Smriti also declares that men not belonging to an âsrama grow in
knowledge through prayer and the like. 'Through prayer also a Brâhmana
may become perfect. May he perform other works or not, one who befriends
all creatures is called a Brâhmana' (Manu Smri. II, 17).
38. And there is the promotion (of knowledge) through special acts (of
duty).
The above conclusion is founded not only on Reasoning and Smriti; but
Scripture even directly states that knowledge is benefited by practices
not exclusively prescribed for the âsramas, 'By penance, abstinence,
faith, and knowledge he is to seek the Self (Pr. Up. I, 10).
39. But better than that is the other also on account of an inferential
mark.
Better than to be outside the âsramas is the condition of standing
within an âsrama. The latter state may be due to misfortune; but he who
can should be within an âsrama, which state is the more holy and
beneficial one. This follows from inference only, i.e. Smriti; for
Smriti says, 'A Brâhmana is to remain outside the âsramas not even for
one day.' For one who has passed beyond the stage of Brahmakarya, or
whose wife has died, the impossibility to procure a wife constitutes the
misfortune (which prevents him from belonging to an âsrama).--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'widowers.'
40. But of him who has become that there is no becoming not that,
according to Jaimini also, on account of (Scripture) restraining from
the absence of the forms of that.
The doubt here arises whether those also who have fallen from the state
of life of a Naishthika, Vaikhânasa or Pârivrâjaka are qualified for the
knowledge of Brahman or not.--They are so, since in their case, no less
than in that of widowers and the like, the growth of knowledge may be
assisted by charity and other practices not confined to âsramas.--This
primâ facie view the Sûtra sets aside. 'He who has become that,' i.e. he
who has entered on the condition of a Naishthika or the like 'cannot
become not that,' i.e. may not live in a non-âsrama condition; since
scriptural texts restrain men who once have entered the Naishthika, &c.,
state 'from the absence of the forms of that,' i.e. from the
discontinuance of the special duties of their âsrama. Compare texts such
as 'He is to go into the forest, and is not to return from thence';
'Having renounced the world he is not to return.' And hence persons who
have lapsed from their âsrama are not qualified for meditation on
Brahman. This view of his the Sûtrakâra strengthens by a reference to
the opinion of Jaimini.--But cannot a Naishthika who, through some sin,
has lapsed from his duties and position, make up for his transgression
by some expiatory act and thus again become fit for meditation on
Brahman?--To this point the next Sûtra refers.
41. Nor the (expiatory performance) described in the chapter treating of
qualification; that being impossible on account of the Smriti referring
to such lapse.
Those expiatory performances which are described in the chapter treating
of qualification (Pû. Mî. Sû. VI) are not possible in the case of him
who has lapsed from the condition of a Naishthika; since such expiations
do not apply to him, as is shown by a Smriti text referring to such
lapse, viz. 'He who having once entered on the duties of a Naishthika
lapses from them, for such a slayer of the Self I do not see any
expiatory work by which he might become clean.' The expiatory ceremony
referred to in the Pûrva Mimâmsâ therefore applies to the case of other
Brahmakârins only.
42. A minor one, thus some; (and hence they hold) the existence (of
expiation), as in the case of eating. This has been explained.
Some teachers are of opinion that even on the part of Naishthikas and
the rest the lapse from chastity constitutes only a minor offence which
can be atoned for by expiatory observances; in the same way as in the
case of the eating of forbidden food the same prâyaskitta may be used by
the ordinary Brahmakârin and by Naishthikas and the rest. This has been
stated by the Smriti writer, 'For the others also (i.e. the Naishthikas
and so on) the same (rules and practices as those for the Upakurvâna)
hold good, in so far as not opposed to their âsrama.'
43. But in either case (such men) stand outside; on account of Smriti
and custom.
Whether the point under discussion constitutes a minor or a major
offence, in any case those who have lapsed stand outside the category of
those qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. For Smriti, i.e. the text
quoted above, 'I see no expiatory performance by which he, a slayer of
Brahman as he is, could become pure again,' declares that expiations are
powerless to restore purity. And custom confirms the same conclusion;
for good men shun those Naishthikas who have lapsed, even after they
have performed prâyaskittas, and do not impart to them the knowledge of
Brahman, The conclusion, therefore, is that such men are not qualified
for knowing Brahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'him who has
become that.'
44. By the Lord (of the sacrifice), since Scripture declares a fruit--
thus Âtreya thinks.
A doubt arises whether the meditations on such constituent elements of
the sacrifice as the Udgîtha, and so on, are to be performed by the
sacrificer (for whose benefit the sacrifice is offered), or by the
officiating priests. Âtreya advocates the former view; on the ground of
Scripture showing that in the case of such meditations as the one on the
small ether within the heart, fruit and meditation belong to the same
person, and that in the case of such meditations as the one on the
Udgîtha the fruit belongs to the sacrificer (whence we conclude that the
meditation also is his). Nor can it be said that the sacrificer is not
competent for such meditation, for the reason that like the godohana
vessel it is connected with an element of the sacrifice (which latter
the priests only can perform). For the godohana vessel serves to bring
water, and this of course none else can do but the Adhvaryu; while a
meditation on the Udgîtha as being the essence of all essences can very
well be performed by the Sacrificer--true though it be that the Udgîtha
itself can be performed by the Udgâtri priest only.--Against this view
the next Sûtra declares itself.
45. (They are) the priest's work, Audulomi thinks; since for that he is
engaged.
The teacher Audulomi is of opinion that the meditation on the Udgîtha
and the like is the work of the priest, since it is he who is engaged
for the purpose of performing that which gives rise to the fruit, i.e.
of the entire sacrifice with all its subordinate parts. Injunctions
referring to the performance of the sacrifices such as 'he chooses the
priests; he gives to the priests their fee' indicate that the entire
sacrificial performance is the work of the priests, and that hence all
activities comprised within it--mental as well as bodily--belong to the
priests. Capability or non-capability does not constitute the criterion
in this case. For although the meditations in question aim directly at
the benefit of man (not at the greater perfection of the sacrifice), yet
since they fall within the sphere of qualification of those who are
qualified for the sacrifice, and since the sacrifice with all its
subordinate elements has to be performed by the priests, and since the
text 'whatever he does with knowledge that becomes more vigorous'
declares knowledge to belong to the same agent as the works which are
benefited by such knowledge, we conclude that those meditations also are
the exclusive duty of the priests. In the case of the meditations on the
small ether, &c., on the other hand, the text says nothing as to their
having to be performed by priests, and we therefore assume in accordance
with the general principle that 'the fruit belongs to the performer,'
that the agent there is the person to whom Scripture assigns the fruit.--
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the lord (of the sacrifice).'
46. There is injunction of other auxiliary means for him who is such, as
in the case of injunction and so on; (the term _mauna_ denoting)
according to an alternative meaning a third something.
'Therefore let a Brâhmana after he has done with learning wish to stand
by a childlike state; and after having done with the childlike state and
learning (he is) a Muni' (Bri. Up. III, 5). A doubt arises whether this
text enjoins Muni-hood in the same way as it enjoins learning and the
childlike state, or merely refers to it as something already established.--
The Purvapakshin holds the latter view on the ground that as 'Muni-hood'
and 'learning' both connote knowledge, the word 'Muni' merely refers
back to the knowledge already enjoined in the phrase 'after he has done
with learning.' For the text presents no word of injunctive force with
regard to Muni-hood.--This view the Sûtra controverts. 'For him who is
such,' i.e. for those who possess knowledge, 'there is an injunction of
a different co-operative factor' 'in the same way as injunctions and
the rest.' By the _injunctions_ in the last clause we have to understand
the special duties of the different âsramas, i.e. sacrifices and the
like, and also such qualifications as quietness of mind and the like;
and by the 'and the rest' is meant the learning of and pondering on the
sacred texts. Stated at length, the meaning of the Sûtra then is as
follows--in the same way as texts such as 'him Brâhmanas seek to know
through the reciting of the Veda, through sacrifices and charity, and so
on,' and 'Quiet, subdued,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23) enjoin sacrifices
and so on, and quietness of mind and the like, as helpful towards
knowledge; and as texts such as 'the Self is to be heard, to be pondered
upon' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) mention hearing and pondering as helpful
towards knowledge; thus the text under discussion enjoins learning, a
childlike state of mind, and Muni-hood as three further different
auxiliaries of knowledge.--'Muni-hood' does _not_ denote the same thing
as 'learning'--this the Sûtra intimates by the clause 'alternatively a
third,' i.e. as the word muni is observed alternatively to denote
persons such as Vyâsa distinguished by their power of profound
reflection (manana), the abstract term munihood denotes a third thing
different from _learning_ and the 'childlike state.' Hence, although the
phrase 'then a Muni' does not contain a word of directly injunctive
power, we must all the same understand it in an injunctive sense, viz.
'then let him be or become a Muni'; for Muni-hood is not something
previously established. Such munihood is also something different from
mere _reflection_ (manana); it is the reiterated representation before
the mind of the object of meditation, the idea of that object thus
becoming more and more vivid. The meaning of the entire text therefore
is as follows. A Brâhmana is at first fully to master knowledge, i.e. he
is to attain, by means of hearing and pondering, to the knowledge of
Brahman in all its fulness and perfection. This is to be effected
through the growth of purity of mind and heart, due to the grace of the
Lord; for this Smriti declares, 'Neither by the Vedas nor by austerities,
and so on, can I be so seen--; but by devotion exclusive I may be known'
(Bha. Gî. XI, 53-54); and Scripture also says, 'Who has the highest
devotion for God' (Svet. Up. VI, 23), and 'That Self cannot be gained by
the study of the Veda,' &c. 'He whom the Self chooses by him the Self is
to be attained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23). After that 'he is to stand by a
childlike state'; what this means will be explained further on. And
after that he is to be a Muni, i.e. he is to fix his thoughts so
exclusively and persistently on Brahman as to attain to the mode of
knowledge called meditation. Having by the employment of these three
means reached true knowledge he--the text goes on to say--having done
with amauna and mauna is a Brâhmana. Amauna, i.e. non-mauna, denotes all
the auxiliaries of knowledge different from mauna: employing these and
mauna as well he reaches the highest goal of knowledge. And, the text
further says, there is no other means but those stated whereby to become
such, i.e. a true Brâhmana. The entire text thus evidently means to
enjoin on any one standing within any âsrama learning, a childlike state,
and mauna as auxiliary means of knowledge, in addition to sacrifices and
the other special duties of the âsramas.--But, an objection is raised,
if knowledge, aided by pânditya, and so on, and thus being auxiliary to
the action of the special duties of the âsramas, is thus declared to be
the means of attaining to Brahman; how then are we to understand the
Chândogya's declaring that a man, in order to attain to Brahman, is
throughout his life to carry on the duties of a householder [FOOTNOTE 711:
1]?--To this the next Sûtra replies.
[FOOTNOTE 711:1. Ch. Up. VIII, 13.]
47. But on account of the existence (of knowledge) in all, there is
winding up with the householder.
As knowledge belongs to the members of all âsramas it belongs to the
householder also, and for this reason the Upanishad winds up with the
latter. This winding up therefore is meant to illustrate the duties (not
of the householder only, but) of the members of all âsramas. Analogously
in the text under discussion (Bri. Up. III, 5) the clause 'A Brâhmana
having risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, and the
desire for worlds, wanders about as a mendicant,' intimates duties
belonging exclusively to the condition of the wandering beggar, and then
the subsequent clause 'therefore let a Brâhmana having done with
learning,' &c., enjoins pânditya, bâlya, and mauna (not as incumbent on
the pârivrâjaka only, but) as illustrating the duties of all âsramas.--
This the next Sûtra explicitly declares.
48. On account of the others also being taught, in the same way as the
condition of the Muni.
The injunction, on him who has passed beyond all desire, of mauna
preceded by pârivrâjya (wandering about as a mendicant), is meant to
illustrate the duties of all âsramas. For the duties of the other
âsramas are taught by Scripture no less than those of the Muni (and the
householder). Similarly it was shown above that in the text 'There are
three branches of sacred duty--he who is founded on Brahman goes to
immortality,' the term 'founded on Brahman' applies equally to members
of all âsramas.--It therefore remains a settled conclusion that the
text under discussion enjoins pânditya, bâlya, and mauna as being
auxiliaries to knowledge in the same way as the other duties of the
âsramas, such as sacrifices and the rest.--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'the injunction of other auxiliaries.'