That the texts under discussion have an injunctive purport also follows
from the fact that they contain verbal forms denoting becoming or
origination--'he is to meditate' and the like; for all such forms have
injunctive force. All these texts therefore are meant to enjoin special
forms of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of mere
glorification.'
23. Should it be said that (the stories told in the Upanishads) are for
the purpose of the Pâriplava; not so, since (certain stories) are
specified.
We meet in the Vedânta-texts with certain stories such as 'Pratardana
the son of Divodâsa came to the beloved abode of Indra,' &c., and
similar ones. The question here arises whether the stories are merely
meant to be recited at the Asvamedha sacrifice or to convey knowledge of
a special kind.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains that as the text' they tell
the stories' declares the special connexion of those stories with the so-
called pâriplava performance, they cannot be assumed to be mainly
concerned with knowledge.--This view the Sûtra negatives, on the ground
that not all stories of that kind are specially connected with the
pâriplava. The texts rather single out special stories only as suitable
for that performance; on the general injunction quoted above there
follows an injunction defining _which_ stories are to be told, 'King
Manu, the son of Vivasvat,' &c. The stories told in the Vedânta-texts do
not therefore form parts of the pâriplava performance, but are connected
with injunctions of meditations.
24. This follows also from the textual connexion (of those stories with
injunctions).
That those stories subserve injunctions of meditation is proved thereby
also that they are exhibited in textual connexion with injunctions such
as 'the Self is to be seen,' and so on. Their position therefore is
analogous to that of other stories told in the texts, which somehow
subserve injunctions of works, and are not merely meant for purposes of
recitation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the pâriplava.'
25. For this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire
and so on.
The Sûtras return, from their digression into the discussion of two
special points, to the question as to those whose condition of life
involves chastity. The above Sûtra declares that as persons of that
class are referred to by Scripture as specially concerned with
meditation ('He who is founded on Brahman reaches immortality;' 'those
who in the forest,' &c.), their meditation does not presuppose a
knowledge of the kindling of fire and so on, i.e. a knowledge of the
Agnihotra, the Darsapûrnamâsa, and all those other sacrifices which
require the preliminary establishnlent of the sacred fires, but a
knowledge of those works only which are enjoined for their special
condition of life.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the kindling of
the fire.'
26. And there is need of all (works), on account of the scriptural
statement of sacrifices and the rest; as in the case of the horse.
If knowledge (meditation), without any reference to sacrifices and the
like, is able to bring about immortality, it must be capable of
accomplishing this in the case of householders also; and the mention
made of sacrifices and the rest in texts such as 'Brâhmanas seek to know
him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,
22), does not prove sacrifices and so on to be auxiliary to knowledge,
since the stress there lies (not on the sacrifices and so on, but) on
the desire of knowledge.--Of this view the Sûtra disposes. In the case
of householders, for whom the Agnihotra and so on are obligatory,
knowledge presupposes all those works, since scriptural texts such as
the one quoted directly state that sacrifices and the like are auxiliary
to knowledge. 'They seek to know by means of sacrifices' can be said
only if sacrifices are understood to be a means through which knowledge
is brought about; just as one can say 'he desires to slay with a sword,'
because the sword is admitted to be an instrument wherewith one can kill.
What we have to understand by knowledge in this connexion has been
repeatedly explained, viz. a mental energy different in character from
the mere cognition of the sense of texts, and more specifically denoted
by such terms as dhyâna or upâsana, i.e. meditation; which is of the
nature of remembrance (i.e. representative thought), but in intuitive
clearness is not inferior to the clearest presentative thought
(pratyaksha); which by constant daily practice becomes ever more perfect,
and being duly continued up to death secures final Release. Such
meditation is originated in the mind through the grace of the Supreme
Person, who is pleased and conciliated by the different kinds of acts of
sacrifice and worship duly performed by the Devotee day after day. This
is what the text 'they seek to know through the sacrifice' really means.
The conclusion therefore is that in the case of householders knowledge
has for its pre-requisite all sacrifices and other works of permanent
and occasional obligation. 'As a horse.' As the horse, which is a means
of locomotion for man, requires attendants, grooming, &c., so knowledge,
although itself the means of Release, demands the co-operation of the
different works. Thus the Lord himself says, 'The work of sacrifice,
giving, and austerities is not to be relinquished, but is indeed to be
performed; for sacrifices, gifts, and austerities are purifying to the
thoughtful.' 'He from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is
pervaded-worshipping Him with the proper works man attains to perfection'
(Bha. Gî. XVIII, 5; 46).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the need
of all.'
27. But all the same he must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the
senses, &c., since those are enjoined as auxiliaries to that, and must
necessarily be accomplished.
The question is whether the householder also must practise calmness and
so on, or not. The Pûrvapakshin says he must not, since the performance
of works implies the activity of the outer and inner organs of action,
and since calmness and so on are of an exactly opposite nature.--This
view the Sûtra sets aside. The householder also, although engaged in
outward activity, must, in so far as he possesses knowledge, practise
calmness of mind and the rest also; for these qualities or states are by
Scripture enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge, 'Therefore he who knows
this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected,
should see the Self in Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23). As calmness of mind
and the rest are seen, in so far as implying composure and concentration
of mind, to promote the origination of knowledge, they also must
necessarily be aimed at and practised. Nor can it be said that between
works on the one side and calmness and so on on the other, there is an
absolute antagonism; for the two have different spheres of application.
Activity of the organs of action is the proper thing in the case of
works enjoined; quiescence in the case of works not enjoined and such as
have no definite purpose. Nor also can it be objected that in the case
of works implying the activity of organs, calmness of mind and so on are
impossible, the mind then being necessarily engrossed by the impressions
of the present work and its surroundings; for works enjoined by
Scripture have the power of pleasing the Supreme Person, and hence,
through his grace, to cause the destruction of all mental impressions
obstructive of calmness and concentration of mind. Hence calmness of
mind and the rest are to be aimed at and practised by householders also.--
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'calmness' and so on.
28. And there is permission of all food in the case of danger of life;
on account of this being seen.
In the meditation on prâna, according to the Vâjasaneyins and the
Chândogas, there is a statement as to all food being allowed to him who
knows the prâna. 'By him there is nothing eaten that is not food' (Bri.
Up. VI, 1, 14; and so on). A doubt here arises whether this permission
of all food is valid for him who possesses the knowledge of prâna, in
all circumstances, or only in the case of life being in danger.--The
Pûrvapakshin holds the former view, on account of no special conditions
being stated in the text.--This the Sûtra sets aside 'in the case of
danger to life'; for the reason that, as the text shows, the eating of
food of all kinds is permitted even for those who know Brahman itself--
the knowledge of which of course is higher than that of prâna--only when
their life is in danger. The text alluded to is the one telling how
Ushasta Kâkrâyana, who was well versed in the knowledge of Brahman, once,
when in great distress, ate unlawful food. We therefore conclude that
what the text says as to all food being lawful for him who knows prâna,
can refer only to occasions when food of any kind must be eaten in order
to preserve life.