THE CONGRESSIONAL PLAN (_Continued_)
The Reports of the Committee on Reconstruction--The Idea of a New
Electorate as the Basis and Condition of Reconstruction--The Freedmen's
Bureau Act of July 16th, 1866--The Disaffection in the Cabinet--The New
Orleans Riot--The Issue of Reconstruction in the Campaign of 1866--The
Congressional Election of 1866--The President's Final Proclamation
Declaring the Civil War Ended--The October Elections--The President's
Message of December 3d, 1866--Rejection of the Proposed Fourteenth
Amendment by the Legislatures of the Reconstructed "States."
[Sidenote: The reports of the Committee on Reconstruction.]
Two days after the transmission of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
"State" legislatures, the Joint Committee of Congress on Reconstruction
made its final report, or rather reports, since there were two of them,
one being signed by all the Republican members of the Committee, and
the other by all the Democratic members.
[Sidenote: The majority report.]
The majority report was an able defence of the view, that by rebellion
and attempted secession the eleven "States" in which these things
happened had lost their "Statehood" and had become disorganized
communities, but that while they could and had destroyed "State"
government, and placed themselves outside of the Union so far as
exercising the powers and privileges of "State" local government was
concerned, they could not, and had not, escaped the obligations of the
Constitution and the authority of the {85} central Government. The
exact language of the report on this point was: "The Constitution, it
will be observed, does not act upon States, as such, but upon the
people; while, therefore, the people cannot escape its authority, the
States may, through the act of their people, cease to exist in an
organized form, and thus dissolve their political relations with the
United States." The doctrine is here more clearly expressed than in
other places, but even here there is a confusing modification contained
in the words "in an organized form." It would have been much clearer if
they had been entirely omitted. The framers of the report were
evidently haunted by that spectre of an abstract, unorganized "State,"
which has played such havoc with good sense in some of the subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court, and which is nothing more than a
Platonic idea.
Based upon this doctrine, the majority report naturally vindicated the
exclusive right of Congress in the work of Reconstruction, which work
was virtually the admission of new "States" into the Union. It,
furthermore, demonstrated that the situation in these disorganized
sections was one largely of exhausted disloyalty only, and that all
that the inhabitants of them had done under the President's
Reconstruction policy was directed toward putting the same men in power
who had led in the rebellion and toward denying civil, to say nothing
of political, rights to the freedmen.
And its final conclusion was, "that Congress would not be justified in
admitting such communities to a participation in the government of the
country without first providing such constitutional or other guarantees
as would tend to secure the civil rights of all citizens of the
Republic; a just equality of representation; protection against claims
founded in rebellion and crime; a temporary restoration of the right of
suffrage to those {86} who have not actively participated in the
efforts to destroy the Union and overthrow the Government; and the
exclusion from positions of public trust of at least a portion of those
whose crimes have proved them to be the enemies of the Union, and
unworthy of public confidence."
As we have seen, the proposed Fourteenth Article of Amendment had
provided for all of these things, except the direct conferring of
suffrage on anybody. With this exception, it had gone even further, in
its provision declaratory of citizenship, and in its protection of the
public debt of the Union.
[Sidenote: The minority report.]
The report of the minority, that is of the three Democrats, was written
by Mr. Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland. It was, as a lawyer's brief, an
able presentation of the view that a "State" of the Union can never
become anything else than a "State," no matter what may be the
character, deeds, attempts or disposition of the people who inhabit it,
and is at all times entitled to the same powers, rights and privileges,
under the Constitution of the United States. It was, however, the
veriest dry bones of legal reasoning, the veriest sophistry of juristic
abstraction. There was no political science in it, no common sense in
it, and it ended with an unfortunate and irritating defence of
President Johnson's personal loyalty, which had not been in the
slightest degree impugned by the majority.
[Sidenote: The idea of a new electorate as the basis and condition of
Reconstruction.]
The majority report indicated, at least, that Congress might require
something more than adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment by the
communities lately in rebellion before they would be recognized as
having been restored to their proper relations in the Union as
"States," and entitled to representation in Congress. At the moment,
however, it is probable that a prompt adoption of {87} the proposed
Amendment by any of the reconstructed legislatures would have been
followed by a joint resolution on the part of Congress similar to that
enacted in the case of Tennessee. There is no doubt that many of the
more radical members of Congress had been long considering the question
of creating an entirely new electorate in the South as the only proper
basis for reconstruction, and that some of the conservatives, from
being opponents of this idea at the beginning of the year, had, by the
middle of it, begun, at least, to waver. To those who could read the
signs of the times correctly, it was manifest that a rejection of the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment by these communities would lead Congress
forward upon that line. The President ought to have understood this,
when Mr. Raymond voted for the proposed Amendment in the House. He
ought to have done all in his power to influence the reconstructed
communities to adopt the proposed Amendment, no matter whether the
submission of it to them by the Secretary of State of the United States
logically involved their recognition as "States" of the Union by the
Administration at Washington, or not. They were not in a position to
exact the precise conclusion of a logical process in their favor,
especially as it was based on a fallacious premise, and the President
did both himself and them a great wrong in not discouraging them from
so doing.
[Sidenote: The Freedmen's Bureau Act of July 16th, 1866.]
A few weeks later Congress scored another victory over the President,
one which did much toward wiping out the defeats of February 19th and
21st. It passed another Freedmen's Bureau Bill, and then repassed it
July 16th, over the President's veto. This bill was framed with the
purpose in view of avoiding those features of the bill, successfully
vetoed by the President on February 19th preceding, {88} which had
influenced certain Republicans to sustain the President's veto. The
differences between the two measures consisted in the following points.
The first bill had no definite time limit; the second would expire in
two years from the date of its passage. The first bill vested
jurisdiction in the Freedmen's Bureau over the civil rights of freedmen
and refugees in all parts of the United States. The second vested the
bureau with jurisdiction over loyal refugees and freedmen without
mention of place. The first vested a most sweeping power in the Bureau
to give all kinds of aid and support to the destitute refugees and
freedmen. The second contained only the more moderate provision of the
original law of March 3d, 1865, on that subject. Finally the first gave
the Bureau jurisdiction over the civil rights of freedmen and refugees,
not only when the deprivation of them was the consequence of rebellion,
but when it was effected by _any local law_, ordinance, police
regulation or other regulation. The second, on the contrary, limited
the jurisdiction of the Bureau to those cases where the deprivation was
the consequence of rebellion.
[Sidenote: The veto of the measure.]
The President could not, however, see much difference between them. He
claimed that his objections to the first bill were valid against the
second. The second measure, he contended, was only a war measure for a
definite period, in a time of peace. It was the prolongation for a
definite time of military jurisdiction over civil matters, when the
civil courts both "State" and Union were open and in the unhindered
discharge of their business. And he held the ground that Congress had
no more constitutional power to create, or perpetuate, military
jurisdiction over civil matters for a definite period in time of peace
than for an indefinite period. He referred to the fact that the Civil
Rights measure, just passed over his veto, met all {89} the points
provided for in the Freedmen's Bureau bill, and affirmed that all of
the provisions of that law would be executed by him through ordinary
civil means, in so far as they should not be repealed by Congress or
declared unconstitutional by the courts.
[Sidenote: Correctness of the President's views.]
From the point of view of to-day it is difficult to see why the
President was not right. There is no doubt that the Freedmen's Bureau
with its powers, jurisdiction and charities, was a far greater source
of irritation in the South than was the presence of the United States
army. While its superior officers were generally men of ability and
character, a large number of the subalterns were canting hypocrites and
outright thieves. They kept the negroes in a state of idleness, beggary
and unrest, and made them a constant danger to the life and property of
the whites; and their veritable tyranny over the white population did
more to destroy Union sentiment among the whites and make them regard
the United States Government in a hostile light than anything which had
happened during the whole course of the rebellion. It was an
institution which ought to have been dispensed with the instant that
the necessity which called it into existence passed away. The law of
March 3d, 1865, had still about eight months to run, and Congress would
be in session again four months before it would expire. There was ample
opportunity for prolonging the law, and that law, it was to be
presumed, was less needed in 1866 than in 1865. It took all of the
party discipline of the Republicans to prevent sufficient disaffection
in their ranks to sustain the President's veto. On the merits of the
question alone they could not have done it. They were in error, and
many of them knew it, but they were now in to fight the President and
they must stand together.
{90} [Sidenote: The veto overridden.]
The veto of the bill was dated July 16th, and the two Houses repassed
it over the veto on the same day. The new law was to be executed
through the War Department, as the original measure had been, and the
Secretary of War had begun to manifest that indecent hostility to the
President which disgraced the last years of the Administration. The
President was largely cut off from even the knowledge of what was
taking place in the operations of the Freedmen's Bureau, and Mr.
Stanton now managed it in such a manner, whether intentional or not, as
to cause the greatest possible friction between the Government and the
whites of the South, and thus to retard the process of Reconstruction
and to destroy what had been already accomplished in that direction.
[Sidenote: Disaffection in the Cabinet.]
[Sidenote: Stanton's attitude toward the President.]
Besides Stanton, three other members of the Cabinet had showed their
disaffection toward the President's policy. They were Mr. Speed, the
Attorney-General, Mr. Dennison, the Postmaster-General, and Mr. Harlan,
the Secretary of the Interior. During the course of the month (July)
these three gentlemen resigned their offices, and were replaced by Mr.
Stanbery, Mr. A. W. Randall, and Mr. O. H. Browning. Their sense of
propriety would not permit them to retain high office under the
President while differing with him so widely in regard to the
fundamental question of Reconstruction. Mr. Stanton, however, took a
different view of his duty. He seemed to feel that he was under
obligations to his country to remain in the President's Cabinet, at the
head of the most important branch of the Administration at that moment,
and protect the country against the purposes of the President. He was
sustained in this view by the Republican majority in Congress, which
soon entered upon its course of depriving {91} the President of his
military control even, by transferring his functions to the Secretary
of War and the General of the army. To the men of the present day, Mr.
Stanton's conduct appears, at least, lacking in a proper sense of
delicacy. It may be regarded in an even more serious light. It may be
looked upon as a conspiracy with the Republican majority in Congress to
rob the President of his constitutional prerogatives, to change the
form of government from the presidential system to the parliamentary
system of administration. It is difficult to find any sufficient
defence for Mr. Stanton's course. It is impossible to clear him of the
appearance of great egotism or of great greed of office, in not
resigning along with his dissatisfied colleagues.
The President knew of this difference of feeling between himself and
his War Secretary at the time of his reorganization of the Cabinet in
July, and would undoubtedly have been glad to receive his resignation,
but he did not ask for it. The newspapers which sustained the
Administration did, however, and predicted that it would be
forthcoming. The Republican leaders, on the other hand, encouraged
Stanton to hold on to the office, and represented to him that the
welfare of his country demanded the sacrifice of his personal feelings
in the matter.
[Sidenote: The opinion and feeling in the North concerning the
condition of things in the South.]
It was now generally proclaimed throughout the North that the rebel
chieftains had repossessed themselves of the reconstructed "State"
governments and were making use of "State" powers to re-enslave the
freedmen. It was also proclaimed that the life and property of Union
men, of whatever race, at the South were utterly insecure, and that at
least a thousand men had been murdered in that section within a year's
time, without any considerable number of the {92} murderers having been
brought to justice. And it was asserted that the President of the
United States had deserted the party of the Union, the party which had
elevated him to the chief magistracy of the land, and was now
conspiring with his old party friends, the Democrats, in both the North
and the South, to drive the Republican party from power and restore the
régime of the Democracy of 1860.
[Sidenote: The New Orleans riot.]
At this moment a horrible tragedy was enacted in New Orleans which
seemed to give verification to some, if not all, of these statements.
It seems that the late Confederate leaders resident in Louisiana,
having received pardon from the President of the United States upon
fulfilling the conditions of the President's amnesty proclamation, had
got possession in 1864 of the reconstructed "State" government of
Louisiana, with the exception of the governorship and some of the
judicial offices. The constitution of 1864, made by sincere Union men,
did not exactly suit them, and the legislature in the spring of 1866
took into consideration a bill for calling another convention together
for the purpose of framing a new constitution, but the Administration
at Washington frowned upon the movement and the legislature abandoned
it. In like manner, the men who formed and established the constitution
of 1864 were displeased with the fact that the "State" government under
it had been captured at the polls by the old electorate of Louisiana,
reinstated through the President's amnesty. They also wanted to change
the constitution, to so change it as to create an electorate which
would bring them back into power again. This meant negro suffrage. Just
before the convention of 1864 adjourned, it passed a resolution vesting
in the presiding officer of the convention the power, and imposing on
him the duty, of reconvoking the {93} convention in case the
constitution framed by it should not be ratified at the polls, or for
any other necessary reason, for the purpose of taking such measures as
might be needful for forming civil government in Louisiana.
Of course, when the constitution framed by the convention was adopted
by popular vote and a "State" government was set up under it, common
sense and common honesty would hold that the convention had been
finally dissolved, no matter how the wording of the resolution might be
forced in the opposite direction. The men of "'64" saw in this wording
their only chance, however, to rescue the "State" government from the
hands of the amnestied electorate, and in their desperation they were
determined to attempt to make use of it. A number of the members of the
old convention got together informally on the 26th of June. The
president of the old convention did not call them together, and he
would not preside at the informal meeting. He made some trivial excuse;
but there cannot be much doubt in regard to his real reason. This
informal meeting then proceeded to elect a _pro tempore_ president,
Judge Howell, an office-holder under the constitution of 1864. It was
this man who issued the proclamation of July 7th, reconvoking the old
convention of 1864. The time appointed by him was the 30th of July at
noon, and the place designated by him was the Mechanics' Institute
Building at New Orleans. The men called together were the members of
the old convention, but to provide for any vacancies that might have
happened or might happen in the former membership of this old body,
Judge Howell called on the Governor, Mr. Wells, to issue writs of
election. The governor did so, and ordered an election of such
delegates to be held September 3d. He thus manifested his approval of
the movement.
{94} Naturally the party of the amnestied viewed this scheme for
depriving them of the "State" government by means of a new
constitution, framed by a defunct convention, and certain to contain a
provision for negro suffrage, with the most intense hostility. They
were not placated either by being referred to the consideration that
the constitution framed by this convention must be submitted to the
suffrages of the existing electorate, and must be ratified by a
majority of the same, before it could be put into operation. They had a
suspicion that the whole thing was instigated by the wicked Republicans
at the North, and that the voting upon such a proposed constitution
would be controlled by them through the military of the United States
Government.
They, therefore, resolved to nip the plan in the bud by preventing the
assembly of the convention, or forcing it to disperse if it did
assemble. The mayor of the city, Mr. Monroe, the same who was mayor
when the Union army entered the city in 1862, applied to the General in
command of the United States troops in Louisiana, General Absalom
Baird, to know what attitude the military authorities would take toward
the convention, and informed General Baird that he intended to disperse
the convention if it should attempt to assemble without having the
approval of these authorities. General Baird was acting for General
Sheridan, who was absent from his post, and he replied with much more
caution than he would probably have done had he been alone responsible.
He told Mayor Monroe that he thought the Governor of the "State,"
rather than the mayor of the city, was the man to interfere with the
assembly of a body professing to be a "State" convention, if there was
to be any interference at all, and he gave the mayor to understand that
his proposed course might be perilous. This was the {95} 25th of July.
Two days later the mayor went again to the General, this time
accompanied by the Lieutenant-Governor, who was of the party of the
amnestied. He now told General Baird that the police would not
undertake to prevent the assembly of the convention, or disperse its
members when assembled, but that its members would be indicted by the
grand jury and arrested by the sheriff. The General seemed to think
that the convention could lawfully assemble, but agreed with the mayor
and Lieutenant-Governor that both he and they would request
instructions from Washington.
The General applied to the Secretary of War, and the mayor applied to
the President. The General informed the Secretary of the movement to
assemble a convention; that it had the approval of the Governor; that
the Lieutenant-Governor and the municipal authorities considered it
unlawful and proposed to prevent it by arresting the delegates; that he
had declared to them that he would not permit them to do this, unless
the President should so instruct him; and he asked for orders, in the
premises, by telegraph. The Lieutenant-Governor and the
Attorney-General of the "State" informed the President of the movement
to assemble the old convention; informed him that negroes were
assembling, incendiary speeches were being made calling them to arm
themselves, and the President was being denounced; that the Governor
was in sympathy with the movement; that the matter was before the grand
jury; and that it was contemplated to have the members of the
convention arrested by criminal process; and they asked the President
to inform them whether the military authorities would interfere to
prevent the execution of the processes of the criminal court.
Secretary Stanton did not reply to General Baird's application at all.
He did not even communicate the {96} General's application to the
President. He afterward explained that he did not consider that Baird's
telegram required any reply. Baird had said in his despatch that he had
informed the Lieutenant-Governor and the city authorities that he would
not allow them to arrest the delegates and break up the convention
unless instructed to do so by the President. The Secretary did not
propose to send the General any such orders, or to allow any such to be
transmitted to him from the President through the War Department, and
so the Secretary thought it best to let the matter rest where the
General had placed it. He did not know that the President had been
applied to by the other side, and the President did not inform the
Secretary of the despatch which he had received. The confidence between
the two men had been already so largely destroyed as to prevent even
consultation upon these grave subjects.
The President, on the other hand, answered the application made to him.
He telegraphed to the Lieutenant-Governor that the military would be
expected to sustain, and not to obstruct, or interfere with, the
proceedings of the criminal court. He did not send any orders to
General Baird, however. Whether the Lieutenant-Governor showed his
telegram from the President to General Baird or not is not positively
known, so far as the writer of these pages has been able to discover,
but it is probable that he did.
It was certainly then the understanding on all sides, at least, that
the "State" and municipal authorities would deal with the delegates to
the convention, if they interfered with them at all, through the grand
jury and the officers of the criminal court, and not through the
police. This did not mean, of course, that the police should not be
present in the neighborhood of the convention for the purpose of
keeping the {97} public peace. They were ordered to assemble at the
stations on the morning of the 30th (July) and to bring their arms.
According to General Sheridan's report to the President, the riot was
occasioned by the marching of a procession of negroes, about one
hundred strong and partly armed, through several of the streets to the
locality of the convention. It occurred about an hour after the members
of the convention had assembled. Naturally a number of people, mostly
of the lower orders, gathered on the sidewalks of the streets through
which the procession passed. Hooting and jeering followed. Then a shot
was fired, probably by a negro in the procession. Then other shots
followed and the crowd rushed after the procession, which soon arrived
in front of the building in which the convention sat. Brickbats now
flew from each side and the riot was in full progress when the police
appeared on the scene. The procession rushed into the building, leaving
a few of its members outside. One of these and a policeman came to
blows, when another shot was fired, upon which the policemen began
firing through the windows of the building. After a few moments a white
flag was displayed from one of the windows, whereupon the firing ceased
and the policemen rushed into the building. Once in the building they
fired their revolvers upon the persons present indiscriminately and
with terrible effect. The persons who succeeded in escaping from the
building were also fired on by the police and by citizens, and many
were killed or wounded. Nearly two hundred persons were killed or
injured, mostly negroes, but some whites, and among them some members
of the proposed convention. There were no United States troops in the
city at the hour of the riot, their barracks being outside. General
Baird had ordered four companies to take position near the place of the
{98} convention, but owing to the fact that he had got the impression
that the convention would assemble at 6 P.M., he had ordered them to
repair to the assigned position at 5 P.M. They, consequently, did not
arrive until the riot was over and the convention was dispersed.
Each party considered the other the aggressor. The Republicans of the
North viewed the massacre as a new rebellion, while the amnestied
Southerners considered the riot the result of a justified resistance to
an attempt to force negro suffrage and then negro rule upon them. It is
very nearly certain that the first shot was fired by a negro, but this
would not justify the wholesale massacre executed by the police. It
could, therefore, be held by the Republicans with a great show of truth
that the public authorities of the reconstructed "State" government of
Louisiana not only would not extend the equal protection of the laws to
all persons, but would themselves deprive persons even of life without
due process of law.
[Sidenote: The issue of Reconstruction in the campaign of 1866.]
The issue of the campaign of 1866 was thus made up. It was simply
whether Congress should reconstruct the President's reconstructed
"States," or rather should pronounce the President's Reconstruction,
and the Reconstruction effected by the amnestied Southerners, null and
void, and proceed to do the work _de novo_, with the purpose of
creating adequate guarantee for life and property and for the equal
protection of the laws to all.
Although it was not a Presidential year, the election of the members of
the House of Representatives with such a problem to deal with, and the
election of "State" legislatures which would consider the question of
adopting the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, made
the canvass of 1866 a truly national {99} one. Four National
Conventions were held during the summer and early autumn, two of each
party.
[Sidenote: The National Conventions of the summer of 1866.]
The Administration party led off with their great meeting in
Philadelphia on the 14th of August. There were a few prominent
Republicans among the delegates, such as Montgomery Blair, Raymond,
Dix, Cowan, Doolittle and Browning, but the vast majority of them were
Democrats. All of the Southern delegates were such. The larger number
of the Northern Democrats were conservative men of the stamp and style
of R. C. Winthrop, W. B. Lawrence, S. J. Tilden, J. P. Stockton, J. E.
English and Reverdy Johnson, but there were also present men of more
radical anti-national creed, like Fernando Wood, J. G. Sinclair, and
James Campbell. Even Clement L. Vallandigham, presented himself as a
delegate. There were many, however, who objected to his presence and he
withdrew. The doctrines put forward at this meeting were simply those
of the President's Reconstruction policy, the doctrines that the
"States" in our Federal system are indestructible and immaculate, and
under submission to national authority always possessed of the rights
of local self-government and of representation in the National
Government. These doctrines were developed into such extreme forms of
statement, and such extreme results were boldly accepted as their
logical consequences, that the cause of the Administration was damaged
rather than helped at the North by the work and experiences of the
convention.
Inasmuch as there had been a great display of harmony between the
leading men of the South and the Northern delegates in the convention
of the 14th of August, making it appear that the Democrats were the
party of peace and reunion, while the Republicans were {100} in favor
of a continuation of the hostile status, the Southern Republicans, or
as they called themselves the loyal Union men of the South, assembled
in considerable numbers in Philadelphia on the 3d of September, for the
purpose of conferring with the leading Republicans of the North in
regard to the condition of things in the South. Such men as John Minor
Botts, William G. Brownlow, George W. Paschal, Thomas J. Durant, M. J.
Safford, Thomas H. Benton, Lewis M. Kenzie, G. W. Ashburn, and many
more of almost equal reputation came to counsel with the leaders of the
Republican party. Many of the most important of these were there,
Trumbull, Greeley, Morton, Chandler, Schenck, Schurz, Matthews, Curtin,
Cameron, Gerry, Speed, the ex-Attorney-General, and Creswell. These are
only a few names of the eminent men who were present.
The delegates separated into two bodies, one body comprehending the
representatives from the South, and the other those from the North.
This was done in order to leave the Southerners free from undue
Northern influence. Mr. Speed presided over the Southern assembly, and
in his opening words declared the purpose of the convention to be to
determine and proclaim whether the assertion of the late Confederates
that their constitutional rights were being denied them in not
admitting their Representatives- and Senators-elect to seats in
Congress was true, or whether, on the other hand, the claim of the
emancipated that their civil and natural rights were being denied them
was true. He soon left no doubt upon the minds of his hearers as to his
own view and belief, and he denounced the President's reconstruction
work, both in principle and results, most roundly. On account of the
intimate relation in which he had stood to the President as his legal
adviser, and on {101} account of the fact that he was a citizen of one
of the old slave-holding "States," his words had tremendous effect in
steeling the purpose of the Republicans of the North.
Under the inspiration of Mr. Speed's speech, the Southern convention
framed and fulminated an address which arraigned the President as
almost a traitor to his party and the Union, and as a friend of rebels
and of sympathizers with rebels, described the results of his
Reconstruction policy and acts as most deplorable, and urged the speedy
adoption of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution as
the only possible cure for the evils which were afflicting the country.
This address made up the issues of the campaign. The dividing line of
the parties now separated those who favored the adoption of the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment from those who did not. The issue was
simple, and the vote upon it was decisive, as we shall see.
The Administration party now attempted to divide the late soldiers, as
it had attempted to divide the Republicans, with but little better
effect. They got together a convention of the veterans at Cleveland,
Ohio, on the 17th of September, and had the venerable General Wool
preside over it. There were many good men and true present, among them
Gordon Granger, Rousseau, Custer, McClernand, and Thomas Ewing; and
they accused the Republicans of attempting to stir up another civil war
over the question of negro suffrage, and urged their old comrades to
insist that the status of peace, and all the consequences thereof,
existed and must be preserved.
This movement was met on the other side by the assembly of a Republican
soldier convention at Pittsburg on the 25th and 26th of September, for
the purpose of upholding Congress in its fight with the Administration
over the question of Reconstruction. The convention {102} was presided
over by General J. D. Cox, and a host of the most capable officers of
the armies of the Union, lately disbanded, participated in its
deliberations and resolves. They denounced the President's
Reconstruction policy, pronounced their adherence to Congress, and
declared for the adoption of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment as the
indispensable measure for the re-establishment of peace, justice and
union.
[Sidenote: The canvass of 1866.]
During the summer and autumn the orators and politicians of both
parties pursued the canvass upon the basis of the doctrines put forth
by the conventions. A very large number, an unusually large number, of
the leading men of the country, took part in the great debate. Even the
President of the United States took part in it.
[Sidenote: The "swing around the circle."]
On the 28th of August he started from Washington to go to Chicago to be
present at the laying of the corner-stone of the Douglas monument. He
took with him General Grant, Admiral Farragut, three of his Cabinet
officers, Seward, Randall and Welles, and a large number of lesser
lights. Crowds gathered at all the principal stopping-places, and the
President spoke to them in defence of his policy of Reconstruction and
of his acts in the execution of it. He denounced his enemies and
opponents bitterly, and descended to undignified and even vulgar
altercation with individuals in the crowds. In his speech at St. Louis,
on September 28th, his hot temper betrayed him into an attempt to throw
upon Congress, the radical Congress, as he called it, the blame for the
New Orleans riot, and he went to the imprudent extreme of almost making
an excuse or a quasi-excuse for the riot. The whole performance of the
President upon the journey was termed "swinging around the circle," and
it both degraded the great office and its {103} incumbent, and injured
the prospects of the Administration party in the campaign.
[Sidenote: The President's final proclamation declaring the Civil War
ended.]
[Sidenote: The October elections.]
[Sidenote: The Republican triumph in the elections of 1866.]
The President had on the 20th day of August, a week before setting out
upon his tour, finally proclaimed the insurrection and Civil War at an
end in every part of the country. He had, on the 2d day of April
preceding, declared the insurrection at an end everywhere except in
Texas, and the proclamation of August 20th gave official witness to its
cessation in Texas. It is certainly a prerogative of the President to
proclaim the cessation of opposition to his execution of the laws of
the Union, and then to execute the same thereafter through civil,
instead of military, officers. If the President had meant no more than
this by his proclamations of the termination of the insurrection, the
position would have been unassailable. But he evidently intended his
proclamations as furnishing a basis for his Reconstruction work, or at
any rate as furnishing a great reason for the general recognition of
the validity of that work. This we can easily gather from the speeches
he made as he "swung around the circle" in the campaign of 1866. He
felt that he had solid ground under his feet, and did not appreciate
the fact that he was resting one of his doctrines upon another, the
latter being no more self-evident than the former. He felt quite sure
of victory, until what were called the "October States," at that time,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Iowa, held their elections. The two
"September States," Vermont and Maine, had largely increased their
Republican majorities, which the President had probably expected and
allowed for, but when the four "October States" gave only twelve seats
in the House of Representatives to the Democrats and nearly fifty to
the Republicans, it was pretty clearly revealed {104} that the
Administration was on the eve of a terrible defeat. It was as
overwhelming as these figures indicated. The final results showed that
the Republicans had elected one hundred and forty-three of their
candidates to seats in the House of Representatives, while the
Democrats had succeeded in securing only forty-nine seats. With the
exception of Delaware, Maryland and Kentucky, all the "States"
represented in Congress had given the Republican party strong
majorities. The strength of the Democratic party was again in the
South, where the Democratic candidates for any kind of office had
almost universally succeeded. In the Senate the Republicans constituted
more than a two-thirds majority of the members, and with their almost
three-fourths majority in the House, there could be no question that,
in a contest between the President and Congress, the former would be
obliged to yield.
[Sidenote: The President's Message of December 3d, 1866.]
Notwithstanding all this, however, the President, in his Message to
Congress of December 3d, returned to the contest. He reargued his case
from every point of view, and with both moderation and great force. He
restated what had been done toward Reconstruction, declaring that peace
had been restored everywhere, that all the laws of the United States
and all the machinery of the United States Government were in unimpeded
operation everywhere throughout the length and breadth of the land, and
that loyal "State" governments had been restored everywhere, and lacked
but one thing of completion, viz., the admission of Representatives and
Senators from ten of the eleven "States" in which secession ordinances
had been passed to seats in Congress. He contended that all the
departments of the United States Government had proceeded upon the view
that the "States" were indestructible--the Congress, in the {105}
declaration, at the outset, that the war was not to be waged in any
spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation,
nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or
established institutions of the "States" which were the scene of
rebellion, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution
and all laws made in pursuance thereof, and to preserve the Union, with
all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired,
and in many other acts and resolutions; the Judiciary, in all
proceedings affecting the reconstruction communities as "States"; and
the Executive, in the entire plan of Reconstruction created by Mr.
Lincoln and followed out by himself. He further contended that in
recognizing these "States" as restored to their former relations,
Congress was not running any risk of having disloyal men thrust into
the legislative chambers of the nation, because each House of Congress
could reject members-elect on account of disloyalty, and could continue
to reject until the constituencies should send up such persons as the
House could approve, and could expel any member whose conduct should
reveal disloyalty. He therefore urged Congress to acknowledge the
Reconstruction of the "States" lately in rebellion, in principle, and
to apply the powers of the two Houses in regard to the elections,
returns and qualifications of their respective members to the
individual persons elected to seats.
[Sidenote: Ineffectiveness of the President's argument.]
[Sidenote: Rejection of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment by the
legislatures of the Reconstructed "States."]
[Sidenote: The effect of this on the temper of the North.]
The President's argument fell, however, upon deaf ears. This was, it is
true, the second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, and was not,
therefore, composed of the persons just elected; but the influence of
the recent elections over its members had been to cow the
conservatives, strengthen the radicals, and cause the wavering to
incline to the side of the extremists. They took the {106} verdict of
the people to be that Congress should ignore the President's work in
Reconstruction, develop a plan of its own, put it into operation, and
base it upon a newly constructed electorate in the South, in which the
lately emancipated should participate. The attitude of the legislatures
of the President's reconstructed "States" in regard to the proposed
Fourteenth Amendment also strengthened them greatly in this view and
purpose. Before the first day of January, 1867, all of these except
three had rejected it by overwhelming votes, and these three followed
the same course a little later. It was said and believed in Washington
that they had rejected the proposed Amendment contemptuously, and under
the advice of the President of the United States. It was the angry
rejection of the proposed Amendment which did more than anything and
everything else to convince the people of the North that Reconstruction
must be now undertaken by Congress, and must proceed upon the basis of
a new electorate at the South which Congress should create.
{107}