1. What is understood from all the Vedânta-texts (is one), on account of
the non-difference of injunction and the rest.
The Sûtras have stated whatever has to be stated to the end of rousing
the desire of meditation-concluding with the fact that Brahman bestows
rewards. Next the question is introduced whether the vidyâs (i.e. the
different forms of meditation on Brahman which the Vedânta-texts enjoin)
are different or non-different, on the decision of which question it
will depend whether the qualities attributed to Brahman in those vidyâs
are to be comprised in one act of meditation or not.--The first
subordinate question arising here is whether one and the same meditation--
as e.g. the vidyâ of Vaisvânara--which is met with in the text of
several sâkhâs, constitutes one vidyâ or several.--The vidyâs are
separate, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; for the fact that the same matter
is, without difference, imparted for a second time, and moreover stands
under a different heading--both which circumstances necessarily attend
the text's being met with in different sâkhâs--proves the difference of
the two meditations. It is for this reason only that a restrictive
injunction, such as the one conveyed in the text, 'Let a man tell this
science of Brahman to those only who have performed the rite of carrying
fire on their head' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 10)--which restricts the impaiting
of knowledge to the Âtharvanikas, to whom that rite is peculiar--has any
sense; for if the vidyâs were one, then the rite mentioned, which is a
part of the vidyâ, would be valid for the members of other sâkhâs also,
and then the restriction enjoined by the text would have no meaning.--
This view is set aside by the Sûtra, 'What is understood from all the
Vedânta-texts' is one and the same meditation, 'because there is non-
difference of injunction and the rest.' By injunction is meant the
injunction of special activities denoted by different verbal roots--such
as upâsîta 'he should meditate,' vidyât 'he should know.' The and the
rest' of the Sûtra is meant to comprise as additional reasons the
circumstances mentioned in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras (II, 4, 9). Owing to
all these circumstances, non-difference of injunction and the rest, the
same vidyâ is recognised in other sâkhâs also. In the Châandogya (V, 12,
2) as well as in the Vâjasaneyaka we meet with one and the same
injunction (viz. 'He should meditate on Vaisvânara'). The form
(character, rûpa) of the meditations also is the same, for the form of a
cognition solely depends on its object; and the object is in both cases
the same, viz. Vaisvânara. The name of the two vidyâs also is the same,
viz. the knowledge of Vaisvânara. And both vidyâs are declared to have
the same result, viz. attaining to Brahman. All these reasons establish
the identity of vidyâs even in different sâkhâs.--The next Sûtra refers
to the reasons set forth for his view by the Pûrvapakshin and refutes
them.
2. If it be said (that the vidyâs are not one) on account of difference,
we deny this, since even in one (vidyâ there may be repetition).
If it be said that there is no oneness of vidyâ, because the fact of the
same matter being stated again without difference, and being met with in
a different chapter, proves the object of injunction to be different; we
reply that even in one and the same vidyâ some matter may be repeated
without any change, and under a new heading (in a different chapter); if,
namely, there is difference of cognising subjects. Where the cognising
person is one only, repetition of the same matter under a new heading
can only be explained as meaning difference of object enjoined, and
hence separation of the two vidyâs. But where the cognising persons are
different (and this of course is eminently so in the case of different
sâkhâs), the double statement of one and the same matter explains itself
as subserving the cognition of those different persons, and hence does
not imply difference of matter enjoined.--The next Sûtra refutes the
argument founded on a rite enjoined in the Mundaka.
3. For (the sirovrata) concerns the mode of the study of the Veda; also
on account of (that rite) being a heading in the samâkâra; and the
restriction is like that of the libations.
What the text says as to a restriction connected with the 'vow of the
head,' does not intimate a difference of vidyâs. For that vow does not
form part of the vidyâ. The restriction refers only to a peculiarity of
the _study_ of the Veda on the part of the Âtharvanikas, being meant to
establish that they should possess that special qualification which the
rite produces; but it does not affect the vidyâ itself. This is proved
by the subsequent clause, 'a man who has not performed that rite may not
_read_ the text,' which directly connects the rite with the studying of
the text. And it is further proved by the fact that in the book of the
Âtharvanikas, called 'sâmâkara,' that rite is referred to as a rite
connected with the Veda (not with the special vidyâ set forth in the
Mundaka), viz. in the passage, 'this is explained already by the Veda-
observance' (which extends the details of the sirovrata, there called
veda-vrata, to other observances). By the _knowledge of Brahman_
(referred to in the Mundaka-text 'let a man tell this science of Brahman
to those only,' &c.), we have therefore to understand knowledge of the
Veda in general. And that restriction is 'like that of the
libations'--i. e. it is analogous to the restriction under which the
sava-libations, beginning with the Saptasûrya-libation, and terminating
with the Sataudana-libation, are offered in the one fire which is used
by the followers of the Atharvan, and not in the ordinary three fires.