In the daharavidyâ (Ch. Up. VIII, 1 ff.) the text, 'those who depart
having known here the Self, and those true desires,' declares at first a
meditation on the small ether, i.e. the highest Self, and separately
therefrom a meditation on its qualities, viz. true desires, and so on.
The doubt here arises whether, in the meditation on those qualities, the
meditation on the highest Self--as that to which the qualities belong--
is to be repeated or not.--It is not to be repeated, the Pûrvapakshin
maintains; for the highest Self is just that which is constituted by the
qualities--freedom from all evil, and so on--and as that Self so
constituted can be comprised in one meditation, there is no need of
repeating the meditation on account of the qualities.--This view the
Sûtra sets aside. The meditation has to be repeated. The highest Self
indeed is that being to which alone freedom from evil and the other
qualities belong, and it forms the object of the first meditation; yet
there is a difference between it as viewed in its essential being and as
viewed as possessing those qualities; and moreover, the clause 'free
from evil, from old age,' &c. enjoins a meditation on the Self as
possessing those qualities. It is therefore first to be meditated on in
its essential nature, and then there takes place a repetition of the
meditation on it in order to bring in those special qualities. The case
is analogous to that of 'the offerings.' There is a text 'He is to offer
a purodâsa on eleven potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the supreme
ruler, to Indra the self-ruler.' This injunction refers to one and the
same Indra, possessing the qualities of rulership and so on; but as,
through connexion with those several qualities, the aspects of Indra
differ, the oblation of the purodâsa has to be repeated. This is
declared in the Sânkarshana, 'The divinities are different on account of
separation.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'offerings.'
43. On account of the plurality of indicatory marks; for that (proof) is
stronger. This also is declared (in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ).
The Taittirîyaka contains another daharavidyâ, 'The thousand-headed god,
the all-eyed one,' &c. (Mahânâr. Up. XI). Here the doubt arises whether
this vidyâ, as being one with the previously introduced vidyâ, states
qualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in that vidyâ, or
qualities to be included in the meditations on the highest Self as
enjoined in all the Vedânta-texts.--The former is the case, the
Pûrvapakshin holds, on account of the leading subject-matter. For in the
preceding section (X) the meditation on the small ether is introduced as
the subject-matter. 'There is the small lotus placed in the middle of
the town (of the body), free from all evil, the abode of the Highest;
within that there is a small space, free from sorrow--what is within
that should be meditated upon' (Mahânâr. Up. X, 23). Now, as the lotus
of the heart is mentioned only in section X, the 'Nârâyana-section'
('the heart resembling the bud of a lotus, with its point turned
downwards,' XI, 6), we conclude that that section also is concerned with
the object of meditation to which the daharavidyâ refers.--Against this
view the Sûtra declares itself, 'on account of the majority of
indicatory marks'; i.e. there are in the text several marks proving that
that section is meant to declare characteristics of that which
constitutes the object of meditation in all meditations on the highest
being. For that being which in those meditations is denoted as the
Imperishable, Siva, Sambhu. the highest Brahman, the highest light, the
highest entity, the highest Self, and so on, is here referred to by the
same names, and then declared to be Nârâyana. There are thus several
indications to prove that Nârâyana is none other than that which is the
object of meditation in all meditations on the Highest, viz. Brahman,
which has bliss and the rest for its qualities. By 'linga' (inferential
mark) we here understand clauses (vâkya) which contain a specific
indication; for such clauses have, according to the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ,
greater proving power than leading subject-matter (prakarana). The
argumentation that the clause 'the heart resembling the bud of a lotus
flower,' &c., proves that section to stand in a dependent relation to
the daharavidyâ, is without force; for it being proved by a stronger
argument that the section refers to that which is the object of
meditation in all meditations, the clause mentioned may also be taken as
declaring that in the daharavidyâ also the object of meditation is
Nârâyana. Nor must it be thought that the accusatives with which the
section begins (sahasrasirsham, &c.) are to be connected with the
'meditating' enjoined in the previous section; for the 'meditating' is
there enjoined by a gerundive form ('tasmin yad antas tad upâsitavyam'),
and with this the subsequent accusatives cannot be construed. Moreover,
the subsequent clause ('all this is Nârâyana,' &c., where the nominative
case is used) shows that those accusatives are to be taken in the sense
of nominatives.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the plurality of
indicatory marks.'
44. There is option with regard to what precedes (i.e. the altar made of
bricks) on account of subject-matter, and hence there is action; as in
the case of the mânasa cup.
In the Vâjasaneyaka, in the Agnirahasya chapter, there are references to
certain altars built of mind, 'built of mind, built of speech,' &c. The
doubt here arises whether those structures of mind, and so on, which
metaphorically are called fire-altars, should be considered as being of
the nature of action, on account of their connexion with a performance
which itself is of the nature of action; or merely of the nature of
meditation, as being connected with an activity of the nature of
meditation. The Sûtra maintains the former view. Since those things
'built of mind, and so on,' are, through being _built_ (or _piled _up),
constituted as fire-altars, they demand a performance with which to
connect themselves; and as in immediate proximity to them no performance
is enjoined, and as the general subject-matter of the section is the
fire-altar built of bricks--introduced by means of the clause 'Non-being
this was in the beginning'---which is invariably connected with a
performance of the nature of outward action, viz. a certain sacrificial
performance--we conclude that the altars built of mind, &c., which the
text mentions in connexion with the same subject-matter, are themselves
of the nature of action, and as such can be used as alternatives for the
altar built of bricks. [FOOTNOTE 668:1]. An analogous case is presented
by the so-called _mental_ cup. On the tenth, so-called avivâkya, day of
the Soma sacrifice extending over twelve days, there takes place the
mental offering of a Soma cup, all the rites connected with which are
rehearsed in imagination only; the offering of that cup is thus really
of the nature of thought only, but as it forms an auxiliary element in
an actual outward sacrificial performance it itself assumes the
character of an action.
[FOOTNOTE 668:1. So that for the actual outward construction of a brick
altar there may optionally be substituted the merely mental construction
of an imaginary altar.]