2. And on account of an inferential mark.

Inferential mark here means Smriti. Smriti also declares that that

knowledge which effects Release is of the nature of continued

representation. Meditation therefore has to be repeated.--Here

terminates the adhikarana of 'repetition.'

3. But as the Self; this (the ancient Devotees) acknowledge (since the

texts) make (them) apprehend (in that way).

The following point is now taken into consideration. Is Brahman to be

meditated upon as something different from the meditating Devotee, or as

the Self of the latter?--The Pûrvapakshin holds the former view. For, he

says, the individual soul is something different from Brahman; as has

been proved under II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8; I, 1, 15. And Brahman must be

meditated upon as it truly is; for if it is meditated upon under an

unreal aspect, the attaining to Brahman also will not be real, according

to the principle expressed in the text, 'According as a man's thought is

in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up.

III, 14, 1). This view the Sûtra sets aside. Brahman is rather to be

meditated upon as being the Self of the meditating Devotee. As the

meditating individual soul is the Self of its own body, so the highest

Brahman is the Self of the individual soul--this is the proper form of

meditation.--Why? Because the great Devotees of olden times acknowledged

this to be the true nature of meditation; compare the text 'Then I am

indeed thou, holy divinity, and thou art me.'--But how can the Devotees

claim that Brahman which is a different being is their 'Ego'?--Because

the texts enable them to apprehend this relation as one free from

contradiction. 'He who dwelling within the Self is different from the

Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who

rules the Self from within; he is thy Self, the inner ruler, the

immortal one'(Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); 'In the True all these beings have

their root, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True;--in that all

that exists has its Self' (Kh. Up. VI, 8); 'All this indeed is Brahman'

(Kh. Up. III, 14, 1)--all these texts teach that all sentient and non-

sentient beings spring from Brahman, are merged in him, breathe through

him, are ruled by him, constitute his body; so that he is the Self of

all of them. In the same way therefore as, on the basis of the fact that

the individual soul occupies with regard to the body the position of a

Self, we form such judgments of co-ordination as 'I am a god--I am a

man'; the fact of the individual Self being of the nature of Self

justifies us in viewing our own Ego as belonging to the highest Self. On

the presupposition of all ideas being finally based on Brahman and hence

all words also finally denoting Brahman, the texts therefore make such

statements of mutual implication as 'I am thou, O holy divinity, and

thou art me.' On this view of the relation of individual soul and

highest Self there is no real contradiction between two, apparently

contradictory, sets of texts, viz. those on the one hand which negative

the view of the soul being different from the highest Self, 'Now if a

man meditates upon another divinity, thinking "the divinity is one and I

another," he does not know'; 'He is incomplete, let him meditate upon

Him as the Self'; 'Everything abandons him who views anything apart from

the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10; 7-II, 4, 6); and on the other hand those

texts which set forth the view of the soul and the highest Self being

different entities, 'Thinking of the (individual) Self and the Mover as

different'(Svet. Up. I, 6). For our view implies a denial of difference

in so far as the individual 'I' is of the nature of the Self; and it

implies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it allows the

highest Self to differ from the individual soul in the same way as the

latter differs from its body. The clause 'he is incomplete' (in one of

the texts quoted above) refers to the fact that Brahman which is

different from the soul constitutes the Self of the soul, while the soul

constitutes the body of Brahman.--It thus remains a settled conclusion

that Brahman is to be meditated upon as constituting the Self of the

meditating Devotee.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'meditation under

the aspect of Self.'

4. Not in the symbol; for (the symbol) is not that one (i.e. the Self of

the Devotee).

'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1); 'He who

meditates on name as Brahman' (Ch. Up. VII, 15)--with regard to these

and similar meditations on outward symbols (pratîka) of Brahman there

arises a doubt, viz. whether in them the symbols are to be thought of as

of the nature of Self or not. The Pûrvapakshin holds the former view.

For, he says, in form those injunctions do not differ from other

injunctions of meditation on Brahman, and Brahman, as we have seen,

constitutes the Self of the meditating Devotee.--This view the Sûtra

sets aside. A pratîka cannot be meditated on as being of the nature of

Self; for the pratîka is not the Self of the meditating Devotee. What,

in those meditations, is to be meditated upon is the pratîka only, not

Brahman: the latter enters into the meditation only as qualifying its

aspect. For by a meditation on a pratîka we understand a meditation in

which something that is not Brahman is viewed under the aspect of

Brahman, and as the pratîka--the object of meditation--is not the Self

of the Devotee it cannot be viewed under that form.--But an objection is

raised here also, it is Brahman which is the real object of meditation;

for where Brahman _may_ be viewed as the object of meditation, it is

inappropriate to assume as objects non-sentient things of small power

such as the mind, and so on. The object of meditation therefore is

Brahman viewed under the aspect of mind, and so on.--This objection the

next Sûtra disposes of.

The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48 · 第 297 / 339 题