
sufficient certainty on most of the more important points, partly by
comparing accounts when they vary, partly by looking to definite
statements on which authorities agree for the teaching and points of
difference between individual philosophers, such as Zeno, Cleanthes,
Chrysippus; partly too by consulting such fragments of their writings
as are still extant. Yet, when the chief points have been settled in
this way, many difficulties still remain. In the first place, it will
be found that only isolated points of their teaching, with at most a
few arguments on which to base them, are recorded; but the real
connection of their tenets, and the motives which gave rise to them,
can only be known by conjecture. Had the writings of Zeno and
Chrysippus come down to us in their entirety, we should have had a much
surer foundation on which to build, and far less would have been left
to conjecture. An opportunity, too, would then have been afforded of
tracing the inward growth of the Stoic teaching, and of deciding how
much of that teaching was due to Zeno, and how much to Chrysippus. That
this work of discrimination can now only be done very imperfectly, is
the second difficulty, and it arises from the nature of the
authorities. It may be ascertained without difficulty what the teaching
of the Stoics was since the time of Chrysippus, but only on a few
points are the differences between Chrysippus and his predecessors
known. For the most part, the authorities do not hesitate to attribute
to the founder of the School all that was known to them as belonging to
its later members, just as everything Pythagorean was directly
attributed to Pythagoras, and everything Platonic to Plato. Still,
there can be no doubt that the Stoic teaching was very considerably
expanded by Chrysippus, and altered in many ways. But how considerable
the alterations were, and in what they consisted, are questions upon
which there is little direct evidence.
[(2) Use to be made of authorities.]
The path is thus marked out, which must be followed in giving an
exposition of the Stoic philosophy. If full information were
forthcoming respecting the rise of the Stoic system and the form it
assumed under each one of its representatives, it would be most natural
to begin by reviewing the motives which led Zeno to his peculiar
teaching, and by describing the system as it grew up. Next it would be
right to trace step by step the changes and expansions which it
received at the hands of each succeeding teacher. In default of the
necessary information for such a treatment of the subject, it will be
better to pursue another course. The Stoic teaching will have to be
treated as a whole, in which the contributions of individuals can no
longer be distinguished. It will have to be set forth in the form which
it assumed after the time of Chrysippus. The share of individuals in
constructing the system, and their deviations from the general type,
cannot be considered, except in cases where they are placed beyond
doubt by the statements of the ancients, or by well-founded historical
surmises. Stoicism will have to be described in the first place as it
is traditionally known, without having its principles explained or
resolved into their component factors; without even considering how
they grew out of previous systems. Not till this has been done will it
be possible to analyse the purport and structure of the system, so as
to fathom its leading motives, to understand the connection of its
various parts, and thus to ascertain its true position in history.
[B. Problem proposed to the Stoic philosophy.]
Proceeding next to ask in what form the problem of philosophy presented
itself to the Stoics, three points deserve to be specially noticed. 1.
In the first place, philosophy was determined practically by an end in
view. 2. The character of this end was decided by the idea of
conformity with reason; and 3, this view was substantiated by
intellectual proof.
[(1) Its practical character.]
The real business of all philosophy, according to the Stoics, is the
moral conduct of man. Philosophy is the exercise of an art, and more
particularly of the highest art—virtue: [68] it is therefore the
learning of virtue. Now virtue can only be learnt by exercise, and
therefore philosophy is at the same time virtue, [69] and the several
parts of philosophy are so many distinct virtues. [70] Morality is the
central point towards which all other enquiries converge. Even natural
science, although lauded as the inmost shrine of philosophy, is,
according to Chrysippus, only necessary for the philosopher to enable
him to distinguish between things good and evil, between what should be
done and what should be left undone. [71] So far from approving pure
speculation, which Plato and Aristotle had commended as the height of
human happiness, Chrysippus plainly asserted that to live for
speculation is equivalent to living only for pleasure. [72] With this
view of Chrysippus most of the statements of the Stoics as to the
relation of various branches of philosophy to each other agree,
although there is a certain amount of vagueness about them, owing to
reasons which will shortly be mentioned; and on no other hypothesis can
the internal structure and foundation of their system be satisfactorily
explained. It is enough to remark here, as has been done before, [73]
that the most important and most distinctive points established by the
Stoic School belong to the sphere of ethics. In logic and natural
science the School displays far less independence, for the most part
following older teachers; and it is expressly noted, as a deviation
from the ordinary teaching of the School, that Herillus, the pupil of
Zeno, declared knowledge to be the highest good, thus making it the
chief end in philosophy. [74]
[(2) Necessity for intellectual knowledge.]
This view of the problem of philosophy is more precisely defined by the
Stoic doctrine of virtue. Philosophy should lead to right action and to
virtue. But right action is, according to the Stoics, only rational
action, and rational action is action which is in harmony with human
and inanimate nature. Virtue consists therefore in bringing man’s
actions into harmony with the laws of the universe, and with the
general order of the world. This is only possible when man knows that
order and those laws; and thus the Stoics are brought back to the
principles of Socrates, that virtue may be learnt; that knowledge is
indispensable for virtue, or rather that virtue is identical with right
knowledge. They define virtue in so many words as knowledge, vice as
ignorance. If sometimes they seem to identify virtue with strength of
will, it is only because they consider strength of will to be
inseparable from knowledge, so that the one cannot be conceived without
the other. Hence the practical study of philosophy conducts with them
to the intellectual; philosophy is not only virtue, but without
philosophy no virtue is possible. [75] Granting that the attainment of
virtue, and the happiness of a moral life, are the chief ends which the
Stoics propose to themselves, still the possession of a comprehensive
scientific knowledge is indispensable, as the only means thereto.
[(3) Position towards logic and natural science.]
[(a) Aristo’s views.]
These remarks prove the need for the Stoics of that kind of scientific
knowledge which has to do with life, the morals and the actions of
mankind, in short, of Ethics. Whether further scientific knowledge is
necessary, was a question on which the earliest adherents of the Stoic
teaching expressed different opinions. Zeno’s pupil, Aristo of Chios,
held that the sole business of man is to pursue virtue, [76] and that
the sole use of language is to purify the soul. [77] This purifying
process, however, is neither to be found in logical subtleties nor in
natural science. Logic, as doing more harm than good, he compared to a
spider’s web, which is as useless as it is curious; [78] or else to the
mud on a road. [79] Those who studied it he likened to people eating
lobsters, who take a great deal of trouble for the sake of a little bit
of meat enveloped in much shell. [80] Convinced, too, that the wise man
is free from every deceptive infatuation, [81] and that doubt, for the
purpose of refuting which logic has been invented, can be more easily
overcome by a healthy tone of mind [82] than by argument, he felt no
particular necessity for logic. Nay, more, he considered that excessive
subtlety transforms the healthy action of philosophy into an unhealthy
one. [83] Just as little was Aristo disposed to favour the so-called
encyclical knowledge: those who devote themselves to this knowledge
instead of to philosophy he compared to the suitors of Penelope, who
won the maids but not the mistress. [84] Natural science would probably
have received a more favourable treatment at the hands of Aristo, had
he not shared the opinion of Socrates, that it is a branch of knowledge
which transcends the capacity of the human mind; [85] and having once
embraced this notion, he was inclined to pronounce all physical
enquiries useless. His attitude towards other sciences has therefore
been generally expressed by saying that he excluded from philosophy
both logic and natural science, on the ground that both are useless;
the former being irrelevant, and the latter transcending our powers.
[86] Even ethics was limited by Aristo to most fundamental notions—to
enquiries into good and evil, virtue and vice, wisdom and folly. The
special application of these notions to the moral problems suggested by
particular relations in life, he declared to be useless and futile;
proper for nursemaids and trainers of young children, but not becoming
for philosophers; [87] wherever there is a proper knowledge and a right
disposition, such particular applications will come of themselves
without teaching; but when these are wanting, all exhortations are
useless. [88]
[(b) Views of Zeno and Cleanthes.]
These views are mentioned as peculiar to Aristo, and as points in which
he differed from the rest of his School; and, to judge from his
controversial tone, the opposite views were those almost universally
entertained by Stoics. That controversial tone, in fact, appears to
have been directed not only against assailants from without—such as the
Peripatetics and Platonists—but far more against those members of the
Stoic School, who attached greater importance than he did to special
ethical investigations, and to logical and physical enquiries. Among
their number must have been Zeno and Cleanthes; for Zeno set the
example to his School of dividing philosophy into logic, ethics, and
natural science; [89] witness the titles of his logical and physical
treatises [90] and also the statements in reference to theoretical
knowledge and natural science which are expressly attributed to him.
Moreover, Zeno himself recommended to others, and himself pursued,
logical enquiries. [91] Indeed, his whole mental habit, [92] with its
keen appreciation of even the subtleties of the Megarians, bears
testimony to an intellectual type of thought which is far removed from
that of Aristo. [93] It was, moreover, Zeno who chose that curt and
unadorned logical style, which is found in its greatest perfection in
Chrysippus. [94] Logical and scientific treatises are also known to
have been written by Cleanthes, [95] who, in his division of
philosophy, allotted separate parts to logic, to rhetoric, and to
natural science, [96] and the name of Cleanthes is one of frequent
occurrence, not only in the natural science, but more particularly in
the theology of the Stoics. Still more exhaustive enquiries into logic
and natural science appear to have been set on foot by Sphærus. [97]
These prove that the energies of the Stoic School must have been
directed to these subjects before the time of Chrysippus, although
these branches of science were no doubt subservient to ethics, whilst
ethics held the most important and highest place in their philosophy.
At a later time, when Chrysippus had expanded the system of the Stoics
in every direction, and especial attention had been devoted to logic,
the necessity for these sciences came to be generally recognised. More
especially was this the case with regard to natural science, including
‘theology.’ All ethical enquiries must start, according to Chrysippus,
with considering the universal order and arrangement of the world. Only
by a study of nature, and a knowledge of what God is, can anything
really satisfactory be stated touching good and evil, and all that is
therewith connected. [98]
Less obvious is the connection between logic and the ultimate aim of
all philosophical enquiries. Logic is compared by the Stoics to the
shell of an egg, or to the wall of a city or garden; [99] and is
considered to be of importance, because it contributes towards the
discovery of truth and the avoiding of error. [100] The value of logic
in their eyes is, therefore, essentially due to its scientific method;
its proper aim is the art of technical reasoning; and thus, following
Aristotle, an unusually full treatment is allowed to the doctrine of
the syllogism. [101] That the value attached to logic must have been
considerable is proved by the extraordinary care which Chrysippus
devoted to the subject; [102] hence, the Stoics would never allow, in
dispute with the Peripatetics, that logic was only an instrument, and
not a part of philosophy. To later writers that stiff logical mode of
description, regardless of all beauty of language, appeared to be a
peculiarity of the Stoic school, [103] and hence that School was
characteristically known as the School of the Reasoners. [104] Frequent
instances will be found hereafter of the Stoic preference for dry
argument and formal logic; [105] in Chrysippus this fondness
degenerated to a dry formalism devoid of taste. [106]
[C. Divisions of philosophy.]
The foregoing remarks have already established the three main divisions
of philosophy [107] which were universally acknowledged by the Stoics
[108]—Logic, Natural Science, and Ethics. As regards the relative worth
and sequence of these divisions, very opposite views may be deduced
from the principles of the [(1) Threefold division.] Stoic teaching.
There can be no doubt, and, indeed, all are agreed in allowing, that
logic was subservient to the other two branches of science, being only
an outpost of the system. If therefore in arranging the parts the
advance is from the less important to the more important, logic will
hold the first place. It will occupy the last place if the opposite
mode of procedure is followed. But the relation existing between ethics
and natural science is an open question. On the one hand, ethics
appears to be the higher science, the crowning point of the system, the
subject towards which the whole philosophical activity of the School
was directed; for philosophy is practical knowledge, and its object is
to lead to virtue and happiness. On the other hand, virtue and the
destiny of man consist in conformity to the laws of nature, which it is
the province of science to investigate. Therefore, natural science has
the higher object. It lays down the universal laws which in ethics are
applied to man. To it, therefore, in the graduated scale of sciences,
belongs the higher rank.
[(2) Relative importance of each part.]
In attempting to harmonise these opposite considerations, the Stoics
did not always succeed. At one time natural science is preferred to
ethics, at another time ethics to natural science, [109] in the
enumeration of the several branches of philosophy. In the comparisons
by means of which their relations to each other were explained, [110]
ethics appears at one time, at another time natural science, to be the
aim and soul of the whole system. Different views were even entertained
in reference to the order to be followed in teaching these sciences.
[111] In describing the Stoic system, preference will be here given to
that arrangement which begins with logic and goes on to natural
science, ending with ethics; not only because that arrangement has
among its supporters the oldest and most distinguished adherents of the
Stoic School, but also because in this way the internal relation of the
three parts to each other can be most clearly brought out. Allowing
that, in many essential respects, natural science is modified by
ethical considerations; still, in the development of the system, the
chief results of science are used as principles on which ethical
doctrines are founded; and logic, although introduced later than the
other two branches of study, is the instrument by means of which they
are put into scientific shape. If the opportunity were afforded of
tracing the rise of the Stoic teaching in the mind of its founder, it
would probably be possible to show how the physical and logical parts
of the system gradually gathered around the original kernel of ethics.
But knowing Stoicism only as we do from the form which it attained
after the time of Chrysippus, it will be enough, in analysing that
form, to proceed from without to within, and to advance from logic
through natural science to ethics. When this has been done it will be
time to go back over the same ground, and to explain how from the
ethical tone of Stoicism its peculiar speculative tenets may be
deduced.