The Battle of Sari Bair.
PART I.
The Preliminaries.
The great battle, apart from the feint attacks away at Bulair and
Mitylene, was to comprise four distinct operations, all closely
dependent one on the other.
1. An attack in force at Cape Helles on the afternoon of August 6. This
would tend to commit Turkish reserves to an action far away from Anzac.
2. The Australian Division, holding the line from Chatham's Post to
Russell's Top, was to make several attacks on the afternoon of August
6. These would serve to immobilize or distract the enemy reserves known
to be concentrated at Koja Dere, behind Mortar Ridge, and at Battleship
Hill.
3. A great assault by the N.Z. and Australian Division, assisted by the
newly-arrived 13th Division and a brigade of Indian troops, advancing
up the three deres that lead to the peak of the Sari Bair--up the Sazli
Beit and the Chailak to Chunuk Bair, and up the Aghyl towards Hill Q
and Koja Chemen Tepe.
4. A new landing at Suvla Bay by the 9th Army Corps, which would pass
over the Suvla Flats early on the morning of August 7, and linking up
with the left flank of the army from Anzac, would press up towards the
height of Koja Chemen Tepe, to prolong the line towards the Anafarta
villages.
The Struggle at Helles.
After a preliminary bombardment on the afternoon of the 6th, the
infantry at Cape Helles dashed to the assault of the Turkish trenches
at 3.50. Thus was the greatest battle in the Gallipoli campaign
commenced by the men of Helles. The bloody and stubborn combat lasted
a full week, the Turks attacking and counter-attacking with two fresh
divisions. The East Lancashire Division, assisted by the war-worn 29th
Division, clung tenaciously to ground they had won--in particular, a
small area of vineyard about 200 yards long and 100 broad, on the west
of the Krithia Road. So fierce was the fighting for this small piece
of cultivated land that this week-long battle is always referred to
as "The Battle of the Vineyard." The object of this attack was fully
achieved. No Turkish soldier could leave for Anzac or Suvla while this
blow was being threatened at Achi Baba.
[Illustration:
[_Lent by Col. Falla, C.M.G., D.S.O._
ANZAC COVE EARLY IN AUGUST, 1915.]
The Battle of Lone Pine.
Let us pass from the tragic vineyards of the south to the hungry hills
of Anzac. During the afternoon of August 6, the slow bombardment
of the enemy's left and centre was increased in intensity. The 1st
Battery of New Zealand Field Artillery, firing from Russell's Top, was
detailed to cut the wire in front of the Turkish Lone Pine trenches.
The "Bacchante" searched the valleys which were believed to contain the
enemy's reserves, while the monitors engaged the batteries at the back
of Gaba Tepe and at the Olive Groves. This bombardment was intended
to make the Turk believe that at last a determined effort was to be
made from the Anzac right in the direction of Koja Dere and Maidos.
The enemy felt that this was the heart thrust, and he waited in his
well-placed cover for the inevitable assault. At 4.30 p.m., the New
Zealand battery concentrated again on the Lone Pine trench, and the
1st Australian Infantry Brigade mustered in Brown's Dip ready for the
assault.
Those awful hours of waiting! Platoon commanders fidgeting with their
wristlet watches that seem to tick off the minutes so slowly. Men
smoke cigarette after cigarette, and talk in undertones. At last the
word comes, "Get ready." Everywhere men crowd on to the firestep.
"Over the top!" Men pull themselves up over the parapet and, regaining
their feet, rush for the opposing parapet with its angry spurts of
flame. Across that bullet-swept No Man's Land race the impetuous men
of Australia. Line after line sweeps on, but not to fall into an open
fire trench on to the foe. These trenches are roofed with timber,
which has to be torn up. A merciless machine-gun fire mows down the
attackers. Some run round the back, get into the communication trenches
and fight their way into the underground fort. So, with hand-grenade
and bayonet, the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade overpower the stubborn
Turks within the fortress.
With the cry of "Allah! Allah!" reinforcements arrive for the enemy.
The weary victors again repel the foe. Night brings no peace. But the
captors of Lone Pine fight on, for they know full well that by their
vicarious sacrifice they have pinned down all the Turkish reserves on
the Ari Burnu front, and have left a minimum of the enemy to resist the
Anzac and Suvla thrust for the peaks of Sari Bair.
Against German Officers' Trench.
The attack at Lone Pine drew many Turkish reserves to Anzac. Everywhere
the enemy was on the alert. What wonder, then, that the occupants of
German Officers' Trench were ready for the 6th Australians? At 11
o'clock on the night of the 6th, mines were exploded at the end of the
trench nearest the Turk. At about midnight, the artillery momentarily
ceased, and the Australian infantrymen crept from the end of their
tunnelled communications which had been constructed under No Man's
Land. The first and second waves of men were mown down almost to a man.
The attack on trenches defended with scientifically-manned machine guns
was almost a forlorn hope.
The Glory of the Australian Light Horse.
At Quinn's, Pope's, and Russell's Top the line was held by the
Australian Light Horse. In common with their brothers of the infantry,
attacks from these places were to be made.
Units of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade were holding Quinn's. From here,
two hundred men in four lines of fifty each were to dash across No
Man's Land in an endeavour to simulate a determined attack. Most of
these gallant troopers died on the parapet from a hail of machine-gun
fire.
From Pope's it was determined to attack Dead Man's Ridge. This effort
was at first a little more successful. Three trenches were occupied,
but after about two hours' desperate fighting our men ran short of
bombs, and tried to withdraw, losing heavily during the operation.
The attack from "The Nek" was as glorious, as tragic, and, alas! as
unsuccessful as from Quinn's. In the first line there were 150 men of
the 8th Light Horse Regiment. When the artillery stopped, about 4.25
a.m., the Turk commenced a barrage of machine-gun fire. The Victorians
clambered up on their firesteps, and at the word dashed into the awful
storm of lead. Down went the whole line. But the second line, with
a few scaling ladders, was ready to go over the top. Out they sped
to certain death. The scaling ladders lay forlornly out on the fatal
"Nek." The third line--150 men of the 10th Light Horse--followed and
shared the fate of their comrades. The fourth line was stopped. Out of
450 men who started there were 435 casualties! Turkish prisoners stated
that they never lost one man! Surely in military history there is no
more splendid record of sacrifice than was enacted that fatal morning
at Quinn's Post and Russell's Top.
But the Australian effort from the right and centre of the Anzac
line had borne fruit, for at Rhododendron and on the Asma Dere, New
Zealanders and other Australians were advancing to the stronghold of
the Turk. Down at Suvla a great British landing was proceeding almost
unopposed.
Part II.
The Anzac Thrust for "971."
The attack from the left of Anzac was perhaps one of the most
complicated in history. The huge sprawling mass of the Sari Bair system
was broken by a multiplicity of water-courses, the sides of which were
often sheer cliffs, scored and fissured by torrential winter rains.
The only possible means of approaching the peaks was by way of these
water-courses. Now, it is a well-known military axiom that troops
cannot pass safely through a defile until the heights are made secure;
it was also known that no troops could push up through two and a half
miles of these savage, scrub-covered hills and be fit to fight a battle
with a fresh, determined foe at the top. So the work had to be mapped
out in stages.
[Illustration: A SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE BATTLE OF SARI
BAIR.
The area represented is about 5,400 yards by 3,000 yards. The distance
from the mouth of the Sazli Beit Dere to the Apex is approximately
2,300 yards; and about 3,700 yards to the top of Hill 971.]
Soldiers know that with more than one body of troops operating there
is always a risk of someone being late. In night operations this risk
is intensified. Further, it is very difficult to fit in what the staff
officers call their "time and space problem." The men could not all go
up one gully. They would arrive at the top a few men at a time, and
could not attack on a broad enough front, but only at one point. So it
was arranged that the force under the command of Major-General Godley
should be divided into four columns--two to break the line and open up
the lower parts of the deres; the other two following shortly after,
and proceeding up the three main deres, pass through the covering
forces to the assault of Chunuk Bair, Hill Q, and Koja Chemen Tepe.
During the nights of August 3, 4, and 5, the New Army troops were
landed at Anzac, marched along the "Big Sap" to their prepared bivouacs
on the hillside, and remained under cover until the eventful night. The
29th Indian Brigade, consisting of one Sikh and three Ghurka regiments,
also arrived and went to their allotted place on the left. This made
available:-
The N.Z. and Australian Division (less the Australian Light Horse),
who were at Quinn's, Pope's, Russell's Top, and Walker's Ridge.
The 13th (New Army) Division (less five battalions).
The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade; and
The Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade.
The Organization of General Godley's Army.
Right Covering Force--(Brigadier-General A. H. Russell):
New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade;
Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment;
Maori Contingent;
Field Troop, N.Z. Engineers.
The task assigned to this force was to clear the lower ridges of the
Sari Bair system, seizing the Turkish posts known as Old No. 3 Post,
Big Table Top, and Bauchop's Hill. The advance was to commence from No.
2 and No. 3 Posts at 9 p.m. on August 6, a movement which would enable
the right assaulting column to get within striking distance of Chunuk
Bair with a minimum of fatigue.
Left Covering Force--(Brigadier-General J. H. Travers):
4th Battalion South Wales Borderers;
5th Battalion Wiltshire Regiment;
Half 72nd Field Company.
Composed entirely of units from the 13th (New Army) Division, this
column was to march northwards along the flat ground; then strike
inland and seize Damakjelik Bair. This force would be able to hold out
a helping hand to the new army landing at Suvla, and would also protect
the left flank of the left assaulting column moving up the Aghyl Dere.
Right Assaulting Column--(Brig.-General F. E. Johnston):
New Zealand Infantry Brigade;
Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section);
1st Field Company, N.Z. Engineers.
This column was to move up the Sazli Beit Dere and the Chailak Dere,
commencing to move up these gullies at 10.30 p.m. Having cleared
Rhododendron Spur, an attack was to be made on Chunuk Bair, eventually
holding a line from Chunuk Bair to the head of Kur Dere, behind Hill Q.
Left Assaulting Column--(Brigadier-General H. V. Cox):
29th Indian Infantry Brigade;
4th Australian Infantry Brigade;
Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section); and the
2nd Field Company, N.Z. Engineers.
The leading troops of this column were to cross the mouth of the
Chailak Dere at 10.30 p.m. towards Walden's Point and up the Aghyl
Dere, pass through the left covering force, assault Koja Chemen Tepe,
and occupy a line from Koja Chemen Tepe to the head of Kur Dere, thus
joining up with the right assaulting column.
Divisional Reserve:
6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment } at the
8th Battalion Welsh Regiment (Pioneers) } Chailak Dere;
39th Infantry Brigade } at the
Half 72nd Field Company } Aghyl Dere.
The troops were ordered to be at the foot of the valley mentioned at 1
a.m. on the morning of August 7, to be used at the discretion of the
General Officer Commanding.
For artillery support, in addition to the divisional artillery already
in position, there were two squadrons of H.M. Navy:
(a) A southern squadron of five vessels, stationed off Gaba Tepe,
detailed to fire at Chunuk Bair and the plateau on which Lone Pine was
situated, and
(b) A northern squadron of two monitors and two destroyers, which were
to engage targets on the northern and western slopes of Sari Bair.
The entire expedition was woefully deficient in heavy guns. Heavy
howitzers, for searching reverse slopes, were desperately needed.
A pathetic entry in General Godley's "Order of Battle" is, "Corps
artillery: one 6in. howitzer!" Once again the men of Anzac were asked
to do with their bayonets and rifles what should have been done with
heavy guns.
The Night of August 6.
We must now look at the scene near No. 2 and 3 Posts. At Helles and
Lone Pine the battles were raging. Turkish reserves were being called
up in both places. So far everything was going well. With the fall of
darkness the four Anzac columns began to prepare for their arduous
night march and assault.
Everybody was to travel light. Kits and tunics were discarded. In
short sleeves and web equipment, with a rifle and fixed bayonet, the
men may not have looked uniform, but they were animated with a spirit
that would dare anything. Just before dark men sewed white patches on
their backs and on their sleeves, so as to indicate in the gloom who
was friend and who was foe. Officers spoke to their men. The principal
injunction was to press on up the hill. If any man lost touch, he was
to join the nearest party and go resolutely on.
The Right Covering Force.
The four regiments of New Zealand Mounted Rifles were the first to
move. It was their duty to break the Turkish line for the infantry
brigades. At 9.30 p.m. they were to move out from the shelter of No. 2
and No. 3. The Wellington Mounted Rifles were to take Destroyer Hill
and then Table Top. The Auckland Mounted Rifles were to take Old No.
3 Post, while the Otagos by way of Wilson's Knob, and the Canterburys
by way of Taylor's Hollow and Walden's Point, were to clean up the
lower ridges and capture Bauchop's Hill. This should give us the line,
Destroyer Hill--Table Top--Bauchop's Hill, and open up the Sazli Beit,
the Chailak and the Aghyl Deres for the infantry.
The Capture of Old No. 3.
Old No. 3 Post was that high piece of ground taken and abandoned at the
end of May. Falling down towards the sea, it resolved itself into two
lower spurs, on which were our No. 2 and new No. 3 Posts.
[Illustration:
[_Lent by Lieut. Moritzson, M.C., M.M., N.Z.E._
ROUGH COUNTRY.
Calculated to throw any troops out of direction.]
Every night, as soon as it was dark, the destroyer "Colne" stood in and
went through the performance of throwing her searchlight on the heavily
fortified slopes of Old No. 3, and commenced a half-hour's bombardment.
The light guns of the destroyer did not cause much material damage to
the carefully constructed overhead cover; but it became the custom
for part of the garrison to leave their trenches and retire to their
dugouts in the rear of the post on the southern banks of the Chailak
Dere. Now, a searchlight beam, while it illumines everything in its
path, makes the surrounding darkness appear blacker and even more
intensified. As the bombardment continued, the Auckland Mounted Rifles
crept up the Sazli Beit Dere. In fifteen minutes the party was lying
quietly at the foot of the fortress. Squadron commanders got their
final instructions, and a small party of strong men, picked for their
skilled work with the bayonet, crept up through the scrub towards the
crest. Led by a scout, this party dodged from bush to bush until they
came to a sentry post of the enemy. Silently closing in from every
side, the four New Zealanders sprang upon the sentries and overpowered
them. "Crack!" went a rifle. One sentry had discharged his rifle
harmlessly in the air as a New Zealand bayonet did its deadly work.
So far we had no casualites. Up on the crest the destroyer's shells
were crashing into the barbed wire and the heavy wooden beams of the
overhead cover. In a few minutes the attacking party was lying all
round the crest on the southern side. Presently the guns stopped, and
the searchlight faded away. This was the signal! The Aucklanders rose
and, spreading fanwise, went straight for the post. Into the covered
trenches dived the Mounted Riflemen. The garrison fought gamely enough,
but there could only be one end to it. The main body of the garrison
came pouring back from their reserve trenches towards the post; but,
caught in the open, they were no match for the men from Auckland. In a
short time the whole work was completely in our hands. There was now
time to closely examine the post. The trenches were roofed, just like
those of Lone Pine, with heavy baulks of 8 x 3 sawn timber covered with
sand bags. The guns on the destroyer had made no material impression on
this cover, as shells striking it had glanced off and buried themselves
uphill. In the front trenches was discovered a dugout with a complete
equipment for electrically firing the 28 small square iron mines placed
in front of the posts. Without the destroyer ruse and the quick, clean
work of the attackers, the casualties would have been very heavy; as it
was, we had only twenty casualties, while close on one hundred Turks
lay dead within the Post and in its neighbourhood. The Auckland Mounted
Rifles had signally avenged the Mounted Brigade losses at the end of
May.
The Capture of Table Top.
Following on the heels of the Auckland Mounted Rifles up the Sazli Beit
Dere, the Wellington Regiment silently cleaned up Destroyer Hill. As
the Auckland Mounted men were stealing on Old No. 3, their comrades
of the Wellington Mounteds were creeping up the Chailak Dere towards
Table Top. Silently up the gully went the mounted men, the 6th Squadron
leading. The 2nd Squadron was to take Table Top itself, and the 9th was
to hold it afterwards. The first objective was Destroyer Hill.
It was quite dark, and difficult to see the way, but these gullies
had been well reconnoitred by the scouts, and the column pressed on,
dragging their telephone wire with them. After resting for a minute,
the front line crept round a corner and came under heavy rifle fire.
The leaders dashed straight at the flashes of rifle fire twenty yards
away. Major Dick at the head of his men cried out "Come on, boys" when
down he fell. But enough surged forward to overwhelm the party of Turks
guarding the communication trench.
This was really a very strenuous piece of work, for from Table Top
on one side, and Baby 700 on the other, communications ran down to
Destroyer Hill. As fast as the enemy here was overpowered, more Turks
crowded down to be dealt with.
[Illustration:
[_Lent by Capt. Janson. W.M.R._
THE PATH TO VICTORY.
The Wellington Mounteds crept up this dere and advanced up the spur
from where the cross is shown.]
The troopers took up a position above a well-defined track and picked
off the enemy as they came along it. Presently a line of men came in
single file down the ridge. They were to pass just above the anxious
little group of mounted riflemen who were painfully conscious of their
bright white patches. Were they our men, or were they Turks? By their
chattering it was discovered they were a party of a hundred Turks on
surrender bent. To the relief of the 6th Squadron, they filed past to
our rear talking and laughing.
Meanwhile the squadron told off to assault Table Top stole quietly up
to the head of the gully. With rifles spluttering in the scrub and
bullets moaning on their flight out to sea, the Wellingtons scaled the
steep clay sides of Table Top and went straight for the Turks. The
fight did not last long. Up came the 9th and made the position secure.
By his boldness and impetuosity the New Zealand Mounted man had again
outclassed the enemy.
The path taken was the secret of success. The 6th Squadron who had
taken the first trench came at Table Top from the front, and it took
them over half an hour's hard climbing--cutting steps in the clay with
bayonets--to reach the top. Foresight and ingenuity, boldness and
determination were alike combined in these first successful captures.
A platoon of Maoris led by a Wellington officer also crept quietly
up the Chailak Dere in order to get round the back of Table Top to
co-operate with the Wellingtons. In the gully between Bauchop's Hill
and Old No. 3 a party of Turks fired on the Maoris, who saw red and
slew the Turks to a man. Chasing the enemy up the gully, the Maoris
never stopped until they were round the back of Table Top, and were
only with great difficulty restrained from tackling Sari Bair by
themselves!
Bauchop's Hill.
The Otago and the Canterbury Mounted Regiments were to move off from
No. 3 Post, traverse the flat ground to the northward, wheel to the
right, and work up towards the high ground of Bauchop's Hill.
Lying in the low ground from about 9 o'clock, the South Islanders saw
the white beam of the searchlight on the scrub and heard the scream of
the destroyer's shells. At 9.30 the searchlight went black out. The
men rose quietly--this was the signal for which they had been waiting.
The Otagos wheeled to the right toward the trenches on Wilson's
Knob--trenches they had lain opposite and observed with periscopes the
last two months of waiting. Spurts of rifle fire ran round the scrub
above Taylor's Hollow and on Walden's Point. Pushing up the Chailak
Dere, the other squadrons of the Otagos came to the heavy barbed-wire
entanglements stretching right across the dere and enfiladed by
fire trenches on the spur. There was nothing to be done but tear
the obstruction away. A section of the Field Troop of New Zealand
Engineers, gallantly led by their subaltern, attacked the wire with
great determination and, after sustaining many casualties, succeeded in
opening the dere to the Otagos and Maoris who pressed on up the gully
towards their objective.
[Illustration: LITTLE TABLE TOP.
Little Table Top was of little military importance, but its
water-scored cliffs are typical of the surrounding country.]
The Canterburys with some Maoris in support, advanced in short rushes
across the flat ground towards the trenches on the foothills. Not a
shot was wasted. Bayonets alone were used. A Turkish machine gun on the
spur leading to Walden's Point was responsible for many casualties, and
this section of the attack was momentarily held up. "Tap, tap, tap"
went the gun, exacting a heavy toll; but a subaltern, named Davidson,
who gained the ridge higher up, collected a few ardent spirits, and
with fixed bayonets, charged straight down the slope. The dirt thrown
up by the angry bullets flicked in their faces as they ran straight for
the gun. Down tumbled the subaltern, killed leading his men, but the
remnants of the party fell upon the gun crew. The keen bayonets did
their silent work, and the gun ceased its death-dealing tapping.
Methodically and irresistibly the Otagos and Canterburys pushed up the
spurs until the greater part of Bauchop's Hill was in our hands. Many a
duel between surprised Turk and desperate New Zealander was fought that
night in the tangled scrub. The ground was so broken, the twists in the
gullies so confusing, that all cohesion was lost. But the troopers knew
that their duty was to press on up the hill, so up the hill they went.
Trench after trench was taken at the bayonet point by Pakeha and Maori.
Presently three great cheers announced the final capture of the hill.
But the losses were severe. Many officers were shot down, including
gallant Colonel Bauchop, who fell mortally wounded, and Captain Bruce
Hay who had taken charge of a hesitating line, was killed shortly after
he had bravely rallied them and led them on.
By now the Sazli Beit Dere, the Chailak Dere, and part of the Aghyl
Dere was opened; the N.Z.M.R. Brigade had decisively smashed the
Turkish line.
The Left Covering Force.
When the attack on the lower slopes of Bauchop's Hill was well under
way the Left Covering Column moved out over the flat ground towards
the mouth of the Aghyl Dere. Having rounded Walden's Point they at
once came under the fire of the enemy. But pressing on, the advance
guard of the 4th South Wales Borderers cleared all before them. The New
Army men, resolutely led, were capable of great things. An hour after
midnight they saw through the gloom the dark mass of the Damakjelik
Bair, and quickly put the Turks to flight.
The lower reaches of the Aghyl Dere were now held by us on both sides;
our left flank was secure; the army landing at Suvla had a definite
point to reach out to.
The Right Assaulting Column.
By midnight the four battalions of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade
were on their way up the deres to the assault of Chunuk Bair. There had
been some delay at the start, as the overs from the high ground fell
among the units as they marched along to the foot of the deres. The
Canterburys went by way of the Sazli Beit, and the Otagos, Aucklands
and Wellingtons proceeded up the Chailak.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Guy._
MAJOR FRANK STATHAM, OTAGO INFANTRY BATTALION.
Who with his brother, was killed in action on Chunuk Bair.]
The night was so dark and the country so rough and unreconnoitred that
the leading files often crept up little branches of the main dere, and
retracing their steps, caused a certain amount of confusion among the
troops behind. So it happened on one of these occasions that part of
the Canterburys struggled in the inky blackness of the night into a
nullah that led them away from the objective. This caused a certain
amount of delay, enemy rifle fire was very insistent, but clearing
trench after trench, the men pushed slowly up the gullies. Stumbling
over the boulders of the dry watercourse, charging each clump of scrub
that spat out tongues of fire, the men of the infantry brigade pushed
doggedly on.
Going up the Chailak, some of the Otago Infantry lost their way and
"took Table Top" only to be gruffly ordered away by the Wellington
Mounteds who had taken it some hours before! Part of the other two
companies of the Otago Infantry--the 8th Southland and the 10th North
Otago--passed Table Top at dawn and resolutely pressed up the dere, led
by Major Frank Statham, a dauntless-spirited soldier and a born leader.
About an hour after dawn this small band of heroes entered the Turkish
communication trench running across the lower slopes of Rhododendron
Spur from the Chailak Dere. They met with little resistance--indeed on
reaching a point where they could overlook the Sazli Beit Dere, they
were astonished to see the valley crowded with scared Turks streaming
back towards Battleship Hill. Some of the bolder spirits of the Otagos
went right on to the Apex and Chunuk Bair! If there had been a dozen
leaders of the Statham type--men who understood country and men of
resolution--the whole of Chunuk might have been ours by nine o'clock.
The enemy was certainly demoralized and on the run.
A signalling officer of the Ghurkas now arrived and sent a message back
to his brigade slowly proceeding up the Aghyl Dere.
The broken country delayed the rest of our brigade. The Canterburys
proceeding up the Sazli Beit had some trouble at Destroyer Hill
because, as we know, the Turkish communication trenches all led in
that direction and fresh fugitive Turks were constantly arriving. It
was well light before the Canterburys reached the lower slopes of
Rhododendron. These slopes were for some time called Canterbury Ridge,
but the older name of Rhododendron survived.
As it was now light, and the attack undoubtedly late, Chunuk could not
be taken by surprise. But looking down towards the Suvla Flats, we were
heartened by the great flotilla of ships and barges in Suvla Bay. Hope
again ran high, for help seemed close at hand. With another effort the
brigade pressed forward and reached the small depression now known as
the Apex, but then christened the Mustard Plaster.
Orders came that an effort must be made to take Chunuk. The machine
guns of the Otago Battalion established themselves along the front,
thus securing the right flank, and doing great execution to the Turks
who were being driven up the gully and were seemingly not aware that we
had a footing on Rhododendron. The Wellington guns were then dug in on
the left of the Otagos, but lined so as to face north and thus command
Chunuk Bair which our infantry must assault. The Auckland guns were
just a few yards behind; those of the Canterburys had not yet arrived.
The order came for the advance with only half the guns posted. There
was a little hesitancy, but Major S. A. Grant gallantly rushed forward
and led the Aucklands over the crest. A thousand yards of the heights,
thick with Turkish rifles, carried out rapid fire on that small band
of heroes. Nothing could live in it and with the exception of a few
survivors who gained a deserted Turk trench 120 yards in front, the
whole were either killed or wounded. The gallant Major Grant was
mortally wounded, dying from his wounds that evening. At this point,
if the Turks had pushed out a counter attack, they could have cleared
the Apex; but the machine guns were invaluable; they cut up the crest
between them and undoubtedly saved the sadly harassed line.
The troops were now very tired. An advance of a little more than a mile
over most difficult country had been achieved. Taking advantage of what
little cover was available, the left flank threw out little parties
to get in touch with the Left Assaulting Column, which, as we know,
consisted of the 4th Australian Brigade and the 29th Indian Brigade.
This column in pushing up the Aghyl Dere had met very strenuous
opposition, but had surprised many Turks and driven them up the gully.
The Aghyl Dere forks about 2000 yards from the sea; the Australians
went up the northern one so that the Suvla army, after getting in
touch with the New Army troops on Damakjelik Bair could push on and
prolong General Monash's left. By dawn, this brigade had reached the
ridge overlooking the head of the Asma Dere. The Indian Brigade, guided
by Major Overton, of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, proceeded up the
southern fork of the Aghyl Dere towards The Farm, which lay beneath the
crest of Chunuk Bair. Poor Overton and his companion scout were killed
while leading up the dere. After receiving the message from their
signalling officer the right flank of the Indians felt out towards
Rhododendron, and succeeded in coming into touch with the New Zealand
Infantry Brigade; the 14th Sikhs felt out towards their left and came
into touch with the 4th Australians.
[Illustration: MAJOR OVERTON'S GRAVE.]
The exhausted line made repeated efforts to get on, but the Turks were
now thoroughly alive to the threatened turning movement and hastily
flung fresh troops on to Abdel Rahman spur to impede the Australians,
who were standing at bay in truly awful country--standing at bay with
their left flank in the air--in touch with no one. The Suvla Bay was
full of ships, but there seemed no movement towards the vital hills.
All that day the troops lay out on the hot hillside exhausted with
their heavy night march. True the ambitious programme of the operation
order had not been achieved in its entirety, but a marked and valuable
advance had been made. The Anzac troops felt that at last they had
room to breathe, for Anzac had been very cramped. Here, after four
months of waiting and watching, we were standing on new ground. There
was a certain thrill and a little pardonable pride in the realization
that these strongly entrenched and defended hill-sides had been taken
by a citizen soldiery from the flower of the Turkish Army.
There was one disagreeable disadvantage in holding these steep
hills--that was the supply of water, ammunition and food. But the
Indian Supply and Transport Corps was equal to the emergency. As soon
as it was dark the drabis of the supply columns started with their pack
mules, and though they paid a heavy toll in men and animals, undeterred
they gallantly soldiered on.
The Canterbury machine guns arrived at the Apex that evening. The
gunners, dead beat, had carried their guns, tripods, spare parts,
their own rifles and equipment, with one hundred and twenty rounds of
ammunition in their pouches, and a box of ammunition between every two
men. They had marched and fought the clock round. Now they had to stand
by and hold the line. There was no time for sleep. It was dig, dig,
dig, and bury the dead.
The survivors of the Aucklands stayed out in their bomb-swept trench.
The Otagos were withdrawn to the Rhododendron for reorganization.
So the night passed with the Auckland Battalion in front of the Apex;
the Ghurkas and the Sikhs on the ridge overlooking The Farm; the 4th
Australian Brigade on the Asma Dere. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles
dug in and improved their line from Destroyer Hill to Table Top and
Bauchop's Hill. General Travers's force was secure on Damakjelik Bair.
But the Anzac Army was not yet in touch with the troops at Suvla.
Part III.
The Attack of August 8.
That night the whole of the attacking force was reorganized in three
columns:--
Right Column--Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.
26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section).
N. Z. Infantry Brigade.
Auckland Mounted Rifles.
Maori Contingent.
8th Welsh Pioneers. } from the 13th Division
7th Gloucesters. } in Reserve.
The Right Column was to assault Chunuk Bair at dawn on the 8th. The
Auckland Mounteds and the Maoris were to be brought up from the Right
Covering Column.
Centre and Left Columns--Major-General H. V. Cox.
21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section).
4th Australian Infantry Brigade.
29th Indian Infantry Brigade.
9th Royal Warwicks.
9th Worcesters.
7th North Staffords.
6th South Lancashires.
The centre of this force was to attack Hill Q; the left was to attack
the Abdel Rahman spur--the two attacks converging on Koja Chemen Tepe,
the highest point in the range.
We must look in turn at the left, the centre, and the right.
Away on the left the Australians of the 4th Brigade moved up the Asma
Dere towards the lower slopes of Abdel Rahman Bair. The intention was
to gain a footing, then wheel to the right, and work up this rugged
northern spur towards Koja Chemen Tepe. By this time, however, Turkish
reserves had accumulated all along the rear slopes of the whole
mountain system. With machine guns and shrapnel the Ottoman soldiery
assailed the Australians, who were presently almost surrounded.
Hopelessly outnumbered, wearied with incessant fighting, the gallant
4th Brigade fell back to its former line.
In the centre the men of the 39th New Army Brigade and the Indians
fared little better. Pushing on past both sides of The Farm the troops
assailed the lower spurs leading up to Hill Q and the left of Chunuk.
But the Turkish machine gunners and riflemen were fresh from reserve.
They held the high ground with all its advantages, they were fighting
in a country with which they were familiar, and compelled our line to
come to a definite standstill on the slopes overlooking The Farm.
The Capture of Chunuk Bair.
On the right things were going better. At dawn the men of the
Wellington Infantry Regiment were ready again to attack the fatal
crestline. The tired troops of yesterday were once again to essay the
seemingly impossible.
At 4.15 in the grey of the morning, the Wellington Infantry and the
7th Gloucesters, led by Lieut.-Colonel Malone, commenced the desperate
struggle for Chunuk Bair. So far as the New Zealanders are concerned,
August 8, 1915, was the blackest day on the Peninsula. But the prize
was the strategical key to the Gallipoli Peninsula. Win the Ridge
and we should win the Narrows. Open the Narrows to the Navy, and
Constantinople was ours! Surely a prize worth fighting for. So from the
scanty trenches on Rhododendron Spur leapt the Wellingtons and the 7th
Gloucesters.
By their dash and audacity the crestline was soon gained. We now had
a footing on the ridge, and to cling to that foothold and extend from
it was now the pressing need. The Wellingtons and Gloucesters started
to dig in, but the enemy evidently made up his mind to cut the New
Zealanders off. A body of snipers picked off all the machine gun crews.
When Malone's battalion was seen marching along the skyline four
machine guns were pushed up to him. These guns never came back. When
half way up the ridge a veritable hail of lead burst round them, and
they were so badly damaged that only one gun could be reconstructed
from the remnants of the four; but it got into position and did good
service until the whole of the gun crew were killed or wounded.
Two machine guns that were to support the right flank of the
attackers from the Apex were pushed forward on the slope to avoid
being silhouetted against the crest line. The Turkish snipers now
concentrated on these guns. Soon all the personnel were killed or
wounded. A Maori machine gun close by lost their officer killed and had
nine other casualties, but a few men fought their gun all day without a
murmur. This was the only machine gun left in action on this flank.
The devoted party on the crest was assailed with every variety of
shell, hand grenades and maxims. Time after time, Turks advanced to the
attack but were driven off at the point of the bayonet. The Gloucesters
who had lost all their officers now came down the ridge to the help of
the New Zealanders. They seemed dazed, but instinct and the example of
the New Zealanders convinced them that the bayonet was the weapon for
the Turk. Time and time again they charged and cleared their front.
The Glory of New Zealand.
This forward Turkish trench became a veritable death trap. Not far
behind it was another line that resolved itself into our real line
of resistance. But some ardent spirits of the Aucklands, Otagos and
Wellingtons decided to stick to their forward line. No one--except the
dozen badly-wounded survivors--can conceive the horrors of that awful
front line trench. It was practically dark when they arrived in the
early hours of the morning. When daylight came it proved to be a fatal
position. About ten or fifteen yards to their front the ground sloped
rapidly away into a valley until again it revealed itself about six
hundred yards away. When it was light this far away hill was seen to be
occupied by about a battalion of Turks--a battalion advancing to attack
this forward trench of Chunuk! A few long range shots were all that
could be fired. Then came the long wait while the attackers crossed the
gully. To the waiting New Zealanders--the New Zealand infantrymen who
had penetrated farthest into Turkey--the minutes seemed hours. But a
shower of hand grenades announced the beginning of the end. From the
dead ground in the front came bombs and more bombs. Away from the
left came the Turkish shrapnel. To fire at all, our men had to stand
up in the trench and expose themselves almost bodily to view. One by
one they died on Chunuk, until after a few hours desperate struggle
against overwhelming forces the only New Zealanders left alive were a
dozen severely wounded. But not for a long time did the first Turk dare
show his head. Then into the trench several crept with their bayonets
to kill the wounded. Fortunately a Turkish sergeant arrived and saved
the lives of the wounded who were carried off to the German dressing
stations behind Hill Q. In all the history of the Gallipoli Campaign
there is no finer story of fortitude, no finer exhibition of heroism
and self-sacrifice, than was shown in this forward trench of Chunuk on
that desperate August morning. Here died some of the noblest characters
in the New Zealand Army. August 8 was a day of tragedy for New Zealand,
but no day in our calendar shines with greater glory.
All that day midst the shriek of the Turkish shrapnel, the dull booming
of the British naval guns, the incessant rattle of musketry and machine
gun fire, that heroic band held on. With their faces blackened with
dust and sweat, with the smell of the picric acid assailing their
nostrils, with their tongues parched for the lack of water, up there in
the blazing heat of the August sun those gallant souls held on.
The Auckland Mounted Rifles and the Maoris arrived at Rhododendron
about 3 a.m. and were ordered to the firing line about 11 o'clock.
The Aucklanders went out to help Colonel Malone on the ridge. On came
the Turks again. The line of infantry and mounteds drove them back at
the point of the bayonet. A portion of Chunuk Bair was undoubtedly
ours, but at what a cost! Many of the finest young men of the Dominion
lay dead upon the crest. Colonel Malone himself, one of the striking
characters in the New Zealand army, was killed as he was marking out
the trench line.
[Illustration: THE APEX AND CHUNUK BAIR.
These photographs were taken after the Armistice in 1918, and clearly
show the distinction between Chunuk Bair and Hill 971, which was 1,400
yards away. No British Troops ever got on to Koja Chemen Tepe (or Hill
971). When New Zealanders say they were on "the top of 971," they mean
"the ridge of Chunuk Bair." Hill Q is about 600 yards from the highest
point of Chunuk Bair. Koja Chemen Tepe is 800 yards further on than
the crest of Q.]
[Illustration: LOOKING TOWARDS KOJA CHEMEN TEPE (HILL 971) FROM
CHUNUK BAIR.
Hill Q is the high ground to the right.]
It was during this struggle for Chunuk Bair that Corporal Bassett of
the Divisional Signallers undertook to carry the telephone line up
on to the ridge and gained the first V.C. for New Zealand. In full
daylight, with the approach swept by rifle and machine gun fire, with
the Turkish field artillery from Abdel Rahman mercilessly searching the
slopes, Bassett dashed and then crept, then dashed and crept again, up
to the forward line on Chunuk. These lines were cut again and again,
but Bassett and his fellow linesmen of the Signals went out day and
night to mend the broken wires. No V.C. on the Peninsula was more
consistently earned. This was not for one brilliant act of bravery, but
for a full week of ceaseless devotion.
The Maoris were sent over more to the left and most gallantly hung on
to an almost untenable position in the neighbourhood of The Farm. They
suffered grievous losses uncomplainingly. At dusk the Otago Infantry
went out to reinforce what was left of the Wellington and Auckland
Infantry, the 7th Gloucesters, and the Auckland Mounteds. Already the
Otagos had suffered terribly, but throughout that awful night of August
8 all previous experiences were as nothing. It was a night of agony by
thirst, of nerve-wracking bomb explosions, and of bayonet jabs in the
dark.
In the darkness a little much-needed water was carried out to the
thirsty men. Hand grenades, food and reinforcements went out to the
battered trenches; more machine guns were sent--three from the Cheshire
Regiment, three from the Wiltshires, and one from the Wellington
Mounted Rifles. The Cheshire guns came back as there was ample without
them. This second lot of four guns was never seen again.
Still another effort had to be made, for the hold we had on Chunuk had
to be increased. It was the most important capture, so far, in the
whole campaign; but the Suvla army still clung to the low ground at
Suvla, leaving the Australians with their left flank out in the air
waiting for the necessary support to carry them on to victory up the
Abdel Rahman.
There was no time to lose. The partial success on Chunuk must be
exploited. We could not afford to wait on Suvla.
The Ghurkas Attack Hill Q.
Once again on the night of August 8 the columns were reorganized for
the attack:
No. 1 Column--Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.
26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one Section).
Auckland Mounted Rifles.
Wellington Mounted Rifles.
N.Z. Infantry Brigade.
7th Gloucesters.
8th Welsh Pioneers.
The Wellington Mounted Rifles came up from Table Top during the night,
but the other troops were already on Chunuk Bair. Their duty on the
morrow was to consolidate their position, and if possible extend it.
No. 2 Column--Major-General H. V. Cox.
21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section).
4th Australian Infantry Brigade.
29th Indian Infantry Brigade.
39th Brigade (less the 7th Gloucesters).
6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment.
This column was to attack the heights of Hill Q.
No. 3 Column--Brigadier-General A. H. Baldwin.
6th East Lancashires. } From the
6th Loyal North Lancashires. } 38th Brigade.
10th Hampshires. } From the
6th Royal Irish Rifles. } 29th Brigade.
5th Wiltshires. } 40th Brigade.
These troops were from the Army Corps Reserve. They were to assemble in
the Chailak Dere on the night of the 8th, move up to Rhododendron Spur
in the dark, and getting in touch with the No. 1 Column on Chunuk Bair,
move up the slopes towards Hill Q.
Troops moving up defiles in the dark are always late, for so many
factors seem to work adversely. Wounded men and transport mules will
persist in coming down and blocking the road. Wounded men are generally
past caring about the fortunes of the fight. Indian mule drivers know
they have to get back to their depot and are perhaps not told the
proper track to take. This, of course, is soon regulated when things
are normal; but while a fight is on there is a good deal of confusion.
No. 1 Column carried out its task and held on to Chunuk Bair; the
Ghurkas struggled up the steeps of Hill Q, their ranks becoming visibly
thinner and thinner until the watchers from the posts below wondered
if there would be enough momentum to carry them to the top. But they
undoubtedly did get there. The Navy now commenced firing over the crest
in order to debar the Turk from pressing a counter-attack. Some of
the shells fell short among the Ghurkas. Instead of getting help from
Baldwin, who was only at The Farm, a few heavy shells crashed on to
the summit. This was one of the tragedies of Anzac. Instead of help
came our own shells. It is the price that must be paid for artillery
support in broken country. These things are unavoidable--they are the
misfortune of war.
[Illustration: A SIKH AND A GHURKA.]
But the enemy saw his chance. Launching a counterattack, the gallant
handful of survivors was swept off the crest and into the valley
below. Simultaneously a flood was loosed on the 4th Australians; wave
after wave was hurled against the New Zealanders up on the shoulder of
Chunuk Bair; flushed with success and confident in the overwhelming
superiority of numbers, wave after wave of skirmishers was thrown
around Baldwin's forces at The Farm until the column was well-nigh
annihilated. General Baldwin himself was killed with many of his
commanding officers. The survivors retired to their original position
on the ridge overlooking The Farm.
The only force to hold its ground was General Johnston's on Chunuk
Bair, where a poor trenchline of 200 yards was occupied. Our fellows
were too exhausted to dig in the hard ground and rock of the
crest-line. It was impossible to put out wire.
This brings us to the end of Sunday, August 9. The battle at Lone Pine
was still raging. Down at Suvla, high officers were trying to infuse a
little energy into an army that had become moribund.
Worn out with three days and three nights of fighting under a merciless
sun, with a short ration of water, suffering tremendous losses, the New
Zealanders and other troops on Chunuk Bair were withdrawn for a little
rest on the evening of August 9. Their place was taken by the 6th Loyal
North Lancashires and the 5th Wiltshires. It was estimated that more
than two battalions could not be usefully employed on the ridge.
We Lose the Crest of Chunuk.
At dawn on the 10th, these two battalions had disappeared! Some of the
North Lancashires who escaped explained that the Wiltshires arrived
tired and did not dig in; they were attacked by the Turks with knives
and bombs; the Wiltshires ran in towards the Lancashires and the
machine guns, and so masked their fire. So were these two battalions
wiped out!
About 6 a.m. the Turks delivered their famous counterattack down the
slopes of Chunuk Bair, and endeavoured to get at the New Army regiments
on the left of the Apex. But the four machine guns of the Canterbury
Battalion were on the left front of the Apex, and the two remaining
guns of the Auckland Battalion were on the Apex itself; two guns of
the Wellington Battalion were back on the Rhododendron with the Maori
gun and the flank gun of the Otago Infantry--these four could fire
over the heads of the guns on the Apex, and commanded the whole of the
approaches from Chunuk Bair. The small details of training, generally
found so irksome, now proved of value. The gunners had already attended
to their guns at the first streak of day. A Canterbury gunner, finding
his gun difficult to adjust reported to the N.Z. Brigade Machine Gun
Officer, who was sighting the gun on to the ridge when the first line
of the Turkish attack came over at that very point. This gun had the
range at once, and followed by keeping the sights a little in advance
of the enemy. The other guns quickly took up the rat-a-tat; the range
was sent to the other five guns. The N.Z. Mounted Brigade machine guns
on Table Top and Bauchop's Hill also found a good target at extreme
range. The New Zealand field guns, especially the howitzers, also
opened up at once.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Col. Falla, C.M.G., D.S.O._
A NEW ZEALAND 4.5 HOWITZER.]
The Turkish line consisted of from 250 to 300 men at about one pace
interval. By the time they reached a point immediately in front of the
guns, the whole of the N.Z. machine guns were concentrated at that
point in accordance with the orders hurriedly issued. Thus was created
a death zone through which the enemy could not pass. They fell over
literally like oats before a reaper. Twenty two lines came down each
as true and steady as the first. They moved at a jog trot with their
rifles at the port. The machine gunners with the assistance of the Navy
and the Field Artillery mowed down line after line until the Turkish
effort was spent. A number of Turks crawled back during the forenoon.
They were not molested by the machine gunners, who admired their
bravery so much as to leave them alone.
The New Zealand Infantry Brigade was relieved at 2 p.m. that day, but
the machine guns were left in to stiffen up the New Army regiments.
At about 2.30 a.m. there was an attack and much confusion. The Turks
showed on the top of the Apex, but the two flank guns of the Canterbury
Battalion quickly dispersed them. Order was only restored at daylight.
The presence of the N.Z. machine guns had saved the situation. The
N.Z. Infantry Brigade again came in with the Aucklanders on the Apex.
The next morning the Turks occupied the point of the Apex, and it
was decided to take a Vickers Maxim out to the front and open up on
them from an unexpected quarter. The gun was just in position when a
peculiar incident occurred. An Otago man of the 5th Reinforcements was
working in front of where the gun took up position. He was told to stop
work when the gun was ready and to crouch down so that the gun could
fire over him. Against all the rules of war he immediately lighted his
pipe. The Turks, only 80 yards away, opened fire with about twenty
rifles on to the light. Their rifle flashes disclosed their position
and the machine gun drove them out.
The New Zealand Infantry were relieved again in a short time and the
machine gunners moved back to Rhododendron. On the first morning after
their move back, a blockhouse was found to have been built in No Man's
Land during the night. It now became plain what the Turks had been
trying to do, but this had been prevented as long as the N.Z. Infantry
were in possession. This blockhouse was a great nuisance to our men at
the Apex, until it was summarily dealt with by the Canterburys later in
the month.
Part IV.
The Battle of Sari Bair.
The Suvla Landing.
We know that the thrust towards Koja Chemen Tepe from Suvla Bay failed.
Let us examine the causes of the failure. For of what use is history if
we do not seek to understand its lessons?
The story of the failure at Suvla Bay is not only the story of the
misfortune of war. It ranks with the tragedy of Kut-el-Amara as an
illustration of what must happen to a nation which accepts world-wide
responsibilities and does not keep itself in a state of preparedness
for possibilities.
The people of the British Empire did not realize that an efficient army
was the complement to a powerful navy. For battleships cannot cross
deserts or climb mountains. Indeed, battleships, as every soldier who
was on Gallipoli Peninsula knows, are of incalculable value for moral
effect, but for supporting troops ashore in mountainous country they
are almost useless. Their guns cannot get at the enemy behind the
crest. Only on rare occasions can ships' guns search reverse slopes.
Ships are built to fight ships--not to act as army corps artillery.
No regular soldiers were available for these subsidiary operations
in the East, but the next best--an army corps of the New Army--was
available for this advance over broken, unreconnoitred country.
The 9th Army Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir F. Stopford, was organized
as follows:--
The 10th (Irish) Division (Lieut-General Sir B. Mahon) was composed of
the 29th Brigade (detached for service at Anzac), the 30th Brigade, and
the 31st Brigade.
The 11th (Northern) Division (Major-General F. Hammersley), consisted
of the 32nd, the 33rd, and the 34th Brigades.
The 13th (Western) Division (Major-General F. C. Shaw), was also taken
from the Suvla Army to act at Anzac. The three brigades were the 38th,
39th, and the 40th.
In that four of his brigades were landed at Anzac, General Stopford
did not have anything like an army corps. His divisional artillery was
lamentably weak, and his corps artillery almost non-existent. True, he
had the support of some warships, but as we know, this support is not
so much material as moral.
It was estimated that a force of 20,000 rifles would overpower a thin
screen of Turks, which was reckoned at about 4000.
The 53rd and 54th Territorial Division (of infantry only) were to
arrive later and be used as a general reserve.
The Hill Features of the Suvla Plain.
The country was not so hilly as at Anzac. From Lala Baba, looking due
east, one saw the high ground running from the Gulf of Saros round
towards the two Anafartas and so to the underfeatures of Sari Bair near
Abdel Rahman Bair.
The plan of campaign was to land during the night of August 6/7 at
three beaches to the north and south of Nibrunesi Point, push back the
screen of enemy scouts holding the sparsely-wooded plain and rolling
country, and occupy the hills about Anafarta, and so take a measure of
the strain off the direct push for Koja Chemen Tepe. Having got astride
the high ground near Anafarta the Turkish communications from Bulair to
their Ari Burnu front would be imperilled.
A reference to the map will show that the conception was a reasonable
one if the country was not strongly held. Resolute troops, vigorously
led, might have reasonably achieved a success. But Chance did not smile
upon our efforts, and instead of closely examining the structure of
this high ground inland, we must look at the tactical features much
nearer the coast line.
[Illustration: SKETCH MAP OF THE SUVLA AREA SHOWING THE LANDING
BEACHES.
The landing place most used in the later stages was near Cape Suvla,
just inside Suvla Bay.]
On the extreme left flank, and overlooking the Gulf of Saros, was the
long ridge known as Kiretch Tepe Sirt. The southern foothills of this
range merged into an expanse of cultivated land, bounded on the
east by the Anafarta Hills, and on the west by the Salt Lake. During
the winter months the Salt Lake takes all the flood waters from the
surrounding hills, and the rough weather brings in the salt water. But
in August the water had disappeared and there was a circular expanse of
grey, sticky sand, measuring a mile across.
About a mile in a south-easterly direction from Lala Baba was the
tactical feature christened "Chocolate Hill." The gorse and grass on
this hill caught fire during the fighting, and one part of it became
a more pronounced reddish-brown than ever. The southern portion was
not burnt, and is distinguished on the map as Green Hill. Standing
on Chocolate Hill and looking towards the east, one saw, half left,
the high ground called Scimitar Hill, and half right, the ill-starred
Ismail Oglu Tepe, known to our men as "W" Hills. The "W" Hills looked
down on to the valley of the Asmak Dere, which ran into the sea about
two miles south of Lala Baba, and running generally in a westerly
direction towards Biyuk Anafarta, threw out two forks, one to the foot
of Abdel Rahman Bair, the other towards Kaiajik Aghala (Hill 60). The
latter fork was the Asma Dere, which, running up past Hill 60, drained
the watershed of Abdel Rahman Bair. Just to the south of the Azmak
Dere, and between Kaiajik Aghala and the sea, was the high ground of
Damakjelik Bair.
So it was intended that the Suvla Army, pushing on across the flat
plains of Suvla in the early morning, should get in touch with their
New Army comrades on Damakjelik and prolong the right of the new Anzac
line held by General Travers's and the 4th Australian Brigades.
The Landing Beaches.
The day before the battle the component parts of the Army Corps were
widely scattered. Part was at Mitylene, 120 miles away; part was at
Mudros, 50 miles away; the remainder at Kephalos, on Imbros, about 16
miles away. As soon as it was fully dark, these three bodies of troops
were speeding on their way to Suvla. Three beaches were to be used.
Beach A was in the centre of Suvla Bay. Beaches B and C were to the
south of Nibrunesi--B for infantry and C for the disembarkation of
artillery.
At 8 o'clock on the night of the 6th, the force sailed from Kephalos
with its collection of water boats, barges and lighters. At 9.30 p.m.,
the flotilla silently crept towards Nibrunesi, and the disembarkation
commenced. The 32nd and 33rd Brigades got ashore expeditiously at Beach
B and rushed Lala Baba.
Then occurred the first disaster. Beach A was not reconnoitred, and the
barges containing the 34th Brigade ran aground. Men jumped into the
water and waded ashore. A few Turkish snipers on Hill 10 and Lala Baba
crept among the troops, who were new to war. In the dark, confusion
reigned. When daylight came the troops were ashore, but that was about
all. There was no pressing on. The men were shaken by their experience
of the night. The line ran round from Lala Baba across the flat ground
to Hill 10.
Trouble at the Beaches.
Just as it was getting light, six battalions of the 10th Division
arrived from far-distant Mitylene. These troops were to go out to the
extreme left flank. They should have landed at Beach A, but owing
to the shallows and the difficulties already experienced there, the
Navy took them to Beach B, south of Nibrunesi! This again upset the
prearranged plan. These battalions fell in and marched along the
mile and a half of open beach towards the left flank, passing behind
and through the men who had earlier experienced the mess caused by
inefficient reconnaissance.
By the time the remaining battalions of the 10th Division arrived, the
Navy had found a small landing place in one of the little bays on the
southern side of Suvla Point, just inside Suvla Bay. These men of the
Irish Division scrambled ashore and pushed on to the high ground of
Karakol Dagh.
When noon came the sun beat down on those poor citizen soldiers, worn
out and tired by their long sea journeys, harassed by daring snipers in
the dark, not very resolutely led, not at home in this hot and dusty
country, tortured by thirst, the improvized and intricate machine went
to pieces at the first rough jolt. Most of that day the Suvla Army sat
down and waited for something to turn up. But during the afternoon some
bold spirits led two battalions of the 11th Division across the flat
ground and secured a foothold on the Chocolate Hills. So, from a point
above Karakol Dagh, the line ran through Hill 10 and past the Salt Lake
to the Chocolate Hills, about two miles from the outpost of their New
Army comrades on Damakjelik Bair.
That night the Anzac troops, as we know, were holding the line
Damakjelik-Asma Dere-Rhododendron Spur.
The Morning of August 8.
This morning--the morning when Malone stood triumphant on the crest of
Chunuk Bair; when the Australians were pluckily attempting to carry
Abdel Rahman--passed strangely inactive at Suvla. Following on their
exhaustion and the heat of the midday sun, the men undoubtedly suffered
agonies from thirst. There was water in the Suvla Plain, but no proper
provision was made to take advantage of it. Instead, much effort was
directed towards getting the supplies known to be somewhere at hand in
ships and lighters. So one thing reacted on another--the bad landing
beach at A caused exhaustion in the troops disembarked there, and was
the cause of greater confusion when the troops for the left flank
were landed on the right. This caused delay, which meant that more
of the precious water was consumed than was allowed for. As a matter
of fact, such was the lack of ordinary supervision, numbers of men
landed without any water in their water-bottles at all! Those who had
water consumed it during the waiting of the day. So General Stopford
brought off mules to carry water in preference to artillery horses, and
created a further excuse for delay--not enough supporting artillery!
At the Anzac landing horses could not be landed, but willing men
manhandled the guns up precipitous cliffs to their positions. No one
seemed to think of this at Suvla. But the Generals in command seemed
fairly satisfied with the progress of things. General Hamilton, over at
Imbros, from where he could best keep touch of his widely-scattered
army, got so uneasy that he could not resist hurrying to Suvla to see
why the advance had been hung up. Nothing was done, but one battalion,
the 6th East York Pioneers, occupied Scimitar Hill and dug in for the
night. It was decided to make an advance early in the morning. Then an
extraordinary incident occurred. The higher command evidently did not
know where the battalions were. The 6th East Yorks were considered to
be the freshest, and were ordered to the attack on another hill in the
morning. This battalion had taken Scimitar Hill, but those in command
did not seem to know it. Accordingly, the 6th East Yorks abandoned
their position on this valuable hill without an effort and marched back
to Sulajik!
[Illustration:
[_Lent by Rev. Wainohu, C.F._
THE ROLL CALL OF THE MAORIS AFTER THE AUGUST FIGHTING.]
The Next Day--August 9.
Early in the morning the 32nd Brigade attacked the hills towards
Anafarta, but were repulsed and continued to occupy a line running
north and south through Sulajik.
This day the New Zealanders clung to the ridge of Chunuk Bair, the
Ghurkas and 6th South Lancashires struggled on to Hill Q, but the
Suvla Army, worn out with fatigue and thirst, lay along the low ground
stretching from the Chocolate Hills towards Kiretch Tepe Sirt.
In this day's attack on Scimitar Hill, serious scrub fires broke out
and held the attention of the troops for the rest of the day. At noon
the units fell back to a line between Sulajik and Green Hill.
A New Move that Failed.
General Hamilton concluded that on this right flank success would be
delayed, and decided to land part of his reserve--the infantry brigades
of the 54th Division--up at the new landing place near Cape Suvla, so
that they might advance, with the 10th Irish Division, along Kiretch
Tepe Sirt, then thrust towards Kavak Tepe and capture the line Ejelmer
Bay to Anafarta, thus turning the Turkish flank.
The infantry of the 53rd (Territorial) Division landed during the
night of the 8/9th, and were to assist the units on the right flank.
The advance of these newly-arrived territorials was a pitiable thing.
Crossing the open country from Lala Baba towards the Anafarta Hills,
the enemy artillery, now considerably increased, took heavy toll. The
enemy again fought his sniping screen with conspicuous ability. The
attack could not get on. Realizing that the troops were unequal to the
situation, it was decided to dig in on a line from near the Azmak Dere,
through the knoll east of the Chocolate Hill, to the ground held by the
10th Division on Kiretch Tepe Sirt.
On August 11, the infantry brigades of the 54th Division were
disembarked and placed in reserve. An attack on Kavak Tepe-Tekke Tepe
was planned by Sir Ian Hamilton, but after a series of minor disasters
the projected night march and attack was abandoned. General Stopford
was now thoroughly convinced that his troops could not be expected
to do more. Even if they gained the high ground, he considered that
the supply of water and food would be too difficult and well-nigh
impossible to arrange. There seemed nothing to do but to dig in
everywhere and strengthen the line.
* * * * *
So ended the great battle for the heights of Sari Bair. The Turk still
held the higher ground at Helles, Anzac, and Suvla.
PART V.
After the Battle.
The Trenches on the Crest of Chunuk.
There has been placed on record a statement that the trenches on the
crest of Chunuk were badly sited. No soldier of experience would have
made such a criticism if he understood the facts. Bare justice is due
to Colonel Malone and those New Zealanders who took Chunuk and held it.
It has been said that the trench line was the wrong side of the crest,
and that there was not a good field of fire.
What would anyone else have done?
We all know that a trench should have the best field of fire. But one
can easily get in a training manual what one seeks for in vain during a
pitched battle! In the carefully prepared treatise, principles are laid
down and their application is expounded. But the enemy is not firing
bullets and hand grenades in the book. The ground in the book, too, is
easy to dig.
Look for a moment at this sketch of a typical crest.
[Illustration]
It is obvious that the trenchline we have gained is the best possible
one under the circumstances. No one contends that it is the best one
theoretically, but at least one has a certain amount of protection.
Anyone who goes forward on to the crest itself is killed by bomb or
rifle fire; anyone who goes over the enemy's side of the crest to dig
posts that have a good field of fire is also sure to be killed. This,
however, does not deter determined soldiers from trying. The men who
did try on Chunuk were buried long after by the Turks, and cannot reply
to criticism--criticism which is cheap, and, in this case, futile.
The only thing to do is to dig deep zig-zag saps through the crest
line, put T heads on each sap, and so get posts with a field of
fire--posts that can be connected by sapping. A determined enemy--and
the Turk was very determined--will not let attacking troops do exactly
what they wish, otherwise war might be made safe, and the front line
become more popular than it is!
The fact remains that the trenches on Chunuk Bair were the only
possible ones for such a situation. Those of us who have found
it necessary to entrench on a crest line in close proximity to a
determined foe, know that what was done on Chunuk could not have been
done any better by anybody else; and there, for the present, the matter
must stand.
The Water Problem.
The question of water was perhaps our most terrible problem during the
week-long battle. It had always been one of the problems of Anzac, but
that awful week in August was the culmination.
In anticipation of the offensive, great efforts were made to overcome
the shortage. It was known that good wells existed on the other side
of the watershed where the Turkish armies bivouacked, and in the
neighbourhood of Kabak Kuyu on the Suvla Plain. Until we could get
these wells, we had to make extraordinary provision. From Egypt, India
and England, every class of water receptacle was procured. Milk cans
came from England; fantassahs from the caravans of Egypt; pakhals from
India; sealed petrol tins by the thousand, filled with water from the
Nile, arrived and were stacked ready for the advance. Water from a
petrol tin looks rusty and tastes abominably, but it is water, and men
count themselves fortunate to get it.
The value of water in the campaign can be realized from one
illustration. Success seemed within our grasp when we got a foothold
on the crest of Chunuk. Tacticians of the Army consider that from
there success should have been exploited--that all available reserves
should have been thrown in there and so distributed along Hill Q to
Koja Chemen Tepe. General Sir Ian Hamilton has put it on record that he
was tempted to throw his reserves into the balance at Chunuk Bair, but
each time the problem of the water supply dissuaded him from putting
any more thirsty men at Anzac. That they were ultimately more thirsty
at Suvla is part of the tragedy, which is easy to point out now, but
difficult then to foresee.
[Illustration:
[_Lent by Capt. Boxer, N.Z.M.C._
A DRESSING STATION IN THE CHAILAK DERE.]
All through the fight on Chunuk Bair men's throats were parched for
the want of water. Intense thirst is one of the cruellest torments man
can suffer. Hot weather, hill climbing, and the excitement of fighting
combine to accentuate the desire to drink. On occasions like this, the
contents of two water bottles do not last long. When the New Zealand
infantry went out on to Chunuk Bair, they had marched all the night
before and lain out on the hillside during the torrid day. Their water
was soon consumed. Water bottles were carefully collected from the
dead, more carefully even than ammunition. The short supply gallantly
carried up by the Indian transport service did not go far, but it
saved the situation.
Perhaps the success of the Australian and New Zealand divisions in this
war was due to having in their ranks skilled and resourceful men who
had spent most of their lives solving problems for themselves. In any
case the New Zealand Engineers took advantage of the well near No. 2
and developed it to the full. Not that there were no difficulties. On
one occasion the bearings got heated, metal ran out of the couplings,
and the engine broke down. Spare parts could be made on the warships,
but that meant delay. We were getting 1,000 gallons per hour, and
pumping 20 hours a day. This meant keeping 2 divisions supplied; so one
old sapper filed up a new bearing out of the gun-metal coupling off a
service pump! Again, owing to the lubricating oil being so poor, the
cylinder rings used to burn on to the piston, and had to be forced off.
First one was broken, and then another. New rings were made by cutting
up a Turkish 4.5 shell with a hack-saw! The job was a lengthy one, but
as the shell was the right thickness, they proved to be A1. After that
a few were always kept on hand. Not without ingenuity and knowledge
born of experience did the troops at Anzac get the water denied their
unfortunate comrades at Suvla.
The Fifth Reinforcements.
If ever mortals were projected into a hell of torture and suffering
it was the men of the 5th Reinforcements. Coming straight from the
transports, they arrived at No. 2 Post on August 8, and were summarily
introduced to modern war. Hundreds of wounded had been carried
down from the bloody slopes of Chunuk and were laid in rows in the
neighbourhood of No. 2 Post, in readiness to be carried along the Big
Sap, and so to the piers as soon as it was dark. These men of the 5th
Reinforcements had served little apprenticeship to active service; but
they had heard of the casualties of the landing at Anzac and Helles,
and some have written that at first they were of the impression that
these rows of wounded men were an everyday occurrence! In a sort of
nightmare, not knowing whither they were going, or even the name of
the dere they traversed, these men dived into the trenches on Chunuk
Bair and found themselves among Wellington and Otago Infantry, Auckland
and Wellington Mounteds--the heroic band of brothers clinging to Chunuk
and prepared to die there. A great proportion did die there; but they
held Chunuk! Into this company of heroes stumbled the men of the Fifths.
They were greeted with "dig for your lives for dawn is not far away,
and if you haven't got cover by then, you're dead men!" All through
the night the digging, the bombing, and the shooting continued. Rifle
barrels got so hot they had to be discarded, and a rifle from a dead
man used. Ammunition and water were collected. Some men used three
rifles, turn and turn about.
[Illustration: CARRYING WOUNDED TO THE PICKET BOATS.]
With dawn came the lyddite shells from the Navy. Dense rolls of yellow
smoke curled round the hills. Small coloured flags were waved to
indicate our position to the Navy.
The suffering from thirst was terrible. When relief did come, men
crowded round the wells at No. 2 and drank tin after tin of the
precious water.
The Valleys of Torment.
During the nights of August 7, 8, 9, and 10, the wounded men of Anzac
seemed to encompass the sum total of human suffering. Travelling
light to avoid the heat of the day, a badly wounded man who could not
walk had to lie out all through the long cold night. To men without
blankets and tunics, and often without a shirt because of the noonday
heat, those nights were excruciatingly cold. Those who could walk
were in fairly good stead. They could reach the dressing stations
near the beach, and get near the piers when the Red Cross barge came
alongside. So it happened that the least wounded were always ready to
be evacuated; the others had to lie in those stricken gullies until the
few overworked stretcher-bearers could carry them down. The lack of
facilities for evacuating wounded was as pronounced as at the landing.
Of course, in war it must always happen that during big battles things
will go wrong. That seems unavoidable, and conditions generally adjust
themselves after a few days. But to get a parallel to the sufferings at
Anzac one must go back to the days of the Crimea.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Capt. Boxer, N.Z.M.C._
A TRAWLER ALONGSIDE A HOSPITAL SHIP.
Under the big Union Jack are six bodies; and one under the small flag.
The trawler made a trip every morning out to the three mile limit,
where a solemn burial service was held--the only mourners being the
padre and the seven men of the trawler.]
[Illustration: IN EGYPT: THE RED CROSS CARS AND THE RED CRESCENT
TRAIN.
The Christian Cross and the Mahommedan Crescent--for perhaps the first
time in history--working together in the interests of humanity.]
The Sazli Beit Dere and the Chailak Dere were crowded with walking
cases; those who could not walk, waited in vain for stretcher-bearers,
then born of desperation, crawled, crept, and rolled down the slopes
into the gullies. Here there was a certain amount of protection against
Turkish fire. Ghurkas, New Army men, and New Zealanders painfully crept
towards the low ground. Perhaps the gully would lead too far away from
the direction of No. 2 Post; men at the last stages of exhaustion would
give up here and wait for the stretcher-bearers who could not come,
for they were overwhelmed with cases nearer home. Medical officers,
padres, dentists and stretcher-bearers toiled against one of the most
heartbreaking experiences of the war. Up in these gullies of torment
men died by the hundred--died of thirst, of awful bomb wounds and of
exposure.
Down near No. 2 Post was an awful sight--a thousand wounded men lying
in rows and in heaps. Crash would come a Turkish shell and the
already wounded would be wounded once again. Mule trains moving up and
down to the Big Sap raised great clouds of fine dust that settled on
everything, increasing the discomfort already caused by wounds, fever,
flies and the alternating heat and cold.
Barges full of mules would pull in to be disembarked. The stretcher
bearers would help with the unloading, and without any cleaning, for
there was no time to worry about the niceties, the serious cases would
be placed on the bottom of the barge and towed out to the hospital ship
or carrier.
When a string of Red Cross barges would come in, the walking cases
would naturally crowd up to the pier in anticipation of getting off;
there was a tendency to leave the helpless man on the beach, but the
medical officers and orderlies watched as well as they were able, and
sent the serious cases to the hospital ships as soon as possible, the
less serious ones going to Lemnos by the hospital carrier.
It is difficult to conceive what clean sheets, soft food, the sight
of the army nurses, and the sound of their English voices, meant to
the tired men of Anzac. Worn to shadows by hardships and suffering,
these men could not understand the present situation. For if their
experiences had been awful, they expected little else. As pioneers in a
desperate enterprise they knew the path would not be strewn with ease
and comfort, but rather with danger and pain--and their expectations
were realized at Anzac; but here on the hospital ships where there were
warm baths, clean underclothing, and the tender ministrations of the
army nurses, the suffering New Zealander was literally overwhelmed with
his good fortune.
CHAPTER XV.
The Battle of Kaiajik Aghala.
When Sir Ian Hamilton realized that he could not win through to the
Narrows with the force at his disposal, he cabled to England for
reinforcements. The answer came that no reinforcements could be sent.
Men and all the munitions of war were wanted for the Western Front.
The dominant school of thought was now in favour of a winter base at
Salonika. There was a keen disappointment over the Suvla failure. The
people had been told that we were only two miles from the greatest
victory of the war. And that was true! But what miles? And we were now
not much nearer victory than we had been before the push, for our every
post was dominated by a higher Turkish one.
[Illustration:
[_Lent by Captain Janson, W.M.R._
AT THE FOOT OF THE CHAILAK DERE.
Officers and men of the Wellington Mounted Rifles going out to Hill 60.]
Sir Ian Hamilton decided to make another effort with a regrouping of
the troops at his disposal.
The only new troops he could call on were the 2nd Mounted Division, a
body of British Yeomanry who had been doing garrison duty in Egypt.
They were composed of young men who had served in the volunteer mounted
service before the war and correspond to our New Zealand regiments of
Mounted Rifles. They totalled about 5000 men, and were organized in
four brigades (the 1st South Midland, the 2nd South Midland, the North
Midland, and the London.)
The 29th Division, who since their desperate landing, had borne the
brunt of the fighting at Cape Helles, were moved from there to stiffen
the New Army division, which were dug in along the Suvla Flats.
By the night of August 20/21, all was ready for the projected attack.
This was to consist of two preliminary movements.
(1) The 29th Division was to move from Chocolate Hills against
Scimitar Hill. Everywhere along the line the other units were to take
the offensive to hold the enemy's reserves in check. The 13th Division
was to attack at 3.15 p.m. The 34th Brigade was to attack on the plain
near Hetman Chair. Next to it the 32nd Brigade was to get possession
of a trench running from Hetman Chair towards "W" Hills.
(2) The Anzac troops from Damakjelik Bair were to attack Kaiajik
Aghala (Hill 60) and swing their left round to junction with the Suvla
forces.
A reference to the map will show that when these two points--Scimitar
Hill and Kaiajik Aghala--were taken the way would be clear for a
converging combined assault on Ismail Oglu Tepe, the well known "W"
Hills of Anzac. From it in a south-easterly direction ran the long
spur on which--some 2700 yards away--was situated the village of Biyuk
Anafarta. A similar distance away, but to the northeast, lay Kuchuk
Anafarta. The occupation of Ismail Oglu Tepe would not only give us
possession of the valleys running up to both these villages, but would
also give us uninterrupted intercourse between Anzac and Suvla, now
continually under the fire of the guns on "W" Hills. The wells in the
neighbourhood were also valuable to whichever side held them.
[Illustration: SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE BATTLES FOR SCIMITAR
HILL AND HILL 60.
"Kuyu" is the Turkish name for well. There were many valuable wells
between Kaiajik Aghala and the sea.]
The Attack on Scimitar Hill.
On the night of August 20/21, the 29th Division assembled at Chocolate
Hills and prepared for the advance on the morrow. All that day they
kept under observation their objective for the morrow--the ill-starred
Scimitar.
The preliminary bombardment was very heavy for Gallipoli, but a mist
on the Suvla plain favoured the enemy, interfering with the aim of
our gunners. At 3.15 in the afternoon the 34th Brigade reached their
objective--the trenches on the plain near Hetman Chair; but the 32nd
Brigade lost direction, and instead of taking the communication trench
leading to the "W" Hills, went far north of it and suffered heavy
casualties. The 33rd Brigade went out to retrieve the situation, but
made the same mistake and failed entirely in its object.
Just after 3.30, the 87th Brigade of the 29th Division, taking
advantage of every bush and every fold in the ground, moved steadily
from Chocolate Hill towards the Scimitar. The 1st Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers stormed the crest and chased the Turks back towards the high
ground leading to Kuchuk Anafarta. But just higher than the first crest
of the Scimitar were other rows of Turkish trenches. From the machine
guns there, from the field guns of "W" Hills, and from Tekke Tepe, came
a storm of lead. The Scimitar was swept with a devastating converging
fire.
[Illustration: Officers of the 29th Division in the trenches at Suvla.]
The 86th Brigade was to attack the right of the Scimitar, and
merge with the 87th Brigade for the attack on the crest; but the
badly-directed 32nd and 33rd Brigades of the 13th Division were now
scattered over the ground between Green Hill and the Scimitar. These
troops got mixed with the regulars and threw them into confusion; but
born of long training, led by experienced officers, companies emerged
from the chaos, and pressed on to the Scimitar. Then a great fire broke
out in the undergrowth and little headway could be made.
At five o'clock the Yeomanry were called from the reserve at Lala
Baba. With their hearts in their mouths, the watchers from the Anzac
hills saw the long lines extend in open order and move across the wide
expanse of plain. Right across the dry Salt lake the troopers quickly
marched. The wonder is that so few casualties occurred. They had some
difficulty in pressing through the scattered men of the 13th Division
round the Chocolate Hills; but by 7 o'clock at least one brigade was at
the foot of the Scimitar. Darkness fell as they commenced to work their
way to the crest. The converging fire again swept the crest and they
too suffered the fate of the Inniskillings and had to withdraw after
suffering fearful loss.
Scimitar Hill, which was taken so easily by the 6th East Yorks and so
tragically abandoned on August 8th, cost over 5000 casualties. There
was not an atom of gain, for everywhere the troops fell back to the
original line.
The First Attack on Kaiajik Aghala.
The attack from Anzac met with better fortune. It will be remembered
that the Left Covering Force occupied Damajelik Bair on the morning of
August 7. The 4th Australian Brigade which fell back from Abdel Rahman
had dug in along the southern bank of the headwaters of the Kaiajik
Dere.
[Illustration:
[_Lent by N.Z. Y.M.C.A_.
OCEAN BEACH AFTER THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE.
This picture shows the Y.M.C.A. marquee in the centre. The road along
the beach, the new wharfs from which the New Zealand brigades embarked
at the evacuation, and the hospitals are plainly shown.]
The line to be attacked was shaped like a boomerang. The operation was
divided into two parts.
(1) The 29th Indian Brigade of Ghurkas and Sikhs was to seize the
important wells, principally Kabak Kuyu--the Suvla end of the
boomerang.
(2) The other force under Brig.-General Russell was to storm Kaiajik
Aghala, which we knew as Hill 60--this was the elbow and the Anzac end
of the boomerang.
The troops for (2) were disposed from right to left as follows:--
(a) The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, now reduced to about 1,400
men, had available for the attack about 400 men from the 13th and 14th
Battalions.
(b) The Canterbury Mounted Rifles were already on the ground, and the
Otago Mounted Rifles were brought over to reinforce them. To each of
these regiments a platoon of Maoris was attached.
(c) Detachments of the 5th Connaught Rangers (10th Div.), the 4th
South Wales Borderers (13th Div.) and the 10th Hampshires (10th Div.)
were on the extreme left, where the South Wales Borderers had been
since August 7 waiting for the joining up of the Suvla forces. The
Indians, it must be remembered, were also part of the Anzac Army.
The ravine of the Kaiajik Aghala separated the Australians and New
Zealanders from their objective. This ravine gradually broadened out
in front of the New Army troops, and debouched on the wide open plain
around the wells of Kabak Kuyu and Susuk Kuyu.
The line was to be attacked as follows:--
KABAK KUYU.
29th Indian Inf. Brigade.
THE HILL OF KAIAJIK AGHALA (HILL 60)
Connaughts Canterbury M.R. Otago M.R. 13th & 14th
S.W. Borderers Maoris Maoris Batt. A.I.F.
Hampshires (about 500 men)
By some strange mischance, the artillery bombardment which was so
liberal at Suvla, overlooked Hill 60 altogether. But at 3.30 the troops
made ready for the advance.
The 13th and 14th Australian Battalions--those veterans of Pope's
and Quinn's, the men who early in August struggled on to the Abdel
Rahman--dashed down the slope. Losing heavily, they raced into the
gully and up the other side. Beaten by Turkish machine gun fire, they
held their ground, but could not get on.
The New Zealand attack had about 800 yards to go. Squadron and troop
leaders spent the day observing the objective and the best lines of
advance. They went back to their men, explained the position and made
clear to everyone that the attack was to be by bayonet only, then
bombs. The formation was to be in lines of successive troops; each
ridge to be taken advantage of as a reforming point for a fresh advance.
There was some wonderment at the lack of artillery fire, but punctually
at 3.30, over the top went the troopers. Down the slope went the
Canterburys and Otagos. Troop after troop dived into the hail of death
and pushed on to the first ridge to collect their scattered fragments.
Each troop made its fifty yard rushes and fell down exhausted. These
men had lived for months on hard rations and were weakened by dysentery
and fatigue. But on they swept again. It was a triumph of resolute
minds over wasted bodies. Reaching the shelter of the gully, they
reformed and commenced the steep ascent. Between the large ridge and
the Turkish trench there was about 100 yards of bullet-swept scrub.
Dozens of the troopers fell never to rise again; the wounded crept into
positions of comparative safety. The Turkish shells set the scrub and
grass on fire, but luckily there was little wind, and the little there
was blew the flames away from our wounded.
By now the Canterburys and Otagos had reached the first enemy trench,
and a bomb fight ensued. Down the communication trench the Turk was
driven. Our men came across an enemy machine gun, which was promptly
turned on to the fugitives. Back came the Turk with a counter attack,
but the troopers stuck like limpets to their hardly-won position.
The position now was: The Indians had seized the well, and were well
round the Suvla flank of Hill 60. The N.Z.M.R. had 150 yards of the
Turkish trenches; but on the right, the 13th and 14th Australians could
not get on. We had a precarious hold that night, as the Connaughts sent
round between us and the Indians were mercilessly bombed back again.
A most dramatic incident occurred when there was a sudden cry of "cease
fire," and from the Turkish trenches on Kaiajik Aghala over 150 Turks
issued with their hands held high in the air. They had rifles with
them, but their movements and demeanour strongly suggested that they
were willing to be taken prisoners. There was no one who could talk
Turkish, so an interpreter was sent for. But before he arrived our men
were out of the trenches trying to carry on a conversation with the
Turks, who seemed perfectly friendly, but could not understand our
words or signs that they must put down their arms and come quietly
away. Suddenly shooting rang out on the right and left. But the O.C.
Otago Mounteds went right out into No Man's Land towards the Turkish
trenches, surrounded by a mob of Turks. He was convinced that we were
about to make one of the biggest hauls of prisoners in the campaign.
The few New Zealanders were hopelessly outnumbered, but still they
tried to indicate by signs and pantomimic gestures that the Turks must
first lay down their arms. By this time firing was brisk in other
parts of the line. Some Turks who came to our trenches reached down
to assist our fellows out, but our men pulled them in and made them
prisoners, very much to their annoyance. The Otago colonel got right to
the enemy's trench, and a Turkish officer tried to pull him in. This
did not seem good enough, so in the grey of the morning the colonel,
a lonely figure, retraced his steps across No Man's Land. Then firing
became general, but not before we had captured a dozen of the enemy.
To this day the senior officers who were on the spot are not certain of
the Turk's intention, but as it was discovered that all the prisoners
and the dead carried many bombs, it is almost certain that they did not
wish to surrender. The most likely story is that a few New Army men
were captured out on the Suvla Flats, and told the enemy intelligence
officers that we were badly shaken and perhaps would surrender. So this
party came down to conduct us into their lines. But instead of finding
a place in the line--if there was one--where men were willing to give
themselves up, they came upon a nest of hornets that stung them very
severely.
During the rest of the night, communications were dug from the old
Australian trenches to their new front line on the other side of the
Kaiajik Dere. The New Zealanders in the Kaiajik trenches were not in
touch with the Australians on the right.
The newly arrived battalion of Australian Infantry--the 18th--now came
out from Anzac as reinforcements. This was at 4.30 a.m. Two companies
were taken round by the Kabak well, along an old Turkish road, and
sent to attack the northern flank of the hill. At first they were very
successful, but the bombing tactics of the enemy were too much for
the newly arrived soldiers, who had to evacuate--about 9 a.m. on the
22nd. At 11 a.m. the N.Z.M.R. again took part of those trenches on the
extreme left, and built a sandbag barricade.
The position now was that the front line trench on Hill 60 was held
for about 200 yards by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles. This trench ran
approximately round the 60 metre contour line. We built traverses to
separate us from the enemy, who held the rest of the trench.
This attack had fallen very heavily on the troops engaged. The
Canterburys, Otagos and Maoris had severe losses--the Canterburys
losing 58 per cent. of their effectives, the Otagos 65 per cent. But
we had taken part of the enemy's trench, and that was something--in
fact, the only thing gained in the whole line from the Asma Dere to the
Chocolate Hills.
We set to work on our communication trenches, and the Turks dug and dug
until they made the rest of Kaiajik Aghala into a veritable redoubt.
Second Assault on Kaiajik Aghala.
For the next few days the units in the line carried on an incessant
bomb and rifle duel, but it was decided to make one more effort to win
the coveted hill.
In the reorganization which took place for the second attack, the
disposition was as follows:--