Stuart had now received his final instructions from General Lee,
authorizing him to move into Maryland, around the rear of the enemy
and between him and Washington. He was likewise instructed to do them
all the damage he could on his way. With his transportation destroyed
and communications broken, Hooker would be seriously embarrassed in
pursuing General Lee, or probably forced to fall back for supplies, or
to defend the capital against this demonstration. In the meantime,
while Hooker was thus delayed, the Confederates would have been
levying contributions on the farmers in Pennsylvania. His original
plan, which was bold in conception and perfectly practicable in
execution, was thwarted by an event which he could not control. It was
obvious now that Hooker would not _initiate_ any movement, but would
confine himself to covering the capital and observing his adversary.
It was equally plain that when the Confederate army made a move west
of the Blue Ridge, Hooker would make a corresponding one on the east.
It was, therefore, all important for the success of Stuart's movement
that the _status quo_ of the two armies should be preserved until he
could get through Hooker's army to the river, when it would be too
late for Hooker to take any step to defeat it. The distance was not
more than twenty miles to the Potomac from the point where he would
enter Hooker's lines; and this could be got over between sunrise and
sundown, as he intended to march in three parallel columns. He knew
the country well, and the position of each corps; and it would have
been easy enough for him to flank them. Before Pleasanton could have
got ready to follow the blazing meteor, it would have been out of
sight. The three brigades that were to accompany Stuart were quietly
withdrawn from Pleasanton's front on the evening of June 24, and
marched in a southerly direction to their rendezvous at Salem. Those
of Jones and Robertson were put in the position they had held about
Middleburg, and, of course, were charged with the ordinary duty of
cavalry on a post of observation. As Gen. Stuart says in his report,
"_Robertson's and Jones's brigades, under command of the former, were
left in observation of the enemy, on the usual front (about
Middleburg), with full instructions as to following of the enemy, in
case of withdrawal, and joining our main army_." An order to a cavalry
officer to _observe_ an enemy, of course implies that he is to report
what he sees; otherwise, there is no use in his observing. Stuart left
behind a force of over 3000 cavalry, which was amply sufficient for
every purpose. By daybreak, on the morning of the 25th, his column
debouched through Glassock's Gap, in the Bull Run, and proceeded
towards Haymarket. At the same time I started across by the route I
had been travelling for a week, to connect with him at the appointed
place. We had stopped at a spring on the mountain side to make our
breakfast on some sutlers' stores that had been saved from our
captives. Two men had been sent forward on a picket; but they had
scarcely got a hundred yards before a volley was fired; and the
bullets whistled all around us. We sprang upon our horses; but, as the
men did not return, we knew that they must have been killed or
captured. General Meade, whose camps were near by, had prepared an
ambuscade a second time for me, but I had escaped. (I wonder if he
would have called this _bushwhacking_.) We made a _detour_ around
them, and hurried on to join Stuart; as we could hear his cannon about
Haymarket. It seems that when Stuart got there, he found the roads on
which he intended to march that day occupied by Hancock's corps, that
had broken up camp that morning, and was moving towards the Potomac.
When I got to the Little River Pike, about eight miles below Aldie,
which was to be our point of junction, instead of meeting him we
struck the head of Hancock's column. His divisions were marching on
every road. I spent the day and night riding about among them, and
with great difficulty extricated myself from the dilemma in which I
was placed. I could not find out where Stuart was, nor he where I was;
for Hancock was between us. So I retraced my steps and went on to
Pennsylvania through the Shenandoah Valley, passing General
Robertson's command, that was quietly resting in Ashby's and Snicker's
Gaps, in the Blue Ridge, after the enemy retired on the 26th.
Pleasanton that day had moved by his flank, across General Robertson's
front, to Leesburg, to cover the crossing of Hooker's army. Why he
should have halted and remained idle three days in the gaps of the
Blue Ridge in Virginia after both armies had marched into Pennsylvania
is a mystery that has never been satisfactorily explained. If there
were any sound military reasons for his staying there _three_ days,
there were equally as sound ones for his not leaving at all. His
proper position was on General Lee's flank, next to the enemy, in
order to protect his rear and to keep him informed of their movement.
If General Robertson had then in obedience to General Lee's and
Stuart's instructions, promptly followed the enemy along the base of
South Mountain through Boonesboro, the Confederate cavalry might easily
have reached Gettysburg in advance of the Federal troops. In this
event, there would not have been the accidental collision of armies.
General Lee would have fought a defensive battle, and Gettysburg might
have been to Southern hearts something more than "a glorious field of
grief." Even as it was, Stuart's movement around his rear had so
confused General Meade, that his army was more scattered than ours,
and two of his corps in the first day's fight, were caught _in
delicto_ and crushed. He was looking for Lee on the Susquehanna,
when in fact he was concentrating on Gettysburg.
On account of Hancock's unexpected movement, Stuart had been compelled
to make a wider circuit than he had intended, and did not cross the
Potomac until the night of the twenty-seventh, the day after Hooker
got over. He thence moved northerly towards the Susquehanna, to put
himself on Ewell's flank in accordance with the instructions of
General Lee. But owing to the derangement of his plans by the advance
of the Union army, without General Robertson having given him notice
of it, Ewell had been recalled, and Stuart did not join the army until
July the second, at Gettysburg, when the battle was raging. But
Robertson's command had not even then come up. This movement of
Stuart's around the rear of Hooker's army has been condemned by
General Long, the military secretary and biographer of General Lee,
as having been undertaken either "from misapprehension of his
instructions, or love of the éclat of a bold raid" (which, of course,
implies disobedience of orders);[13] and General Longstreet says that
as he was leaving the Blue Ridge, he instructed Stuart to follow him
down the Valley, and cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, but that
Stuart replied that he had discretionary powers from General Lee where
to cross the Potomac.
[13] In the "Memoirs of General Lee," p. 271, General Long
says: "Previous to the passage of the Potomac, General
Stuart was instructed to make the movements of the cavalry
correspond with those of the Federal army, so that he might
be in position to observe and report all important
information. In the performance of this duty Stuart had
never failed, and probably his great confidence in him made
Lee less specific in his instructions than he would
otherwise have been. But on this occasion either from the
misapprehension of instructions or the love of the éclat of
a bold raid, Stuart, instead of maintaining his appropriate
position between the armies, placed himself on the right
flank of the enemy, where his communication with Lee was
effectually severed. This greatly embarrassed the movements
of General Lee, and eventually forced him to an engagement
under disadvantageous circumstances."
In the Century Magazine, General Longstreet, in his article
on Gettysburg, says: "When Hill with his troops and
well-supplied trains had passed my rear, I was ordered to
withdraw from the Blue Ridge, pass over to the west of the
Shenandoah and to follow the movements of the other troops,
only to cross the Potomac at Williamsport. I ordered Gen.
Stuart, whom I considered under my command, to occupy the
gaps with a part of his cavalry and to follow with his main
force on my right, to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown,
and move on my right flank. Upon giving him this order, he
informed me that he had authority from Gen. Lee to occupy
the gaps with a part of his cavalry, and to follow the
Federal army with the remainder. At the same time he
expressed his purpose of crossing the river east of the Blue
Ridge and trying to make way around the right of the Federal
army; so I moved my troops independent of the cavalry,
following my orders, crossed at Williamsport, come up with
A. P. Hill in Maryland, and we moved on thence to
Chambersburg."... "On the 30th of June we turned our faces
toward our enemy and marched upon Gettysburg. The third
corp, under Hill, moved out first, and my command followed.
We then found ourselves in a very unusual condition: we were
almost in the immediate presence of the enemy with our
cavalry gone. Stuart was undertaking another wild ride
around the Federal army. We knew nothing of Meade's
movements further than the report my scout had made. We did
not know, except by surmises, when or where to expect to
find Meade, nor whether he was lying in wait or advancing."
Gen. Longstreet will find it difficult to reconcile what he
now says were his orders to the cavalry with his letter to
Stuart, or the following one to Gen. Lee:
HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1863, 7.30 P.M.
GEN. R. E. LEE,
_Comdg., &c._
GENERAL:--Yours of 4 O'C. this afternoon is rec'd. I
have forwarded your letters to Gen. Stuart with the
suggestion that he pass _by the enemy's rear_, if
he thinks that he may get through. We have nothing of
the enemy to-day.
Most respectfully,
J. LONGSTREET,
_Lt.-Genl., Comdg._
So it appears that it was Gen. Longstreet who suggested to
Stuart the idea of "another wild ride around the Federal
army."
When this charge was made against Stuart, both the critics were
viewing his movement in the light of the disaster to our arms at
Gettysburg, and it was more agreeable to put the blame of it on a dead
man than a living one. General Long, who had access to the Confederate
archives, may plead the blindness with which he is afflicted as an
excuse for his error, and I have no doubt that General Longstreet has
forgotten that his own letter to Stuart contradicts his statement.
Gen. Lee made two reports of this campaign; one written in July, 1863,
a few weeks after the battle; and a more detailed one in January,
1864. There is a slight color of truth in the imputation cast upon
Stuart that Gen. Lee intended to censure him in his report. But this
is owing to a false interpretation given to it by persons who have
construed a single sentence literally, and not in connection with
others that qualify and explain it.[14] Gen. Lee does say: "It was
expected that as soon as the Federal army should cross the Potomac,
_Gen. Stuart_ would give notice of its movements, and nothing
having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was
inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. Orders were
therefore issued to move on Harrisburg." Now if all that Gen. Lee
says in his report about Stuart's cavalry is read, together _as
a whole_, it is apparent that in the sentence above quoted, he
uses _Stuart's_ name not in a personal sense, but descriptive of his
cavalry corps, for in another place he says that Stuart had been
directed to divide his cavalry, leaving a portion to watch the
enemy in front of the mountain passes in Virginia, and "with the
_remainder_ to cross into Maryland and place himself on the right
of Gen. Ewell," who was marching on Harrisburg.[15]
[14] General Lee says: "In the meantime, the progress of
Ewell, who was already in Maryland with Jenkin's cavalry,
advanced into Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg, rendered
it necessary that the rest of the army should be within
supporting distance, and Hill having reached the Valley,
Longstreet was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah,
and the two corps encamped near Berryville.
"General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain-passes
with part of his command _as long as the enemy remained
south of the Potomac_, and with the _remainder_ to cross
into Maryland and place himself on the right of General
Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the former officer, that he
could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by
getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was
left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or
west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no
time in placing his command on the right of our column as
soon as he perceived the enemy moving northward.
* * * * *
"The expedition of General Early to York was designed in
part to prepare for this undertaking, by breaking the
railroad between Baltimore and Harrisburg, and seizing the
bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville.
* * * * *
"The advance against Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence
received from a scout on the night of the 28th, to the
effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the
Potomac and was approaching the mountains. In the absence of
the cavalry it was impossible to ascertain his intentions;
but to deter him from advancing farther west and
intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was
determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains.
* * * * *
"The movement of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg
had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. As
soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into
Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of [B. H.]
Robertson and [Wm. E.] Jones, which had been left to guard
the passes of the Blue Ridge, to rejoin the army _without
delay_, and it was expected that General Stuart, with the
_remainder_ of his command, would soon arrive. In the
exercise of the discretion given him when Longstreet and
Hill marched into Maryland, General Stuart determined to
pass around the rear of the Federal army, with three
brigades, and cross the Potomac between it and Washington,
believing that by that route he would be able to place
himself on our right flank in time to keep us properly
advised of the enemy's movements. He marched from Salem on
the night of June 24th, intending to pass west of
Centreville, but found the enemy's forces so distributed as
to render that route impracticable. Adhering to his original
plan, he was forced to make a wide detour through Buckland
and Brentsville, and crossed the Occoquan at Wolf Run Shoals
on the morning of the 27th. Continuing his march through
Fairfax Court House and Drainesville, he arrived at the
Potomac below the mouth of Seneca Creek in the evening. He
found the river much swollen by the recent rains, but after
great exertion gained the Maryland shore, before midnight,
with his whole command. He now ascertained that the whole
Federal army, which he had discovered to be drawing towards
the Potomac, had crossed the day before, and was moving
towards Fredericktown, thus interposing itself between him
and our forces.
* * * * *
"Robertson's and Jones's brigades arrived on July 3d, and
were stationed upon our right flank. The severe loss
sustained by the army, and the reduction of its ammunition,
rendered another attempt to dislodge the enemy inadvisable,
and it was therefore determined upon to withdraw."
[15] Stuart has been criticised for carrying into our lines
a train of one hundred and twenty-five wagons, which he
captured in Maryland, with supplies for Hooker, on account
of the delay it produced in joining Gen. Lee. But the
expedition has been condemned, not as an independent raid,
but because it is said that it deprived Gen. Lee of his
cavalry, which ought to have given him notice of Hooker's
advance into Pennsylvania. But as Gen. Lee actually received
notice of it on the very night that Stuart crossed the
Potomac, it is hard to see what harm was done by taking the
wagons with him. And I have shown that Stuart left with Gen.
Lee sufficient cavalry to do the work of guarding his flank
and observing the enemy.
Clearly Gen. Lee did not intend to involve himself in the
contradiction of saying that he expected Stuart _personally_ to
perform at the same time the double duty of watching Hooker along the
Potomac, and guarding Ewell's flank on the Susquehanna.[16] Gen. Lee
in thus referring to Stuart was somewhat careless and inaccurate in
his language, as he was when, in describing the battle of Gettysburg,
he said that Robertson's command _arrived_ on July 3d, when, in fact,
it never got nearer than Cashtown, some eight miles from the
battle-field. But Gen. Lee is explicit in saying, _in his report_,
that he gave Stuart full authority to make the movement around the
enemy's rear. Among the Confederate archives in Washington, I have at
last found in Gen. Lee's confidential letter-book his final
instructions to Stuart, which have never been published, which must
set this controverted question at rest forever. At the time when they
were written, Gen. Lee's headquarters were at Berryville. They are
dated June 23, 1863, 5 P.M.
[16] So far as keeping Gen. Lee informed of Hooker's
movements is concerned, it was immaterial whether Stuart
crossed east or west of the Ridge. In either event he would
have been separated from Gen. Lee and unable to watch the
line of the Potomac. Stuart was _ordered_ to take three
brigades to the Susquehanna and to leave two behind him to
watch Hooker. He was simply given discretion as to the point
of crossing the Potomac. He is not responsible for the
division of his command.
In them Gen. Lee presents to Stuart the alternative of crossing the
Potomac west of the Blue Ridge at Shepherdstown and moving over to
Frederick, Md., or, "_you will, however, be able to judge whether you
can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the
damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either
case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of
Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc._" In a letter
to Stuart dated June 22, he had said: "_If you find that he is moving
northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take
care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland
and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in
communication with him, guard his flank and keep him informed of the
enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use
of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move
towards the Susquehanna by the Emmetsburg route, another by
Chambersburg._" The intention of General Lee clearly was that Stuart
with one portion of the cavalry was to guard Ewell's flank and give
him information of the enemy. The other was to be left[17] behind, as
he says in his report, "to hold the mountain passes _as long as the
enemy remained south of the Potomac_." To suppose that Gen. Lee
intended them to remain there after the enemy had gone is to suppose
that he was not only unfit to command an army, but even a corporal's
guard. It is clear that he intended the two brigades under Robertson
to perform the same service for the column of Longstreet and Hill
(with whom he had his headquarters) as Stuart was to do for Ewell, who
was separated from him. When these two corps crossed the Potomac on
the 25th, _he knew_ that Stuart had not crossed _west_ of the Ridge in
advance of them. He would not have committed the blunder of marching
all his infantry into Pennsylvania knowing that all his cavalry was in
Virginia. He must, therefore, have expected for Stuart to cross the
Potomac on the same day to the _east_ of the Ridge; which he would
have done but for Hancock's movement. Some have contended that his
anxious inquiries for Stuart when he got to Chambersburg prove that he
did not know which way he had gone. They only show that he did not
know where Stuart was _at that time_. As Stuart had been directed to
open communication, as soon as he got into Pennsylvania, with Ewell,
and had not been able to do so on account of the Federal army getting
between them, Gen. Lee, not having heard from him, very naturally felt
a great deal of solicitude for his safety. If Gen. Lee had not thought
that he would cross the Potomac somewhere on the same day that he did,
he would have waited and sent for him. But again, Gen. Lee would not
assume the responsibility of authorizing Stuart to go around Hooker's
rear unless the movement had the approval of Gen. Longstreet, whose
headquarters were at Millwood, not far from Berryville. Gen. Lee's
instructions to Stuart were therefore sent through Longstreet. In a
letter to Stuart, Longstreet not only approves of Stuart's going into
Maryland around the rear of the enemy, but _opposes_ his going the
other route through the Shenandoah Valley, on the ground that it would
disclose their plans to the enemy. In concluding his letter he says:
"_N.B.--I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at
the present moment will in a measure disclose our plans. You had
better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed
route in rear of the enemy._" By "_our rear_" Longstreet meant
through the Shenandoah Valley. The reasons he gave Stuart were
conclusive in favor of the course he took. It was Gen. Lee's
policy to detain Hooker as long as possible in Virginia. But if
Stuart passed to the west of the Ridge and crossed the Potomac at
Shepherdstown, he would be discovered by the signal stations of
the enemy on Maryland heights. This would indicate, of course,
that the infantry was to follow him. On the contrary, Hooker would
interpret a movement around his rear as nothing more than a
cavalry _raid_, and it would be a mask to conceal Lee's designs.
It was no fault of Stuart's that he was unable to execute his
plan.
[17] On June 22, 1863, 3.30 P.M. Gen. Lee, writing from
Berryville, Va., to Ewell, who was then about Hagerstown,
Md., says:
"My letter of to-day, authorizing you to move toward the
Susquehanna, I hope has reached you ere this. I have
also directed Gen. Stuart, should the enemy have so far
retired from his front as to permit of the departure of
a portion of the cavalry, to march with three brigades
across the Potomac, and place himself on your right and
in communication with you, keep _you advised of the
movements of the enemy_, and assist in collecting
supplies for the army. I have not heard from him since."
As Stuart was not ubiquitous, Gen. Lee must have relied
on the cavalry left behind to do for him what he
intended that Stuart should do for Ewell.
The Count of Paris says that it was impracticable from the first, and
differed in its condition from his other operations of this kind,
because they were undertaken while the armies were both stationary.
Now, at the time when Stuart resolved on going into Maryland by this
route, both armies were as stationary as when he rode around McClellan
on the Chickahominy; and Hooker was waiting for the Confederates to
move. But it could not be expected for Hooker to stand still while his
adversary was in motion. Now it so happened that the corps of
Longstreet and Hill moved from Berryville on June 24, towards the
Potomac, which they crossed the next day, Hill at Shepherdstown, and
Longstreet at Williamsport.[18] Their route of march was in plain view
of Maryland Heights, and the news was immediately telegraphed from
there by General Tyler. This set the whole of Hooker's army in motion,
on the morning of the 25th, for the Potomac. About the time,
therefore, that Stuart's column appeared on the eastern side of Bull
Run, on the morning of the 25th, Hancock broke up camp and started on
the same road that Stuart intended to march. Hancock was ahead of him,
and had the right of way. Gen. Longstreet had urged Stuart to go that
route, for fear that if he went through the Shenandoah Valley, the
plans of the commanding general would be disclosed to the enemy.
[18] [_Telegram._]
MARYLAND HEIGHTS, June 24, 1863.
H. W. HALLECK, _General-in-Chief_:--
Longstreet's corps, which camped last between Berryville and
Charlestown, is to-day in motion and before 6 O.C. this
morning commenced crossing by the ford one mile below
Shepherdstown to Sharpsburg.
GEN. TYLER, _Brigadier-General_.
I am unable to understand why he could not foresee that the march of
all the Confederate infantry in full view of the enemy would have the
same effect. If the corps of Longstreet and Hill had delayed a single
day in leaving Berryville, Stuart would have landed on the north bank
of the Potomac on the night of the 25th. Hooker would then have been
utterly confounded. Before he could have made up his mind what to do,
the Confederate cavalry would have been watering their horses in the
Susquehanna, and all the communications between Washington and the
North would have been broken. But now to return to the cavalry which
Stuart, under Gen. Lee's orders, had left in front of the enemy in
Virginia, as he says, "_to observe his movements, and follow him in
case of withdrawal_." Of course, this duty could not be discharged
without keeping in sight of the enemy. But instead of following, they
fell back in an opposite direction, and gave no information to Gen.
Lee and no trouble to the enemy. Gen. Lee says that on the night of
the 28th he heard through a scout that had come in that Hooker was
over the river, and was moving north. He is mistaken as to the date,
as there is a letter of his to Gen. Ewell, dated Chambersburg, June
28th, 7.30 A.M., which says, "I wrote you _last night_, stating that
Gen. Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac, and is advancing
by way of Middletown,--the head of his column being at that point in
Frederick County, Md." He directs Ewell to move to Gettysburg, which
had become to him what Quatre Bras was to Wellington, when he learned
that Napoleon was over the Sombre. In his report of the campaign, Gen.
Lee says that as soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into
Maryland, orders were sent to Gen. Robertson to rejoin the army
"_without delay_." The very fact that Gen. Lee had to send back for
this cavalry shows that it was in the wrong place, and where he did
not intend it to be. In his instructions to Stuart, when leaving, he
had said: "_Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left
behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in event of the
enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the
Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, bringing
everything clean along the valley, close upon the rear of the army._"
It is clear that the instructions to Gen. Robertson were to leave
Virginia when the enemy left; for how could he otherwise "_watch
the flank and rear_" of the Confederate army, and be "_close upon_"
it. Gen. Robertson[19] says that during the time he was lying in the
gaps of the Virginia mountains, after the enemy had crossed the
river, he was in daily communication by couriers with Gen. Lee's
headquarters.[20] Then so much the worse if he did not inform him that
the enemy had disappeared from his front. The inquiry is now naturally
suggested, _What did he communicate_?
[19] See his letter of Dec. 27, 1877, in _Phila. Times_.
[20] Stuart's report says: "I submitted to the commanding
general the plan of leaving a brigade or so in my present
front, and passing through Hopewell, or some other gap in
the Bull Run Mountain, attain the enemy's rear, passing
between his main body and Washington, cross into Maryland,
joining our army north of the Potomac. The commanding
general wrote to me, authorizing this move if I deemed it
practicable, and also what instructions should be given the
officer left in command of the two brigades left in front of
the enemy. He also notified me that one column should move
via Gettysburg and the other via Carlisle towards the
Susquehanna, and directed me, after crossing, to proceed
with all dispatch to join the right (Early) of the army in
Pennsylvania.
* * * * *
"Robertson's and Jones's brigades, under command of the
former, were left in observation of the enemy on the usual
front, _with full instructions as to following up the enemy
in case of withdrawal and rejoining our main army_." This
report was read by Gen. Lee and not one word of dissent by
him is endorsed on it. It bears his initials in pencil,
_R. E. L._, in his own handwriting.
Again he says, "He [Gen. Lee] was fully aware of my position and the
specific duty I was then performing." But what that specific duty was
no one knows. If Gen. Lee ordered him to remain there unemployed, then
he could blame no one but himself for the want of cavalry, and the
responsibility would rest on him.[21] But the fact that Gen. Lee sent
for him to join the army as soon as he heard that the enemy was
advancing north, is proof that he never intended him to stay in
Virginia after they had gone. Gen. Lee had issued orders from
Chambersburg for the concentration of his army at Gettysburg, and as
he says, sent back for Robertson's command to join the army _without
delay_. When the order was read, Gen. Robertson marched his two
brigades that night to Berryville, which is west of the mountain, on a
route almost parallel and in an opposite direction from Gettysburg,
which is east of it. On June 30, he continued his westerly and
circuitous march to Martinsburg, and on July 1, the day of the
battle, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport. If he had crossed at
Shepherdstown and gone to Boonesboro, he might easily have reached
Gettysburg after receiving Gen. Lee's order on the morning of July 1,
when it was held by Buford with only two brigades of cavalry. Gen.
Meade had sent off most of his cavalry in search of Stuart. It was
this diversion created by Stuart that saved Gen. Lee's communications
from attack. Buford was too weak to assume the offensive. On June 24,
when Gen. Lee moved with Longstreet and Hill down the Shenandoah
Valley, he left Gen. Robertson's command between him and the enemy.
On July 3, Gen. Robertson had so manoeuvred that _Gen. Lee had got
between him and the enemy_. Stuart had ridden around Gen. Hooker while
Gen. Robertson rode around Gen. Lee. _Sic itur ad astra._
[21] Gen. Robertson says that when he received Gen. Lee's
order he was at Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge in Fauquier
County. Jones's brigade was twelve miles farther north, at
Snicker's Gap in Loudoun, and joined him at Berryville.
Stuart had placed them about fifteen miles to the front of
the Gaps at Middleburg to watch the enemy. After he left,
they retired to the mountain and rendered Gen. Lee no more
service while there than if they had been west of the
Mississippi.
There are reports of their operations on file from all the
brigade and regimental commanders of the cavalry in this
campaign _except Gen. Robertson_, who, at his own request,
was relieved of his command as soon as he returned to
Virginia.
Since the above was written, I have found in the archives of the war
office a copy of Stuart's orders to Gen. Robertson when leaving
Virginia; but he does not appear to have been in the least governed by
them. They confirm all I have said as to the duty required of the
cavalry that were left under his command. Through abundant caution
Stuart repeated them to Gen. Jones. He was instructed to watch the
enemy and report their movements through a line of relay couriers to
Gen. Longstreet; and when the enemy withdrew, to harass his rear and
impede his march, and follow on the right of our army. There seems to
have been no effort made to execute these orders; for both Gens. Lee
and Longstreet say that no intelligence having been received through
the cavalry of Hooker's crossing the Potomac, it was supposed that he
was still south of it; while Pleasanton says that he never had a
skirmish in retiring. The fact that Pleasanton's cavalry corps reached
Leesburg by noon of the 26th shows that they must have left Gen.
Robertson's front at Aldie early that morning. In a despatch[22] from
Leesburg to Hooker's headquarters dated June 26, 12.45 P.M., he
significantly says that all is _quiet_ towards the Blue Ridge, and
that only a few cavalry videttes were seen about Middleburg, and none
on the Snickersville Pike. If his flank and rear had been harassed,
all would not have been _quiet_. Again, Gen. Robertson was directed to
keep his command on the right of the army and in contact with the
enemy when they left, in order that he might keep the commanding
general informed of their movements.
[22] [_Telegram._]
LEESBURG, [VA.], 12.45 P.M.,
June 26, 1863.
MAJOR-GEN. BUTTERFIELD,
_Headquarters, A.P._
Have just arrived. One division is covering the flank from
Aldie to this place by way of Mount Gilead. Three brigades
of Second division are covering the three roads from Aldie
and Gum Springs. _All quiet towards the Blue Ridge. Very
few cavalry pickets seen near Middleburg this morning. None
in the Snicker's Gap pike._
A. PLEASANTON,
_Major-General_.
But when Gen. Lee had sent an order for him to come on and join the
army, as there could be no reason for his remaining any longer in
Virginia after the enemy had left, he actually followed on the _left_
and crossed the Potomac at Williamsport. Gen. Lee's _right_ flank was
thus left exposed to the enemy's cavalry, but fortunately they had
nearly all been sent in search of Stuart. If the pressure of the
column of three thousand cavalry with two batteries under Robertson
had been brought to bear on the flank of the Union army, its advance
into Pennsylvania would have been less rapid, and Meade could not have
spared two-thirds of his cavalry to send after Stuart to embarrass his
march. If the force of cavalry which Stuart left behind him had
promptly moved in obedience to his orders on the 26th to place itself
in its proper position on the right of the army, then it could easily
have occupied Gettysburg in advance of the enemy. It did nothing of
the kind, but quietly rested three days at Ashby's Gap to learn
through Gen. Lee where the enemy had gone. The professed historians of
the war make no mention of these facts. _Stuart is dead_: "O! for one
hour of Dundee."
HEADQUARTERS, June, 22, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART,
_Commanding Cavalry_.
GENERAL:--I have just received your note of 7.45 this morning to
General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday
were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps
he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I
fear he will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac before
we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that
two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear,
you can move with the other three into Maryland and take position
on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with
him, guard his flank, and keep him informed of the enemy's
movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of
the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move
towards the Susquehanna by the Emmetsburg route, another by
Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state that there was no
enemy west of Fredericktown. A cavalry force (about one hundred)
guarded the Monocacy Bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of
course, take charge of Jenkins' brigade and give him necessary
instructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must be by authorized
staff-officers, for their respective departments, by no one else.
They will be paid for or receipts for the same given to the
owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I
wish you to see is strictly complied with.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE, _General_.
HEADQUARTERS, MILLWOOD, June 22, 1863, 7 P.M.
MAJ.-GEN'L J. E. B. STUART,
_Comdg Cavalry_.
GENERAL:--Gen. Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you, to be
forwarded to you, provided you can be spared from my front, and
provided I think that you can move across the Potomac without
disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving via Hopewell Gap
and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by
that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what
our plans are, than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I
forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions.
Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave, and
order Genl. Hampton--whom I suppose you will leave here in
command--to report to me at Millwood either by letter or in
person, as may be most agreeable to him.
Most respectfully,
J. LONGSTREET,
_Lt.-Genl._
N.B. I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the
present moment will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had
better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed
route in rear of the enemy.
J. LONGSTREET,
_Lt.-Genl._
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF NORTH VIRGINIA,
June 23, 1863, 5 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART,
_Commanding Cavalry_.
GENERAL:--Your notes of 9 and 10.30 A.M. to-day have just been
received. As regards the purchase of tobacco for your men,
supposing that Confederate money not be taken, I am willing for
your commissaries or quartermasters to purchase this tobacco and
let the men get it from them; but I can have nothing seized by the
men.
If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two
brigades to watch him and withdraw with the three others; but
should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had
better withdraw this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross
at Shepherdstown next day and move over to Fredericktown.
You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around
their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can,
and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after
crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's
troops, collecting information, provisions, etc.
Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to
watch the flank and rear of the army and (in event of the enemy
leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the
Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and
bringing everything clean along the Valley, closing upon the rear
of the army.
As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving
towards Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the
mountains must do what he can to counteract them; but I think the
sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better.
The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former letter.
Hill's first division will reach the Potomac to-day, and Longstreet
will follow to-morrow.
Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements.
I am, very respectfully and truly yours,
R. E. LEE,
_General_.
[_Confidential._]
HD. QRS. CAV'Y DIV.: ARMY OF N. VA.,
June 24, 1863.
BRIG.-GEN'L B. H. ROBERTSON, _Com'dg Cavalry_:
GENERAL:--Your own and Gen'l Jones's brigades will cover the front
of Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps; yourself, as senior officer, being
in command.
Your object will be to watch the enemy, deceive him as to our
designs, and harass his rear if you find he is retiring. Be always
on the alert, let nothing escape your observation, and miss no
opportunity which offers to damage the enemy.
After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient
pickets in the mountains, and withdraw to the west side of the
Shenandoah, and place a strong and reliable picket to watch the
enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the Potomac, and follow the army,
keeping on its right and rear.
As long as the enemy remains in your front in force, unless
otherwise ordered by Gen'l R. E. Lee, Lt.-Gen'l Longstreet, or
myself, hold the gaps with a line of pickets reaching across the
Shenandoah by Charlestown to the Potomac.
If, in the contingency mentioned, you withdraw, sweep the valley
clear of what pertains to the army, and cross the Potomac at the
different points crossed by it.
You will instruct General Jones from time to time as the movements
progress or events may require, and report anything of importance
to Lieut.-Gen'l Longstreet, with whose position you will communicate
by relays through Charlestown.
I send instructions for Gen'l Jones which please read. Avail
yourself of every means in your power to increase the efficiency
of your command, and keep it up to the highest number possible.
Particular attention will be paid to shoeing horses, and to
marching off of the turnpikes.
In case of an advance of the enemy, you will offer such resistance
as will be justifiable to check him and discover his intentions;
and, if possible, you will prevent him from gaining possession of
the gaps.
In case of a move by the enemy upon Warrenton, you will counteract
it as much as you can compatible with previous instructions.
You will have with the two brigades two batteries of horse
artillery.
Very respectfully your obl. servt.
J. E. B. STUART,
_Major Gen'l Com'dg._
Do not change your present line of pickets until daylight
to-morrow morning unless compelled to do so.