It thus appears that the text 'when all desires which once entered his
heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains
Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7), does not mean such immortality as would
imply complete destruction of the state of bondage.
11. And to that very (subtle body) (there belongs) the warmth, this only
being reasonable.
It is observed that when a man is about to die there is some warmth left
in some part or parts of the gross body. Now this warmth cannot really
belong to the gross body, for it is not observed in other parts of that
body (while yet there is no reason why it should be limited to some
part); but it may reasonably be attributed to the subtle body which may
abide in some part of the gross body (and into which the warmth of the
entire gross body has withdrawn itself). We therefore conclude that this
partial perception of warmth is due to the departing subtle body. This
confirms the view laid down in Sûtra 7.--The next Sûtra disposes of a
further doubt raised as to the departure of the soul of him who knows.
12. If it be said that on account of the denial (it is not so); we deny
this. From the embodied soul; for (that one is) clear, according to some.
The contention that the soul of him who knows departs from the body in
the same way as other souls do cannot be upheld, since Scripture
expressly negatives such departure. For Bri. Up. IV, 4, at first
describes the mode of departure on the part of him who does not possess
true knowledge ('He taking to himself those elements of light descends
into the heart' up to 'after him thus departing the Prâna departs');
then refers to his assuming another body ('he makes to himself another,
newer and more beautiful shape'); then concludes the account of him who
does not possess true knowledge ('having attained the end of these works
whatever he does here, he again returns from that world to this world of
action. So much for the man who desires'); and thereupon proceeds
explicitly to deny the departure from the body of him who possesses true
knowledge, 'But he who does not desire, who is without desire, free from
desire, who has obtained his desire, who desires the Self only, of him
(tasya) the prânas do not pass forth,--being Brahman only he goes into
Brahman.' Similarly a previous section also, viz. the one containing the
questions put by Årtabhâga, directly negatives the view of the soul of
him who knows passing out of the body. There the clause 'he again
conquers death' introduces him who knows as the subject-matter, and
after that the text continues: 'Yâjñavalkya, he said, when that person
dies, do the prânas pass out of him (asmât) or not?--No, said
Yâjñavalkya, they are gathered up in him (atraiva), he swells, inflated
the dead lies' (Bri. Up. III, 2, 10-11). From these texts it follows
that he who knows attains to immortality _here_ (without his soul
passing out of the body and moving to another place).--This view the
Sûtra rejects. 'Not so; from the embodied soul.' What those texts deny
is the moving away of the prânas from the embodied individual soul, not
from the body. 'Of him (tasya) the prânas do not pass forth'--here the
'of him' refers to the subject under discussion, i.e. the embodied soul
which is introduced by the clause 'he who does not desire,' not to the
body which the text had not previously mentioned. The sixth case (tasya)
here denotes the embodied soul as that which is connected with the
prânas ('the prânas belonging to that, i.e. the soul, do not pass out'),
not as that from which the passing out takes its start.--But why should
the 'tasya' not denote the body as the point of starting ('the prânas
do not pass forth from that (tasya), viz. the body')?--Because, we reply,
the soul which is actually mentioned in its relation of connexion with
the prânas (as indicated by tasya) suggests itself to the mind more
immediately than the body which is not mentioned at all; if therefore
the question arises as to the starting-point of the passing forth of the
prânas the soul is (on the basis of the text) apprehended as that
starting-point also (i.e. the clause 'the prânas of him do not pass
forth' implies at the same time 'the prânas do not pass forth from him,
i.e. from the soul'). Moreover, as the prânas are well known to be
connected with the soul and as hence it would serve no purpose to state
that connexion, we conclude that the sixth case which expresses
connexion in general is here meant to denote the starting-point in
particular. And no dispute on this point is really possible; since
'according to some' it is 'clear' that what the text means to express is
the embodied soul as the starting-point of the prânas. The _some_ are
the Mâdhyandinas, who in their text of the Brihad-âranyaka read 'na
tasmât prâna utkrâmanti'--'the prânas do not pass forth _from _him' (the
'tasya' thus being the reading of the Kânva Sâkhâ only).--But, an
objection is raised, there is no motive for explicitly negativing the
passing away of the prânas from the soul; for there is no reason to
assume that there should be such a passing away (and the general rule is
that a denial is made of that only for which there is a presumption).--
Not so, we reply. The Chândogya-text 'For him there is delay only as
long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be united'
declares that the soul becomes united with Brahman at the time of its
separation from the body, and this suggests the idea of the soul of him
who knows separating itself at that very time (i.e. the time of death)
from the prânas also. But this would mean that the soul cannot reach
union with Brahman by means of proceeding on the path of the gods, and
for this reason the Brihad-âranyaka ('of him the prânas do not pass
forth') explicitly declares that the prânas do not depart from the soul
of him who knows, before that soul proceeding on the path of the gods
attains to union with Brahman.
The same line of refutation would have to be applied to the arguments
founded by our opponent on the question of Ârtabhâga, if that question
be viewed as referring to him who possesses true knowledge. The fact
however is that that passage refers to him who does _not_ possess that
knowledge; for none of the questions and answers of which the section
consists favours the presumption of the knowledge of Brahman being under
discussion. The matters touched upon in those questions and answers are
the nature of the senses and sense objects viewed as graha and atigraha;
water being the food of fire; the non-separation of the prânas from the
soul at the time of death; the continuance of the fame--there called
_name_--of the dead man; and the attainment, on the part of the soul of
the departed, to conditions of existence corresponding to his good or
evil deeds. The passage immediately preceding the one referring to the
non-departure of the prânas merely means that death is conquered in so
far as it is a fire and fire is the food of water; this has nothing to
do with the owner of true knowledge. The statement that the prânas of
the ordinary man who does not possess true knowledge do not depart means
that at the time of death the prânas do not, like the gross body,
abandon the jîva, but cling to it like the subtle body and accompany it.